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FancyCat

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Everything posted by FancyCat

  1. Snake Island does not seem big enough for a garrison to not suffer horridly from a Russian missile strike. Might be best to keep it empty.
  2. You weren't impolite at all, I appreciate you taking the time to translate material and share information with us. Hopefully this scenario is the outcome, and Ukraine can achieve some victories.
  3. I am not familiar with Russia. I appreciate anything you correct me on. So why not mobilize if he must win? Or is the propaganda just so paper thin in Russia that it's his end if he calls it? The good thing if your correct, is Ukraine only need to defeat the current units in Ukraine and whatever they can find from the bottom and that's it. She basically gets to roll them back to pre-2014 instead needing to fight a mobilized Russia.
  4. Or another way, it's too premature to say Putin must go, that regime change in whatever way is done is required to safeguard Europe and Ukraine. Putin may just leave Ukraine, in a twisted sense. Assuming this forum thread and more optimistic thinkers are correct, and without mobilization, Russia WILL lose and Russia MAYBE loses with mobilization, assuming Putin isn't just being fed absolute lies and falsehoods on the Russian war machine, and knows the same or similar lack of mobilization means the defeat of the Russian military, that whatever mobilization does for Russia, it does not outweigh losing in Ukraine. Reflect on that. He can lose the war with Ukraine in it's current format. But he cannot afford to mobilize the population. Now my argument falls flat if he's being fed trash by his officers and officials which tbh, is just as likely a reason as him trying to preserve his options.
  5. It is in Russia's interest to show off to the world that it will fight forever in Ukraine, that Ukraine is a fight of survival for the outclassed Russian state against the stronger NATO and EU degenerates in order to more easily divide NATO and EU in supporting Ukraine, uneasy over this seemingly forever conflict. In the same vein that Ukraine needed to illustrate to the West they weren't gonna cut and run like Afghanistan before getting money and weapons, Russia must show a unrelenting profile of eternal conflict in Ukraine to stare down the West and make them blink. Their rhetoric does not match their actions, in the same vein as threatening to nuke London over British support to the Ukrainian Nazis there is no accompanying mobilization and raising alert level in their strategic missile forces, and as they say they fight a "war of survival for the motherland" in their media studios, Girkin bitterly complains about the lack of mobilization for war and foretells of a Russian defeat. On that note, Girkin, a ardent Russian nationalist desperately wants to win in Ukraine and he is complaining of the government losing the war. Certainly, the actual mobilization of Russian society for war would reopen doors and opportunities for him in particular but also for the empowerment of more hardline factions he represents. That Putin fails to do so, imo indicates again that we may be farther away from that irrationality where Putin is infected in such a manner that he must die or risk blowing all of Russia up. Right on time. I disagree, being a kingmaker in other countries is quite powerful. I will bring up GrigB stating that Russia becoming a 3rd Pole in the world is more a carve out for Russia's sphere of influence and note that should the U.S fall apart in global influence, (like if the U.S pulled out of NATO), the resulting vaccum falls neatly in line with a longstanding Russian goal of a divide where Germany and France rule over Europe, Russia regains her border regions in EE, she take firm dominance in Central Asia. Recall the German Admiral, high-ranking as well, who stated to Indian naval officials that the focus should be on allying with Russia and India to oppose China. The breakup of Anglo-American influence in Europe, would facilitate that arrangement nicely. The loss of America in European defense makes it a lot easier to pull apart the rest of NATO and bring about that dreaded betrayal EE is worried about. I absolutely agree with you that the driver is the West, I'm just pointing out that Putin is making moves and they were never as irrational as they seem at first glance, mistakes? Absolutely, but the die