Market Garden...Was success ever a possibility

[JonS]

Let's not get carried away here. Yes, II S.S. Pz.K was in the vicinity of Arnhem, but it consisted of two grossly understrength divisions, one of which was in the process of moving back to Germany. And there should really be an asterix next to Pz., since neither division contained much in the way of armour.

Of far more import than a few clapped out Panzers was the intelligent garrisoning of the entire area around Arnhem. Practically every town and village contained some element from II S.S. Pz.K, generally consisting of a platoon or company, generally foot mobile or perhaps with some comandeered vehicles or bicycles. These small groups were able to move relatively swiftly towards Arnhem from multiple directions on the 17th, and coalesce into a coherent force to the west of the Bridge, blocking any reinforcement of Frost's battalion. But it was an essentially infantry force that stopped the 1st Airborne Division.

The importance of the aerial recce photos of the German tanks near Arnhem has been greatly exaggerated ever since that highly tendentious movie of Ryan's already rather partial book.

Yes, Op M-G was, in retrospect, overly ambitious, but the relevant commanders had pretty good reasons to think it would be a success, as it so nearly was. In the end the difference between success and failure came down to a matter of mere hours.

[Broadsword56]

And the really brilliant -- maybe decisive -- thing was how the German command reacted and improvised so well as the battles developed, grabbing troops from all over and funneling them into action.

None of the Allied planners could have anticipated this by just looking at the maps and OOBs and intelligence that all suggested the Germans were a spent force.

I'm sure military academies will study that for many years to come.

[YankeeDog]

And the really brilliant -- maybe decisive -- thing was how the German command reacted and improvised so well as the battles developed, grabbing troops from all over and funneling them into action.

None of the Allied planners could have anticipated this by just looking at the maps and OOBs and intelligence that all suggested the Germans were a spent force.

I'm sure military academies will study that for many years to come.

Well, yes. But the speed and confidence of the German reaction can at least in part be credited to the fact that the Germans captured a very detailed description of the Allied plan of attack early in the operation. So they didn't have to do much guesswork at all as to where the Allies were headed, and when; this info was conveniently provided for them.

[JonS]

And the really brilliant -- maybe decisive -- thing was how the German command reacted and improvised so well as the battles developed, grabbing troops from all over and funneling them into action.

Yes, fully agree (and I think I mentioned something to that effect in an earlier post in this thread?)

None of the Allied planners could have anticipated this by just looking at the maps and OOBs and intelligence that all suggested the Germans were a spent force.

Yes, although ... I don't know if any of the Allied nations could, in similar circumstances, have improvised as rapidly and effectively*. But the Int wonks, at least, should have been well aware of the German ability to improvise rapidly and decisively when necessary. They'd seen it in Tunisia, Sicily, at Salerno, at Anzio, and to varying degrees at different times during the Normandy campaign. Those weren't all flukes, that's just the way the Germans did things, and the Int wonks are paid to know that and use it to think and act like the enemy.

Still, if you've no idea how many parachute training schools there are spread across Germany, nor how many staff and students were enrolled in each of them in mid-1944, you'd have no way of assessing how quickly the 1st Fallschirm Armee could be whipped together, nor how strong it could become.

Jon

* although, the Allies weren't completely inept on the improvisational front. Op MG was an excellent example of mounting a major operation at essentailly no-notice. So was Op SLAPSTICK, and even things like Ops TOTALISE and TRACTABLE were put together with what seems like astonishing rapidity given the scale of resources involved. The US has their share, too, including the response to Op LUTTICH, and the breakout from Avranches.

[Vark]

Fast and Furious was not a continuation with Bush's Wide Receiver programme. Wide Receiver attempted to track the weapons after having being sold, and had the cooperation of the Mexican government. Fast and Furious was run without the Mexican governments knowledge, actively discouraged agents in tracking the weapons and resulted in the death of a Border Agent.

The Justice Department did not stop it, but reacted sluggishly after whistleblowers broke the details, and is now accused of a cover up and deliberate disinformation on the operation. Minor details I know, but when Watergate II arrives don't be too surprised at the tale of groupthink pervading a large organisation, and the especially pernicious effect of self-appointed mind guards.

As for judging Arnhem with 20/20 hindsight, imagine the opposite tale. That an operation, that could have saved immeasurable lives, was cancelled because of the fear that the Germans had massively reinforced the area, which post-war turned out to be false. How would history then have judged the respective commanders? War is about calculated risk, unfortunately, you have very little idea about what is happening when you assess that risk (a fact CM portrays very well). Just to say it went ahead to protect reputations is somewhat disingenuous and conjures up the "Oh what a Lovely War" portrait of generalship, unthinking, uncaring glory seekers.

