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Centurian52

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Everything posted by Centurian52

  1. Thanks. Rereading Dr.Fusselpulli's comment, I really should have figured out from the context that the Panzerfaust Lanze and Panzerfaust 44 were one and the same. Yeah, there doesn't seem to be any consistent system. The Panzerfaust 30 and Panzerfaust 60 of WW2 were named for their effective ranges in meters (does anyone remember if the Panzerfaust 100 ever saw the light of day?). The Panzerfaust 44 was named for the size of its barrel in mm. And the Panzerfaust 3 does seem to be named for its succession number. I think it's a matter of tradition at this point that the successor to the Panzerfaust 3 will have to be named according to an entirely different naming convention from any of the previous Panzerfausts (they could go by date (ex: Panzerfaust 27 if it comes out in 2027) or perhaps use the American system and call it the M1 Panzerfaust).
  2. I believe the Bundeswehr was using the Panzerfaust 44 (44 referring to the size, in mm, of the barrel) during the timeframe of CMCW (entered service in 1967, phased out in the 1990s as it was gradually replaced by the Panzerfaust 3 from 1987 on (I'm sure we all remember the Panzerfaust 3 from CMSF2)). It's one of the reasons I was hoping to get the Bundeswehr in this module (not that I mind getting the BAOR instead). Similar to the RPG-7 in a lot of ways. Reloadable, with a similar range to and slightly better penetration than the RPG-7 (with the PG-7V rocket), rocket was bigger than the barrel (67mm to the barrel's 44mm, so you get a similar look with a larger warhead sticking out of a smaller barrel). Basically I think it would have played a lot like having RPG-7s on the blue team. Oh well, I'm sure we'll get it next time. And we have Chieftains as a consolation prize, so I can't really complain.
  3. The Germans and the British were the top two forces I wanted to see added, so this is awesome news! I think I was a bit more eager to see the Germans, but I'm happy with the British (I can wait on the Germans, just as long as I do get them eventually). The timeframe adjustment is interesting. My expectation based on the original 79-82 timeframe was that the Chieftain would not perform any better than the M60. My reasoning was that HEAT and APFSDS ammunition of the period could defeat ANY homogeneous steel armor, even the thicker Chieftain armor (Stillbrew composite armor won't be added until 1986). And while the Chieftain does have a more powerful 120mm gun, it still has the same ammunition it had in 1965, which doesn't perform any better than the 105mm ammunition available to the M60 in 79-82 (L23 APFSDS doesn't come out until 1985). But pushing the timeframe back to 76 might change things a bit. I don't know what ammunition the Soviets had available in 76, but perhaps there is a chance that the thicker armor of the Chieftain will provide a noticeable increase in survivability over the M60 in 1976, as opposed to 1982 when I expect both vehicles to be reliably killed by any AT weapon. And of course the best round the M60 has in 1976 is the M728 APDS, which the L15 APDS fired by the Chieftain does outperform. So while I don't expect the Chieftain to have any noticeable advantage in survivability or firepower over the M60 in 1982, perhaps it will have noticeably better survivability and firepower in 1976. And of course I look forward to seeing the L1A1 in action. Except for small numbers in the hands of Fallschirmjager and Mujahedeen, we haven't seen fully battle rifle armed units in Combat Mission before. I expect the British infantry to perform just as well as US infantry in long range engagements, where both the L1A1 and M16 are essentially functioning as high magazine capacity semi-automatic rifles (the Brits might actually perform even better at long range, since every infantry squad has a GPMG). But I expect them not to perform as well in close range engagements, where the assault rifle armed US infantry switch to using their rifles like submachine guns, and the battle rifle armed Brits will essentially still just have high capacity semi-automatic rifles. EDIT: After perusing the Steel Beasts wiki ammunition data it does look like a lot of pre-76 Soviet ammo will really struggle to get through the frontal armor of the Chieftain. It won't be immune by any measure, but I think it's going to be a beast.
