Volksgrenadiers

[flamingknives]

Although SMGs were still in use in regular infantry until the 1980s and, with ammunition improvements, are still used by support troops.

[coe]

I was following along with this discussion and it led me to reading a bit about the September 1944 in Nancy, France (that area)...it seems like the Americans romped on the Germans even defeating some decent formations (15th PzGr) and out maneuvering them. Whereas the German attacks seemed rather clumsy - either way it seems the loss ratio favored the Americans...any explanations for this? Any thoughts about the outcome if it were the russians or british in place of the Americans instead?

It seems the Americans were well organized where the Germans just didn't know where things were.

Was it the initial disorganization of the Germans that might have allowed the penetrations of their lines and rather large losses (I was reading some stuff from the Combined Arms research library).

[JasonC]

First, the Americans weren't just anybody, this was third army and the men who created the US armor branch - Patton, Wood, Abrams. In their first serious fight as an army, after a largely unopposed romp across France. They certainly outscored the Germans in the September Lorraine fighting, not just better able to afford it but a better than one to one exchange ratio, despite having 75mm Shermans against Panthers.

The overall German strategic situation was not good, but their "play" was worse. They were trying to patch together some sort of continuous front while the Allies were caught in logistical problems, created by grabbing all of France in one month. They first tried overconfident sorties west of the Moselle and lost entire brand new Panzer brigades in a matter of days.

On one occasion, a single combat command of a French armor division (US equipment and pattern) KOed practically all the Panthers and about half the Pz IVs of a fresh brigade, in one day. Caught them in a valley village area from two sides, with Priests and Shermans hitting from flanks anything that peeked over the crest line, while tossing HE into the valley. The Germans thought they were loaning that brigade to the front line for a probe for 48 hours; instead they just lost it.

The Panzer brigades were a mistake from the begining. Panzer commanders recommended using new tanks to refit existing Panzer divisions, to get their cadres, experienced staffs, and all make use of their remaining all arms support. But OKW overrule that, and made new KG sized formations instead, out of green men. Wanted more armor formations on the map, psychologically, perhaps. More likely, they wanted to control the commitment of the new armor, and in particular to ensure it got offensive missions.

Which was another mistake, but one the whole arm made over and over again, a few staff officers excepted. Their armor doctrine was ridiculously offensive minded. It had worked in 1940 and in 1942, and they didn't adapt well to it no longer working. I'll detail that story below. But first, understand that the higher ups snapped up any armor at all fresh and not immediately in the line, for grandious counterattack schemes.

Hitler thought he was pulling a repetition of Manstein's famous "backhand blow" in the Kharkov counterattack, early 1943. Which restored the front in southern Russia, by catching overextended and logistically weakened Russian armor spearheads, cutting them off from supporting units farther back, devouring them, and then repeating the process farther up the trail of following exploitation forces.

OKW thought the Americans were as logistically overextended after grabbing France. Which was largely true, in the gasoline area at any rate. But the US army wasn't a horsedrawn affair. Except for a division left behind in Brittany to mop up port hold outs, all of third army was up with the leaders, basically. The leading forces did stall for a week, but they weren't thin. And by the time the Germans assembled a serious force, they has gas again, too. The few formations thrown in prematurely - piecemeal - were about three echelons too small to have any impact on an entire mechanized army, and were simply devoured.

Along the Moselle the Germans did put together a solid line, from Nancy to Metz. It was a good position and defended by good troops. Some of them fresh VG holding cities and forests, some of them veteran Pz Gdrs from Italy or SS formations up around Metz etc. But the Americans punched across. The Germans decided this was a perfect occasion for their grandious counterattack, meant to smash what they thought would be a relatively weak spearhead thrown across a tough river barrier.

The result was the famous Arracourt battles. Panthers charged every morning in fog, to avoid allied air. The result was a series of knife fights at 200m, which the US won hands down. They were more often in their own defensive zone, better visibility, TDs heard the Panthers coming, Shermans flanked them, etc.

This was not unusual, actually. The German record on the attack with armor against the Americans was pretty poor. Kasserine worked at first, broke in the end. Same for the Bulge. They regularly got through the front line infantry and then lost the fight with reserves in the depth of the American defensive zone. This happened not once, but eventually in the late stages of Kasserine, at El Guettar, at Salerno, with 17th SS's attack in the Cotentin, with Lehr's attack north of St Lo in July, with Mortain, and with Arracourt. It was a regular pattern.

If you sit back on a hill top 2 km away with a platoon of Panthers hull down, crawling over the right bit of crest for the shot you want, your flanks covered by a half dozen other such hill tops, with PAK in front, infantry in the woods and villages, arty on call - you have a great defense. Few US weapons can seriously hurt you. But instead, thrust forward with a whole battalion of Panthers at once, down 2-3 roads a company on each, and what happens? Do you get through the front line battalion? Sure. So what?

Now you are in bazooka land. Every hedge and wood needs to be scoured by Panzergrenadiers, but they are being blasted by 105s and 155s. They hear you, they see you. You are buttoned because of the shells and infantry. Tank destroyers run you to ground. And every 105 towed or SP, every Sherman, every 57mm ATG, every zook, none of which could touch you on that hilltop, is suddenly perfectly effective, because you can't drive through an enemy army without showing side plate.

The Germans should have husbanded their uber armor and used it as linebackers, smashing the most forward US probes. But defending with armor was simply a heresy. Armor attacked. That was its reason to exist. If a PD had anything like its full compliment of tanks, it got an attack mission. PDs defended after they had been ground down to 30 runners, half of them vanilla types, no great shakes.