roll honestly could have been such that he might have been immortalized as the reviver of Russia's empire. How fortunate he's in the process of being destroyed. Now Putin must go....well aside from the fact it's pretty impossible as we discussed before, there is a chance I think we can come to a sort of arrangement. Oh I don't think we need to do anything different than refrain from invading Russia or overthrowing Putin. If Putin does not want to become Gaddafi, whom it is rumored he is obsessed with how the man ended up brutally murdered, he needs to keep his options open even now, and if he opens himself up to full-scale military defeat in Ukraine, he may well get the fate of Gaddafi. That's the key, full scale defeat. If he's already lost, there isn't any point in mobilizing. Maybe hes pinning his hopes on a stalemate, but there's a lot to be said about the lack of mobilization will render even stalemate impossible but if he pulls all the stops and Russia still loses, he gets the ax. Maybe his division of the West might pull off at the last minute. But he can't lend anymore rope to hardliners to hang himself i think. Instead, if I were Putin, I would prep the way to hang the whole field of senior intelligence and military for failure in Ukraine and wipe out my enemies internally by blaming them for Ukraine. If any of them die in Ukraine, even better. Now certainly this is outlandish, but hey, there isn't any obligation for a different leader than Putin to automatically steer the country towards peace and good relations with her neighbors and plenty of evidence Russian society may not accept such a person as leader anyway. Another leader climbs up, and is eager to cut his chops, or we can just have the bastard Putin stew in Moscow alone till he dies. It's certainly easier than trying to comb among the Russian elite for someone who can keep them in line without invading their neighbors and certainly easier than watching them initiate a breakup of the Russian Federation. Considering this is the most likely scenario, where Putin remains as leader of Russia but kicked out of Ukraine (vs overthrown) all I'm really saying is killing Putin is not 100% needed just yet.
  6. The fact that personnel like the Rosgvardiya who got lawyers and got themselves discharged instead of being deployed to Ukraine emphasizes for all the dictatorship and mafia structures, there is still a sort of legality, structure that can allow this to occur. I think it's important to recognize that wouldn't fly in wars or more aptly national wars for survival that the Russian state and government media is so frenzied about warning about NATO and EU. I wonder as part of the strategy to turn the Russian people apathetic, the bombardment of conflicting information makes it easier for people to accept changes in narrative without getting worked up over it. So maybe Russians might accept whatever happens in Ukraine, win or lose as long as Putin keeps the war losses limited to the volunteers or poor in Russian society and therefore out of sight and state media says all is well. In that sense, it's important NATO does not escalate the conflict. If Putin wants to lie to the people, so be it, just get the hell out of Ukraine. No need to invade Russia. No need to generate actual patriotic fever with war with NATO that causes people to sign up for the army, that is something the state media can't control. I really dunno why tens of thousands of Russian soldiers are dead, and Russian society is barely budging. I think as long as that persists, it would be a mistake to actually escalate rhetoric cause evidently, Russians don't really give a damn about the losses, why should we act and give them targets to focus their anger on. What I'm saying is the base of the Russian people's attitude to this conflict seems much more softer than it should be. There is a disconnect between words and actions in Russia and it would be a mistake to not look into it and let Putin have his ****ty out, as long as Ukraine can join the EU and NATO pre-2014 borders, I don't give a damn about Russia. Why slow-broiling the frog is important, bit by bit NATO kit in Ukraine improves and the lack of Russian coherent and strong response to stop it shows it's the right idea in ensuring that when Russia finally pulls the gas to Europe in desperation to stop the equipment flowing, we can go vainly "no, no we stop, we don't give anymore" as Ukraine wipes out every Russian ammo dump in the country.