  4. I'm definitely a proud member of the obscure content faction! Although I'm not part of the faction asking for North Africa or early Eastern Front, mainly because those theaters were already covered in CMx1 and I still find CMx1 to be perfectly playable (CMx1 is still the second most realistic tactical wargame engine in the world after CMx2 after all). But any war or theater that has not yet been covered in either CMx1 or CMx2 is absolutely on my list of content I would like to see in the future (Poland 39, France 40, Pacific, Korea, Vietnam, etc...*). But I also understand that your time and resources are limited and that my interests need to be balanced with the interests of your other customers. I am just grateful for what you have delivered, and will be excited if and when you release a game covering a previously uncovered war or theater. *My obscure content itch even extends into time periods that Combat Mission is poorly suited for anyway (there are loads of 19th century wars I want to fight, such as the Crimean War, Franco-Prussian War, and Anglo-Zulu War). I have a particularly strong itch for WW1, which no company in the world seems to have developed an appropriate engine for. It is hard to describe how badly I want a WW1 tactical wargame (almost as badly as I wanted a Cold War tactical wargame prior to the release of CMCW), but I am captivated by the image of entirely rifle-armed companies advancing by rushes in huge extended order lines in 1914 giving way to platoons advancing by fire and maneuver with specialist weapons sections in 1918 (I blame you @Hapless, thanks a lot for making me obsessed with a time period that is not covered by even a single tactical wargame).
  5. Fair enough. But I don't PBEM. Multiplayer has never been something I've been interested in. It requires coordinating with other people, which is not really the sort of thing I want to do in the limited time I have available for entertainment.
  6. Perhaps, but that doesn't really bother me. I think balance is seriously overrated anyway. I know I may be in the minority, but I tend to prefer realism at all costs, even if that results in extremely unbalanced scenarios (learning to keep your force alive while retreating in the face of a superior enemy, or rapidly exploit in the face of an inferior enemy, are just as important as learning to go toe to toe with an equal enemy as far as I'm concerned). I am excited by the prospect of a timeline expansion. Honestly I was content with the timeframe we had, and was just looking forward to more forces getting added in (really looking forward to the West Germans and British in particular). But if we get a timeline expansion in addition to new forces then that's even better. Later variants of the Abrams, such as the M1IP or perhaps even the M1A1. And while all of those naked T-64/72/80s that we've currently got are fine, there is just something about the late 80s versions of those tanks which are buried in ERA bricks that really does it for me. I grew up on WiC, so it is that late 80s WW3 scenario that I find the most fascinating (nothing gets me pumped up for some Cold War era combat quite like those WiC cutscenes). I always knew that WiC wasn't all that realistic, so I've always been curious about how a NATO vs WP showdown would actually go down in that period. And if it turns out that the Soviets perform poorly in that period, then so be it. At least my curiosity will be satisfied.
  7. The terrain and vehicles have been changed perfectly. I'm getting some GUI issues, but I haven't ruled out a possible clash with one or more of the other mods that I'm running.
  8. I thought I had all of them. But I found a few in here that I didn't have. Thank you!
  9. Thank you! I had it before but lost it when recovering data from my old hard drive. I'll try not to lose it this time
  10. It seems to be gone. I don't see it or an equivelant in the mod warehouse either
  11. Because if they did that then people would quickly make a module for just about every single war/operation/battle that the Combat Mission engine can handle. There would be no games left for BFC to release, and so they wouldn't be able to make any more money. But if BFC ever closes its doors (lack of business, critical mass of the team retires, etc...) then this would be an outstanding idea! It would be a fantastic way to keep Combat Mission alive even without any further official content.
  12. I definitely want a Combat Mission title covering a war between China and the US/Taiwan. But I think we will get a better product if BFC waits a bit on this one. It is generally much easier to model events after they happen then it is to try to guess what year the war will take place in and what Chinese and Taiwanese force composition will look like by then. CMBS is going to need a lot of work now that it is no longer hypothetical, and I think if BFC were to release a Taiwan focused Combat Mission today it will just find itself in the same position before too long.