The Germans were forever throwing away their magnificant armor on useless counterattacks because they did not have a defensive armor doctrine. An example makes this clear. The commander of a storied PD who fought his whole army out of the trap of the south of France, has taken control of the remnants of a shattered Panzer brigade, a fresher one that hasn't done well the last few days, cadre from another PD, and his own PD with a reduced number of runners.

For days he batters away at a US combat command, trading Panthers for Shermans and not getting even 1 to 1. He has been clever about arty and night infantry attacks helping out, to keep it up as long as he had. But he is now down to 30 runners, having used up essentially all the armor in the whole theater. So he calls off his attacks - and is promptly reprimanded for showing insufficient offensive spirit! Not by some political brown nose at OKW, but by a picked old Prussian Rundstadt protege.

It was a general disease - have armor, attack, lose armor, defend.

A few staffers saw what was going on. A practice had already developed in Russia that tried to keep local control of PDs instead of letting the higher HQs snarf them up for another counterattack - you gave them frontage. That way, they couldn't be taken from you without leaving a hole in the line. The right place for them would be just off the line in local reserve, ready for action in any direction, linebacker style. But if you put them there, the muckety mucks would sweep it away instantly and send it to godsknowswhere to launch another glory ride.

So they left them in the line and got them ground down slowly. The higher ups retaliated by not sending new tanks to PDs on defensive missions, instead making new formations or topping off ones in the rear for elaborate full rebuilds. The Panzer brigades were just the latest and worst example of this. Worst, because at least a rebuilt PD retained experienced cardes and all arms in the right portions etc. And might get a defensive mission after their first crisis intervention counterattack.

With the armor the Germans sent to Lorraine, fully re-equipping the crack 11th Panzer division, the 21st PD, giving 17th SS one panzer battalion, likewise for 3rd and 15th Panzer grenadier, plus TDs or StuGs for all of the above as well, and all of them employed defensively, the PDs as monster backs and the Pz Gdrs as sinew behind river lines and between the woods and cities held by the infantry - you could have fought 3rd army to a standstill, while keeping that massive force intact.

Instead they attacked and attacked throughout September until there was nothing left. 3rd army didn't go further because the supplies went to the Brits and the Hurtgen (until November, when Patton battered Metz for no good reason), but it was intact and the Germans had little left in front of them, when they could have had that powerful force. But they just didn't "get" armor as a defensive power, it made no doctrinal sense to them. Armor... attacked.

I hope this is interesting.

[Q]

Dang Jason, where _do_ you get all your info. I have a hellish time finding interesting WWII books that don't repeat themselves. Can I camp in your library?

[Wartgamer]

The Panzer Brigades were not all green men. They were built around remnants of other divisions and would surely have some experienced people amongst the green loaders and other 17-18 year olds.

I can't say I approve of the concept if there were PD and PGD that could have used the weapons instead. The Soviets had figured out how to do things by late 43. Unbelievable that the Germans would futz around like they did.

[JasonC]

Read the official histories instead of simplifications of them for the masses. Any truly detailed operational narrative winds up revealing scads more than an historian interviewing three hazy vets, who spend half the time talking about human interest items and a third on personal details of no great general import.

Read the US army green books - much of the stuff discussed here is thematic in the Lorraine volume by Hugh Cole. If you've read all of them you can see patterns you won't see in just one. Read the South African histories of North Africa, aka the Sidi Rezegh Battles. For WW I, read the British official histories. German unit histories, division level stuff and stuff from the staffers, are better than the high level accounts of the famous muckety mucks (though everyone should still read Manstein) or the official lines of party historians. Read the Russian general staff study volumes Glantz has translated.

You want a professional officer rather than a nationalist historian, talking about military lessons learned rather than "human interest" and "drama".

[JasonC]

The Panzer brigades had cadres, certainly, but they performed absymally, and a large part of it has to be put down to green formations. The men hadn't worked together, and a lot of the rank and file were raw. They also tended to get committed piecemeal, and as I have stressed here, on overly offensive missions. Until wrecked - remnants were allowed to defend but not the full strength formations.

[SgtMuhammed]

The notion that a veteran cadre can quickly whip a green mob into an army is entirely a myth. One outstanding NCO isn't going to make much difference in a section of soldiers who barely know how to operate their equipment and who have never been under fire. Their actual combat record shows as much. It takes time to train men to be a unit and it takes a unit to be successful in combat. As Jason points out, these units were almost never given that time before they were rushed off to save the day.

[ May 04, 2005, 07:30 PM: Message edited by: sgtgoody (esq) ]

[coe]

Interesting JasonC, do you think in your opinion that the Germans had better success against the russians in their counter attacks at the time? And if so, what was the difference?

And I presume at some point, the Germans would have to attack, how do you think that would have best been accomplished, likewise, do you think the Americans were more successful in their attacks against the Germans and aside from artillery and air support why?

I'm curious on this stuff as you can see.

[Wartgamer]

Interesting that the Panzer Brigades were given Panthers. Many of the remnants were absorbed into PD after being destroyed btw. They were also used on the eastern front and accounted for many of the panthers lost during the summer.

[JasonC]

Did they have better success against the Russians? On the whole I think yes, they did, but they still misused their armor by using it too offensively, and could have got more out of it with a more balanced doctrine that taught them when it was better to stand on the defensive.

