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Beleg85

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Everything posted by Beleg85

  1. Merry Christmas to all folks- in first place, to Ukrainian defenders. AFU gave nice gift.
  2. Just a curiosity: somebody already made a simulator of FPV drone, set in current war. From keyboard straight into trenches... https://store.steampowered.com/app/2707940/FPV_Kamikaze_Drone/ Meanwhile, Ukraine MoD announced ambitious plan to increase https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-announces-ambitious-plan-to-produce-1million-fpv-drones/ FPV drone production up to 1 mln a year:
  3. Krynki area, Russian tankodesantniki storming positins of 37th Brigade. I think it is the same place that entire muscovite squad was wiped out while running month ago, within seconds that was recorded by drones. Very bad feng-shui there for Russians apparently.
  4. Not necessarly; some general remarks amid other contrary remarks. Put it together with Arakhamia interview (which was also not-well recepted in Ukraine, due to unfortunate wording) and we indeed see that USA/UK at that moment were for Ukraine continuing oppose Russians. But this sole fact is neither new nor surprising; to claim that part of the West forced Kyiv to fight against its will and recognition of the situation is other thing. And we so far have no proofs of that, other than this one sentence that can be differently interpreted. Specified stance of Ukrainian delegation was contrary to what you are claiming: they knew Putin will partition their country one way or another, and it became only blatantly obvious after massacres were discovered. They did put the nose in settlement room, sniffed a little what can be bargained and left cause it had no sense, regardless what Boris Johnson was shouting from next room. Add internal UA politics mechanisms that were at play here, which you (and I) know very little about. By puting different pieces together, especially from Ukrainian sources you rarely cite (they are just dogwalked pawns with no voice, right?), one almost see how the process developed and feel dilemmas they were facing. First year of the war confirmed that it was possible to push Russians out of their country on specific directions, train new troops and obtain Western support. Now we are in sort of limbo; there is no clear strategy of winning, we don't know what to do with this hot potato and additionally long-time supporters face various domestic problems; chiefly USA, which naturally was spritus movens. Generally you still think it was entirely possible to see how events will unfold already in March 2022. There were so many factors: will Germany and sceptics in EU send help, will massive financial and material support be possible, how Ukrainians will fight, how US domestic audience will react, how Russian economy will behave under sanctions (yes- they should be much heavier), will Russian power system crumble (wasn't that far) etc. that it was very difficult to predict the outcome. State of limbo kicked in somewhere around middle of 2023. But yeah, we should far much better for sure, especially regarding industrial capacities.
  5. I think we differ in interpretation what Israeli said here- perhaps in not small part due to hebraic being actually very difficult and imprecise language to communicate and translate (you can even see it observing both men talking here). Journalist says "So West blocked it", Bennet generally agrees ("They basically did, and at that time I thought it was wrong."), but immediatelly say in retrospect it is difficult to know if they were right (3:00:30+) or if reaching agreement was possible even if they have not curb it (3:02:10). Also he several times mentions that West was not wrong in its more aggresive, pro-sovereign Ukraine approach (3:00:00), that US was distrustful of Putin (2:40), that rewarding thug too soon may indeed be bad idea (3:02:30, rather journo suggestion here) and that after initiall concessions of boths sides, negotiations started to loom and finally were closed after Bucha. Note that he only presents his point of view (negotiator), not pretending to judge whole process or knowing what was happening internally in Kiyv or Washington at that moment. Of other interesting things may influence his expressions here: he is also admitting he had Israeli interests in mind during this crisis (2:32, may influence his perception if true) and underlines his role as 3rd party, thus speaks many times about his bond with Putin and how he trusted Russian president. He also claims Putin's "denazification" clearly meant killing Ukrainian president (and that was one of Putin's chief consession, other being reportedly some higher limits for post-agreement Ukrainian army that were to negotiation) and that Putin, while generally open in personal contacts, gets immediatelly irritated when Ukraine is mentioned (they are all Neo-nazis etc.)- another confirmation of his state of mind. There is nothing particulary breaking or spectacular in this (rather chill-out) interview that we wouldn't know before; it basically overlaps well with other sources. We know USA/UK were convinced at that time Ukraine can get more from it than what would be initially negotiated and that -after sides agreed upon on several points- Kyiv was ultimatelly too distrustful of Putin's intentions to make a deal. You can, but it is always a bet and Kyiv call. There are always pros and cons, like is always the case with such heavy decisions- everyone can be smart in retrospect. First year of this war showed that Russians failed to even properly encircle Kyiv, Ukrainians could and did repulse Russians in two successfull offensives, retook Kherson and hold lower Dnieper line and even crossed it, that RuAF took unbelievable amount of casualties and that even with firepower advantage muscovites cannot push the front beyond some village or small town; and even that by terrible cost. Hell, we almost saw Russian system of power close to crumbling during Prigozhin march- first such event faced by Putin ever. Thnigs started to loom on Western and Ukriane side only in late phase of this war, circa after failure of Zaporizhia offensive. Perhaps West can put its sh**t together, or not- we will need to see. I seriously doubt that in the end Ukraine will be in worse position than being disarmed and served to Putin on a plate, saute and with sauce.
