Beleg85

Wait, we are talking about traditional espionage, subversion in mass media or political influences? These are all very different things: first is by definition in shadows we know very little, second belongs chiefly to multi-national media platforms (hello Elon) and about third: you cannot arrest people, without solid evidence, only because they have different opinion about international or economical issues. In many Western countries a lot has been done to counter Russian infowars. As far as I know Russia Today and similar cancer was quite violently removed too; no major outlet, even left-lib ones (BBC, Guardian etc.) are sufling Muscovite propaganda without checking it twice. Unless you mean some form of active censorship, but that will not bed well with most of Western countries and would likely be counter-productive from UA standpoint anyway.

Interesting clip- reportedly Russians dug a tunnel and detonated a mine in Avdiivka area, after which assault team came out of it and stormed Ukrianian trenches. So mine warfare is back too? How would like to "solve it"? Everybody in charge is more than aware that Russia wages hybrid war against NATO for a long time and open societies will fall pray to it to some extent. That's their nature.

All very true, but are we sure West communicated limited scope and purpose of sanctions to Ukrainian public; and did they received the message? Because now we seem to having perception problems about limits of help these people can reliabaly receive. And I know quite plenty measured and knowledgable guys, also former militaries tracking this war from the start (from UA and outside), who simply cannot understand why big business still sell Russians precise machine stuff or top-end electronics used in EW warfare (last case given by Steve, there are more) or how muscovite tourists can continue flock to Europe like they did before the war, with some minor additional difficulties. Mind you- last thing is a status symbol for Russian upper middle class, probably far more important than in our societies (another failure to understand cultural significance of some feature). I am not calling to harm our econimies too much ofc. but we should communicate strategy behind it much better, I believe; the hope sanctions will do more work was quite widespread in UA for last two years, despite logic. So we should be frank with UA from the start in this respect: sanctions are chiefly for post-war bargain, not to cripple their direct war effort in significant way. Otherwise they risk morale crisis. It naturally is part of the larger problem you descibed before, namely incoherence and lack of defined strategy.

AFRF may suffer through winter quite substantisally, but the biggest problem for now seems Russian ability to keep industrial production going. They do have serious problems, like recent reports of Korean ammo being dangerous to crews, but overall they managed to pass the sanctions with crucial equipment production and replenish/upgrade it fast enough. It is a fact by this point: our half-baked sanctions (albeit quite heavy by western standards) failed to cause true ammo hunger or significant lack of sophisticated equipment on katsap side. This is our biggest failing till now- not failed belief in superiority of western equipment, training or outdated command procedures of new brigades, but lack of understanding and political will to sanction Muscovites properly. It would quite likely fail anyway due to their significance on global stage and sheer size, but without it Kremlin can wage this war- in one form or another- for years.

That was going to happen anyway, with or without successes in Zaporizhia. Unless someone really believed bragging by Budanov that AFU tanks will wash their tracks in Black Sea by Christmas. I am also not sure how much you are in your own social bubble here (mind, we all have one); my contacts, analysts and many other people who are in Ukraine every second week serving soldiers with stuff paint diferent mental picture: it will be difficult winter, but we will endure. Rifts are visible, but it looks like temporary hangover. Grudgings on insufficent Western help are there, but they are as old as this war.

Well, we know it was going to be that way if offensive failed beyond expectations (and they were huge and unwisely infalted by various coteries both in and outside UA). We even discussed it here in length, you can check posts from late winter, any conclusion was to prepare yourself mentally on failures, stoppages and problems. They are ingrained in the process of such long war, and were gonna happen anyway even if AFU captured Tokmak. Informational chaos was as long as I remember after first phase of honeymoon, Poroshenko jumping on Zelensky, various political coteries criticizing others for these or that military failures. Also Russian influence is very likely here. I think the problem here is lack of any visible light at the end of tunnel (for now) of how this whole thing is supposed to end; NATO should try to communicate clear strategy for UA asap.