  7. I think it does matter what the Russian government terms it as, especially when explaining it to the Russian people, whom I've already detailed is the only force able to change the Russian leadership (I don't think Putin's grasp on the elite is gonna break and if it does break, we aren't gonna see signs of it till he's dead). If Putin says "special military operation" over without mobilization, without "war", say right now at current territorial gains, will the Russian people accept that? I've been mulling it over since we are watching Russia push hard for territory, when they should honestly play defensively and my only conclusion is once he feels like he has enough, he's gonna declare it over, demand a ceasefire and spin it so that Russia is the more principled one looking for peace, and Ukraine is being unreasonable. (Which they aren't, but Russia is stewing in its own reality) and that will matter as Putin tries his best to divide the west and dry up support for Ukraine. As for the unrealistic aspersions of Russia and Putin, I can only point out that (I believe this invasion was decided way before 2020) Putin almost got a anti-NATO, pro-Russian President of the U.S that had he won his 2nd term, intended on removing the U.S from NATO, breaking the SK-US alliance, and somehow I doubt would have been as forthcoming with aid for Ukraine as the current president is. Putin I think knows he's outclassed militarily, but his mastery of internal subversion I think he was assuming would prevail, I believe was pretty close to paving a path where Ukraine would have been standing alone, and while yes, rebellions and guerilla warfare but I think the west still gets a huge defeat in soft power and influence it cannot recover in the event of Ukraine's annexation and yes Russia's military is outclassed, but the annexation of Ukraine would have substantially increased Russia's position and influence. Also, someone made a good point, Russia uses Ukrainians against each other...and while I'm sure resistance and unrelenting independence furor will remain, but Ukraine had become a part of a Russian Empire previously, and I think it would be folly to say it wouldn't occur again had Putin annexed the whole country. And I gotta underline with Ukraine absorbed into Russia, it really does have a chance at piercing into NATO. I mean the dockyards at Mykolaiv did make the Moskva, and the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier. (Yes yes corruption but that didn't stop Russia from almost destroying NATO from the inside) Now I agree with a ton of what you stated, but I think it isn't too irrational to be Putin and think I don't have a decent chance at annexing Ukraine.
  8. What does he mean by "might "off" you there too"? Kill the mother to hide the fact they took a bribe and then betrayed the deal?
  9. Colonies are usually more expensive than they are worth to the imperial core. The loss of 13% includes the return of Alsace–Lorraine to France, lost in 1871 and Poles to join Poland.
  10. Adam Tooze, who wrote The Wages of Destruction, a really insightful book on the Nazi economy, talks about Keyes and his argument for less forceful conditions for Germany following WWI here. As for French “revenge” pff, the war never impacted Germany the way it did France, the Western Front took place on French soil, 10% of France’s mainland territory was occupied, yet that had 14% of its workers, and produced 60 and 40 percent of French steel and coal. The issue of harshness really comes down to the fact Germany never actually felt defeated. Only losers pay, and certainly Germany did not lose WWI in their minds. It was a utter mistake to not occupy Germany. Meanwhile, France paid her reparations following the Franco-Prussian War, where Germany demanded payment and promised occupation until payment was done in full. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_indemnity My earlier link to wiki indicates that the portions required of Germany were similar to those demanded of France in 1871, no wonder France insisted on payment in 1918, 50 years earlier, Germany had insisted and occupied France till the payment was done, and yet as noted in the wiki link above, France paid and still recovered.
  11. Modern historians think the reparations were completely within Germany’s ability to pay them. The burden imposed on Germany was similar to the burden imposed on France following the Franco-Prussian War but the political circumstances did not allow Germany to faithfully pay the reparations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_reparations#Modern
  12. Maybe I’ll be proven wrong later but for all the hope Russians would agitate over the loss of tens of thousands of Russian countrymen, there isn’t much of that occurring, and uh…..not a lot of connecting the dots between how Russia is both winning in Ukraine and yet suffering so many dead in official media. Galeev had stated the deaths of these ethnic minorities don’t affect the stability of the state, but one would think that several months and tens of thousands dead, there would be more agitation or questioning by civilians but my impression is that’s not really happening, so maybe Galeev is right?
