Market Garden...Was success ever a possibility

[acehammer]

You know, there's a saying that runs something like 'better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak out and remove all doubt.'

The plan wasn't to lauch XXX Corps unsupported into Germany. The plan was for XXX Corps (and 1st AAA) to secure a launching pad.

Hopefully you can perceive the subtle difference there.

FSM give me strength

Gee, thanks for getting me right on this. 30 Corps was'nt going to take the Ruhr by itself, Ike and Patton were fools for thinking wide front.

[Paper Tiger]

Hindsight is such a wonderful thing. Since we all know how it turned out, we find it hard to see what an exciting and innovative idea it was. It must have looked like a good idea at the time and they obviously thought that there was a real chance that they could pull it off. It wasn't unreasonable to believe that the Germans were out of the game after the thrashing they'd just taken. The Germans astonished the Allies and would have done so wherever the Allies had made their next effort. The war wasn't going to be over before Christmas because there was too much fight left in the German army. If the Allies had gone with another plan, we'd all be asking if 'Plan X' could really have worked.

[Michael Emrys]

...we find it hard to see what an exciting and innovative idea it was.

It seems to me—once again with the wonderful benefit of hindsight—that the idea of an airborne carpet was seriously overplaying their hand. First of all, they didn't have enough transports to land three complete divisions on the first day and keep them supplied thereafter. This coupled with some questionable choices for landing zones put the airborne troops at a serious disadvantage from the get go. It's outstanding that they did as well as they did.

Michael

[Elmar Bijlsma]

I'm off the opinion that Market Garden was worth doing. What else were the Allies going to do at this point?

The first attempt on getting past Antwerp had already sputtered out, so that does not look promising if you want to have a last try at keeping the Germans on the back foot. Certainly not if you need to go island hopping across Zeeland afterwards too.

So, leaves us with Patton. Who in their right mind would give Patton their last supplies? Not exactly known for his careful husbanding of supplies and grasp of logistics. His genius did not exactly lie in that direction, to say a kind thing. And for what prize? Backing Patton would see you master off an awkward bit of non essential Germany, with a populace the Allies were at the time rather fearful off. And all that at the far end of a tricky supply line. The gains made would no doubt look impressive on a map, but would not get Allies much closer to knocking the Germans out of the war.

MG on the other hand, could see you bag tens of thousands of Germans in Holland and Zeeland. Plus you'd get the ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam and possibly Amsterdam/IJmuiden. And then past the Reichswald and into the Ruhr, the heartland of industrial Germany. And your supply lines go through an area where the chief danger to the troops would be contracting VDs. If you have only one shot at VE day in '44, this plan looked like the best bet.

Besides, it is wrong to think of MG as a no hoper. How close they came to success despite all the flaws and mishaps! Had the Allies had things go their way on one or two occasionss, i could well see this have a success. Alas, it was not to be.

It's popular to blame Monty for it's failure, or maybe XXX corps. But if you absolutely must identify the fingerprints of defeat I'd suggest you ink up General Gavin's hands. 82nd seriously screwed the pooch with their inaction in the opening stages. The 504th's stellar achievement later would not make up for the failures.

But even so, how close they game.

It was a risky gamble but with a huge payout upon success.

You win some, you lose some. Such is war. This was a loss, but a loss that saw important gains be made. In WWI Haig would have loved to be defeated like this!

The most remarkable thing about MG's place in history is the vitriol with which blame was assigned. And I think that was more to do with poisonous atmosphere in parts of the US Press Corps, which kicked off decades of arguing, then any failings in men and their plans. The Allies had failures before without leading to so much articles written with ill will.

[Rocky Balboa]

Hindsight is such a wonderful thing. Since we all know how it turned out, we find it hard to see what an exciting and innovative idea it was. It must have looked like a good idea at the time and they obviously thought that there was a real chance that they could pull it off. It wasn't unreasonable to believe that the Germans were out of the game after the thrashing they'd just taken. The Germans astonished the Allies and would have done so wherever the Allies had made their next effort. The war wasn't going to be over before Christmas because there was too much fight left in the German army. If the Allies had gone with another plan, we'd all be asking if 'Plan X' could really have worked.

Well this is an excellent point. On a much smaller scale when playing CMBN, I can't count how many times I thought I had my opponent on the run and pushed the assault to quickly and with little preparation only to be delivered a bloody nose in the process.

[YankeeDog]

.

