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National Characteristics (Long and Pedantic)


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I know that there have been posts before in the topic of national characteristics, but I couldn’t resist raising the subject again. So like a moth to the bug zapper, here I go.

I argue for national characteristics in CM. I do so not because I think that the soldiers of different nations had certain inherent characteristics. I do not think that this was the case. I do so because I think that doctrine, training, manpower and equipment affected the ways that the armies of different nations fought, and did so in ways that could be reflected in CM.

Take doctrine and training, as I understand them to have existed at the time. Each army used a sufficiently different tactical system to fight differently in the CM system.

German training emphasized things like attacking weakness instead of strength, probing before committing, moving without much regard to flanks, using maneuver offensively to establish defensively strong positions, selecting defensive positions with an eye to maximizing firepower rather than cover and concealment.

Russian training was fairly basic in its treatment of fire and movement, and taught that high casualties in the initial assault were an acceptable price to pay for bringing about low-casualty maneuver warfare. Russian offensive operations were often meticulously rehearsed at the tactical level (sometimes down to the individual soldier) and tended to be rigid operationally.

US training was designed to turn out a reasonably skilled army quickly. Offensive doctrine fell in between the German emphasis on flexibility and the Russian concept of meticulous plans meticulously carried out. The defensive was merely waiting for enough supplies to resume the offensive. American units seemed to rely more on training from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Units published training and tactics, and tactical innovations spread laterally between units.

British training seemed more tactically informed than US training, but from the top down, with an emphasis on “immediate action drills” aimed at enabling platoons to carry out preplanned actions quickly. British artillery doctrine was perhaps the most flexible of all the major combatants, with FOs being ably to call down truly astounding concentrations of firepower.

Look also at equipment and manpower. These factors also controlled tactical doctrine in the ETO.

Both the US and the UK faced crises of manpower, particularly among infantry. By the end of 1944, after 5 years of war, the British Army was a wasting asset (I can’t speak for the Canadian replacement situation). The US had gambled on a “small army” to build up air and naval power, and had greatly underestimated the casualty rates for infantry to boot. While the US Army was able to continue to field new draftee divisions even late in the war, it had to mount an intensive search for replacements to older divisions. Both of these armies (and particularly the US) were blessed, however, with lavish material support. Ammo, guns, vehicles, communications gear and airpower were all relatively plentiful, with temporary shortages experienced only when supply lines were stretched. From the perspective of these armies, ammo, communications and even armored vehicles were all easy to replace, but each life lost was expensive.

While the German Army faced a manpower problem at least as severe as the Western Allies’, it was not in its power to solve it with material. The Heer was ruthless in stripping support units to (or perhaps below) the minimum workable size. It equipped its infantry with progressively more automatic weapons to counteract the shrinking size of squads and platoons. It relied on slave labor in factories to draft workers and send them to the front. But as the war in the ETO progressed, the German army found it harder to get supplies forward, to keep vehicle strengths up, to keep artillery operating in the face of Allied airpower, or to keep units equipped with goodly quantities of communications equipment. The result was an increasing German reliance on infantry, mortars and direct fire support both offensively and defensively.

Sheer raw manpower was not a Russian problem. The Russian problem was to completely rebuild an army on the shattered ruins of 1941. The Russian recovery in 1942-43 is remarkable by any measure, but it (and the general nature of the Soviet industrial plant) left the Russians with equipment imbalances – primarily in communications, but also in the automotive area. The Russian economy was geared to making large heavy metallic things – guns, planes, tanks – but not small electronic things like radios. These critical communications shortages pushed the tactics of mass on them. Without a means to maneuver flexibly, the Soviet Army relied on intricate pre-set planning. Without radio-equipped FOs to direct fire, the Soviets had to use rigid pre-set fire plans and artillery in a direct fire mode.

So what does this mean for national characteristics. I think that the factors outlined above can be reflected in CM through both the AI and the units points costs.

The AI might make German units more likely to start an attack with probes, and more likely to try another route of advance if it met strong resistance to an initial thrust. Defensively, the AI would weigh lines of sight over cover and concealment in selecting positions. The AI would be sparing in its use of armor and artillery, at least until the enemy’s positions were fully developed.