  13. Why I ask whether Russia and the Russian people consider it a war, why is Medvedev saying stuff like "if Ukraine invades Crimea, it will be war". Isn't Russia still hiding the KIAs and WIAs from public knowledge? I was under the impression this was to try and defer foreign involvement but "special military operation" serves a domestic purpose as well, no? Russia still has not mobilized, and I'm beginning to think that it's not just simply due to the burden of explaining it's failure in Ukraine so far, it is also gonna have to explain why despite after mobilizing Russia is still gonna lose. (Which I think is a valid separation to consider) if one considers that military defeat brings about regime changes, certainly making a distinction between a "special operation" and a war might just be enough leeway to get Putin out of getting overthrown.
  14. Definitely not a lot I disagree with from you. Is this still referenced as a special military operation in Russia? Has it become a war? I wonder about that.
  15. As much as we crow about NATO defeating Russia, the UK Chief of the General Staff is entirely correct to frame that war starting between NATO and Russia itself is a failure for the West. Scenarios where Russia can even think to conquer Finland, the Baltics must be made unthinkable. Putin must not be able to bet he can seize the Baltics and dare the West to try and retake it. In a sense, not only has the war in Ukraine awakened Europe to the reality of a hostile Russia, but that war itself is absolutely destructive and should be avoided at all costs. To be frank, it shouldn't matter what the population of a area desires, as we see far too often ethnic cleansing and other acts of mass violence are undertaken to cause that potential referendum to change results. Ukraine gained independence in 1991, and Russia accepted it, made agreements with it for the upkeep of the Black Sea Fleet, it has no right to intervene in the affairs of Ukraine like it did in 2014. If it wanted to pressure Ukraine's government to do things differently, it had so many options aside from invasion or military action. Economic sanctions, appeals to the UN for world cooperation. As a UN security council member, it would have been strongly noted. Instead Putin amassed troops and invaded.
  16. Well shoot, I remember writing a post in this thread where I post out that Russia will need tons of money/investment by China to prop up no matter what and that may not even make up for what it exports if it becomes a basket case aside from being a black hole of corruption. The Russian Tsar was Father over all the state and people, that includes ownership of the land, people and state. I don't see too much a difference in how they take between a Tsar who owns and takes what he wants due to divine right and a mafia boss who does the same through coercion and power. Hmm, not sure one can classify the desire of the Russian elite to reclaim a 3rd pole in the world as irrational. Destabilizing to the existing world order, sure, but irrational, no. As for removal....while yes, it's important to define goals first, it's essential to be realistic, and realistically Russia will not give up her nuclear weapons. North Korea has already illustrated the ability to be a isolated state and exist, I see no reason Russia can't fall the same path and exist with nukes. External removal is therefore impossible. Only internal conflict can bring about a state more friendly/accommodating to the west and there is no certainty that the internal structure allows for such a state to exist. In the same way we can see Putin's regime craft their messaging to bolster domestic support for their goals, it would be folly for the West, to even say in a governmental sense what your saying now. There isn't any point in saying Russia must be demilitarized, or stripped to the status of a puppet state or suggest that it's a inferior state even if it's stated to be impossible to enact or unrealistic, it's as goal defining as Putin's intention to reconquer the Russian Empire. It brings up distrust, it hardens positions, it is unproductive, it is only fuel for a paranoid actor to absorb. Obviously this is a wargaming forum, none of us sit near any levers of power or influence so it's not a big deal except maybe for DMS. But Biden was quick to backtrack on regime change in Russia, and that was the right decision, at the end of the day, no fuel must be given to paranoid Russia about being destroyed or overthrown or turned into homosexual degeneracy (Russian media likes to bring this up a lot). But yes we are broadly in principle on what will happen, except I want to emphasize the West may get failure despite doing everything "right" simply cause there is another actor involved.