So, leaves us with Patton. Who in their right mind would give Patton their last supplies? Not exactly known for his careful husbanding of supplies and grasp of logistics. His genius did not exactly lie in that direction, to say a kind thing.

Actually, during the race across France, the battles in Alsace-Lorraine and later in the 3rd Army's counterattack during the Battle of the Bulge, Patton proved himself quite adept at maintaining the offensive despite long supply chains and very limited logistics. See also the 3rd Army's crossing of the Rhine, wherein Patton actually beat Monty across the Rhine, despite Monty's Operation Varsity having logistics and support priority. Patton got across the river for fraction of the supplies used and lives lost in Varsity.

And for what prize? Backing Patton would see you master off an awkward bit of non essential Germany, with a populace the Allies were at the time rather fearful off. And all that at the far end of a tricky supply line.

Maybe not as nice a plum as the lower Rhine, but had Patton kept going after Arracourt, he was headed straight for the Rhine via Saarbrucken or Karlsruhe, and would have been threatening Frankfurt. Hardly an "awkward bit of non essential Germany", if you ask me. Yes, the supply lines to here certainly would have been tricky, but not really much worse than the supply line through Arnhem, at least until Antwerp or another major port was made useable; an issue which the Allies didn't really have a plan for even if MG did go as hoped. Did they think the Germans garrison entrenched at Walacheren Island and along the Scheldt, or in Amsterdam, were just going to give up and let them use the port(s) to supply XXX Corps a charge across the Rhine once the Bridge at Arnhem was secured? I would still have taken weeks to clear, de-mine, and repair either port, and XXX Corps wasn't going to go very far across the Rhine until the Allies had a working deep-water port nearby to supply them.

Which is, of course, why I say the right move was to throw everything into clearing the Scheldt and getting Antwerp working as a port. I wouldn't have thrown my lot in with Patton either, but not due to any deficiencies in Patton as a commander, or because the objectives in front of 3rd Army were necessarily undesirable. In September 1944, the allies just need that port more than they needed anything else.

[Michael Emrys]

I[t] would still have taken weeks to clear, de-mine, and repair either port...

Antwerp was captured pretty much intact and the mine clearing shouldn't have taken more than a few days once the estuary was out of range of German artillery. If it had been a clear priority for 21st. AG that first of all the German 15th. Armee was not to be allowed to escape to Walcheren, and secondly that it and North Beveland were to be occupied by Allied forces as quickly as possible, the port of Antwerp could have been servicing deep water vessels well before the end of September.

Which is, of course, why I say the right move was to throw everything into clearing the Scheldt and getting Antwerp working as a port. I wouldn't have thrown my lot in with Patton either, but not due to any deficiencies in Patton as a commander, or because the objectives in front of 3rd Army were necessarily undesirable. In September 1944, the allies just need that port more than they needed anything else.

There you go. Couldn't agree more.

Michael

[JonS]

mine clearing shouldn't have taken more than a few days once the estuary was out of range of German artillery.

No, that's hopelessly unrealistic. Clearing the mines the Germans used was a process that took weeks of repetitive, intensive, nerve wracking effort.

[chas_in_mlb]

Off topic but this question burns to be answered: Where did the whole "Hun" thing get started, anyway? I know the British used it in WWI ("Beware of the Hun in the Sun" the aviators always said), but why "Hun"? Did Attila have anything to do with Germany or the land that was to become Germany? Or was it just a label that helped portray the enemy as warlike barbarian hordes?

If it hasn't already been answered, it was Rudyard Kipling. He wrote a poem for the British papers, with the line "the Hun is at the gate"; inferring that the Germans were invaders bent on destroying civilization as analogous to what happened in the late Roman Empire in the west.

For all we have and are,

For all our children's fate,

Stand up and take the war.

The Hun is at the gate!

Our world has passed away,

In wantonness o'erthrown.

There is nothing left to-day

But steel and fire and stone!

Though all we knew depart,

The old Commandments stand: --

"In courage keep your heart,

In strength lift up your hand."

Once more we hear the word

That sickened earth of old: --

"No law except the Sword

Unsheathed and uncontrolled."

Once more it knits mankind,

Once more the nations go

To meet and break and bind

A crazed and driven foe.

Comfort, content, delight,

The ages' slow-bought gain,

They shrivelled in a night.

Only ourselves remain

To face the naked days

In silent fortitude,

Through perils and dismays

Renewed and re-renewed.

