Chief

I'm working on a scenario in which the AI has to deploy some AT guns that begin under tow. It really seems to struggle with this task. Have others experienced this? Any thoughts as to how to make the AI's job easier? ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

I played this for an Allied win on the first turn while doing every thing wrong. I didn't gather in the engineer squads to the buildings or use the halftracks effectively. I managed the win by (1) putting the .50 cal. up high and hiding it, (2) putting the jeep hull down behind the stone wall, where the AI showed remarkable discrimination on when to shoot and when to fight and (3) parking the M8 hull-down behind the same wall, where it demolished the German armor. I almost got swamped by a German infantry assault from the wheatfield, but the hidden MG (and infantry) turned the walled-in area into a killing zone as soon as the bad guys hopped over the wall. By the time the Germans were assaulting from the woods, the M8 was queen of the battlefield and was able to hold them off. I agree that the key seems to be keeping the M8 alive while killing the German AFVs. The hull-down position was instrumental in this. If the M8 had been knocked out, I would have been toast. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

I just saw my first effort at scenario design posted on the Combat Mission HQ website. It's title is "Jumbo" and its subject is the American push west in the Lorraine in November of 1944. I'd appreciate feedback from any hearty souls who play it. If you're playing solo, I suggest taking the Americans against the AI.

My last post on rarity and point values -- I swear it! I got a sense from reading previous posts that the OPTIONAL rarity factor system discussed for CM2 might have the effect of simply adjusting the point values of the units to reflect their relative scarcity or abundance. I fear that this would simply result in players never picking rare units and always picking common units if they wanted to maximize their force effectiveness. But there are other ways. For example, BTS could rig the system so that units (or numbers of units) are available based on their rarity. Thus, a German player would get a shot at purchasing no, or very few KTs, based on the scenario date, force type and total points value. Or a system equivalent to ASL's rarity system could be used. There, the players each rolled dice to determine how high they could go up the rarity ladder in buying units. Maybe something like this is the intention and I missed it, but I succumbed to the compulsion to put my oar in the water. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

Will Italian vehicles appear in CM2? Granted, there weren't all that many on the Russian Front, but there were some. Ulterior motive: with BT-5s and L3/35s in the same CM game, I bet that I could gen up some Spanish Civil War scenarios. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

Well, I hate to mention this, and don't everyone yell at once, but how about . . . letting each side use some of the other's captured equipment. I gather that the Germans used a lot of Russian artillery and at least some tanks, while the Russians used captured German armor to some degree. I recall a great photo of a T-28 and a captured PzK V parked nose to tail on a snowy Russian road. The Russian crew in the Panther must have thought they had died and gone to heaven.

I've also noticed that the AI seems to hang HQs out in front, where they frequently get smoked. However, if you read a book like Wilson's "If You Survive", you do get the sense that a platoon leader's life expectancy was about the same as a mayfly's. IMHO, the CM AI get platoon HQ mortality about right, but for the slightly wrong reason. Accounts I read suggest that many platoon leaders died not so much because they were out in front of their troops, but because they had to move among the troops (exposed to fire) to get anyone to do anything. If anything, I think that CM lets the player off a bit easily by permitting platoon HQs to command from relatively unexposed positions. But as a player and not the AI, I'm not complaining too much. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

Well, okey -- First board war game: Avalon Hill's D-Day ca. 1968. First computer game: some C64 dealie from SSI that took 8 minutes to load (literally) and involved individual vehicles and guns. My, but we've come a long way since them.