For Americans and British, the AI might be more resistant to abandoning an avenue of attack in the face of opposition, and more likely to dump in armor and artillery support to bull a way through. Units would be more affected by events on their flanks and more inclined to directly assault the enemy rather than try to infiltrate by and occupy dominating positions. On the defense, artillery fires and other support would be rapidly applied. In general, infantry units without armor or artillery support should be more prone to calling things off – and with US units more prone to wait for support than British units. For both countries, units would be fairly comfortable operating at a distance from command elements.

For Russians, the AI might adopt a plan and stick with it until exhaustion. Heavy direct fire support weapons would play a prominent role, and artillery, when available, would tend to be massively but inflexibly applied. Defensively, concealment and cover should be emphasized, and the defense should be tough but relatively immobile. Units would stay close to their commanders.

Points values could also play a role in giving a unique flavor to each nation’s forces. Disclaimer: I have not done an exhaustive analysis of the CM:BL points values, and I of course have no idea of the points values for the upcoming Russian Front effort. What I’m suggesting now is that, in addition to the absolute effectiveness of a unit, that the points system also take into account the relative value of the unit within its own army.

Let’s look first at infantry. A regular 12 man US 44 Rifle Squad costs 34 points, while a Heer 9 man 44 Infantry Squad costs 29. This implies that a US infantryman is worth 2.83 points, while his counterpart is worth 3.22 points. But to the US Army, an infantryman was a scarcer commodity that he was in the German Army. So perhaps US squads should be more expensive on a man for man basis than their German counterparts.

Artillery provides another example. A regular US 105mm FO with 100 rounds costs 215 points: 2.15 points per round. His German counterpart with 60 rounds costs 113 points, or 1.88 points per round. This implies a relationship inverse to history. In the ETO, US radios, artillery rounds and artillery tubes were more plentiful and so arguably “cheaper” that their German counterparts.

What I am proposing is a tricky bit of balancing – a points system that pushed players to assemble forces with historical force characteristics by weighting the points value for individual units to reflect the scarcity of those units at the front.

So to sum up, I make a case for national characteristics in CM, not to reflect some sort of inherent quality, but to reflect force doctrines, force structures, and the relationship between the two. If this could be properly implemented, I think that it could enhance an already great game system.

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Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

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hail mary full of grace, hear this my prayer mumble mumble mumble...

/crosses self

/starts frantically digging hole, throwing occasional frantic glances skyward, as if 16-ton railway gun shells might drop from sky at any moment.

[This message has been edited by Terence (edited 12-14-2000).]

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I found that very interesting Chief, thank you for posting that.

While I don't think the AI suggestions would get implemented - though I wouldn't mind if they were - I agree that the points could be tailored to give each force more "character".

If people say that you can just have lots of green troops versus a few veteran, then that's not good enough. Even battle-experienced Russian troops could fight poorly because of their training.

(now wait for the miserable gits to pick it apart).

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As far as tactics are concerned all the differences between nationalities you mentioned are either beyond CM's scale, or are a matter of training which is already modeled. If you want to see several detailed discussions of this feel free to do a search. It has been rehashed many many times. As for changing the point values, point value is determined by effectiveness on the battlefeild. Tanks were certainly cheaper for the US, as that oft-qouted 5 to 1 ratio implies. However, a Sherman should not cost 1/5th of what a german tank costs because we could feild more of them. That would unbalance the game. Similarly infantry should not be "balanced" to reflect the real conditions because it would unbalance the game. The reason why German troops often cost more per troop is because of the greatly supperior firepower they bring onto the battlefeild. If you want another can of worms do a search concerning request to actually lower the cost of the American infantryman because of his inferior firepower.

I now await Madmatt and his love of all things shiny and padlock.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by M. Bates:

If people say that you can just have lots of green troops versus a few veteran, then that's not good enough. Even battle-experienced Russian troops could fight poorly because of their training.

(now wait for the miserable gits to pick it apart).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So, are veterans veteran or not? I've never been a soldier, but I imagine that battle experience weeds out poor training - or more precisely, those soldiers not capable of recognizing poor training as such and moving beyond it - rather quickly.