Though all we made depart,

The old Commandments stand: --

"In patience keep your heart,

In strength lift up your hand."

No easy hope or lies

Shall bring us to our goal,

But iron sacrifice

Of body, will, and soul.

There is but one task for all --

One life for each to give.

What stands if Freedom fall?

Who dies if England live?

Edwardian Englishmen likened the British Empire to that of the Roman Empire- historians like Gibbon created the myth of the "Pax Romana" and "Hun" was a term that Kipling's readers could understand and correlate to their predicament in 1914, as they saw as a direct threat to their empire.

[Aragorn2002]

With as result two terrible world wars which destroyed not only the British empire, but Europe at the same time. History can be cruel.

[StellarRat]

Far bolder and less planned operations have succeeded in the past. The Trojan Horse and the crossing of the Delaware come to mind. As always there is LUCK and SKILL in all military campaigns. So, YES, it did have a chance to succeed IMO.

[YankeeDog]

Far bolder and less planned operations have succeeded in the past. The Trojan Horse and the crossing of the Delaware come to mind. As always there is LUCK and SKILL in all military campaigns. So, YES, it did have a chance to succeed IMO.

The Trojan Horse is a myth. Like many myths, it may well be based on a historical event, but there really isn't much of anything that can be said for certain about actual event that inspired it. And in any event, the myth tells the story a very carefully planned ruse, not a hastily executed "Hail Mary" attack. So bold, sure. But "less planned" certainly not. IMHO, it would be better compared to Operation Bodyguard; the operation that convinced the Germans that the Allied landing would be coming in Pas de Calais or even Norway, rather than Normandy.

Washington's crossing of the Delaware was a limited, hit-and-fade raid. It was also very carefully planned. Unlike the plan for Market Garden, Washington's plan for the Delaware raid paid careful attention to intelligence on the enemy disposition, set realistic goals, and incorporated multiple contingencies and redundancies; indeed this is probably why it succeeded despite several setbacks. The original plan called for three coordinated crossings, only one of which really succeeded. The weather was dreadful, which further complicated the already challenging crossings. And after the raid was over, a substantial number of Continental soldiers also got drunk on captured stores of rum, which jeopardized the return crossing. But Washington had planned things well enough that the Army was able to overcome these problems.

If anything, the Delaware raid is a good case example of the kind of careful planning and allowance for contingencies that should go into planning a bold military operation, things that were largely absent from the plans for Market Garden.

[sburke]

The Trojan Horse is a myth. Like many myths, it may well be based on a historical event, but there really isn't much of anything that can be said for certain about actual event that inspired it. And in any event, the myth tells the story a very carefully planned ruse, not a hastily executed "Hail Mary" attack. So bold, sure. But "less planned" certainly not. IMHO, it would be better compared to Operation Bodyguard; the operation that convinced the Germans that the Allied landing would be coming in Pas de Calais or even Norway, rather than Normandy.

I am not one to often defend Montgomery. In fact I am not sure I ever have. That being said, I would agree the crossing of the Delaware and Trojan horse are probably not good examples. Neither of those situations was afflicted by one item everyone on the allied side had in plenty. Montgomery, Bradley, Eisenhower and Patton were all convinced the German army was on the ropes and incapable of reacting to the tempo of battle.

Patton would pay for that attitude in the Metz campaign where his capabilities as a commander would come up short. Bradley would allow the US army to squander it's advantages in the Huertgen and Eisenhower as theatre commander missed that the Allies had reached the limit of what they could reasonably expect to do without taking time to regroup and deal with their logistical situation.

The fact that everyone was arguing about where to focus their resources for the next offensive is indicative that no one realized they had already passed the point where further offensive action was likely not the smart move right now. In that context, Montgomery was simply following the same pattern as everyone else in SHAEF. They had already written off any possible reaction on the German side as having any real bearing on their plans.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but is missing the key component that the Allied commanders faced, FOW.

[YankeeDog]

I do not lay all the blame for Market Garden's failure at Monty's feet, either. Certainly, as the one most directly responsible for coming up with the idea and plan for the operation, he deserves his fair share. But there's more than enough blame to go around, and individuals both above him and below him in the command chain deserve their portion as well.

Eisenhower is certainly the one that must ultimately bear responsibility for the "victory disease" that permeated SHAEF after the race across France. By this point in the war, he should have known better than to underestimate the Germans, and he should not have allowed such a dangerous attitude to permeate his headquarters.

