CM2 & Russian Squads

[Kanonier Reichmann]

Fantastic information on Soviet Rifle formations (once again) PzKfwI. Thanks for the education. At this rate I might even advance to Junior Grog 1 standard! And yes, that's 1 out of 10 not the other way around.

Regards

Jim R.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Kanonier Reichmann:

Fantastic information on Soviet Rifle formations (once again) PzKfwI. Thanks for the education. At this rate I might even advance to Junior Grog 1 standard! And yes, that's 1 out of 10 not the other way around.

Regards

Jim R.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

NP glad to share. To many images of the Red Army have come from German memoirs which generally are biased, as they look to provide an alibi for their defeat in the East.

Blaming failures on Hitler's interference Ie, Moscow, Stalingrad Zitadelle etc, while portraying the Soviets as a faceless horde with no tactical or operational skills not that this doesn't have some basis, as evident in some Soviet operations in 41 & 42, while portraying German troops as tactically & operationally brilliant, bravely fighting on but being beaten by sheer weight of numbers of men & equipment. Which also has a basis if one doesn't look at anything but numbers in an operation, and ignores the reason for the numbers was pre operation build up instead of sheer numerical superiority on its own.

While giving no credit to Soviet operational level successes, such as Moscow, & Stalingrad, & avoiding admitting that their own logistical & planning measures contributed to their own failures. They also attribute the high losses in 1944 - 1945 suffered on the Eastern Front to Hitlers incompetence & constant interference never admitting the growing skill of Soviet operational leaders & the increasing skill of the Soviet troops. Or the fact that the Soviets had learned their lessons well from the Germans, & evolved into a force that eventually gained in skill that surpassed their teachers in the art of mechanized warfare.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-20-2000).]

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

It's also true that for most of the battles in the early war years, the Germans were able to use their initiative to obtain local numerical superiority. When you combine numerical superiority with more experienced troops and better tactical doctrine, it's it's almost no wonder that the Germans made such impressive initial gains.

I'm not sure what the most realistic way to model Soviet troops is. I hope, though, from a gaming perspective, that these troops are somehow different from other troops. Some of my favorite SL scenarios were those where 30 Russian squads with one or two leaders attack 10 german squads with about six leaders: as a gamer, you were forced to play the Soviets differently from how you played the Germans, and this added quite a lot of depth to the gameplay.

I think BTS will do what is most realistic, and that's what I want them to do, of course. But I hope that what is most realistic turns means that russian troops are somehow different from inexperienced german troops.

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Los:

RE: Commisars and executions:

"That the Soviet regime was almost as unforgiving towards its own soldiers as towards the enemy is demonstrated by the total figure of 13,500 executions, both summary and judicial, carried out during the Battle of Stalingrad. This inlcuded all crimes classed by commisars as 'extraordinary ecvents', such as retreating without orders, to self inflicted wounds, desertion, crossing over to the enemy, corruption and antisoviet activites.

Los<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Have you read what German troops did to get out of stalingrad? murders self-wounds, impersonating wounded/officers was common.

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

To many images of the Red Army have come from German memoirs which generally are biased, as they look to provide an alibi for their defeat in the East.

portraying the Soviets as a faceless horde with no tactical or operational skills not that this doesn't have some basis, as evident in some Soviet operations in 41 & 42, while portraying German troops as tactically & operationally brilliant, bravely fighting on but being beaten by sheer weight of numbers of men & equipment. Which also has a basis if one doesn't look at anything but numbers in an operation, and ignores the reason for the numbers was pre operation build up instead of sheer numerical superiority on its own.

They also attribute the high losses in 1944 - 1945 suffered on the Eastern Front to Hitlers incompetence & constant interference never admitting the growing skill of Soviet operational leaders & the increasing skill of the Soviet troops. Or the fact that the Soviets had learned their lessons well from the Germans, & evolved into a force that eventually gained in skill that surpassed their teachers in the art of mechanized warfare.

Regards, John Waters

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thank you - finally someone who read propaganda of both sides!

Soviet troops were frequently fighting hard and to the end.

In fact dehumanizing enemy is common practice in all military. It is easier to kill human-like creature than a human...

[Guest MantaRay]

Yes John Waters was the resident Guru on the Steel Panthers boards. He really knows his stuff, and I am surprised BTS doesnt have him on the team.

