Calamine Waffles

I'm not saying 42k is correct, but 15k KIA is just too low. I'd guess it's at least 20-25k by now, minimum.

You use a lower multiplier. KIA to WIA ratio is going to be higher for an army operating with 1970/80s first aid and medical evacuation. Let's just agree to disagree on that. Again, he's using that flawed multiplier here based on US military statistics. Again, 15k is virtually impossible given we know Ukraine has 7-8,000 dead Russians in cold storage in April. Ukraine cannot possibly be recovering half of every Russian killed in the war, especially since many of those dead will be on territory occupied by Russia as well, and some will have been vapourised when their T-72/BMP exploded. We know that for the entirety of this war Russia has been having so many logistic problems, why would anyone think they're even at US WWII levels of ability in evacuating and patching up wounded?

You're using the US KIA to casualty ratio calculation which assumes a level of triage, CASEVAC, and medical care that I frankly doubt exists in the Russian Army or its proxies. I don't think it is an accurate estimate for total casualties. Russia mobilized nearly 300,000 soldiers before the war, and with the ongoing covert mobilization, who knows how many they actually have in Ukraine? Anyway, the point is that 15k is almost certainly wrong, and 7k is complete bull pulled out of Kofman's arse.

And your assumption that they would have roughly 185,000 casualties is based on what?

The Ukrainians had about 7-8,000 dead Russians in cold storage. Unless you believe they are so efficient that they are recovering half of the Russians killed in Ukraine, there is absolutely no way that the Russian dead are only 15,000. And that was in April. https://www.thelowdownblog.com/2022/04/numbers-of-unclaimed-russian-war-dead.html This is "Karl"'s claim. I have no reason to take it seriously prima facie, but based on his track record, I'd say he's probably closer to the truth. Remember that the Russians are on the offensive and they are having repeated failed attacks.

Thanks for your insights! It was just my impression as an outsider looking in. To put it bluntly, I don't think Kofman is in any position to know Russian KIA any more accurately than "Karl" from Estonia. Who, by the way, has been more on point with regards to this war than Kofman ever was.

https://wartranslated.com/day-115-june-18-summary-of-arestovych-and-feygin-daily-broadcast/ I had suspected there probably was some treachery involved in their success on the Southern Front. Also suspected it was the SBU, as they were never reformed or "purged" the same way as the ZSU was post 2014.

I don't recall where on Twitter I saw it, but apparently the geography downriver means that if they blow the dam most of the flooding will be on the eastern bank of the river downstream, which is where the Russians would be in a fight for Kherson.

There are a few things: 1) There just aren't that many of the Western systems there. You're talking about maybe 200-300 or so altogether of M777s, FH-70s, M109s, Krabs, etc. at most in Ukraine right now. 2) Ukraine cannot mass their forces to launch big counteroffensives until they are reasonably sure the Russian indirect fire capability has been reasonably degraded. Even then, they still have to worry about potential Russian air strikes, and Ukrainians don't have that many modern mobile SPAA, while MANPADS don't have the range. 3) They were not given the really good stuff (the M777 in particular did not come with Excalibur, contrary to what news media outlets reported earlier). 4) It outranges most of the Russian standard howitzers (Msta-B, Msta-S, D-20, D-30), but not the dedicated Russian counterbattery stuff (Giatsint-B, Giatsint-S, 2S7) and the rocket artillery (BM-27 and BM-30). 5) Most of the Russian logistics stuff is located pretty deep in the rear, so if you want to hit those you have to bring up the artillery to nearer the FEBA, which in turn puts you more in range of the Russian standard artillery.

Interesting appendix to a paper from RAND about the Russian military and military industrial complex: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1086706 Highlights the state of several important Russian arms manufacturers. Just three of them here: Kolomna BM (maker of the Iskander-M) (p. 124) Novator (maker of the Kalibr) (p. 129) Motovilikhinskie Zavody (maker of the BM-27 Uragan) (p. 108)

I honestly despise these AI voices because I associate them with YouTube ads. I'd much rather hear a real person speak, with accent and all.

I mean, basically use some common sense: an army that has lost half its material is no longer functional. Russia would be breaking through now in Donbas and probably reaching the banks of the Dnipro river. I would not be surprised if they are using Soviet accounting to get these numbers, where if a T-64BV got hit and had to be sent back to the factory for repair it counts as a "loss". That's how the Soviets accounted for "losses" in WW2.

That's just silly. Loss rates are going to be highly uneven because the intensity of the conflict is highly uneven across the entire frontline.

Citing OAN...it's a bit like citing Russia Today.

If the Ukrainian use the same "loss" accounting as the Soviets did, then "lost" means anything from "got stuck on the bridge/river crossing and could not take part in the battle" to "completely destroyed."

Oh, your parents have memories of World War 2? So you must have memories of the Greek junta, no?

Also should be noted that US/NATO continued presence in Afghanistan relies on Russian co-operation.

Oh, that's great then. Nizh ERA has been proven to be able to defeat 3BM42 Mango. So, the Bulats etc. are reasonably well protected. http://btvt.info/3attackdefensemobility/bulat_dz/img026.jpg http://btvt.info/3attackdefensemobility/bulat_dz/img010.jpg

The other thing is that these people continuing to be throw about "well, who could have known that Russia would get this so wrong" is not only intellectually dishonest, it is downright unhelpful. It doesn't help the Ukrainians in terms of encouraging Western aid and keeps sowing doubt. Save your defensive petulence for after the war is over. Then we can do a proper post mortem.

Yeah, he's talking about "oh, Russia is not pursuing a realistic strategy like just going into Donbas, who could have imagined that..." Did he see the military build up occurring in Belarus, Russia, and Crimea in the months leading up to the war? What *did* he think was Russia going to do with those forces? Were they just going to sit around with thumbs up their asses while the Donbas group goes in? For that matter, O'Brien freely admits he was wrong because he thought Russia was not going to invade. But the reason he thought that was because it would be incredibly foolish and self-destructive. I also think something that is not talked about but should very much be discussed is how these analysts also *underestimated* the Ukrainian military.

Which...it is? You're imagining a fight against an enemy that doesn't exist, and who has a goal that the real one is not pursuing? Your job as an analyst is to get things right as much as possible, and to have a realistic appraisal of your enemy's intentions and capabilities. If you have a platform, your views have an influence on what governments may do based on your assessments. Why were people like Stanimir Dobrev or Kamil Galeev or O'Brien able to get a better picture of Russia, its military, and the likely course of the war?

It will if they concentrate forces, which is why the southern Ukrainian offensive is quite slow. They're mostly fighting by infiltrating in infantry forces, especially at night.

TB-2 is significantly larger than those drones, so it is easier to shoot them down with air defences. RKG-1600 is basically just an RKG-3 with 3D-printed fins, so 220 mm penetration shaped charge if it lands correctly.

They sent at least one to Lysychansk recently, so they probably also use it to protect military HQ as well? And yeah, they have very valuable ABM capability and Ukraine does not have many of them.