And Patton and Bradley certainly didn't cover themselves with accolades at Huertgen and Metz, respectively. Though at Metz, I do think Patton gets a *little bit* of a bye in that he was working with a very constrained supply situation, esp. wrt heavy artillery ammunition. This problem was especially felt in the siege and reduction of the heavy forts in and around Metz. If Market Garden had not been given supply priority (and/or if the Allies had focused on getting Antwerp usable as a port rather than MG), then the siege of Metz probably would have been considerably easier.

But overall, Patton's best command decisions were not made at Metz. Ironically, Montgomery's skills as a commander were probably better suited to the kind of tactical situations that existed at Huertgen and Metz, and Patton was probably better suited than Montgomery to be in overall command of an operation like Market Garden. But Montgomery wanted to show that he could out-Patton Patton, and vice versa, it seems. While in many ways polar opposites, one way that Montgomery and Patton were two of a kind was in the size of their egos.

[sburke]

While in many ways polar opposites, one way that Montgomery and Patton were two of a kind was in the size of their egos.

Walking stick and funky sweaters verus spit and polish with stupid looking revolvers... hmm I think I'd have taken Monty's look for the cover of the GI edition for GQ. The bit with the pistols would have me worried about my commander's mental balance. But yeah, the egos were monumental. Politicians and Generals have a lot in common.

[Michael Emrys]

Ironically, Montgomery's skills as a commander were probably better suited to the kind of tactical situations that existed at Huertgen and Metz, and Patton was probably better suited than Montgomery to be in overall command of an operation like Market Garden.

That was something that I was thinking of posting if you hadn't beat me to it. It was one of the war's great ironies that the two generals were each given a chance to try the other's favorite dish and neither liked it.

Michael

[Sakai007]

Lord, why do all of us Yanks have to hate on Montgomery's clothing choices. He is British, might as well be from a different planet as far as clothing goes. Personally, I liked Patton's style of dress. The man was full of himself, and probably a touch insane, just what you need to beat the most battle hardened army in the world at the time. It's kind of scary to think what would have become in Europe if the Ruskies had made a separate peace and all those highly skilled corps from the Eastern Front had reinforced the West before MG.

[para]

I read somewhere that Patton had his men appropriate a fair chunk of the supplies earmarked for OMG.

Is this true?

[YankeeDog]

I read somewhere that Patton had his men appropriate a fair chunk of the supplies earmarked for OMG.

Is this true?

Not really. 3rd Army's Quartermaster Corps got pretty good at "creative acquisition," and you'll find incidents here and there of supplies intended for elsewhere somehow ending up in the 3rd Army's stores. But they were far from the only formation in the allied armies doing this, and in any event from what I can tell, the lion's share of what was supposed to go to XXX Corps and the other units involved in Market Garden, did.

[Michael Emrys]

I read somewhere that Patton had his men appropriate a fair chunk of the supplies earmarked for OMG.

Is this true?

Unlikely. I'd reckon that most of the stuff they "requisitioned" came from First Army.

Michael

[sburke]

Lord, why do all of us Yanks have to hate on Montgomery's clothing choices. He is British, might as well be from a different planet as far as clothing goes. Personally, I liked Patton's style of dress. The man was full of himself, and probably a touch insane, just what you need to beat the most battle hardened army in the world at the time. It's kind of scary to think what would have become in Europe if the Ruskies had made a separate peace and all those highly skilled corps from the Eastern Front had reinforced the West before MG.

Don't sell us short, our grandfathers, great uncles etc trashed 1st and 2nd SS PzK along with a number of other good divisions. About the only premiere divisons they didn't face were Wiking and GrossDeutschland. I would also say at this time one might reconsider battle hardened as the correct word in favor of battle fatigued. There comes a point where the edge wears off and the unit without time to regroup, re train etc loses it's battle acumen and just starts getting punch drunk in a way. As to a separate peace, fat chance. The Third Reich had made it's bed with the Russians. The only way they could have made a separate peace was to surrender almost everything directly to Stalin. The Russians were outright winning now. Blood was in the water and that Shark knew it. Besides, our plan was to nuke them and that would have stayed the plan if it had to be.

And I wasn't hating on Monty's clothing. I think the relaxed manner has a different and from my view better impact on your average grunt than walking around like a peacock prima donna. Patton was admired while he won whereas Monty's troops as far as I understand adored him through thick and thin. That could be an errant perception based on what materials I've read, I'd love to hear from those with better knowledge.