Mate, I think you are overreacting a little here. If one dubious article and several protesting truckers are enough to break the will of country that endured 50k KIA and beat the crap out of Russians in two successfull offensives, than I suppose we observe very different war. You are right about danger of Russian subversion and weakened morale after failure of summer offensive, but it is question of general direction where the war is going (lack of clear "roadsigns" in entire thing), not some mortal danger within Ukraine itself. I also doubt - and can base here on many experts, including Ukrianians themselves- that only thing that kept your folks going for so long was one last hope of successfull offensive. This war is not rollercoster, it's bloody marathon.

Correct, except it has nothing to do with failed offensive: these are grassroot, not official protest in reaction for (another) border problem stemming from way much faster than normal access of Ukraine to European markets. There was no time to reach complex, pan-European conclusion in many areas in case of agricultural products, transport,small business etc. Such things happen and will happen for a long time; in different countries in EU among various working groups are threatened by cheaper Ukrainian labour and products. It's unavoidable, I would say, and various border disagreements and small trade wars are reality from day one of invasion, like they were before the war. They are additioanlly fuelled by centralized, oligarchic system of UA agriculture and (to slightly better degree) transport, where literally several corrupted barons can hold the grasp on government and force "no step backward" policy. Suffice to say, I personally heard stories and saw photos from refugees 27.II. about local farmers still blocking their roads with tracktors inside UA, circa 10kms from border crossings - it took half a day and personal intervention of internal minister to remove them. That was while Russian tanks were closing on Kyiv, mind you- he called them from bunker. Sooner or later some agreemtent will be probably reached. Interesting... clip suggets that Russian Omon raided this local version of Amazon and gave voyenkomat calls to employees working there from outside Russia...could be a Ukrainian psyops though, there were several of this kind already, but similar practices in Russia were not unheard of before.

Just a silly snippet for anniversary of Maidan...it happened that Vadim Titushko, infamous hooligan whose name was given to entire kind of street-thugs of pro-Yanukovych clan (titushki) is now a decorated sergant in Ukrainian 72nd Brigade. Sometimes war takes the best from people...

Correct, however for people less interested in European mechanisms and in the context of rest of the post, worth to add that even PiS- ruled PL never voted with Orban on any anti-Ukrainian practices; to the contrary, it made a lot to soften Hungarian stance in matter of financing for Ukrainian military effort (as far as can be done in his case). Also it is not precise to say that are anti-European; they are anti-centralized EU aka federalized. And not the only ones. PL never was, and never will be pro-Russian. Netherlands now in theory can. Wilders may be a problem for Ukraine, especially if political sanitary cordon around him will break but it seems he will not be powerful enough to form coalition anyway. Probably he will stick to his core of anti-immigrant policies? And Dutch state already took obligations and curse with rest of EU, so I wouldn't expect any violent changes here too. So no reason to despair for now; this type of politicians is always loud before elections, afterwards they suddenly become more nuanced. Here some summ up by Dutch journo, but it is twitter so treat with grain of salt: https://twitter.com/bencoates1/status/1727608887916818612