Sorry, I belched. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

Two thoughts from a relative newbie struggling to get better: (1) I tried Chance Encounter in hot seat mode a few times. That gave me a sense of how each side viewed the actions of the other. The shift in point of view was helpful to understanding concealment, LOS and the effects of fire. (2) The AI is devilish good in exploiting LOS. I've seen it use LOS in armor vs. armor situations to isolate a particular tank and pick it off from a position to which the tank's friends have no LOS. It's much better than I am at this. One antidote -- always deploy armor in pairs, close together, so that at least two vehicles have a shot at any attacker. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

"Augen zu?" -- That's my sig! ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

"Augen zu" -- that's my sig! ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

Here comes the technical stuff. I have the official TO&E for the US "Armored Infantry Battalion" (7-25) for 16 JUN 1945, the divisional TO&E (17) for the light armored division for 12 FEB 1944, and Forty's "US Army Handbook." Stir vigorously and here are the results. US armored infantry companies in 1944-5 had 20 halftracks plus three halftrack mortar carriers. 15 'tracks were allocated to the infantry platoons -- 1 for each of 3 rifle squads, 1 for a 60mm mortar team, and 1 for 2 LMG teams. 3 of the 'tracks towed 57mm AT guns. 1 'track hauled the company HQ and 1 was in the maintenance section. The unit also had 3 jeeps and 2 2 1/2 tonners. The TO&Es list the 'tracks as "w/o armament" which I deduce means that the armament is listed separately: 10 "Gun, machine, cal. 30, heavy, flexible" and 10 "Gun, machine, HB, cal. 50, flexible." So, presumably, half of the tracks got .30s and half got .50s. The company also got 18 bazookas, enough to allocate 1 per squad with some left over for the AT guns and the service elements. I have no indication of how they were actually distributed. In '44, the company had no BARs, but by '45 there were 9 in the company -- 1 per squad. For other small arms, the company had 78 carbines, 25 SMGs, 136 M1s and 3 M1 sniper rifles. This is for the '45 TO&E; the '44 company had slightly varying proportions. I don't have a squad organization for armored infantry. Total personnel: 6 officers and 245 enlisted, which includes service troops -- a supply section and a maintenance section. This said, the actual frequently varied from the official. I have also read that the presence of armored support and the lack of infantry replacements caused the 57mm guns to disappear. The 'tracks were generally not well-liked as combat vehicles, and it was not unusual for the troops to ride on tanks (viz the Singling action). I bet that squads tried to pick up BARs to boost their mobile firepower. And, of course, by late '44, a 251 man company was probably pure fantasy -- effective strengths of 50 men were probably more the norm.

Regarding 45 degrees and the Panther -- I don't recall a precise 45 degree angle being mentioned in connection with the Panther. My supposition is that Panthers might be taught to engage at a shallower angle, in an attempt to slightly increase the angle of attack for rounds striking the front glacis, while exposing the sides at a large angle of attack. My impression is that CM models target angle effects on penetration -- that a shot at a target with no-slope armor sitting at a 45 degree angle to the firer is analyzed as striking at a 45 degree angle to the armor. Can others confirm or deny this?

I also recall reading that both Tiger and Panther crews were trained to engage enemy armor over their right or left fronts rather than straight on. I'll have to go find the source.

Amen. This sort of thing has to be taken with a grain of salt. It reminds me of after-action reports from the WW II Pacific naval battles -- in which each side would praise the quality of the other's flashless powder while bemoaning the flash from its own. There much about the eye of the beholder here. And Wilson, in "If You Survive", has some good things to say about armor support, IIRC. ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

If this is repeatedly observed behavior, I'd also vote for some tweaking for this logic. I can understand that LOS considerations might be hard to program, but I would vote in favor of more a logic rule reducing the likelihood of a unit seeking cover moving to cover occupied by known enemy units.

I too, through clever maneuvering, have succeeded in getting tank hull MGs blocked. Cool result, methinks.

Yes, two of my favorite activities (in CM). I had a weird thing last night with the withdraw command that I suspect plays into other posts I've seen about irrational retreating. My boys are advancing through fog (visibility about 80m) towards a bridge. I advance a team to check the place out (OK, to draw fire), whereupon they get pasted by a KT sited next to the bridge. Fine sez I, they done their duty and I will now bug them out of there by issuing a withdraw command to fade them into the fog (and some conveniently close piney woods). Surprise! The withdraw command will only let these po boys withdraw towards the KT, away from their friendly edge, across the bridge and into a house. So I opts for crawl instead and haul out of sight. Any thoughts on what gives here? It sounds to me like the withdraw command was evaluating the house as the best cover for these people to take, regardless that they would have to troop across the bridge away from their pals and past a KT. I also suspect (but can't say definitively) that the AI retreating units will occasionally do the same thing: move units closer to a known enemy if it evaluated the cover that the enemy is in as the best cover around. The bocage threads also suggest this, at least for that terrain type. So, ye hearty grognards, have you seen this behavior on the part of your minions? And how do you deal with it? ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!