  13. No Oplots either. The Ukrainians only had a handful at the beginning of the war and I haven't seen much evidence of them showing up in combat. Bulats should be very rare as well. For the most part the Ukrainian tanks should be T-64BVs (out of what's available in CMBS). For Ukraine: 44.58% T-64BV 17.03% T-64BV Zr. 2017 8.98% T-72M/M1 8.36% T-80BV 7.12% T-72B 4.02% T-72AMT 2.79% T-72AV 2.48% T-64BM 'Bulat' 2.17% T-64B1M 0.93% T-72 'Ural' 0.62% T-64BM2 'Bulat' 0.31% T-64BVK 0.31% T-64B 0.31% T-64A
  14. My idea of what is present in Ukraine and in what quantities is based on the Oryx blog. Equipment has changed over time. IIRC the most common Russian tank at the beginning of the war was the T-72B3 Obr. 2016, whereas right now it is the T-72B3. At the beginning of the war there were no T-62s or T-90Ms, now they are both present but rare. T-72Bs have become a lot more common over the course of the war, and are currently the second most common after the T-72B3. Adding up all of the Russian tanks knocked out so far and recorded on the Oryx blog (not counting all "unknown" tanks) the Russian tanks in Ukraine seem to have consisted of (keeping in mind that these numbers are not final, since the war isn't over yet): 19.25% T-72B3 16.71% T-72B 15.07% T-72B3 Obr. 2016 14.17% T-80BV 7.29% T-80U 5.73% T-72 Obr. 1989 4.91% T-80BVM 3.6% T-64BV 3.19% T-62M 2.87% T-72A 2.05% T-90A 1.8% T-72BA 0.66% T-62MV 0.66% T-72AV 0.66% T-80UE 0.41% T-90M 0.25% T-72B3 Obr. 2014 0.16% T-64A 0.16% T-80UK 0.08% T-80UM2 0.08% T-80BVK 0.08% T-62 Obr. 1967 Which frustratingly does not add up to 100%, but I assume that's down to a rounding error. If I were making the hard calls about which vehicles to include in the game I don't think I would include anything less common than the T-72A, since at that point more than 90% of the Russian tanks would be represented. Unfortunately that would leave out the T-90M, but so it goes. The most important tanks are the T-72B3, T-72B, and the T-72B3 Obr. 2016. With just those three tanks you can represent just over 50% of the Russian tanks that have actually been used in Ukraine. I don't have the time to run the same numbers for IFVs, but you get the idea. The Russians have a huge diversity of vehicles, some more common than others, some fairly new and some which would be more at home in CMCW. It looks like the BMP-2 is by far the most common, with BTR-82s being the next most common, still significant numbers of BMP-3s, and a surprising number of BMP-1s. It looks like there have been a significant number of BTR-80s (Oryx records 133 knocked out BTR-80s so far), but in general IFVs appear to be much more common than APCs.
  15. I've fallen about 60 pages behind, so I'm not sure if this has already come up. But ISW has on several occasions mentioned that the Russians will try to forcfully mobilize Ukrianians in occupied parts of Ukraine. This seems...risky. Admittedly I am not Ukrainian, nor has my home been occupied by a foreign army for the last six months. But I have tried my best to put myself in the mindset of a Ukrainian being forcefully mobilized by the Russians (oppressive regime occupies my home and commits warcrimes for six months, and then gives me a gun), and that scenario always ends with me killing my Russian officers at the first opportunity and defecting the the Ukrainian army. Wouldn't any unit raised for the Russian army from forcefully mobilized Ukrainians end up mutinying, killing their Russian officers, and donating themselves and all of their equipment to the Ukrainian army? At the very least the Russians would have to dedicate a significant amount of manpower towards providing security to make sure such units do not immediately defect. And even then firefights between disgruntled soldiers and FSB should only skyrocket once there are thousands of soldiers that not only don't want to fight for the Russians, but would actively rather be on the other side. Have I missed something? Do the Russians have some master plan to prevent forcefully mobilized Ukrainians from immeadiately fighting back? Perhaps by putting them in rear-services positions where it may not be necessary to give them guns? Or are people just far less likely to fight back, given ample means, motive, and opportunity, than I've assumed?
  16. They managed it for the US and the Soviets, so it's clearly not impossible. I assume it will take the better part of a decade to get all of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in. And even then the Balkans, Scandinavian, and Caucuses fronts may have to be neglected (although interest in seeing the US Marines in this time period may see some prioritization of the Scandinavian front). I don't necessarily expect them to get every branch of every army on every front, but I assume they will eventaully get all of the most important forces for the main central European front.