[Michael Emrys]

I think the relaxed manner has a different and from my view better impact on your average grunt than walking around like a peacock prima donna. Patton was admired while he won whereas Monty's troops as far as I understand adored him through thick and thin. That could be an errant perception based on what materials I've read, I'd love to hear from those with better knowledge.

I tend to agree with you. I think troop morale depends mostly on whether they feel like they are on the winning team. They will put up with danger and privation as long as they are making progress, and the more dramatic the better. Every vet I ever met from 3rd. Army made sure that I knew it, but I never heard any vet from any of the other ETO armies boast of the fact. On the other hand, I once met one who had been a captain on Patton's staff who told me, "I coulda shot the sonofabitch!" So, his soldiers may have been proud to serve under him, but that does not mean he was universally loved.

Montgomery made sure that Tommy knew that he was cared for. As a consequence, he was personally well liked even when slow progress meant high levels of frustration at times. And he tended to select his staff officers from among those whom he knew were personally loyal to him, even if they were not the most competent. One thing that I think gets overlooked by those evaluating him as a general is that he had a shrewd idea of what his soldiers and armies were capable of and what they were not, and most of the time he tailored his strategy and tactics accordingly. That meant heavy reliance on artillery, the most professional and accomplished arm of the army and resultant careful and detailed planning that unfortunately lacked flexibility. But greater flexibility would likely have proven a will-o'-the-wisp. If given greater latitude to exercise leadership initiative, most of his officers wouldn't have known what to do with it. Unlike the German army, they hadn't much preparation or encouragement in its use. Monty used what he had to hand, and if he committed a blunder now and then, well so did more or less everybody else. War is like that.

And so it goes...

Michael

[Hessian deserter]

IMO... Only in Mont'ys dreams. Ike should have given those resources to Patton to go through the SAAR....IKE,IKE,IKE always kissin Mont'ys behind

[Dave85]

Don't sell us short, our grandfathers, great uncles etc trashed 1st and 2nd SS PzK along with a number of other good divisions. About the only premiere divisons they didn't face were Wiking and GrossDeutschland. I would also say at this time one might reconsider battle hardened as the correct word in favor of battle fatigued. There comes a point where the edge wears off and the unit without time to regroup, re train etc loses it's battle acumen and just starts getting punch drunk in a way. As to a separate peace, fat chance. The Third Reich had made it's bed with the Russians. The only way they could have made a separate peace was to surrender almost everything directly to Stalin. The Russians were outright winning now. Blood was in the water and that Shark knew it. Besides, our plan was to nuke them and that would have stayed the plan if it had to be.

And I wasn't hating on Monty's clothing. I think the relaxed manner has a different and from my view better impact on your average grunt than walking around like a peacock prima donna. Patton was admired while he won whereas Monty's troops as far as I understand adored him through thick and thin. That could be an errant perception based on what materials I've read, I'd love to hear from those with better knowledge.

Another Interesting 'what if' this one. To be honest if for whatever reason (obviously would never have happened) the russians were out of the war by the start of '44, I cant see what the allies could have done short of trying to bomb germany into submission for several years.

Could overlord ever have even got off the beaches without the eastern front? not likely IMO. If they had somehow gained a strong foothold in normandy, maybe they could have held it, but could they have broken out? considering how much trouble it was in the event, I cant really see it being possible against an army 3 times the size. The western allies trying to defeat the huns in a land campaign on a single front would have made their casualties in WW1 seem trivial.

I struggle to see what possible outcome there could have been other than 'A' bombing germany into oblivion. Take nuclear weapons out of the equasion, god only knows what would have happened. Another armistace? With that lunatic running the show, not likely.

[Vark]

My late grandfather in law, god bless him, adored Monty and would talk movingly about how his arrival changed the atmosphere, virtually overnight. Monty was excellent at self-promotion but he seems to have been able to say just the right things to get his men fired up.

Interesting the talk about under-estimating the Germans, during post-war briefings some German Generals asked their Soviet captors, why they had not proceeded, during one operation, more quickly. The Soviets said they were worried that the Germans were drawing them into a trap, at which the Germans had a hollow chuckle and told the Russians what forces they actually had. The Russian response was along the lines of better safe than sorry, which seems counter to the traditional, full speed ahead and damn the torpedoeski attitude we often read about.