This may now be a done deal, but I thought I'd add my 2 cents. (And it's effortless, because I'm just lifting the text of an earlier post of mine on a thread stared by Wilhammer): "I can confirm that the M3A1 was apparently viewed as a replacement for the M3 in US TO&Es. I have an official TO&E for a recon troop that noted that the HTs will be M3s until M3A1s become available. I quote from TO&E 2-27 (15 July 1943), commenting on the M3A1s assigned to the troop: 'Modified half-track pers carr with ring mount for cal. .50 MG and panel mounts for cal. .30 MG. Pending availability,, carr pers, half-track, M3 w/o armament will be substituted.'" OK -- not dispositive, but suggestive of the result that the two were the same. Further, all official US TO&Es from this period that I have seen list the halftracks as "w/o armament" and list the MG armament (.30 or .50 cal.) separately. For these TO&Es, at least, the M3 and M3A1 were used interchangeably. Also, see my post on Allied platoon organizations, which quotes more material from US official TO&Es that these documents, at least, treated halftracks with and without .50 cal. armament interchangeably. Now the .50 cal. HTs may have been M3A1s, or they may have been M3s with field kit mods, but the arithmetic of the TO&Es (particularly for the armored infantry company) drives to the conclusion that they had more than 6 man passenger capacities with the the Ma Deuce on board.

Thanks, folks. This is good info.

IIRC, USAAF and RAF air support could and was called in FO style by special teams. The US eventually installed some radios in tanks that operated on aircraft frequencies to facilitate calling in airstrikes. Finally, aerial FOs in Pipers and Stimsons could call in jabos. The key to getting air cover on call seemed to be whether aircraft were orbiting in the vicinity of the FO awaiting strike orders. And, yes, own goals were fairly common, particularly when procedures were not fully developed. Somewhere, I think I read about the percentage of tactical air missions that were called versus the percentage that were strikes on targets of opportunity. By the bye, I'd love to see Piper FOs buzzing around in CM:BO.

Cool, then add me to the pool of repeated asking.

A random thought on Tiger crews that perhaps the grogs could weigh in on. I can easily understand why most German AFV crews could range in quality from lousy to great, but I had the impression that Tiger crews tended to be picked men with previous experience. True or false?

I saw some interesting AI behavior, and I wondered if the vets on the board could shed any light on it. I did a search but found nothing. I was playing a scenario against the AI in which I had emplaced some AT guns with fairly narrow but long LOS's to positions that I thought the enemy AFVs would occupy for fire support. I guessed right in one case, and whacked a Mk IV. His panzer buddies then cleverly cruised to positions that were exactly optimal for providing fire support against my infantry while at the same time avoiding exposure to my gun. After two turns of blasting, they then advanced into the gun's LOS and happily died. (And I was happy for them.) So it seemed to me that two things were happening here. (1) The AI seems to be able to anticipate the LOS to and from a particular position with precision, even before it has a unit there. (2) As others on the board have observed, the AI will sometimes "forget" about an out of sight threat after a turn or two. I'm cool with both of these features, but I'm curious as to whether others have seen these things happen consistently enough to take them into account when fighting the AI. Final question. Generally, I find that the AI is a lot better than I(a newbie) am at doping out the LOS of a position before it gets there. (For example, figuring out how to use a slope to concentrate fires on one of my tanks and leaving the others without a LOS back -- even though my other tanks are close by.) Any tricks for determining the LOS from positions you don't occupy (other than camping there in 1 view, which I've tried with only mediocre success)? ------------------ Also los, Augen zu, und hinein!