The Kharkov counterattack was successful because the Russians pushed the exploitation after Stalingrad very hard. To the point of logistic breakdown for the leading units. The Germans then railed in large fresh armor formations, corps sized. Kept them reasonably concentrated and used them all at once, without a lot of lead probing or warning time.

The Russians were more separated front to back by the mobility differences on their forces (most foot or horse drawn). The arty hadn't kept up, didn't have ammo, the mass of the infantry formations was far from the leaders. The units farthest ahead got the least supply. Terrain was open in many places, though there was some city stuff as well. But a low overall force to space ratio. Depleted units at the end of an offensive spread out over 2D space, thin up front. The Germans hit that thin stuff with a quite concentrated all arms force, built around fresh and superior armor.

What conditions were regularly present in the west, that weren't on this occasion in the east? Firepower dominance from arty kept well up and supplied. Zooks rather than ATRs in the defended zone. Usually tighter terrain (though there was some city stuff in the east, and open stuff in Tunisia). Gun fronts and reserves of TDs and second echelon armor to converge on the location attacked. Arguably better combined arms doctrine - though that shifts with the period compared (not great in the west early, not bad in the east late).

One can also compare something like Kursk, where the Germans failed for similar reasons to their regular failures in the west - but accomplished far more in the attempt. Part of that is just forces - the Germans had a very powerful force for Kursk, much stronger than they had for a fiasco like Mortain for instance. One might compare it to the Bulge I suppose. There was the same initial break in and success, the same large scale melee with the defender's operational reserves deep in his zone, the same eventual failure.

But they hurt the Russians a lot more on that occasion, than they hurt the US in the Bulge. Particularly in the south. And the eventually failure had more to do with successful Russian offensives elsewhere (Orel) than is commonly realized. Kursk north is quite similar in the way it failed, though.

Do the Germans have to occasionally counterattack? Certainly, they did so a lot, they were sometimes quite good at it on a tactical scale. The Germans were tactically quite skilled throughout the war, on all front. But their strengths were not where many suppose, in the late war anyway. It wasn't repeats of the 1940 to 1942 armored breakthrough formula. That worked so well only against defenders who did not yet know how to counter it (by a defense in depth, shifting large reserves in front of any break in).

The Germans were good at a scale below that, more tactical still. Night infantry attacks. Traps on defense. Skillful use of even limited amounts of arty, hitting the right places to catch the most men. The stuff their shoestring remnants of armor managed to accomplish once on defense is regularly impressive. When they did have serious amounts of armor lying around to throw in defensively, they stopped anything. That happened in Mars, at Anzio, for the Brits in Normandy. It didn't happen more often or last longer because half their armor was thrown away on the overly ambitious stuff.

How do you use armor in a balanced way, as part of a mobile force conducting an overall operational defense? I used the analog of a linebacker. That means, in reserve, shifting ahead of the enemy heavy point. Setting up in strength in front of him, and then letting him come on into the kill zone. To produce a Goodwood style tank massacre, for example.

Will that sometimes involve some locally offensive moves? Sure. You reposition a subformation to get LOS, "raiding" a portion of the attackers at range. But you don't over commit to it. You aren't pushing for Antwerp or the Normandy coast. You are just trying to kill the enemy.

See, it all makes perfect sense if the question you are asking yourself is, where and when am I going to destroy his armor? Because then, it is obvious enough a kill sack in your zone is a more promising location for it, than off in his. If instead you are trying to win the whole campaign without having to face his armor, it looks foolish to go looking for it or to await it. You want to hit where it isn't and drive for some grandious offensive operational objective. Expecting to pocket and kill whole armies again, as in the glory days of 1941.

Well, that didn't happen and it wasn't going to happen. Offensive spirit did not produce those successes. Enemy weaknesses and mistakes did. The allies weren't that dumb anymore. You couldn't beat them without fighting them, you had to kill them by fighting them. In particular their armor. And it is just a different focus and emphasis, a different way of thinking about what armor can do for you, to consider it the "heavy wood" in a frankly attritionist battle of material, than to think of it as exploiting cavalry that was going to make the enemy evaporate by driving around him.

They didn't have this defensive armor doctrine. Instead, that just sort of happened, as the net result of a lot of counterattack attempts, and tactical skills applied with whatever remained on hand after them. That was all twice as hard as it needed to be, because the armor was decimated first at lower exchange ratios that it could have achieved.

Look at the Russian defense at Kursk. They put a front in reserve, along with a tank army for each face of the salient. That is depth. As the German northern attack peters out, they prep their own in the adjacent region. And get it going while the southern attack is still fighting the remaining reserves.

Well, what if the Germans had armor reserves that large, ready and waiting, at the time of attempts like the Orel attack? What actually happens is they pull out a corps from the northern attack area and race it to the scene, but the Russians are in and the Germans are in deep trouble already.

What is the pincers movement planned for Kursk, wasn't directed at three lines of fortifications and hundreds of thousands of mines and layered army groups, but was nearly as big, and directed instead at some bulge the Russians had created in the previous 72 hours, in one of their own attack attempts? If all the PAK nests were German instead of Russian? OK, the Russians lost a lot of tanks in a charge in the south, after the attackers there had half their heavy hitters in the shop. Think they would have fared better if that occurred 20 miles inside a German defense, with the heavy hitters all fresh?

That is what they could have been doing. They didn't, because a defensive role for armor, an annihilationist one directed at enemy fielded forces in pitched battle - under the best available conditions for it, certainly, but tackled directly - just did not fit their armor doctrine. Whenever they found themselves fighting that way, they considered it an anomoly to be corrected. By gathering enough armor and attacking with it for (by then, largely imaginary) deep objectives again.