Ray

[Tiger]

Soviet rifle company April 1941 to October 1941:

1 company hq, 1 medical section, 3 rifle platoons each with a platoon hq, four rifle squads and a mortar squad; 1 mg platoon with a platoon hq and 2 mg squads.

In the company hq were 2 officers, 1 p.o., 1 nco, 4 other ranks.

Their weapons were 2 pistols, 5 rifles.

The company hq also contained a draft horse and a cart.

The medical setion had 1 nco with a pistol and 4 other ranks.

Each rifle platoon hq had 1 officer, 1 nco, 1 other rank. Weapons were 1 pistol, 1 submachinegun, 1 rifle.

Each rifle squad had 1 nco and 10 other ranks. Their weapons were 1 pistol (Nagant Model 1895 7.62mm revolver or Tokarev Model 1930/33 automatic), 2 submachineguns (PPSh), 8 (7.62 Mosin Nagant Model 1891/30--same one used in WW I with minor changes, and the SVT-semi-auto series *thanks Mk IV * ) and 1 light mg (7.62 Degtaryev DP. This was the equivalent to the bren or bar. The DT tank light mg was also used due to shortages).

The mortar squad had 1 nco and 3 other ranks. They had 1 pistol, 3 rifles and 1 50mm mortar (M1940).

The mg platoon hq had 1 officer and 1 other rank. Their weapons were 1 pistol and 1 rifle. Attached were 2 draft horses and a cart.

The 2 mg squads each had 1 nco and 4 other ranks. They had 1 pistol, 4 rifles, and 1 medium mg on a cart (M1910 Maxim water-cooled--same one from WW I).

no AT-rifles were on the rifle company's to&e due to unavailability.

In July 1941, these changes were made for reduced strength divisions due to shortages:

Each rifle platoon was authorized only 2 light mgs (two squads in each platoon had to go without). In August the 50mm mortar squad was eliminated from all but 1 platoon in the company. The medium mg platoon was dropped entirely. The companies heavy weapon strength was now down to 6 light mgs and 2 50mm mortars.

In October, all the mortars in the infantry were withdrawn and formed into a single regimental mortar battalion due to the inability of the newly promoted officers to employ them correctly. Similiarly all hvy mortars (120mm) were employed into a single divisional mortar battalion.

A submachinegun company was added to each regiment at the same time. These had a 7-man hq platoon and three 31-man platoons. The company hq had 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 political officer, 1 first sergeant, a medical sergeant, a runner, a wagoner & two horse wagon. Each platoon had a lieutenant and 3 squads each with 2 sergeants and 8 privates, each armed with a PPsh-41 submachinegun.

In December changes were once again made:

Three light mgs were added to each rifle company, allowing 3 of the 4 squads of each platoon to have them.

Each regiment could field a company of three 9-gun AT-rifle platoons.

As far as radios, there was only 1 in each battalion hq and 2 more in the regimental signals company. The infantry gun battery had a radio as well.... (runner!)

Two new units were added to the new december 1941 to&e orders, though existing divisions were instructed not to create these: a rocket-launcher battalion and an AT battalion.

Each infantry battlion had: a battalion hq, 3 rifle companies, a mg company.

Regimental assets during ths period were a mounted recon platoon, an infantry recon platoon, an AA mg company, a pioneer platoon, a chemical platoon, a flamethrower platoon; all directly under the regimental hq.

There was an infantry gun battery, AT battery (re-added in December), AT rifle company, a submachinegun company, a regimental mortar battalion that had four 50mm and four 82mm mortars (rem the hvy mortars were given to a divisional battalion). Each regiment had 3 infantry battalions.

So it looks like that mortar support for the soviets in 1941 is going to be all from off-board divisional support. Also note that none of their squads has reached over 12 men, which is currently modeled in CMBO. Each platoon would have 4 squads instead of 3 though, as it applies now to the german and Allies in CMBO.

[This message has been edited by Tiger (edited 10-23-2000).]

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Tiger:

Soviet rifle company April 1941 to October 1941:

1 company hq, 1 medical section, 3 rifle platoons each with a platoon hq, four rifle squads and a mortar squad; 1 mg platoon with a platoon hq and 2 mg squads.

In the company hq were 2 officers, 1 p.o., 1 nco, 4 other ranks.

Their weapons were 2 pistols, 5 rifles.

The company hq also contained a draft horse and a cart.

The medical setion had 1 nco with a pistol and 4 other ranks.

