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Calamine Waffles

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Everything posted by Calamine Waffles

  1. The problem with a NATO type mutual defense bloc in the Indo-Pacific region is that the Indo-Pacific region is a lot more heterogeneous and less integrated than Europe + North America is. Many of these nations have very different and often competing strategic interests, and some (Japan and Korea) still bear significant historical grudges.
  2. Is of great Soviet tradition. http://maxmodels72.ru/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MA35277-1.jpg
  3. I think the Aspide is going to be more useful to the Ukrainians at this time. It's no S-300, but it is a capable medium range system in its own right.
  4. I think you could definitely call it piracy if the grain vessels not a Ukrainian flagged vessel. And you could deal with them accordingly
  5. To be quite honest, the Turkish Navy is stronger than the Black Sea Fleet at this point. They along with the Romanian Navy could easily force the Black Sea Fleet to back off from a grain convoy.
  6. The problem for Germany is that there is a fairly strong Russo-appeasement faction in the SPD, Scholz's party. This is the same problem that Israel also faces, since the current coalition is quite reliant on the Russian Jewish diaspora, and is hence very reluctant to openly act against Russia.
  7. A true rarity: a Ukrainian Shilka performing the AA role
  8. One thing I'm curious about is the status of Ukraine's S-200 and S-300V batteries. They have not been seen in this war at all.
  9. Kast talks to Dobrev, who has been one of the more prescient analysts when it comes to this war.
  10. The US considers cyber-attacks to potentially be an act of war depending on their seriousness https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2017/10/war-cyberspace/ Also, nowhere in that PDF you posted does it even mention the words "act of war". There's also a very strict definition for offensive cyber operations in US military doctrine: https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/10/offensive-cyber/
  11. China's most important strategic partner IS the US. Without the US upholding the globalised world order, either the Chinese will have to do it themselves or they will be severely degraded in the coming decades. The US's willingness to do so for the past 50 years is what allowed the rise of China.
  12. The problem is that most of the OPEC countries do not have any crash surplus capacity. It will take years for them to bring traditional oil wells online, whereas the US can do it within a few months using shale oil.
  13. I decided to order these two books from a bookstore in Kyiv. Shipping to the US ($28) will cost more than the books themselves ($25). I'm a sucker for lavishly illustrated books, so I think these will be worth it.
  14. This is a nice chess puzzle that illustrates it. https://www.chess.com/daily-chess-puzzle/2022-05-29
  15. I don't think they're gaffes. honestly. I think he really is saying what he means to say, but the way it works is like how an instruction from the Prime Minister eventually becomes just a suggestion to the ambassador in Yes, Prime Minister.
  16. SBU claims to intercept comms where Russians in Ukraine started eating dogs
  17. I believe that can only be accomplished if the Russians agree to demilitarize Crimea. As long as it hosts naval and air assets that can be used to threaten Ukraine, it will be a non-starter.
  18. You don't necessarily have to starve them, all you have to do is make the military installations unusable and destroying warships/SAMs located there because they threaten Ukrainian territories and assets. It's perfectly justifiable because Russia uses their naval assets to launch Kalibrs at Ukraine. Like, the Ukrainians can still keep the water flowing from Nova Khakova and allow food through. Maybe cut off fuel supplies if absolutely necessary.
  19. There is retaking Crimea militarily, but there's also making it unusable to Russia to the point where they have to give it up. I imagine the latter us much more doable with Harpoons and SAMs + the destruction of the Kerch bridge.
  20. The problem is that he, like many of the other Russia-specific military analysts, bought into the PR and theatre that the Russians put out (which, in fairness, the Russians seem to have bought themselves). Generalists tend to have a broader picture because by their nature they have to have some knowledge about how militaries other than just Russia's operate. So that can act as a sanity check.
  21. In WOTR, Kofman was saying he thinks Russia will rebuild and probably faster than most people think, but who is going to finance Russia's rebuilding and remodernising of the military? Unlike 1905, they are in terminal demographic decline and France is not going to bail out their arms industry or rearm their military this time. Is China going to foot the bill? Unlikely, they see Russia as a resource extraction state like the US sees Canada. They also have their own historical grudges against the Russians. They have no interest in a strong, independent Russia beyond one that can keep the Europeans occupied.
  22. The thing is that, before the war he was one of those people who was publishing articles like this: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/09/23/zapad-2021-what-we-learned-from-russias-massive-military-drills-a75127 You could very well argue that analyses from fairly influential people like him discouraged heavier Western aid to Ukraine, especially in the lead-up to and earlier stages of the war. I think they have to acknowledge that this probably led to a lot of Ukrainian deaths, and I don't think they have the intellectual honesty to do that.
  23. It's too bad then that their leader seems to tend to act more to Putin's interests.
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