Commander stays very calm, despite his folks getting wounded in succession and himself too. Just by looking how wounded soldier with cut out pants (beefy bearded one, funny nickname "Alkaida" ) shivers one can almost feel this cold in the trench. Kudos to female medic too. Oh, and sound of tracks definitellycan get on nerves. On light side, they are very well armed and clearly know their stuff. Anyway, worth to watch. Pretty educational video, I would say, even if no enemies are visible. PS. And summary of actions from one of our military analysts: "ONE OF THE IMPORTANT DAYS IN THE EAST" Fragment of the fighting near Avdiyevka, probably of an infantry platoon from the 47th Mechanized Brigade. .... A ride in combat vehicles... Night rotation of infantry platoons in the "Reks" position, taking over the position at night and fighting to maintain it, dressing the wounded and the brilliant calm of the commanding non-commissioned officer, which spreads to the entire platoon, despite heavy fighting with the "Peters" (Russians). and "Pitery" hold on... they fight... they don't give up At times the defense is circular... but we hold on . Our guys support "Żelazek" and "Architect" (platoons). The commander tells the "German" with MG2 (German machine gun) to save ammunition, and the "German's" helper and ammunition keeper is... "Jewrej", i.e. a Jew [funny, cause the other guys is called Alkaida ][Russian artillery fires dangerously and frequently, and has unexploded bombs (one can be heard at the beginning of the film). Interestingly, women in combat units fight like men. The film was shot from the position of the command point and the nest for wounded... Then fighting in the trenches with the attack of Russian infantry, and in the distance you can hear the bursting of Ukrainian artillery cluster shells. There are probably fewer "Peters" now... Grenades are flying, and drones are flying somewhere in the distance... but ours (I think) Russian fire wounds the Ukrainian commander. There is a hole, it doesn't matter, the wounded non-commissioned officer continues to command the platoon's operations, and the platoon fights... You can see that the army is under fire, and stress does not paralyze you but helps you make the right decisions, just like during training A rally of Russian tanks into positions, followed by Russian infantry, but in the "German" position - with MG3. The commander ordered the "ateshniks" (anti-tank section from the abbreviation AT) to let the tanks pass rather than expose the platoon to "meat from their fragmentation shells". The "Żelasko" position took care of the tanks. Supposedly it put something down... it had more "atheshniks" The commander is ordered to leave the position... Platoon is preparing to evacuate. The commander will determine the order of loading into the wagons. The nest of wounded goes first The "German" is the last one, but he complains that he must have left too much ammunition, which he took so hard to bring to the "Peters"... War wagons arrive and put up a smoke screen and use fire to weaken the retreat of the companions Evacuation, and the heavy M2 Bradley provides solace and shelter Hurry to the assembly area... medics are waiting there. Evacuation of the wounded and rest... This day was good, no losses, only hurts... I recommend. Movie approx. 30 min. Best regards and thank you

POV: you prefer to be an infantryman mobik assaulting on foot or a tanker inside a vehicle crossing the open field with knowledge that every enemy drone around see you? Damn, in this war even being artilleryman sucks. One can only wander what Russians in those vehicles think. It doesn't seem they have large chances of survival.

https://militaryland.net/news/offensive-through-the-eyes-of-a-soldier/ Interesting, about summer offensive. Yup, unfortunatelly our ability to make them is one of causes of current stalemate. I am not sure if any business company collectivelly understand what sacrifice even means; it's concept coming from a world beyond corpo-language. And what cannot be expressed, cannot be thought.

Didn't read it, but some experts on Ukraine actually living there are rather critical of the book- it is collection of interviews with various named and unnamed officials, not proper historical work that would cross the sources with each other and present effects to the reader. Interesting piece to be sure, but inherently subjective. We will need to wait for in-depth works for several years. Meanwhile, short summary of effects of trip of the same crew of analytics as before. Conclusions are unsurprising and not very optimistic: https://threadreaderapp-com.translate.goog/thread/1725157813364600855.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=pl&_x_tr_pto=wapp Given the length and character of FIN-RU border, it was to be expected. Problem will likely only grew in time and scope, as it is great source of income for middle-level aparatchiks.

Since talk about casualties pop up lately due to The Economist article, recent report of " Book of memory of the Fallen" created by various volunteers gives overal estimates of AFU losses at at least 30 thousand KIA. They are still being counted, so will increase, but it is less than from 70k newspaper source gave. https://novynarnia.com/2023/11/14/knyga-pamyati-22-23/ Their spokesmen said lately also that there is a lot of MIA, whom he estimated at 15 thousand- presumably, mostly dead. Ratio 2:1 in KIA in MIA is quite high given lack of big encirclements in this war, except Mariupol. May be effect of bureaucratic practices. That would gave us ca.50k perhaps at this moment in time.

Pretty short summary of Ukrainian needs regarding equipment. Nothin new, but perhaps worth to look at.

Perhaps it was posted before. Russian attack on position of 58th Brigade. Tense clip.

I think there was such example when Ukrainians fly into tunnel under Antonovsky Bridge back in a day. First drone hit the partly-covered entrance, second flew straight into the tunnel where armour was hidden. It was high-priority mission, though that demands good precision and allocation of resources.