[Erwin]

"unthinking, uncaring glory seekers..." It's never everybody, and many are wonderful, but clearly there were quite a few...

[Broadsword56]

And the problem is not so much glory seekers at the top, but ordinarily good, decent and moral people -- the worker bees -- who find themselves in a situation they've never expected or prepared to handle, a situation that suddenly demands great moral courage.

Imagine being trained and loyal to a specific corporate/military/political/institutional culture, then suddenly discovering wrongdoing or a grave error. Reporting or stopping it goes against everything you've ever been taught. Every pressure and incentive presses you to just keep quiet, follow the herd, and go along. Or you do report it through proper channels, and the organization reasssures you that -- don't worry -- it's all being taken care of, now go back to work and stop worrying about it.

History and the present day are full of these situations, and I can't really blame the people who were faced with these decisions and failed to do the right thing. I hope I would, but who knows what we would really do until we face that situation ourselves.

[Vark]

True, Erwin, but in regards to Market Garden who fits the "quite a few" category?

Broadsword, having been in similar situations, to those you list, with the added fun of threats of physical violence, I can say the following. One of the main reasons for sticking to my guns (alas, as I live in the UK that is not a literal description) was the deep seated anger at what I had discovered/endured. It was this, at times volcanic rage, that allowed me to finally triumph, but it was hard not to query my own motives when I saw the impact on my family.

[Broadsword56]

True, Erwin, but in regards to Market Garden who fits the "quite a few" category?

Broadsword, having been in similar situations, to those you list, with the added fun of threats of physical violence, I can say the following. One of the main reasons for sticking to my guns (alas, as I live in the UK that is not a literal description) was the deep seated anger at what I had discovered/endured. It was this, at times volcanic rage, that allowed me to finally triumph, but it was hard not to query my own motives when I saw the impact on my family.

Thank you for your courage, Vark. IMHO, our civilization and democracy would be better off (to prevent all the distasters cited higher in this thread) if our schools actually *taught* moral courage to kids when they're young. It could be a completely nonpartisan type of civics class, with lessons about how to recognize when "your moment of decision" is at hand, how to speak out, recognize what a "conflict of interest" is and why it's a bad thing, handle retaliation, etc. Obviously you can't "teach" an emotion like courage, but you can give them practical and philosophical tools to help them recognize such situations for what they are and deal with them. It even connects to the anti-bullying efforts going on now, since bullying only thrives because of all the passive bystanders who keep their heads down and lay low.

[Vark]

Broadsword, as a teacher I heartily concur, and only today was teaching about when to show restraint and when to retaliate. Students then asked how do you know when to pick the two options, as though they need to learn it formulaically and were quite perturbed by my equivocal response. Still, Western education is so badly flawed at the moment, in producing young adults with the basic skills to face the realities of the 21st Century world, that teaching moral courage, whilst highly desirable, is not alas a priority. For starters, it would be nice to have ALL the students in my classes spell their own names correctly/and or use capitals in doing so!

[Michael Emrys]

Sometimes because the underlings don't protest loudly enough, not wanting to risk their own careers. Or sometimes their bosses bury the warnings in a desk drawer because they're afraid exposing the failure will reflect badly on their department. Or sometimes the operation is just so big, involves so much prestige and money, has powerful political backing, and is so deep-rooted that it has acquired an unstoppable momentum of its own.

Then there are all the warnings of this and that which come pouring into any intelligence operation. How to pick out from the general noise which ones are worth attending to? A lot of times it comes down to the experience and intuition of the officer who is handling it, and sometimes he guesses wrong.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Broadsword, as a teacher I heartily concur, and only today was teaching about when to show restraint and when to retaliate. Students then asked how do you know when to pick the two options, as though they need to learn it formulaically and were quite perturbed by my equivocal response. Still, Western education is so badly flawed at the moment, in producing young adults with the basic skills to face the realities of the 21st Century world, that teaching moral courage, whilst highly desirable, is not alas a priority. For starters, it would be nice to have ALL the students in my classes spell their own names correctly/and or use capitals in doing so!

I honestly don't know how to tell you how completely I agree with all of that. Good work and keep going!