Each rifle platoon hq had 1 officer, 1 nco, 1 other rank. Weapons were 1 pistol, 1 submachinegun, 1 rifle.

Each rifle squad had 1 nco and 10 other ranks. Their weapons were 1 pistol (Nagant Model 1895 7.62mm revolver or Tokarev Model 1930/33 automatic), 2 submachineguns (PPSh), 8 semi-automatic rifles (7.62 Mosin Nagant Model 1891/30--same one used in WW I with minor changes) and 1 light mg (7.62 Degtaryev DP. This was the equivalent to the bren or bar. The DT tank light mg was also used due to shortages).

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sgts, & snipers begining in June 1941 recieved the SVT-38 & SVT-40 semi auto rifles, it was orginaly planned to arm the Plts with these rifles as well but it was found the rifles were to fragile for regular issue troops as they required more maintance then could be expected from front line troops, so the Plt riflemen stayed with the reliable M97/30 Moisin - Nagant rifles, The Soviets chose the SVT-40 over the SVT-38 & Sqd leaders & Snipers carried the SVT-40, the sniper model had telescopic sights.

Their were no SMGs in the original Rifle Plt or structure originaly (see below as well) SMG's were considered security wpns until after the war began, in the March 42 Shtat we see the addition of 9 - 12 SMGs to the Plt HQ & Co HQ structure.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

In July 1941, these changes were made for reduced strength divisions due to shortages:

Each rifle platoon was authorized only 2 light mgs (two squads in each platoon had to go without). In August the 50mm mortar squad was eliminated from all but 1 platoon in the company. The medium mg platoon was dropped entirely. The companies heavy weapon strength was now down to 6 light mgs and 2 50mm mortars.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Soviets had 2 types of Rifle Sqds with 9 men each Sqd, depending on LMG availability later, they varied it when they had a Plt structure of 4 Sqds to 2 with 2 LMG, 2 with 1 LMG. I posted the early Sqd compositions in an earlier post this was the July 1941 structure which was difrent from the 1938 structure,with a plt structure of 3 Sqds of 9 men, which became the standard composition until March 1942 with Shtat 04/201.

In the original 1938 Shtat an Rifle Company had an HQ with; Co, PO, 1st Sgt, 1st Sgt's asst, & a clerk with 3 Plts with; 4 Sqds with; 12 men each Sqd, an HMG Plt with; 2 Sqds with 6 men each. For a total of 6 Officers, 180 NCO, & EM, with 120 rifles, 12 LMGs, 12 Grenade launchers, & 2 HMGs. By March 1942 a Rifle Co had 5 officers, 1 PO, 30 NCO's, 139 EM, with 9 - 12 SMGs, 12 LMGs, & 11 snipers & a Plt consisted of Plt HQ, with 2 men, 1 officer, 1 NCO, each Plt had 4 Sqds each with, 2 NCO's, 1 LMG, 1 Sniper, & 8 Riflemen.

The 50mm mortar was not 'officialy' eliminated from the Rifle Co, Shtat until 1943 Ie, the March 1942 Shtat (Shtat 04/300) still retained the 50mm. The Dec 10 1942 Shtat series 04/500 was the last major Shtat revision for Rifle Div TO&E, until August 1945. The formal removal of the 50mm mortar & ATR units was actualy in May 1944 though most Soviet Rifle Divisiomns began getting rid of the 50mm Mortar & ATR Co's in early 1943 as both wpns were obsolete.

The Soviets constantly revised the standard composition w/o officialy changeing the Shtat Ie, in May 1943 1/3 of the Rifle Regt's rifles were replaced by SMGs, the implementation was left up to the Rifle Div Co's Ie, some chose to implement SMG plts into the Rifle Co's while a few other Rifle Divs added a few SMG ewuipped personel to the Rifle Plt & Sqds. While the 57mm & 76mm Zis-3 in 1943 began to unoficialy replace the 45mm gun as well with no major change to the Shtat.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

In October, all the mortars in the infantry were withdrawn and formed into a single regimental mortar battalion due to the inability of the newly promoted officers to employ them correctly. Similiarly all hvy mortars (120mm) were employed into a single divisional mortar battalion.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Shtat 04/301 from July 1942 for a Rifle Regt was a mortar Co & a mortar Battery, the mortar Co had 9 82mm mortars & the Battery had 6 120mm mortars while the Rifle Co still retained 1 50mm mortar sec with 1 50mm mortar, this difered from the March 1942 Shtat with the Mortar Bn, being renamed Battery, & reduced from its previous 3 mortar Co's.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

So it looks like that mortar support for the soviets in 1941 is going to be all from off-board divisional support.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ayup except for the 50mm mortar. Also the Rifle Bn artillery with 45mm AT guns, & 76mm howitzers (both were considered Regtimental artillery) was depolyed in a DF role usualy in a gap between the Rifle Co, positions or in flanking positions where it was needed.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-22-2000).]

