From Active Defense to AirLand Battle

[THH149]

An excellent review of the prospects of US winning with Active Defense doctrine and why they moved to AirLand Battle. The presenter notes in no uncertain terms that after a 100+ wargames by V Corps, General Starry concludes they never win using Active Defense.

 

 

[domfluff]

I have previously watched it, and it's a pretty good overview.

"Winning" with Active Defence was never really an option, and ultimately winning tactically or operationally can never be, because there's no proactivity to it. The aim then was to slow, delay, and make room for a strategic or especially political victory - something which wargaming, and especially wargaming of that period, tends to model very badly. Whether "winning" on that level is plausible is more guesswork.

CM:CW sits right at that switch-over, and I think does a good job of showing why that would be the case at the tactical level - the disparity in numbers and raw strength means that you're forced into a defence in depth (so, similar to the Syrians in CMSF), and your mobility and coordination allows you to perform an elastic defence effectively (unlike the Syrians in CMSF). Whilst Active Defence might well have had no chance of winning (and as ever with Cold War it's *really* important to specify timeframe here, but let's say the seventies), I'm not sure there were too many other options on the table, given the equipment and the state of the US army post-Vietnam.

The more Bradleys, Abrams and M60A3 TTS you start throwing in, the more the US play like the US in CMSF. The enemy is still better equipped than the Syrian army there, so it's not a complete stomp, but it's a lot more of a stomp than the rest of the game.

What I do think is interesting is that all of the NATO powers were pursuing some kind of "defence in depth" strategy, but the manner they went about it was quite different.

(Some of this is from some inadequate sourcing, especially for the Bundeswehr, so take it for what it's worth)

The US was pursing "virtual" depth through an elastic defence (so "sideways", if you like), because their key weapon was TOW. The aim was to maximise the number of 2km+ engagements and keep the enemy more than 1km away at all times.

The British emphasised actual depth ("backwards") and counter-attack, with the structure being built around Chieftain, especially it's heavy armour and 120mm cannon.

The Germans instead emphasised creating depth forward - dropping off infantry defensively and them roaming ahead with Leopard and Marder independently, creating depth in what would otherwise be the enemy position. The key weapon then is Leopard 1, and the mobility that would offer, as well as using Marder more like a light tank.

[The_Capt]

Super interesting and excellent overview.  I wish it came out about a year earlier, would have saved us some research time.  In CMCW, we are really talking about the seam between these two concepts as Active Defence was still in play but Starry's thinking was beginning in inculcate the US Doctrine (he had just been V Corp Comd).  So for example the US Campaign is a narrative of what Active Defence would have looked like as the US player bounces backwards against the Soviet hordes.  Other lateral forces (3rd Armd) even swing over as per doctrine in the campaign.  If the player makes it to the end, they essentially get a proto-AirLand scenario of a deep counter-strike, as opposed to what Active Defence dictated (i.e. park here and wait).  

The Soviet campaign is the mirror opposite and demonstrates the weaknesses of Active Defence.  Despite the difficulty (and it would have been high in RL) the Soviet player always has the initiative up to Battle 4, when a US counter-attack occurs - again emergence of maneuver as oppose to KZ-centric.  Further, the Soviet demonstrate the real flaw in Active Defence, in my opinion - the Soviet "bot" concept.  Active Defence relies almost entirely on the Soviets not maneuvering below Div level and that is one helluva weak assumption.  We have had a lot of discussion (and some noise) on how nuanced Soviet C2 was or was not and some of it was likely reality and some US/western wishful thinking.  I do believe that at a tactical level MRR and below the empowerment of tactical commanders was low, they were really pointed at something at told to "go at it" but I do not believe that at the Div level the Soviets were going to stick to the US template in Active Defence of conveniently marching through 3 KZ layers.  Based on what I have seen Soviet operational doctrine was far more nuanced than that.

So in the Soviet campaign we see the 120th MRR actually shift deep objectives, from Lauterbach to Alsfeld.  Alsfeld was originally the objective of the 172 nd (see game manual); US Active Defence has no room for Soviet MRRs shifting dynamically but I do not believe for a second they would not.  If the Soviets shift the line of main effort the entire house of cards of Active Defence falls apart.  Back in the day when we were doing tactics training we were still doing pre-set KZs and in gaming the Soviets would obligingly drive straight into them and die...very nice for us, tea and medals all around.  Soviets may have had a largely conscript Army that trained to mass-template standard but these were real people with brains and, as far as WW2 demonstrated, could improvise very well.  