Good Interview, but short one, from one of AFU veterans:

Still far from the level of famous clip of German mercenary doctors removing organs from wounded AFU patients. https://voxukraine.org/en/public-health-fakes-ukrainian-military-man-witnessed-the-work-of-black-transplant-specialists-at-the-front-issue-33 Also some month age there was one great in-depth interview with DPR soldiers by one of Russian "journos", who described in detail how they killed so many american mercs, that BlackHawks hoovered constantly at night, crossed the frontline and managed to take their bodies back to "giant, secret freezer in Poland". Further they even claimed they shot down one helicopter, but remains where immediatelly bombed by Ukrainian artillery, so unfirtunatelly no wrecks to show. As you see, in Russia Americans are in the same time extremelly dumb and ungodly clever. Very difficult enemy for Ivan. Perhaps action was planned by Boris "Tactical" Johnson himself.

I assure you, sire, our officials are more stupid. I won't take any "no" for answer here. He was a police general not military, btw., so shouldn't take bloody granade launcher as a gift anyway. Plush handcuffs, retired trained police dog, maybe 9 mm casings with "Best cop in the world" would be more appropriate. But on serious note, circulation of various less-than'legal "stuff" from this war will likely be a problem in the future also within EU. And likely used in Russian propaganda against Ukraine.

Yup, but it's probably not sexism: all his children would likely be purposfully kept away from political power, male or female, as he always clearly expressed such wishes. Despite our perception, in Russia he is viewed as quite modern and even liberal man when comes to family, women, personal heritage etc. Chechens works differently- they are extremelly familiar, so we may likely see diarchy or even triumvirate for long years, with council of Elders (think of Senate made from chief followers of Kadyrovs) moderating conflicts. At some point ambitions will probably take over, but it may take a long time. Even in such system somebody must be clear pater familias, though. Ofc. first Kadyrov must be dead, which is by no means a given in nearest future.

Not directly about Ukraine, but since we talk about Chechnya a lot: younger son of Kadyrov, Adam (mentioned before) reportedly took some unspecified, but high position among senior security apparatus of his father. https://www.euronews.com/2023/11/06/chechen-leader-hands-son-15-prominent-position-in-security-forces Younger fatty (yes, I am mean- kid is already sadistic at 15 years old) Adam will take security and likely military forces; he appears more and more often with his father. Nominally older but more timid Akhmet will likely succeed overall governance and civil administration. Of 3rd, middle Zelimkhan (still older than Adam) little is known. It looks like projected system in case of father's death is something of a family business with carefully limited boundries, likely guarded by closest allies of the family. Imagine succesfull Italian Pizza company but with guns. For past 2 years we have occassion to watch how conditions are created for future succession in totalitarian regime. Note how Kadyrov is actually more prudent than Putin...despite relatively young age, he knows he can pass away and try to prepare his small kingdom for it.

Worth to note that Wolski is normally firmly in the "tankers' camp, claiming that warfare did not change substantially and drones/isr/precision is just new addition to mechanized forces or, at the most, danger countered by super airforce. It seems to be prevalent view in top brass and around-military circles here, just like in other NATO armies. Too eager pointing toward fundamental changes new technology brings to the battlefield is often considered amateurish, lacking depth or (worse) following empty intellectual fashion. Argument of Ukrainian September Kharkiv offensive often pops up in these discussions. They do realise of course warfare is evolving, but I don't think they fully get level of tactical and operational repercussions yet.