[Kanonier Reichmann]

PzKwI or Tiger... can you tell me, was it just a fallacy that the Soviets had 76mm AT weapons & 82mm Mortars so they could utilise captured German shells, or was it simply a coincidence thet some of their major weapons were 1mm larger in diameter than their enemies. Or perhaps they couldn't use captured shells at all?

Look forward to any input you may have.

Regards

Jim R.

[Tiger]

Simply coincidence I would imagine. What weapon development does is look at the most effective, in terms of performance and weight, system you can make. Why not a 73mm gun or a 78mm gun? Because you don't get the same advantage over a 75 or a 76mm gun in terms of firepower & weight. In other words, most of the weapon sizes are the accepted known optimum for that particular weapon. These would be already known by all weapon manufactuers through study, research, technical journals, espionage, what have you.

This does not mean you won't experiment with other weapon configurations but you'll end up leaning towards the optimum size/caliber anyways. Incidentally the German 120mm mortar is a direct copy of the soviet 120mm mortar. If somethinig works good you stick with it.

-johnS

[tss]

Kanonier Reichmann wrote:

was it just a fallacy that the Soviets had 76mm AT weapons & 82mm Mortars so they could utilise captured German shells, or was it simply a coincidence thet some of their major weapons were 1mm larger in diameter than their enemies.

Russian guns were traditionally measured with "pound" system (as were British guns). The basic field gun size was 12 pounder with 87 mm calibere. The other pound-based calibere was 24 pounder (107 mm). Additionally they also had several 6 inch (152mm) guns that were 20 to 60 pounders.

In 1900 Russians started to design a new gun family that would be measured using the size of the barrel. The first gun to be designed was the 3" gun (76.2 mm). It was updated 2 years later to resemble more the famous French 75 mm gun. So, the 76.2 mm calibere comes from inch-based measurement system. (That gun, "76mm pushka obr. 1902" formed the backbone of the Red Army in 1941. Incidently, it was also the main gun type of the Finnish army where it was called 76K02).

Similarily, Russian 152 mm guns were almost exactly 6 inches. I don't know why they decided to use 122 mm guns (4.8 inch) instead of 127 mm guns (exactly 5 inches).

I'm not certain why Soviets decided to use 82 mm as their mortar calibere.

- Tommi

[Renaud]

Here's my theory on the similarity of gun measurement/designation between combatant nations in wwII:

I think WWII weaponry of both sides tended to have similiar calibers due to all nations having purchased weapons from the same major European arms manufacturers in the decades before the war. For instance, the French 75 was a very famous weapon in WWI, similar to the fame of the german 88 in WWII. So, many nations bought it and built various weapons systems around it or used it as a starting point for new guns without every changing the caliber or millimeter designation. Also, I would guess it is probably easier for machine tools to be modified to produce ammunition for different weapons sytems as long as the shell diameter tooled remains unchanged.

Interestingly, the tendency for different weapon systems with the same designations but incompatable ammo was ordered changed by Stalin in 41 shortly before Barbarossa. It was discovered that having multiple types of 120mm weapons created delivery problems. The 7.62 pistol was phased out of service for this reason...untrained supply personnel would send truckloads of 7.62mm pistol ammo instead of the needed 7.62 rifle ammo.

In one fabled story Stalin was present for a early 1941 (pre-barbarossa) demonstration firing of the new 130mm rockets. The test could not commence because some poor bastard had delivered 130mm howitzer shells instead of rockets. Rather than execute everyone involved, which was what Stalin's inner cicle expected, Stalin ordered that henceforth all new weapons would have a slightly different calibur from their precursors. Thus, the BM-13 rocket ammo was always referred to as '132' ammo, only later was it actually increased in diameter to 132mm during post-war modernization. This may be why the Soviet's had 152mm rather than 150mm and 122mm rather than 120mm ammo. It prevented gun ammo from being sent to mortar units and vica versa, and probably prevented captured ammo from being mistakenly used. (german 150mm vs Russian 152, etc)

Source for the above is from the chapter 'Why do Calibres Vary' in 'Inside the Soviet Army', by Viktor Suvorov. (Pseudonym for the author, a Soviet Officer who defected during the cold war).