I hope this helps.

[Wartgamer]

Actually the Panzer Brigades started with Hitler's suggestion about having small mobile fast groups to counter attack an destroy enemy armored attacks. They were supposed to be 'antitank' units and counter attacking units at that. He brought this up right before Bagration.

Perhaps that is why they were 'based' around the 75MML70 gun (Panther and JagdpanzerIVL). Tigers are too slow and other 88s (Jagdpanther) not available. The 'Panther' gun would give the units 'homogenous' ammunition/gunners and AT capability.

On the eastern front, attacking armored units would have greatly outnumbered them. They would have had some quick initial effect but in reality, given the dropouts from battle/breakdown, they would not have 'staying-power'. Just as the Panther 'brigades' at Kursk melted away, I suppose too would the 1944 Panzer Brigades. Any use of tanks like the Panther or the Tiger required centralized recovery/repair/parts/etc.

Supposedly there were two types of Panzer Brigades:

http://thingy.apana.org.au/~luddite/wargames/Type2PzBrig.html

http://www.fireandfury.com/extra/downloads/pzbrig1944.pdf#search='Panzer%20Brigades'

101st Panzer Brigade

Ordered formed on 11/7/1944, actually formed on 15/8/1944.

The 2101st Panzer Battalion was formed from the 1st PanzerJaeger Training Battalion. Rate them as Green, Morale 8 as they were most likely traing on assault guns and not tanks. Though the PanzerJaeger company can be trained.

The 2101st Panzer Grenadier Battalion was formed in Wehrkries III. Trained, morale 8.

In August it was teamed with the SS Panzer Brigade Gross as a divisional sized kampgruppe under General Von Strachwitz. Here it took part in the first offensive to restablish contact with Army Group North which had just been encircled for the first time.

From September the various elements of Gruppe Strachwitz were used to cover the retreat of Army Group North into the Courland Sector.

In October 44 the brigade was absorbed by the rebuilding 20th Panzer Division, in East Prussia. With the brigade headquarters becoming the staff 21st Panzer Regiment. While the Panzer Battalion became the I/21st Panzer Regiment.

The Panzer Grenadier battalion is described as becoming a PanzerJagd-kommando battalion within the 20th Panzer. Though since the division was being rebuilt at the time, it would be unlikely that this was an extra battalion.

102nd Panzer Brigade

Ordered formed on 20/7/1944, actually formed on 15/8/1944.

The 2102nd Panzer Battalion was formed from the 5th Reserve Panzer Abiltung in Denmark. Rate them all as trained, morale 8.

The 2102nd Panzer Grenadier Battalion was formed in Wehrkries XI. Trained, morale 8.

November 44 absorbed by the 7th Panzer Division

103rd Panzer Brigade

Ordered formed on 26/7/1944, actually formed on 15/8/1944.

The 2103rd Panzer Battalion was formed from the Panzer Abiltung Norwegen. Rate them all as regular, morale 8.

The 2103rd Panzer Grenadier Battalion was formed in Wehrkries XIII. Trained, morale 8.

November 44 absorbed by the 5th Panzer Division. The headquarters of the 103rd brigade was used to command a Panzer Kampgruppe in early 45.

104th Panzer Brigade

Ordered formed on 18/7/1944.

The 2104th Panzer Battalion was formed in Wehrkries XI. Trained, morale 8.

The 2104th Panzer Grenadier Battalion was formed in Wehrkries XI. Trained, morale 8.

November 44 absorbed by the 20th Panzer Division

[JasonC]

Selections from the Lorraine Campaign by Hugh Cole (see earlier link, US center for military history), with commentary, about the Panzer brigades.

First some strategic context for use of the PBs in the west -

ten panzer brigades were in the process of formation or just going into action on 1 September. Their equipment varied according to the ebb and flow of German industrial production, but in general these first brigades, numbered from 101 through 110, would be built around a panzer battalion that contained some forty Panther tanks (Mark V).

Early in August Hitler ordered that the Western Front should be given priority on the tanks coming off the assembly lines. Contrary to the advice of his armored experts he decreed that the Panthers should not be used to refit the depleted and burned-out panzer divisions already in being but should go straight from the factory-to the new panzer brigades, which he envisaged as mobile reserves capable of immediate commitment.

The plan for them - note that Rundstadt wanted the armor sent to the Aachen-Hurtgen with a defensive mission in front of the Ruhr. He was overruled by Hitler.

(Rundstadt's orders after his recall at the begining of September) From 1 to 3 September Rundstedt and Westphal were briefed by the OKW staff and cursorily by Hitler. Hitler expressed himself as unworried about the situation on the Western Front. He believed that the Allies were outrunning their supplies and would soon be forced to a halt. In any case the Allied advance was being carried by "armored spearheads." These could be cut off by counterattacks and the front would then be stabilized. The best opportunity to truncate these armored spearheads would be found in the vicinity of Reims, on the south flank of the northern Allied forces. Finally, like the OKW staff, Hitler stressed the importance and impregnability of the West Wall. His verbal orders to Rundstedt were brief: stop the Allied advance as far to the west as possible; hold Belgium north of the Schelde and all of the Netherlands; take the offensive in the Nancy-Neufchâteau sector by a counterattack toward Reims.