So the points on US/western biases have some validity, we needed the Soviets to be a mindless horde to fit our plan and not necessarily their own; there is truth in this.  In reality the 79-82 timeframe was a collision of bad assumptions on both sides.  US - active defence, Soviets - tactical and operational fluidity with very centralized command and control. Frankly after designing, building and playing the game, and watching numerous other do the same, I really have no idea how this whole thing would have turned out.  Some days I think - "no way the Soviets would have run out of gas in the first 48" and others " the US were totally screwed".   We knew this was a bit of a sweet spot but the depth of this weird little window into the Cold War continues to surprise me.

 

[danfrodo]

I listened to this video a long time ago.  It's very good.  But it still comes down to "BFC please give me mid-late 80s so I've got more Abrams and Bradleys!  I have paid my dues, watching my poor hapless M113s & M60s getting pummeled.  I want payback!!

[sawomi]

4 hours ago, danfrodo said:

 "...give me mid-late 80s" ...!!

This would mean an operational NATO attack scenario, because as of May 1987 Warsaw Pact changed the military doctrine to defensive not only in intent but also in strategic operational implementation. That means in case of war the battlefield would have been on GDR territory.

from "Fulda Gap: Battlefield of the Cold War Alliances":

Quote

In the course of the rethinking that began in the mid-1980s, the military began to deal more realistically with the consequences of a nuclear war, also in view of the Chernobyl reactor disaster. The arms race aimed at winning a nuclear war, or at least at preparing for a possible war in the best possible way, had placed a heavy economic burden not only on Moscow's allies, but especially on the Soviet Union itself. Moscow took this into account with its new view of a future war.

With the new military doctrine of 1987, the pact focused on a defense strategy with sufficient forces and means, deterred by a possible use of nuclear weapons. From now on, the frontline defense operation was at the center of the pact's strategy.

The situation of the GDR improved only marginally, however, because its territory now mutated from an operational and transit area to a direct battlefield and war zone. 

 

Edited February 17, 2022 by sawomi

[arkhangelsk2021]

2 hours ago, sawomi said:

This would mean an operational NATO attack scenario, because as of May 1987 Warsaw Pact changed the military doctrine to defensive not only in intent but also in strategic operational implementation. That means in case of war the battlefield would have been on GDR territory.

from "Fulda Gap: Battlefield of the Cold War Alliances":

 

That's it, I'm taking the plunge. Osprey clearly doesn't want my money this month anyway. Is anyone having any more like logging in to their site for purchases?

[danfrodo]

On 2/17/2022 at 3:52 PM, sawomi said:

This would mean an operational NATO attack scenario, because as of May 1987 Warsaw Pact changed the military doctrine to defensive not only in intent but also in strategic operational implementation. That means in case of war the battlefield would have been on GDR territory.

from "Fulda Gap: Battlefield of the Cold War Alliances":

 

OK, I'll take 1985 then.  Good info, thanks for sharing that.

[Simcoe]

On 2/17/2022 at 6:54 AM, The_Capt said:

Super interesting and excellent overview.  I wish it came out about a year earlier, would have saved us some research time.  In CMCW, we are really talking about the seam between these two concepts as Active Defence was still in play but Starry's thinking was beginning in inculcate the US Doctrine (he had just been V Corp Comd).  So for example the US Campaign is a narrative of what Active Defence would have looked like as the US player bounces backwards against the Soviet hordes.  Other lateral forces (3rd Armd) even swing over as per doctrine in the campaign.  If the player makes it to the end, they essentially get a proto-AirLand scenario of a deep counter-strike, as opposed to what Active Defence dictated (i.e. park here and wait).  

The Soviet campaign is the mirror opposite and demonstrates the weaknesses of Active Defence.  Despite the difficulty (and it would have been high in RL) the Soviet player always has the initiative up to Battle 4, when a US counter-attack occurs - again emergence of maneuver as oppose to KZ-centric.  Further, the Soviet demonstrate the real flaw in Active Defence, in my opinion - the Soviet "bot" concept.  Active Defence relies almost entirely on the Soviets not maneuvering below Div level and that is one helluva weak assumption.  We have had a lot of discussion (and some noise) on how nuanced Soviet C2 was or was not and some of it was likely reality and some US/western wishful thinking.  I do believe that at a tactical level MRR and below the empowerment of tactical commanders was low, they were really pointed at something at told to "go at it" but I do not believe that at the Div level the Soviets were going to stick to the US template in Active Defence of conveniently marching through 3 KZ layers.  Based on what I have seen Soviet operational doctrine was far more nuanced than that.