This may be a fable, albeit a plausible one, as there are other good explanations put forth (imperial to metric conversions, etc).

Ren

[tss]

Renaud wrote:

This may be why the Soviet's had 152mm rather than 150mm and 122mm rather than 120mm ammo.

I believe that the 152 vs 150 mm comes from inch-based vs metric-based measurement. However, numerous similar-caliber guns could and did cause supply problems and it may be one reason for distinct caliberes.

On the other hand, I don't think that it completely explains the 122 vs 120 mm issue. That is because first Russian 122 mm guns were issued in 1909 (and 1910, Imperial Russian Army had two different 122 mm howitzer models that used interchangable ammo), long before first modern mortars were designed. But then again, these guns were based on the German 120 mm model 1901 howitzer, so it may be the case that Russians wanted a calibere different from that.

Hmm. I just remembered that I have Paulaharju's "Old Guns" in my bookshelf. Count Shuvalov introduced in the 18th century a standardized pound-based gun family with the following guns:

3 lbr -- 76 mm

6 lbr -- 96 mm

12 lbr -- 122 mm

18 lbr -- 138 mm

24 lbr -- 152 mm

36 lbr -- 174 mm

48 lbr -- 192 mm

So those "strange" caliberes had a long history in Russian use. The 87 mm / 107 mm system that I mentioned above was introduced in mid-late 19th century, but since they were not pure black-powder weapons, Paulaharju don't give their details.

BTW, speaking of mortars, I read a funny anecdote about Soviet 50 mm mini-mortar ("Naku", as it was called in Finland). One Finnish 2nd Lieutenant (who wrote of this event in his memoirs) was going on leave by train during the Winter War. He was sleeping but he woke up when he heard an argument. He noticed that the train police had examined the bag of a soldier and found one of those 50 mm mortars and a couple shells there. The patrol then (understandably) asked him why the hell was he carrying the thing. The answer was: "My neighbour was somehow found to be unfit for military duty and I wanted to wake him up one morning with sounds of war. And that thing is not really dangerous, even its maximum range falls 50 meters short of his bedroom". At this point the 2nd Lieutenant decided that he didn't want to take a part of that conversation and pretended to continue sleeping. The patrolmen didn't know what to do about the situation and in the end they only confiscated the mortar and shells and let the man continue his voyage.

- Tommi

[Guest barrold713]

Hiya All:

Great thread and mucho thanks for the detailed information. Makes me think that BTS has their work cut out for them in the department of implementing squad values over the time period to be covered in CM2.

Not knowing the intracies of doing this, what is your opinion on how this should be accomplished in game terms? Please excuse or ignore if this is an unduly silly question.

BDH

------------------

"Democracy is two wolves and a lamb discussing what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting the vote"

- Ben Franklin

[IntelWeenie]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Renaud:

Interestingly, the tendency for different weapon systems with the same designations but incompatable ammo was ordered changed by Stalin in 41 shortly before Barbarossa. It was discovered that having multiple types of 120mm weapons created delivery problems. The 7.62 pistol was phased out of service for this reason...untrained supply personnel would send truckloads of 7.62mm pistol ammo instead of the needed 7.62 rifle ammo.

In one fabled story Stalin was present for a early 1941 (pre-barbarossa) demonstration firing of the new 130mm rockets. The test could not commence because some poor bastard had delivered 130mm howitzer shells instead of rockets. Rather than execute everyone involved, which was what Stalin's inner cicle expected, Stalin ordered that henceforth all new weapons would have a slightly different calibur from their precursors. Thus, the BM-13 rocket ammo was always referred to as '132' ammo, only later was it actually increased in diameter to 132mm during post-war modernization. This may be why the Soviet's had 152mm rather than 150mm and 122mm rather than 120mm ammo. It prevented gun ammo from being sent to mortar units and vica versa, and probably prevented captured ammo from being mistakenly used. (german 150mm vs Russian 152, etc)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The US did this very thing with the designation of the 106mm Recoilless Rifles right after WWII. (They were actually 105mm)

------------------

Cats aren't clean, they're covered with cat spit.