  6. Right about this Kremlin shill Schroeder, but If Bennet is to be believed (and we have no reason not to, albeit he too could have Israeli interests in mind) situation with talks looked slightlly diiferently. West indeed advised Ukrainians to fight and Putin was willing to make some temporary concessions when stuck, which Israeli former PM find good signs as to willingness to coooperate from his mediator point of view. But clue is (as Arakhamia confirmed) he was not being believed enough in Kiyv as reliable partner to have ceasfire with. Talks loomed for some time until Bucha and others massacres were discovered, and they realized Muscovy will do everything to swallow UA state.
  7. Yes, he does states that he thought reaching ceasefire was possible at that very moment (=before Bucha, 2:45) but he is not sure from a posteriori point of view if it had even worked ("Cause statemenship is very complex" and "there were many factors", 4:51, a part you missed). Murdered civilians were a potent fact in both Western and internal UA politics- there was no coming back to talks after it became obvious what Ivans did, especially from Ukrainian perspective. Additionally, Arakhamia on other interview too stated that they were simply not trusting Putin enough to sign agreements with him about neutrality. The fact that talks were in place, Putin was willing to make some concessions when wounded after his army became stuck spectacularly or that Boris Johnson came to Kyiv to promote not signing deals with Vova does not change basic premise- if Ukraine would dismantle bulk of its own military forces and finlandize, it was only a question of time before it become swallowed again by muscovia. They would have Russian tanks over their necks anyway, sooner or later. And Ukrainians understood it from the start; Bucha was just a confirmation. You may not get inner workings of Kremlin politics since you focus on America, but Putin couldn't allow in long term to have image of a loser in this war- and that would be effect if potentiall ceasefire of the kind we discuss here would take place, while Russian columns took such looses in the north, both on Eastern and Western side of Dnieper. Perception of his war as military failure could be deadly for his imperial mojo, and even making small concessions to Ukraine would put him in very difficult position internally. Agree, sanctions should be much stonger and West do lack coherent strategy for this war after 2023- but is is a topic touched upon many times in this thread. Also book by Z. Parafianowicz gives some details of behind-the-courtain talks between US and CEE countries- initial US plan for this war was supporting insurgency, not conventional conflict on such massive scale. White House did reevaluate its stance to support heavy weapons to Ukraine quite dramatically, so they did changed their strategy when learned Ukrainians can in fact defend. Doesn't sound idiotic nor lazy on western behalf, at least at that time.
  8. Now that is trustworthy source. And Naftali Benett clearly stated both sides were thinking they were winning and that negotiations broke finally when Ukrainians discovered level of atrocities Russians commited.
  9. Interesting interview by Butusov about small drones and infantry tactics.
  10. Putin seems very active lately on ideological front. He again unfurls his imperial plans more closely now- at least for time of elections subjects must see entire great, golden tapestry of his plans, magnificently decorated with maps, historical and religious anecdotes and displayed with all old sentiments he can find. In his mind, Kremlin will try to "take back" lands up to Lower Dnieper, crucially including Odessa.
  11. Curiously, he was given 10 bln euro bribe several days ago from various funds, frozen previously due to corruption practices. Today leaders all agreed that he will "disappear" from the floor and voting will take place in his absence; idea was reportedly Scholz's or Michelle. Thus he can stay clean, cry "they tricked us!" (but not too convincingly...) while unblocking UA access. Just another day in Brussels. Do not get fooled "we don't talk with Orban" either; it's theatre. He is veteran of this place, knows every corner and they will miss him greatly one day, cause every dirty job can be given to/ pushed on him if necesary. Additionaly, he is popular in Hotel Rooms due to knowing awful lot of dirty jokes. Also Georgia come in. That will be fun.