So in the Soviet campaign we see the 120th MRR actually shift deep objectives, from Lauterbach to Alsfeld.  Alsfeld was originally the objective of the 172 nd (see game manual); US Active Defence has no room for Soviet MRRs shifting dynamically but I do not believe for a second they would not.  If the Soviets shift the line of main effort the entire house of cards of Active Defence falls apart.  Back in the day when we were doing tactics training we were still doing pre-set KZs and in gaming the Soviets would obligingly drive straight into them and die...very nice for us, tea and medals all around.  Soviets may have had a largely conscript Army that trained to mass-template standard but these were real people with brains and, as far as WW2 demonstrated, could improvise very well.  

So the points on US/western biases have some validity, we needed the Soviets to be a mindless horde to fit our plan and not necessarily their own; there is truth in this.  In reality the 79-82 timeframe was a collision of bad assumptions on both sides.  US - active defence, Soviets - tactical and operational fluidity with very centralized command and control. Frankly after designing, building and playing the game, and watching numerous other do the same, I really have no idea how this whole thing would have turned out.  Some days I think - "no way the Soviets would have run out of gas in the first 48" and others " the US were totally screwed".   We knew this was a bit of a sweet spot but the depth of this weird little window into the Cold War continues to surprise me.

 

Thanks for sharing. I noticed each scenario in the Soviet campaign has an obvious approach that gets obliterated in a kill zone and a hidden approach that dismantles the defense from within. Was that intentional? Is that what you're describing with the weakness in active defense?

[The_Capt]

13 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Thanks for sharing. I noticed each scenario in the Soviet campaign has an obvious approach that gets obliterated in a kill zone and a hidden approach that dismantles the defense from within. Was that intentional? Is that what you're describing with the weakness in active defense?

Not sure if it was intentional.  When I built the Soviet Campaign, I pretty much started with the US defence position (in all but mission 4) based on the KZ concept.  The fact that there were hidden approaches just sort of happened, but I guess it would be true of any defensive position.  What is more telling is that I am watching players go "nope" at the obvious KZs while the entirely of US Active Defence doctrine was for the Russians to "not do that".  The Soviet Campaign is hard, by design, but based on US doctrine a that time it should be unwinnable, which it clearly is not.

Mission 2 - Eiterfeld was  pulled directly- well the map was- from a US Army wargame they had sent around back in 1979 (Bil got a copy): dkreview.pdf 

Here you can see the obvious KZs in the center of the map (we pulled up the South side a bit but it pretty much matches).  However, players as Soviets keep taking Hill 446, which is simply not "the plan".   My sense is that Active Defence would work very well if you are fighting a zombie horde but living intelligent human beings, even ones with a centralized and templated doctrine are probably going to go "nope". 

Edited February 23, 2022 by The_Capt

[Simcoe]

58 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Not sure if it was intentional.  When I built the Soviet Campaign, I pretty much started with the US defence position (in all but mission 4) based on the KZ concept.  The fact that there were hidden approaches just sort of happened, but I guess it would be true of any defensive position.  What is more telling is that I am watching players go "nope" at the obvious KZs while the entirely of US Active Defence doctrine was for the Russians to "not do that".  The Soviet Campaign is hard, by design, but based on US doctrine a that time it should be unwinnable, which it clearly is not.

Mission 2 - Eiterfeld was  pulled directly- well the map was- from a US Army wargame they had sent around back in 1979 (Bil got a copy): dkreview.pdf 

Here you can see the obvious KZs in the center of the map (we pulled up the South side a bit but it pretty much matches).  However, players as Soviets keep taking Hill 446, which is simply not "the plan".   My sense is that Active Defence would work very well if you are fighting a zombie horde but living intelligent human beings, even ones with a centralized and templated doctrine are probably going to go "nope". 

That's really cool. I'm wrapping up the 2nd mission in the Soviet campaign currently. I tried three different angles of attack without taking the hill and it doesn't seem possible NOT to take the hill before doing anything else. 

Did they really expect the Soviets to run into their kill zones? Would you recommend any websites that discuss this concept?

[The_Capt]

5 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

That's really cool. I'm wrapping up the 2nd mission in the Soviet campaign currently. I tried three different angles of attack without taking the hill and it doesn't seem possible NOT to take the hill before doing anything else. 

Did they really expect the Soviets to run into their kill zones? Would you recommend any websites that discuss this concept?