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fernando:

Russian were well known by their lack of flexibility and poor tactics. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have a quote from German officer who said during the 1944 the SOVIET troops showed great tactics and extreme flexibility. They avoided strong points, captured territory, surrounded german groups and battered them continuosly without many losses.

If you want the name/book I can provide it

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fernando:

You’re right. The Russians lost about 3-4 times more soldiers than the Germans did because they were tactically brilliant and their men displayed lots of initiative

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually the losses we had this discussion before. Soviet losses were calculated to be 2.1:1 not 4:1.

These number is inaccurate because it does not include Finn, Rumanian, Hungarian and other axis nation losses.

So the real number would be less then 2:1...

[Guest wwb_99]

One one cuts through the nationalist rhetoric, the German officers give a pretty fair analysis of the strenghts and weaknesses of the Soviet soldier and Red Army in a set of pamphlets produced by the army, which have been compiled into a paperback, "Fighting in Hell." Given they were written for the U.S. army as an assessment of a potential opponent (who we should remeber was ideologically demonized and dehumanized), they are rather frank. And after reading these assessments, one does gain a certain respect for the Soviet combat arms. But one has to admit that there was some inferiority, but that inferiority lay in logisitcal not combat tasks.

WWB

[Mark IV]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Tiger:

Each rifle squad had 1 nco and 10 other ranks. Their weapons were... 8 semi-automatic rifles (7.62 Mosin Nagant Model 1891/30--same one used in WW I with minor changes) <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Moisin-Nagant was definitely bolt-action, NOT semi-automatic. They were repeating rifles with a magazine, but the shooter had to manually work the bolt between each shot (just like the K98 Mauser and the Enfields, etc.).

Nit... picked. Would certainly affect FP numbers, though.

Just passin' through....

[Guest Big Time Software]

Hi guys,

When anybody talks about the good/bad aspects of Soviet forces, one must be VERY carefull to not make strong generalizations.

The most important factors to think about are:

Time Period - Early war Soviet formations were generally very poorly led. This is NOT a myth, but a byproduct of the Stalin's purges, intially huge losses, and rapid mobilization. Things changed over time and by the end of the war the Red Army had a damned fine fighting force.

Formation type - some Soviet units were very well trained and lead by skilled soliders, others were full of conscripted criminals with no military training. Big difference between the two! So the "quality gap" was much wider within the Red Army than it was within the German Army (however... toss in Luftwaffe field divisions and perhaps not!).

Weaponry - especially early on, some units were under equipped and/or very poorly equipped. You can't fight well if you have no ammo or only light tanks vs. German main battle tanks. The US Army had similar problems in North Africa.

Situation - in some cases all tactical concerns were thrown aside because of political needs. In other words, units were ordered to do the impossible. This happened more at the beginning, but persisted all the way up until the end of the war. The Battle of Berlin is an example of unnecessary Soviet blood being spilled in pursuit of political ambitions. BTW, the Germans had a few disasters like this too (Bagration for example).

So I would say it is a myth that the Soviet soldiers and leadership were poor quality as a rule. However, the more you are talking early war the more truth there is to the argument that the Soviets were poorly led. Incidentally, this is true for US forces as well But just like the US, the Soviet tactical leadership did get better as the war progressed. Some of it was through experience, some was through technological advances (like getting radios for their tanks by 1943).

If anybody wants to see an early war example of Soviet operational success, check out the battle for Yelnia. This battle lasted almost 2 months IIRC, and the Germans certainly lost it. Although they largely held their ground (er... and they were on the attack!), the Germans lost about the equivalent of a Corps' worth of troops. The Soviets lost much more than that, but as the battle wore on they learned from their mistakes. Unfortunately, the price of experience were large piles of Soviet dead.

Steve

[Tiger]

Yeah Mark IV, my mistake. The Moisin Nagant was certainly bolt-action, and there was the rifle, sniper, and carbine version. The basic rifle version was replaced by a carbine that could attach a bayonet and issued to troops in 1944.

The Soviet semi-auto rifle was the Tokarev SVT-38, followed by the SVT-40. These were not well-liked because they were unreliable, innaccurate, and difficult to maintain. A fully auto-version called the AVT-40 was used in summer of 42 and used as a substitute for the light machinegun.