It's a fairly often-quoted aphorism that fighter pilots' life expentancy shot up drastically if they could fly five missions. At that point, they were generally considered to have worked out the kinks in their technique and learned enough tricks to fight and survive. Contrarily, the vast majority of ace kills came from green pilots on their first few missions.

But apparently, according to M. Bates, this experience doesn't make a difference. If the training is poor, the experience means diddly.

I simply can't go along with statements like that, and I will happily argue them until my fingers go numb from typing.

Moreover, I believe that making statements like: "...then that's not good enough," and "now wait for the miserable gits to pick it apart" is a poor way of making an argument. Right off the bat, you're setting up a confrontational atmosphere. If that's really what you're interested in, feel free to say so, but don't expect it to be fun.

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Grand Poobah of the fresh fire of Heh.

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Chup,

the comment about fighter pilots was right on.

Certainly that environment accentuated the importance of skill and experience (since very little else went into who won the fights). I remeber reading that when it came right down to it, most air kills in WW2 could be typified by aces shooting down rookies. Kind of sad really.

Jeff Heidman

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I think Chief's post was excellent because I learned a few things from reading it.

I'm not sure about implementing stuff like that in the game, since with good scenario design you could mimic a lot of the points about availability he mentions, and Im not sure that the state of the art -- as far as programming AI is concerned -- can stretch as far as national differences.

What I mean is that at this point we have an excellent challenging AI that doesn't act like a prat 90 percent of the time.

I'm not even sure if you cold program an AI to act like a non-Prat Russian or a non-prat British commander as differentiated from a non-prat German, and not have it lose something. But im not a programmer...

Finally, Mr. Bates, as a Gold Plated, Plutonium Cored Miserable Git, 1st Class, I Must Ask: Wouldn't battle hardened Russian troops have transcended their training during the course of becoming Battle Hardened.

On the job training with the added selection pressures of dying when you screw up seems like it would produce good soldiers fast.

I look forward, non-confrontationally to hearing your answer.

Terence

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>Wouldn't battle hardened Russian troops have transcended their training during the course of becoming Battle Hardened.

Yes to some extent, but there would have still been the same arse-about-face structure behind them.

Perhaps a game like CM doesn't lend itself to national characteristics because the player is responsible for each individual man, I just don't know.

BTW the 'miserable gits' was in ref. to the topic starting post getting pulled and quoted to bits.

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I suppose it doesn't matter how battle hardened you are if the polkovnik announces that the regiment has been selected for a human wave attack and the NKVD guys at the back of the formation are loading their pistols and looking speculatively at the back of your head....

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>I suppose it doesn't matter how battle hardened you are if the polkovnik announces that the regiment has been selected for a human wave attack and the NKVD guys at the back of the formation are loading their pistols and looking speculatively at the back of your head....

My theory is that Stalin ordered those human wave attacks as a means of not having to produce firearms. Therefore, when the first lines are cut down in their swathes, the next lot of men pick up the weapons and then carry on. It probably takes two men to produce a gun, so it is cheaper for one man to die and to have two factory workers take his place than to provide guns for everyone individually.

Is this a sound theory?

I'll get me coat...

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by M. Bates:

>I suppose it doesn't matter how battle hardened you are if the polkovnik announces that the regiment has been selected for a human wave attack and the NKVD guys at the back of the formation are loading their pistols and looking speculatively at the back of your head....

My theory is that Stalin ordered those human wave attacks as a means of not having to produce firearms. Therefore, when the first lines are cut down in their swathes, the next lot of men pick up the weapons and then carry on. It probably takes two men to produce a gun, so it is cheaper for one man to die and to have two factory workers take his place than to provide guns for everyone individually.

Is this a sound theory?

I'll get me coat...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No.

I won't bother refuting your contention on a point by point basis. Too easy. I'll jsut pick an easy one:

*One* man can proabbly produce several hundred guns a year. But he can only get himself killed once.

The incidence of the "human wave" attacks by the Soviets are well over-stated.