...The planning and operations of the German high command, as related to the strategic problem posed by the rapid advance of the Third Army, give an illuminating picture of the way in which Hitler's "intuitive strategy" had come to supersede skilled professional operational planning and realistic appraisals of existing tactical conditions. In August 1944 Hitler studied the large-scale map in his headquarters at Eiche, near Berlin, and then ordered the counterattack toward Avranches designed to cut off the First and Third Armies, giving detailed instructions as to the way in which each division of the counterattack force should be employed. Now Hitler again intervened in an attempt to destroy the Third Army, and again without reference to the advice of his field commanders or the capabilities of the weapon in his hands.

on 3 September Hitler gave OB WEST new instructions for the over-all conduct of the war in the West which included a plan for a large-scale counterthrust directed against the Third Army. This scheme was the most ambitious to be advanced during the months between the Mortain counterattack and the Ardennes offensive. By Hitler's orders the German right wing and center would fight a defensive battle (but under no circumstances would any large units allow themselves to be encircled by the Allies). On the left wing a mobile force would be assembled west of the Vosges and given a dual mission: first, it was to cover the retreat of the Nineteenth Army and LXIV Corps while holding the terrain west of the Vosges necessary for freedom of maneuver; second, it was to attack in strength against the extended south flank of the Third Army, finally turning east to strike the American divisions in the back as they closed up facing the Moselle River.

Hitler proposed to implement his grandiose scheme with considerable force, and he personally selected the units to carry out the maneuver. The initial counterattack group, as designated by Hitler, was to be composed of the 3d, 15th, and 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions. It would be augmented by three new panzer brigades (111th, 112th, and 113th), to be brought up from Germany, and would be reinforced "if possible" by the Panzer Lehr Division, the 11th Panzer Division, the 21st Panzer Division, and three more panzer brigades (106th, 107th, and 108th).

The three panzer grenadier divisions were in the Metz area, with one panzer grenadier regiment of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division engaged west of Arlon, in Belgium. The 11th Panzer Division was fighting a rear guard action in the Besançon area, to cover the eastern flank of the retreating Nineteenth Army. The famous Panzer Lehr had been reduced to a shadow division and was still engaged. The 21st Panzer Division was refitting. Of the panzer brigades only the 106th had reached the front, detraining at the moment near Metz, while the rest were organizing in Germany. Model, aware of the true situation, begged for three armored divisions from the Eastern Front, but with no success.

...the 106th Panzer Brigade had been thrown into a hasty counterattack against the 90th Division west of Thionville, on 8 September, and had come out of the fight with only nine usable tanks and assault guns-and no ordnance train to repair its damaged equipment.

On 9 September, however, Blaskowitz was informed that the XLVII Panzer Corps would begin the counterattack with only a Kampfgruppe (Colonel Josef Rauch) from the 21st Panzer Division and the 111th and 112th Panzer Brigades coming up from Germany-a very considerable reduction from the scope of the original plan. Such a force was hardly calculated to inspire much confidence in any far-reaching success. The two panzer brigades were newly organized and equipped with a battalion of Mark IV's and a battalion of Mark V's (Panthers) apiece-a total of ninety-eight tanks per brigade-plus a two-battalion regiment of armored infantry. But the 21st Panzer Division was woefully weak...

Yet even now Berlin remained far removed from the tactical situation and Hitler issued a Jovian decree that the Fifth Panzer Army would not be used in any frontal attacks against the advancing Americans, but would be kept intact for its main mission. Blaskowitz gave a very liberal interpretation to this last order (if he did not flatly violate it) and committed the 112th Panzer Brigade against the XV Corps, with such disastrous results as to make that panzer brigade little more than a cipher in future operational plans.

The fate of the 106th PB, committed early against the 90th ID -

On 7 September the new commander of the First Army, General Knobelsdorff, decided to risk the 106th Panzer Brigade against the left flank of the Third Army in a spoiling attack calculated to deflect the American advance toward the Briey mines. Hitler concurred in this decision, but tied a string to the 106th with orders that it could be used for only forty-eight hours. In the late evening the panzer brigade moved south through Aumetz, slipped along side roads between the positions of the 358th and 359th, and about 0200 the following morning hit the 90th Division command post. Apparently the Germans did not realize what they had done, for some of the tanks continued on to the south, with the result that the 106th soon was strung out in a disjointed series of actions.

The surprised Americans fought with whatever weapon was at hand: pistols, rifles, bazookas, and individual tank destroyers and antitank guns. The artillery section of the division staff was encircled but fought its way out on foot. Tanks, tank destroyers, and three battalions of infantry rushed back to the scene at daylight and engaged the disorganized Germans, now almost completely surrounded by the 90th, wherever they could be located. The enemy had found it easy to break into the American lines but lacked the weight to exploit his gains or extricate himself. Very little of the armor that had formed the spearhead of the penetration succeeded in fighting its way back to the north.

By the end of the day the 90th Division had captured or destroyed thirty tanks, sixty half-tracks, and nearly a hundred miscellaneous German vehicles. Many of the armored infantry escaped, but the 106th Panzer Brigade returned to its lines hardly more than a name and number.

--- Notice, the PB successfully penetrated all the way to the US divisional CP in a night attack. But then found itself a single KG in the middle of an entire ID with attached armor and TDs, and hopelessly outnumbered in all arms terms in the resulting pure melee. The Americans did not care that their line was "broken" or that there were Germans behind them or that their HQs and artillery were directly engaged. They simply turned on the intruders at dawn with everything that had and fought it out. And deep in the US defensive zone, a single KG had no chance of defeating them in a wild disorganized melee. Every weapon in the US arsenal was effective in such a fight. The intel differential was with the defenders, as so were numbers.