  17. On one hand it is undoubtedly a failure that this war has occurred and certainly the west holds some blame for not taking stronger positions against Putin earlier. Certainly stronger positions towards Ukraine joining NATO or EU may have helped prevent war. But it's important to note that even after 1991, Russia still enacted violent actions towards it's neighbors and breakaway states that illustrated the limits of both that internal collapse in the Soviet Union and the ability of the West to bring change. And while the west could have taken more stronger positions then, certainly a more dominant west would have simply validated Russian fears with intervention and cause more spreading conflict. (Nukes..) What I'm saying is there isn't going to be a way to nearly tie this up in a bow. In 25 years this may well go down again. All the West can do is prep and act with restraint. A lot was done right past 1991 mind you. Eastern Europe is undoubtedly a success story, even if still painful and bloody for some states. Russia can only try to take Ukraine, instead of invading the Baltics or Poland. NATO, EU themselves have not collapsed, a victory of its own deserving acclaim. All the west can do to prep is ensure the eastern flank remains strong, and includes Ukraine. If we keep the EU and NATO in 30 years, it may never even happen. No need to take down Russia in any sense.
  18. I recall a Twitter thread where the poster noted that sanctions for the purposes of regime change essentially never work and that sanctions for that goal will always fail, but for goals like preventing Russia from rearming easier, then that's way more achievable. I think you are overestimating the CIA a little too much. Considering that Germany only broke for peace due to invasion about to take place and Russia vs the west is no where near such a point of occurring, there isn't any real path that results in trials or reparations happening. The cold war where the Soviet Union collapsed "and the West won" only reinforces my point that change can only happen internally. And as many have stated, the limits of that collapse continue today, a Russia that 30 years later, is invading wholesale all of Ukraine. So even that internal led collapse didn't prevent this outcome today.
  19. I doubt regime change is on the table, none of Europe except maybe Britain has any stomach for that, but I doubt the U.K is keen on the idea of regime change as a concept to be promoted, and I seriously doubt the current U.S government is inclined under Biden to seek out regime change. For the purposes of punishment of Russia for launching the war, certainly Putin is marked with a stain that cannot leave Russia until he leaves power but I argue that the West's objective in insisting Russia gets rid of Putin, is more aimed to Putin that he crossed a line he cannot walk back rather than a attempt at regime change. Considering the laxness at earlier Russian actions, I think it's a reaction partly to compensate for the prior inaction as Putin will take any signal at weakness as positivity for his current course. I actually contest that Russia and Putin understand that Russia is unable to form a third pole to compete against China or the West and that it's only for domestic consumption, in that your separating the elite from the mass of Russia in their goals. It's far more likely the elite, and Putin are true believers in this project. I seriously doubt you can have a pilant regime willing to engage in war crimes trials, and reparations without the change in Russian culture needed to allow such a regime to exist. As I already stated I doubt a regime change occurring from external pressure, so internal is the only way it occurs, but if Russian culture does not change, then the conditions preventing a environment where war crimes trials and reparations remain. Nuclear disarmament is certainly off limits without change to Russian culture and mindset. To prempt DMS, it is far more likely the West has decided simply to punish Russia and deter Russia rather than seek to change Russia on the inside. If Russia wants to be ****ty, so be it, but we don't have to stand and listen to it and we certainly aren't going to try and change its mind to try and get them to see they are wrong, but if Russia tries to take Ukraine again, they get punched in the face rightly.
  20. long thread but basically Def Mon thinks Russia has a huge artillery mass in the region of SD and Popsana, etc, that will force Ukraine out of the remaining salient but Russia is exposed on the other fronts, Ukraine will try and focus on strangling that mass from being deployed effectively thru long range fire, and launching attacks on other fronts to try and draw Russian focus away from Donbas.
  21. theres little point in talking about seeking to end the current regime in Russia, cause it will never happen (nukes). Best thing Ukraine needs to focus on is regaining her pre-2014 borders, joining EU, NATO and then it probably does not matter if Russia comes back for round 2, as Poland-Ukraine and co could probably hold them off quite well if NATO/EU ever fell apart.
  22. The Russian ammo dump strike from this morning.
  23. Dunno if true but he seems knowledgeable. Interesting that Ukraine is able to hit these depots. Either the Tochkas are getting thru what should be the strongest AA due to being the primary front, or those HIMARS are amazing.
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