Jeff Heidman

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Uraaaa!!

Za Rodinu!!

Za Stalina!!!

Cmert' Fashistam!!!

ahem. Sorry. got a little carried away.

Personally, I have no way of knowing about the human wave attacks, but I do know that Jeff is damn smart on this subject and doesn't post unless he knows what he is talking about.

I just used the human wave attack example to illustrate that I was sidling up to the concept of agreeing with Bates. In some cases if the army --operating from a doctrinal standpoint -- ordered something dumb, you didn't have much choice regarding dying no matter how battle hardened you were.

[This message has been edited by Terence (edited 12-14-2000).]

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>No.

I won't bother refuting your contention on a point by point basis. Too easy. I'll jsut pick an easy one:

*One* man can proabbly produce several hundred guns a year. But he can only get himself killed once.

Hehe, it was supposed to be semi-funny, but I suspect that such scary ideas were not so uncommon in the Soviet Union...

>The incidence of the "human wave" attacks by the Soviets are well over-stated.

I'd been wondering about that. If they had been so prevalent as I read about in the books, then the Reds might have been down to one man and his dog by late '41.

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>I just used the human wave attack example to illustrate that I was sidling up to the concept of agreeing with Bates. In some cases if the army --operating from a doctrinal standpoint -- ordered something dumb, you didn't have much choice regarding dying no matter how battle hardened you were.

lol, I bet that the Russian soldiers were ordered to hop on one leg towards the enemy because "it saves energy".

Mind you, they did smarten their acts up, as otherwise the Russians wouldn't have won the war. Hats off to 'em, they fought bravely that's for sure.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

lol, I bet that the Russian soldiers were ordered to hop on one leg towards the enemy because "it saves energy".

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Don't be ridiculous. Any Soviet Soldier saving energy when he could be bravely battling the facist invaders would be shot as wrecker and saboteur.

Also Soviet Union has largest microchip and tallest dwarves.

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Most AIs actually do a good simulation of a Russian attack: Completely uncoordinated and consistently throw good men into the same ambush.

All that aside, I think that modeling soft factors like 'national characteristics' is a slippery slope leading to a black hole, building as much on cultural prejudice as fact. Demonstratable, quantifiable advantages should, and are shown. For example, US arty is alot faster than anyone else's. But it is alot to make sweeping generalizations based on 55 years of secondary sources.

WWB

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Before battle, my digital soldiers turn to me and say,

Ave, Caesar! Morituri te salutamus.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>All that aside, I think that modeling soft factors like 'national characteristics' is a slippery slope leading to a black hole, building as much on cultural prejudice as fact.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You're a foreigner, you would say that!! wink.gif

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by wwb_99:

Most AIs actually do a good simulation of a Russian attack: Completely uncoordinated and consistently throw good men into the same ambush.

All that aside, I think that modeling soft factors like 'national characteristics' is a slippery slope leading to a black hole, building as much on cultural prejudice as fact.

WWB

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ill agree with you on the soft factors.

Also, all kidding aside, the Soviet troops in stalingrad did not stop the germans by flinging themselves into the same ambush over and over. They did it --out numbered and undersupplied -- by cunning vicious street fighing and the use of snipers and special storm detatchments.

slava sovetskomu narodu

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Guest Germanboy

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Chief:

So to sum up, I make a case for national characteristics in CM, not to reflect some sort of inherent quality, but to reflect force doctrines, force structures, and the relationship between the two. If this could be properly implemented, I think that it could enhance an already great game system.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, BTS have said they entertain the notion of an optional rarity system for CM2, which I think would go some way to dealing with this. Apart from that, at the sharp end allied superiority may have been the norm, but it was not always the case. So to implement it generally would not add to the game, IMO. Leave it to the scenario designers. If you want to design a scenario in which 5,000 points US assault 500 points German, be my guest, but I won't play it. I have better things to do. The problem is that a general implementation of this system would make the game to unbalanced. Historically more accurate, maybe. No fun to play, certainly.

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Andreas

<a href="http://www.geocities.com/greg_mudry/sturm.html">Der Kessel</a >

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 12-14-2000).]

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