The fate of the 112th PB, committed early against CCL, French 2nd AD -

The 112th Panzer Brigade furnished the bulk and the armored backbone of the XLVII Panzer Corps. If committed under different circumstances it might have been a formidable threat to the fragmentized XV Corps, since it had a full complement of new tanks: a battalion of 48 Mark IV's and another of 48 Mark V's.

On 12 September the 112th Panzer Brigade debouched from Epinal in two columns. The right column, consisting of the Panther battalion, mobile infantry, and artillery, moved directly west in the direction of Vittel while the left column, containing the Mark IV's, began a circular movement that carried it south toward Bains-les-Bains, in anticipation of an attack by advance units of the American Seventh Army which were already as far north as Vesoul. Late in the day the right column of the 112th Panzer Brigade bivouacked near the village of Dompaire, southeast of Mirecourt. The left column, finding no American troops on its flank, had begun to wheel north toward Darney, from which a main road led to Vittel.

General Luettwitz now decided to commit Kampfgruppe Luck, the weak infantry detachment belonging to his corps, and ordered it to march to Dompaire on 13 September. Once this infantry reinforcement had reached the north column and the south column was in position, Luettwitz intended to throw the combined strength of the 112th Panzer Brigade and Kampfgruppe Luck at Vittel, some eleven miles to the west. But this ambitious plan was doomed to failure.

After seizing Vittel on 12 September, CCL, 2d French Armored Division, continued east and laagered that night just short of Dompaire and Damas-the latter a village about two miles southeast of Dompaire. During the late afternoon French civilians had brought word to Colonel Langlade's headquarters that a large German tank force was moving on Dompaire. This intelligence was confirmed in the early evening when French outposts picked up the sound of heavy vehicles congregating in the area. Langlade ordered his artillery into position and prepared to engage the enemy on the morrow. His plans were simple: the right column (Colonel Minjonnet) of CCL would strike through Damas and cut the main road between Dompaire and Epinal; the left column (Lt. Col. Jacques Massu) would attack the enemy concentrated at Dompaire. The village of Dompaire lay in a narrow valley and most of the German tanks were assembled here on the low ground.

At dawn on 13 September a small reconnaissance party, headed by four tank destroyers, left Minjonnet's bivouac and rolled toward Damas. Just short of the village it surprised some German Panthers, loosed a few rounds, knocked out a Panther, and hurriedly retired to the shelter offered by a small ridge. The German tankers made no move and soon the 12th Chasseurs was on the scene with its Sherman tanks. Colonel Langlade meanwhile had sent Massu's force around to the north of Dompaire. Here his observers reported the town and nearby fields "literally crawling" with enemy tanks. Langlade made a feint with his armored infantry and then, when the German Panthers started to deploy to counter this move, the French poured in a terrific fire from their tanks and field guns.

But the French were not to engage the Panthers by themselves. The American air support officer with the 2d French Armored Division had succeeded in reaching XIX TAC by radio and General Weyland's headquarters dispatched the 406th Group from its base at Rennes, far back in Brittany. The fighter-bombers made four strikes at Damas and Dompaire during the day, lashing at the huddled Germans with bombs and rockets.

After each air strike Massu and Minjonnet displaced forward, using the cover of neighboring apple orchards and pine groves and compressing the milling Panthers into a narrowing killing ground on the valley bottom. Eventually the French seized a cemetery, on a rise at the north edge of Dompaire, that gave them complete control of the battlefield.

In the afternoon the leading tanks of the south column of the 112th Panzer Brigade were discovered moving hurriedly toward Ville-sur-Illon, apparently intent on striking the French in the rear. CCL, however, was ready for this new threat and destroyed seven Mark IV's at the first encounter. As this action continued the German losses increased, and finally the southern column abandoned its rescue attempt.

Late in the day the Germans in the Dompaire sector deserted their vehicles and fled on foot to the east, leaving the battlefield to the French. This fight, characterized warmly by the XV Corps commander as a "brilliant" example of perfect air-ground co-ordination, not only was an outstanding feat of arms but also had dealt a crippling blow to Hitler's plans for an armored thrust into the Third Army flank. The 112th Panzer Brigade had lost nearly all of its Panther battalion-only four of these heavy tanks escaped the Dompaire debacle. In addition the Mark IV battalion had sustained some loss, bringing the total number of tanks destroyed to sixty.

--- Notice, a single French combat command annihilates a Panzer brigade in one day. Shermans, a few TDs, and Priests against Panthers at first, Pz IVs helping them in the afternoon. They have air and they have stronger artillery. But the basic cause is they catch the Germans in a valley bottom and keep them bottled up there, with flanking fires from two directions.

The German tanks can't crawl out of the low ground without exposing themselves in sequence to all the guns of the flanking force they aren't advancing toward. Each of these has on the order of 20 shooters able to kill a Panther from the side at any range. 100 rounds will come downrange in one minute, whenever any tank appears above the crestline. They can't withdraw from the gully either.

Instead they remain trapped and wait for their Pz IV battalion to free them by hitting one of the "holding" French forces. In the meantime, they are shelled relentlessly and repeatedly bombed. The French advance their LOS picture in stages, isolating the remaining safe area for the German tanks - and eventually move a force to a position with LOS over the whole valley bottom. By that time the Germans there are a shambles. Remnants try to espace on foot.

All accomplished more rapidly than the Pz IVs can intervene to help, so when they show up they face an equally capable force head on, trade a few shots and give up.