The moisin-nagant remained in service throughout the war, though increasingly the PPSh submachinegun was used by the infantry.

-john

[Mark IV]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Tiger:

Yeah <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sorry, I generally enjoyed your post. I'll need to sharpen up on Soviet ground force TOE when CM2 arrives, but I'm on the road and CMless now.

Since I'm traveling east where people are still literate, I have raided the book stores and come up with "Warriors of the Rising Sun" by Edgerton (very good read, excellent R-J stuff, though with a point to make), von Senger und Etterlin's "German Tanks of WWII", and Jentz's "Panzer Truppen" v.1. I'm groggin' out, ovah heah.

The high-volume sports retailer at home was just selling Moisin-Nagants for about $89.95 and even had ammo for them, and I was thinking about picking one up when I get back... love them old military bolts. If they have an all-matching number I'll get a box of ammo and write a review....

[Guest wwb_99]

I almost picked up a Mosin-Nagant M1895 made in 1917 that had obviously seen conflict, but I was but a poor college student. Alas, now I am far away from that favorite gun shop of mine. But if anyone is in New Orleans, check out Shooters Club, out on David Dr. in Kenner. Great prices and lots of cool ex-military stuff.

WWB

[tss]

Big Time Software wrote:

example of Soviet operational success, check out the battle for Yelnia. This battle lasted almost 2 months IIRC, and the Germans certainly lost it. Although they largely held their ground (er... and they were on the attack!), the Germans lost about the equivalent of a Corps' worth of troops. The Soviets lost much more than that

According to Krivosheev, the Yelnya offensive lasted from 30.08. - 08.09.41., only 9 days. However, he sometimes has pretty strange categorizations for battle lenghts and this may be one of those. (right now I can't remember anything than name of that battle).

Krivosheev gives Soviet casualty figures as 10701 KIA + MIA and 21152 wounded, totalling about 30% of 103200 troops committed. Adding a factor of 1.3 to represent unreported casualties, the total figure rises to 41500 casualties.

- Tommi

[PzKpfw 1]

The importance of El'nia was it was the 1st time the Soviet's blunted the Germans as well as providing an example of things to come.

The Soviet offensive initially tied down Das Reich, and 10th Pz Div, and kept the Smolenesk pocket open as the Germans didn't have the troops available with DR, & 10th Pz tied down fighting their way to El'nia, & 7th Corps Inf 's slow progress to Mogilev, to close the pocket.

While the Soviet 13th Army tied down 24th Pz Corps & 1st Cavalry Div, at Mogilev as well as it was trying to hook up with Yeremenko's forces at El'nia. The constant pressure from the Soviet's on the flanks forced the continued commitment of 1st Cavalry, 10th Mtz, & the bulk of the 4th Pz Div, 18th Pz Div which was suposed to relieve Grossdeutschland at Roslavi was tied down on the Dnieper waiting on Inf Divs to relieve it as well.

The continued Soviet pressure on DR & 10th Panzer forced the 3rd & 4th Pz Div's commitment at Krichev, while the increasing heavy attacks from El'nia forced the Germans to attempt to use full 9th Corps & GD who had finaly been relieved at Roslavi to attack towards El'nia, as Das Reich & 10th Panzer were in dire straights as losses climbed, but both were drawn into the fighting at Smolensk. GD eventually was able to break off & get to El'nia.Finaly the 268th Inf Div arrived allowing 10th Panzer some mobility to respond to breakthroughs etc.

In all 9 German Div's were committed at El'nia including the Inf from 4th Army all were decimated in the fighting at El'nia in fact the losses were so bad at El'nia that, the 137th Inf Div lost 1200 men in 3 days fighting at El'nia alone, the German 9th & 20th Corp's reported unless reinforcements were sent soon the Corps's would be decimated. The German high command then decided to pull out of El'nia as their position was 'untenable with the Smolensk pocket tieing down reserves & no reserves available in the OA, with the onset of bad weather all German forces had withdrawn from El'nia, by Sept 6th.

The El'nia offensive caused the German failure at Smolensk to close the pocket allowing over 100,000 Soviet troops to escape the pocket, these troops would later be used to defend Moscow & launch the winter counteroffensive. The reason the El'nia fighting seems longer then the Soviet official operational dates is El'nia was part of a much bigger battle, the Germans were involved in, they classify it as Smolensk - El'nia operation.

Regards, John Waters

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"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.