In light of latest discussions about Russian replenishment equipment capabilities, it is worth to paste here Wolski's (one of PL analitics) post about tank production of both sides. Roughly translated but you can get the idea: Yesterday, there was a discussion about what she posted in Le Monde by [...]. . The article mentions 600 tanks A YEAR in UWZ (T-72/90 family) and Omsk (T-80) And yes, it is possible. But not as the production of new machines, but as the production of new ones, the restoration of old ones and the renovation of shot machines recovered from the battlefield. After the collapse of the USSR at peace, in the best years UWZ could produce about 250 - 300 T-90S/T-90A tanks, where the main limit was the availability of W92 and W92S2, then - here there was a limit of about 250 tanks per year, and in 2A46M5 barrels with a bayonet connector which are incompatible with older guns Oska built about 60 T-80BWM per year. Is it possible to double production on a war footing? In theory, in practice it didn't work out very well for the Russians. Otherwise, we would be talking about 1k+ machines delivered this year to MO FR together with renovated vehicles. And so we write "only" about the delivery of 600 tanks in 2023, including refurbished vehicles. Of course, La Monde forgot about Chita and other factories where the T-62M is currently manufactured using components from North Korea. It was planned to deliver 260-280 vehicles this year, but production, or rather reconstruction at the factory, is to be completed by about 130 tanks, and the target capacity will be achieved next year. As a result, we are talking about the fact that the Russian Armed Forces will receive about 700 tanks this year - new tanks, restored from warehouses and renovated after evacuation from the battlefield. The Russians have so far lost about 2,500 tanks in the war, and as you can see, within a year they managed to regain about 25-27% of the loss they suffered. This does not mean that they will be able to make up for all the losses by 2026 - for example, the process of restoring machines from warehouses is non-linear - in 2024 there will be a peak in capacity and then the pool of machines (capable of doing so) will begin to run out. Therefore, RUS is trying to expand the production of UWZ and Omsk because they know that from 2025 they will have to rely mainly on new tanks in the process of reproducing combat losses of armored weapons. Personally, I estimate that in 2024, the RUS will be able to incorporate about 1,000-1,200 tanks of all categories into the Russian Armed Forces (new, recovered from warehouses, repaired after evacuation from the battlefield). Well, what does it look like in Ukraine? Ukrainians repair about 30 tanks a month recovered from the battlefield OUTSIDE Ukraine. Which is approximately 360 recovered machines per year. From T-64BW, for which there are no components, through T-72M1 to Leopard 2. Deliveries of new machines in 2023 and those contracted until the end of the year (including Leopard 2 and Abrams) will make up for the irretrievable losses from this year, including those from the failed offensive. Perhaps even slightly positive at the end of the year. Of course, this is only possible because Poland has donated over 350 machines to the UA in less than two years. And we can give another hundred (PT-91). But so far, the cars renovated in Ukraine + delivered by the West this year give a value approximately equal to the Russian 600-700 cars Yes, you read that right. Please make a note of this. However, we have an elephant in the room here, which I have been writing about since November 2022 - the pool of Western machines that can be delivered is a finite value, and this year is only "saved" by surprisingly low UA irreversible losses. Unfortunately, the year 2024 will see an almost double increase in the reconstruction capacity of RUS and a significant decrease in the reconstruction capacity of UA (by over 1/3, how much more - it is debatable). However, what does the ANNUAL production capacity look like in the "West"? South Korea: 40 to 80 K2 (confirmed closer to 40) Israel: up to 100 Merkavs and Namers (approximately) Germany: 25-30 Leopard 2A7V USA: 180 in one shift in LIMA Yes, the US's production capacity is about the same as the rest of us combined. The above data is OSINT ofc - just read parliamentary interpellations, congressional reports, state senators', annual reports of companies, open statements of company presidents and directors, etc. Of course, the above may be increased: Lima produces 15 Abrmas per month and 5 Strykers, there is an option to produce 20 M1 m/c (240 per year) and when the second shift is launched: 33 vehicles per month (396 per year!). South Korea's capabilities are difficult to estimate, and KMW personally estimates it at double what it already has - although deliveries to Hungary and Norway indicate that there will be around 25 tanks per year there. What's the moral in this for us? 1) In Abrams we trust because only GDLS has the appropriate production capacity 2) Licensed production of either M1A2SEPv3PL or K2PL should be launched in Poland, but care should be taken to ensure that it becomes the basis for a mobilization plan for renovations and distributed production based on components already produced in peacetime. And most importantly: I challenge the author of the fall of the Panzerwaffe (article)@WojenneH because Norbert wrote several epic articles about what happened to the Panzerwaffe in 1943 and 1944, that it collapsed. What matters is not how much you produce/renovate, but how much you lose during this time and... whether your production base can be effectively attacked by aviation and production interrupted and disrupted. And at the end of this long entry, one more question: In the event of a NATO vs. Russia conflict, UWZ and Omsk would not stand in one piece for long . And the need to disperse production and hide it underground would quickly reach the scale of the Third Reich's needs in Russia in 1944. Unfortunately, Ukraine has no room for maneuver here and we are seeing a material war in its worst form.