(For the history buffs, yes that is the same Jacques Massu who later commanded the French paras in Algeria).

The first probe by 111th PB hits a US cavalry screen and eats it, then faces US reserves -

About 0700 on the morning of 18 September the advance guard of the 111th Panzer Brigade hit the 42d Cavalry outposts manned by A Troop. The six 75-mm. assault guns from E Troop were rushed forward to meet the Panthers, but the American shells bounced off the heavy frontal armor of the German tanks and three of the guns were destroyed in as many minutes.

The cavalry fought desperately, but armored cars and machine guns were no match for the Panthers. Dismounted action by small groups of cavalrymen was more effective against the German infantry following the tanks and held the enemy advance guard in check until about 1100...

General Blaskowitz intervened about noon and ordered Manteuffel to press the attack and take Lunéville. A combined assault by the 111th Panzer Brigade and 15th Panzer Grenadier Division detachments forced CCR and the cavalry back into the north part of the city.

In answer to this threat CCA, across the canal, rushed a task force to the scene while General Eddy detached CCB, 6th Armored Division, which had just closed to support the 35th Division east of Nancy, and started it for Lunéville.

The first reinforcements arrived about 1600, including some tank destroyers from the 603d Tank Destroyer Battalion which distinguished themselves in a fire fight at close quarters; as did the American artillery-now comprising two armored field artillery battalions and the 183d Field Artillery Group laid down an accurate and destructive fire, the enemy fell back behind the railroad tracks in the south quarter of the city. When night came Manteuffel ordered the 111th Panzer Brigade to disengage.

--- Notice, Panthers overrun cavalry readily enough, but the accompanying Pz Gdrs are readily delayed, though not serious hurt, by tiny forces. (A sign of greenness, to me).

A US AD has many layers of Task Forces and they readily arrive in front of the penetration. Dueling Panthers with TDs at close quarters results in even exchanges, no big advantage to the Panthers. The exchanges are at close quarters because the defending Americans use cover - to get LOS at all, the Panthers must drive practically on top of them.

Large scale US artillery intervention is what actually stops the attack - 2 armored field artillery batallions means 36 Priests firing indirect, and a field artillery group means 36 155mms. In CMAK terms, 6 105 and 9 155 FOs. Against a few battalions of Pz Gdrs.

The German tanks cannot continue without their support, or they get into the knife fight brawl, buttoned, without accomplishing anything. Arty strips the tanks, and a line of Shermans and TDs interspersed in broken terrain then holds them.

All those are preliminaries to the Arracourt battles proper, which have been covered much more extensively. Suffice it to say that a Panther in morning fog on the attack is not appreciably superior to a US TD. Whoever shoots first wins. First shot goes to the side that hears the other guy coming or hustles to a good flank position etc. The Germans are no better at this than Patton - Wood - Abrams trained tankers in 4th Armored - who have the advantages of a defensive stance, good artillery support, air in the afternoon, etc.

So, overall - an overly ambitious offensive scheme that resources do not really exist to justify. Piecemeal commitment of green forces, drastically underestimating the enemy. Tactical difficulties attacking, resulting in great waste of fine armor at little cost to the Allies. At best even exchanges when things go well, and occasionally very large losses that aren't even close to even. The PBs were a mistake, green, used too aggressively, and died without accomplishing much. The same tanks in the hands of veteran divisions using them defensively, could have accomplished much more.

[ May 05, 2005, 08:58 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Wartgamer]

I would mark up the overall poor performance to crappy leadership at command level and facing TAC-Air and Superior Artillery than any 'Green' factor.

Its hard to get past 'green' when you are bled Red from the get-go.

Panthers/PanzerIVs are not uber-tanks and any time they are used 'Tiger-Style' (outnumbered by many weapons), they will lose.

By mid-44, the whole uber-tank (armor across front/sides defeating AP) is a thing of the past. Most guns can hole most tanks in the sides. Only combined arms/use of smoke/concentration of force can offset an enemy. Driving a Brigade into the middle of a division is just bad command.

BTW:

Panzer Brigade 101,102,103 and 104 were all sent to the eastern front with 36 Panthers each in AUG 44.

For a short period, a sizable number of Panthers fielded were being sent to these PB. The most telling stat is that more Panthers are lost in September 44 than in July and August (All fronts). The Germans also lose 750 some Panzer IV during September 44. The German use of armor is suspect during Fall44. How much is because of Panzer Brigadom is debatable.

In another thread it was explored that the fielding of Panthers showed that the Germans actually had a buildup of Panthers since it was taking too long to get the Ist Panzer battalions trained on them. perhaps the Germans felt this was a way to get them out of depots.

A better solution may have been to just convert certain Panzer Divisions to all Panthers. The thought being that a Panzer Division that had one Battalion already trained on Panthers could expand its two battalions 'on-the-fly'. Its Panzer IV guys having traing plus experience making the jump easier than newly trained tankers from a school. The 'Panther' division could then be a major attack and counter attcking force.

Other Panzer Divisions could get Panzer IVs with a mix of Jagdpanzer/StuG making up the other Battalions. In effect, they become Super-Panzer-Grenadier divisions. They are really defensive in nature against heavy armored attacks but could still play a back seat counter-attack role or exploitation role.

[ May 05, 2005, 09:36 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[JasonC]

Of course it is bad command, but why is the bad command given? What were they trying to accomplish? What did they think the point was? They drove panzer corps into entire armies and the armies evaporated. The drove PDs through Russian infantry corps and annihilated them in sequential battles with local superiority. Their doctrines stemmed from a time when they were marginally richer and accomplished massive victories against larger enemy forces, cheaply. All of which, incidentally, they had accomplished in far less capable tanks.