Michael

[Childress]

Still, Western education is so badly flawed at the moment, in producing young adults with the basic skills to face the realities of the 21st Century world, that teaching moral courage, whilst highly desirable, is not alas a priority.

Basic skills? A good friend, who's a HS teacher for the LA Unified School District, would be elated if her charges refrained from dropping the F Bomb on her during class. They're pig ignorant of history (except American transgressions), geography, literature, math and science (except global warming). But loaded to the gills with 'self-esteem'.

[noob]

Thank you for your courage, Vark. IMHO, our civilization and democracy would be better off (to prevent all the distasters cited higher in this thread) if our schools actually *taught* moral courage to kids when they're young.

This seems a bit naive considering the immense power vested interests have, and use, to maintain the status quo, i see nothing short of violent revolution for any meaningful structural change in any country.

However a teaching programme could work if it actually threatened those interests, then that could possibly cause those interests to suppress those teachings, which in turn could facilitate violent resistance and a meaningful revolution........like Communism in the 20th century.

[Erwin]

Re MG even tho' I admire Monty I think it started with his seeing MG as the key to him winning the war "single-handedly" and cutting the glory from Patton and then on downwards in M's staff who most assuredly had bought in to the same dream. Seen it happen in other companies and chat forums all the time (heh).

[MengJiaoRedux]

Let's not get carried away here. Yes, II S.S. Pz.K was in the vicinity of Arnhem, but it consisted of two grossly understrength divisions, one of which was in the process of moving back to Germany. And there should really be an asterix next to Pz., since neither division contained much in the way of armour.

Of far more import than a few clapped out Panzers was the intelligent garrisoning of the entire area around Arnhem. Practically every town and village contained some element from II S.S. Pz.K, generally consisting of a platoon or company, generally foot mobile or perhaps with some comandeered vehicles or bicycles. These small groups were able to move relatively swiftly towards Arnhem from multiple directions on the 17th, and coalesce into a coherent force to the west of the Bridge, blocking any reinforcement of Frost's battalion. But it was an essentially infantry force that stopped the 1st Airborne Division.

The importance of the aerial recce photos of the German tanks near Arnhem has been greatly exaggerated ever since that highly tendentious movie of Ryan's already rather partial book.

Yes, Op M-G was, in retrospect, overly ambitious, but the relevant commanders had pretty good reasons to think it would be a success, as it so nearly was. In the end the difference between success and failure came down to a matter of mere hours.

So if that formation had not been there, then MG might have worked as planned.

[sburke]

So if that formation had not been there, then MG might have worked as planned.

A lot of what ifs that worked out differently might have resulted in it working out as planned. Nature of war. For want of a nail and all that.

I'll have to say, my view of Monty is definitely due for an update. I've learned a lot from discussions on this forum and realized I do have a skewed historical perspective that is in need of more research. That is one of the things I like about history. It isn't fixed, it is simply our knowledge at any one moment is fixed. New information leads to new understandings. Things are always far more complicated than we generally want to face.

I was in Rome this month and did the tour of the Forum again and learned a few new things about Nero and the fire that I believe is the result of new archaeological evidence and political understandings of the situation in Rome at the time. Also an interesting comment by the docent - Take the history you know with a grain of salt. Roman history was written by those in the Senate and they had reason to hate Nero.

[JonS]

So if [iI SS PzK] had not been there, then MG might have worked as planned.

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showpost.php?p=1361580&postcount=45

[Vark]

Sburke, have you read Norman Dixon's "On the psychology of military incompetence"? There is a good chapter on Monty and a possible explanation for his military behaviour.

[sburke]

Sburke, have you read Norman Dixon's "On the psychology of military incompetence"? There is a good chapter on Monty and a possible explanation for his military behaviour.

No I have not. oh crap another book to the ever growing pile to be read. Unfortunately that pile was working great in between CM releases, but it now appears the CM releases are going to interfere with my book reading.... Damn you BF!!!!

[Vark]

Yeah, in the same boat, been bitten by the Norman conquest bug! As my wife wearily remarks, looking at the scattered tomes, we can always get another bookshelf, trouble is where will it go! Dixon's book is a must, some real eye-opening stuff that you can apply to yourself, or your work colleagues!

[Michael Emrys]

I'll have to say, my view of Monty is definitely due for an update.

Monty is a hard one to get right (as is also true BTW of almost all of the major players). In some ways he was an excellent general. In others, he can drive you to despair. Fitting those two contradictory sides of his personality together can be a real challenge.

Michael