  12. In case worth to check this lady's articles: https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/12/12/fiona-hill-ukraine-putin-00131285
  13. All very good points about ideological performance of regime:
  14. One need TG to see full palette. Twitter is not popular in Russian- speaking world, therefore we see much less gruesome videos from their side. Btw. it underlines importance of awarnes as to the question of how our sources work AD 2023. Yes, very often they seem to work more "in blind" than UA, but FPV itself can show its camera before the hits as well. Perhaps they may even simply have less devices to record it on the front, due to general lower access to civilian volunteers than Ukrainians.
  15. Also adding to topic of land UGV's, here short clip with Russian version, used for evacuation and transport. Post below one can see a screenshot of another muscovite UGV used for carrying out the wounded; note jammer on side. These things seems still relaitevly rare on both sides of frontline and chiefly shown in propaganda videos.
  16. Very interesting diagrams, it's good aLostArmour is at least still doing their job. In the summer, as far as I remember in-depth interview with one Ukranian drone operator, AFU lead the way also tactically- they formed separate detachments inside units that were highly flexible, while Russian drone-operators (outside of former LDPR, who were better in this field) were more acting like sniper teams subjected centrally to Brigade or even higher-level commands, working on specific orders. But it seems this difference also flattened with time. Do these cheap drones even have computers powerful enough to count all this in real time? This stuff seems much more expensive than average FPV. But if you are right, then it seems chief diadvantage of Russia is still outdated tactical doctrines and squareheads in military and defensive (or rather: offensive) industry. They can unfortunatelly overcome that in time.
  17. Russia wasn't leading in developing autonomous systems so far; it demands significant investments, brain-centres and likely technology that may be seen as superficial from Kremlin perspective. Waves of normal drones are in turn already in place, luckily many russian commanders have the same "mental blockade" as older AFU ones, not taking anything other than recon drones and maybe dedicated Lancets as serious replacements for artillery. Regarding lack of clips from Russian FPV strikes- unfortunatelly untrue for many months already, here some recent compilation: For more one would need to install TG.
  18. Destroyed Russian Grad. Very nice form, could stand in some New York gallery.
  19. Well, they already lost several dozens so no big deal in itself. Old Bradleys seem one of most favoured vehicle types in AFU and most feared by Russians. Muscovites TV grasped second wind and is often doing rounds in working Western equipment; they visibly feared it a lot before the offensive, and now the spell is broken. Long are the days when Soloviov made entire episode of his show staring on empty NLAW case like he would be touched by Gods, who send it to him in a dream.
  20. Just a nice show of longer range fire from Bradley autocannon: Saw translation lately of one of posts from Russian milbloggers, it was in roughly this manner: when Ukies storm our trenches riding on Amercian Bradleys, defenders tend to run away immediatelly or fight o the bitter end, nothing between. Fire from their cannons is worse than facing tanks; at least the latter need to raload and leave 10 sec. gap to run/hide, while autocannons sweep everything in the area, not even leaving time to surrender. It seems Russians captured two Bradleys in working condition, and videos with them are flying everywhere in Mordor TV.
  21. Meanwhile...Christmas gifts list: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-latest-weapons-request-includes-thaad-air-defenses-f-18s-2023-12-06/ Ok, so this article is rather strange and I'd be cautious if it is not effect of some internal pressure struggles or controlled leak to put US public opinion more against helping.
  22. Another succesfull muscovite strike on Ukrainian artillery system; Bohdana or Ceasar hit by most probably a lancet.
  23. Whoopsy... traitor and one of possible Gaulaiters in original Russian plan for Ukraine, infamous Ilia Kyva, was found dead in Moscow. https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/12/06/former-ukrainian-lawmaker-illia-kyva-found-dead-in-moscow-region
  24. Moscow is lately again working heavily on Iranian direction. Axis of Evil seems to have new ugly baby.
  25. Most probably on Sahrawis, albeit they keep quiet in last years and heavy IFV's are potentiall liabaility there. But Marocco king always go big on money and various gigantomaniac projects, despite part of his population living in relative poverty. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moroccan_Western_Sahara_Wall Btw. a fascinating piece of fortification, idea to simply sorround desert with long wall (and mann it with soldiers and modern surveillance tech) against bedouins is mix of so old with so new in one piece. It seems today's conference in DC regarding Ukraine will need to be postponned. It's sign of something bad or normal part of negatiations in Senate?
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