They did not ascribe those earlier successes to the Allies being dumb at the time. They ascribed them to their own doctrines and what they thought of as the power of the offensive.

They thought they were driving through a thin infantry division unprepared to defend to eat its HQs and artillery, and that the result would be some panicky flight or paralysis. They thought attacking as such was a massive force multiplier, that "the offensive is the only decisive form of warfare", that the initiative was everything, that concentrated superior tanks smashed anything in their way. And they were simply wrong about these things.

A Panther on defense is a terror to the weapons the US and French had at that time. Practically all the Shermans in 3rd army were plain 75s (and the few 105s in each battalion). The US TDs at the time experienced shatter failure against the Panther front beyond 500 yards. At long range and from the front, only tungsten from a TD getting a turret hit, could hurt them. The Panther kills everything it points at, out to several kms. Yet on the attack, this was thrown away. Attackers get hit from the sides and when they do engage frontally the defender can choose to have the initial range be very close, by simply using available cover.

[Wartgamer]

A (single?) Panther on the defense is a single tank. It can readily be smoked/bombed/out-manuvered.

The correct use of armor is in groups and utilize thier mobility.

[JasonC]

And wet straw makes smoke when thrown on a fire. Duh.

[Wartgamer]

Not if it puts it out.

[Pzman]

Everyone can tell how much you two love one another. Can we have constructive comments and facts not personal opinions?

[Wartgamer]

I think the heart of the matter is that the Germans, for all thier ground breaking armored ideas, got off on wierd tangeants late in the war.

Having a 'Panther' armored division (2 Panther battalions), with heavy retrieval assets (bergpanther) available, is a much better use of Panthers given the known breakdown/recovery issues.

The lighter Panzer III and Panzer IV chassis vehicles could still get by with HT recovery vehicles.

The nightmare of a single battalion Panther (or brigade) trying to churn out a company of 'runners' was the storey of these heavy vehicles from the beginning.

The Panther is an offensive vehicle. It must run its engine to be effective. To use it defensively is just wrong.

People talk about Quality having advantage over quantity. But having runners was usually the bottom line.

[jtcm]

Where did Massu and the French learn how to fight like that ?

[coe]

So how were the Americans so successful on the attack if the german armour was a terror on defense? Was it just numbers (on attacks in general I think American casualties were less than the German's (but is that only for successful attacks)).... Any info on casualty ratios for successful German attacks on the Americans ?

[JasonC]

jtcm - Massu fought in the campaign in France, and later fought in North Africa with Leclerc's column of the Free French from 1941 - which crossed the Sahara from Chad to Libya at one point, 1500 miles. (Politically, he was an original and lifelong Gaullist). He was an experienced officer by the time of the Lorraine fight. He was in the Cobra breakout (the division landed just after got going) and the liberation of Paris; his division saw significant fighting in both. In the latter, he led the storming of Gestapo HQ, and personally removed the German flag from the Arc de Triomphe. He went to Indochina right after the war, as commander of the lone regiment of his AD sent there (he was a Lt Col by then). When the Viet Minh took Hanoi in late 1946, he took it back with just his regiment. Later and most notoriously he commanded the 10th paras in Algeria, and won the battle of the Casbah using torture and other extreme measures - which turned French opinion against the war. He defended that in a book in 1971. By 2000, age 92, he admitted (some others continued to deny) and regretted it. He died in 2002.

[JasonC]

To coe -

The US didn't face that much German armor precisely for the reason I am discussing, and when they did it was usually attacking them rather than the other way around. When the US was attacking, which was most of the time, the Germans they were fighting did not have much armor left.

There are some expections to this, though. The Germans had a fair amount of armor in Normandy in July, and again in the Bulge even after they lost the initiative. On both occasions, the US had to attack Germans with significant amounts of armor. They took serious losses doing so but for quite limited periods - less than a month on each occasion. In each, the Germans lost significant forces after the attrition period, when the front moved again. On both occasions, the Germans suffered heavy attrition in the static period but as an exchange, and additional losses afterward, often cheap to the US.

US artillery and air, general logistic strength, and overall depth mattered for all of these. In Normandy, the Germans had practically no replacement rate, relying instead of new units drawn to the battlefield from Brittany and the like. The US faced about as much armor over the whole campaign as the Brits did, but the timing was different and more of it was employed offensively against them - Caretan early with 17th SS, Lehr in July, some formations thrown in from of the breakout itself and run over by the unleashed US ADs - each a piecemeal affair compared to the Brit sector - and Mortain, much larger than those but overambitious, badly timed, compromised by Ultra, etc.

Pure tank loss terms, the evidence is that the Germans did not outscore the Americans overall (head to head I mean), but might have run even with them. But understand, some of those German loses are non-battle, some of the US losses are to PAK and infantry forces, etc. In infantry loss terms, PWs are what put the overall German losses much higher than the US. When defending in static attrition fighting, the Germans regularly outscored the US in infantry. Then a Tunisia, or Cherbourg, or south of France, or the channel ports, or the Ruhr pocket, brings in tens to hundreds of thousands "bagged", and dwarfs those differences.

[jtcm]

I know who Massu was. I just wonder where the Free French learned how to fight with combined arms so devastatingly-- Gaullian doctrine ? US doctrine ? N. A. experience ?