Couple really good papers:

https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/From-Active-Defense-to-AirLand-Battle.pdf

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083634.pdf

And of course there is personal experience.  They were still teaching a form of this to us back in the late 80s and early 90s as AirLand Battle and manoeuvre warfare doctrine did not really start to inculcate the Canadian military training system until the mid-90s.  We still were doing KZs and defence in depth belts.  I can recall one computer ex (thsi thing called JANUS, which probably cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and had the computing power of the old Pentiums) where we did exactly as the video above describes.  And then gleefully watch the Soviets charge headlong into the KZ, even the last vehicle who would have seen the burning hulks from miles away, charged directly in like a lemming. 

Over 30+ years one lesson we still keep learning is that "the enemy is not going to cooperate".  

[Simcoe]

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Couple really good papers:

https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/From-Active-Defense-to-AirLand-Battle.pdf

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083634.pdf

And of course there is personal experience.  They were still teaching a form of this to us back in the late 80s and early 90s as AirLand Battle and manoeuvre warfare doctrine did not really start to inculcate the Canadian military training system until the mid-90s.  We still were doing KZs and defence in depth belts.  I can recall one computer ex (thsi thing called JANUS, which probably cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and had the computing power of the old Pentiums) where we did exactly as the video above describes.  And then gleefully watch the Soviets charge headlong into the KZ, even the last vehicle who would have seen the burning hulks from miles away, charged directly in like a lemming. 

Over 30+ years one lesson we still keep learning is that "the enemy is not going to cooperate".  

Really cool. Thanks for sharing.

[THH149]

Don't drive into Kill Zones!

Another good mission is Killing Time at Kirtorf, where the US had set up a kill zone, so you need to work out a way to avoid that. Its could also be called "what happens after your forces take the ridges in training scenarios 1 and 2".

Russian training scenarios emphasise:

1. spot 'em ie the enemy (ie US)

2. bomb 'em with artillery

3. Snipe 'em with ATGMs etc

4. Blast 'em when safe with advancing massed tank fire

5. Shoot 'em with infantry once they unloaded behind the tanks and advance onto the objective

6. Run over 'em as all your vehicles reset for the next objective!

But sometimes, like in Czechmate, you have to fight for critical terrain from which to spot the enemy, so you've got to be agile/flexible in applying lessons 1-6. 

[Halmbarte]

 

7 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Not sure if it was intentional.  When I built the Soviet Campaign, I pretty much started with the US defence position (in all but mission 4) based on the KZ concept.  The fact that there were hidden approaches just sort of happened, but I guess it would be true of any defensive position.  What is more telling is that I am watching players go "nope" at the obvious KZs while the entirely of US Active Defence doctrine was for the Russians to "not do that".  The Soviet Campaign is hard, by design, but based on US doctrine a that time it should be unwinnable, which it clearly is not.

Mission 2 - Eiterfeld was  pulled directly- well the map was- from a US Army wargame they had sent around back in 1979 (Bil got a copy): dkreview.pdf 

Here you can see the obvious KZs in the center of the map (we pulled up the South side a bit but it pretty much matches).  However, players as Soviets keep taking Hill 446, which is simply not "the plan".   My sense is that Active Defence would work very well if you are fighting a zombie horde but living intelligent human beings, even ones with a centralized and templated doctrine are probably going to go "nope". 

Even the dimmest Modern Soviet Man can see there are better ways to shut down the American meat grinder than by sticking your arm into it until it seizes.

Playing as the Soviets in either WWII or CW I'm always going to try infiltration and recon with the hope of finding an unguarded path to the enemy rear that can be exploited. You don't always have time for finesse and there are occasions where you have to do a full frontal assault. But just because you have a force that's pretty good at hey diddle diddle straight up the middle doesn't mean every tactical problem should be solved that way. 

H

[THH149]

I lke the idea of the US applying AirLand Battle as soon as they work out that Active Defense aint working that well. As the vid explains, US doctrine is not meant to be taken as the only way to win, and if a commander has a better way then they are able to apply that (but the results need to show it works i guess or else its a transfer to the mexican front for that guy).

[Simcoe]

17 minutes ago, Halmbarte said:

 

Even the dimmest Modern Soviet Man can see there are better ways to shut down the American meat grinder than by sticking your arm into it until it seizes.

Playing as the Soviets in either WWII or CW I'm always going to try infiltration and recon with the hope of finding an unguarded path to the enemy rear that can be exploited. You don't always have time for finesse and there are occasions where you have to do a full frontal assault. But just because you have a force that's pretty good at hey diddle diddle straight up the middle doesn't mean every tactical problem should be solved that way. 

H

Agreed. The line of tanks is coming but there's a pretty hefty checklist before that happens. You can still use mass and speed but you need to take the dominant terrain first. The first Soviet campaign mission is a great example.