  17. Returning to Cold War Module speculation, it probably won't take very many modules to get in all of NATO. There are really only four NATO countries that I can think of that have their own unique equipment. The US, UK, West Germany, and France. The tank fleets of a lot of other countries are made up of a mix of Leopard 1s as their latest and greatest tanks, and Centurians as their previous gen tanks which are in the process of being replaced (Belgium has some French AMX-13s). So, for the most part, once West Germany and the UK are in the rest of NATO can probably be done all at once, since most of their equipment will already be in the game (except for France and, by extension, Belgium). I believe Spain and Turkey both have M-47s, which aren't in any game yet. But Spain doesn join NATO until 1982, so probably doesn't make the timeframe cut. It would be interesting to see fighting in the Balkans (Greece and Turkey vs Bulgaria and Romania) and the Caucuses (Turkey vs the Soviets in the mountains), but central Europe is the priority for me. Obviously all the equipment for the Warsaw Pact is already in, so they might potentially be done all at once. So a potential roadmap could be West Germany, then the UK, then France, then all of NATO (insert Warsaw Pact at any point). Or the UK, then West Germany and all of the NATO countries that have a mix of German and British equipment, then France and Belgium (insert Warsaw Pact at any point). Or the UK and West Germany, then all of the NATO countries that have a mix of German and British equipment, then France and Belgium (insert Warsaw Pact at any point). Or West and East Germany, then the UK and France, then the rest of the Warsaw Pact and the rest of NATO together. The possible permutations are endless and I keep thinking of more plausible ones, so there is plenty of room for BFC to surprise us. edit: Just reviewed my information. The Netherlands also has AMX-13s. Greece has some AMX-30s. And Italy, Greece, and Turkey all have M-47s. So French equipment is needed to fully represent Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece. That's enough countries that a French module will probably be needed ahead of a general "all remaining NATO countries" module.
  18. Western support is a big reason why Ukraine is winning. But the biggest reason is probably Russian incompetence coupled with good Ukrainian strategic and operational decisions. The absence of western support likely would have resulting in Ukrainian defeat by now, but all the western support in the world wouldn't have helped if the Ukrainians didn't use it effectively. edit: A phrase I'm becoming increasingly fond of is "necessary but not sufficient". Western weapons were likely necessary but not sufficient for Ukrainian victory. Russian incompetence was likely necessary but not sufficient for Ukrainian victory. And Ukrainian competence was likely necessary but not sufficient for Ukrainian victory. All three of those conditions together were likely required for victory. An absence of any one of those likely would have resulted in defeat.
  19. I'm sure I'm late to the party on this nugget of info, but I woke up to see this in the first paragraph of this morning's ISW report: "The Kremlin acknowledged its defeat in Kharkiv Oblast, the first time Moscow has openly recognized a defeat since the start of the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin officials and state media propagandists are extensively discussing the reasons for the Russian defeat in Kharkiv Oblast, a marked change from their previous pattern of reporting on exaggerated or fabricated Russian successes with limited detail.[1] The Kremlin never admitted that Russia was defeated around Kyiv or, later, at Snake Island, framing the retreat from Kyiv as a decision to prioritize the “liberation” of Donbas and the withdrawal from Snake Island as a “gesture of goodwill.”[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) originally offered a similar explanation for the Russian failure in Kharkiv, claiming that Russian forces were withdrawing troops from Kharkiv Oblast to regroup, but this false narrative faced quick and loud criticism online.[3] The Kremlin’s acknowledgment of the defeat is part of an effort to mitigate and deflect criticism for such a devastating failure away from Russian President Vladimir Putin and onto the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the uniformed military command." https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13
  20. Already a thread on that If were taking bets my money is on East/West Germans. British forces seem next most likely. If we're very lucky perhaps we'll get West Germans and British at the same time. Or perhaps a full Warsaw Pact pack (similar equipment and organization could mean that perhaps it isn't too much effort to do them all at the same time). While we definitely won't be getting the French in this module, I'm hopeful that we'll be getting them eventually. And for that reason I opened up a thread inquiring about the sate of their rifles in the CMCW time period.
  21. Not so disappointing. While I think we all hoped we would have it by late 2022, I think we all knew deep down that it would come in 2023.
  22. There is a lot to unpack in that quote. I never meant to imply that war never changes. It does. It changes a lot. I was emphasizing how much it changes due to factors other than time/technology. But just because my emphasis was on how much variability there is in wars even in the same time period, that doesn't mean there isn't also a considerable amount of variability in war between different time periods. War changes both in time and space, and according to dozens of other factors that are difficult to account for. I assume the point of that quote, when it was first uttered in a Fallout cutscene, was to emphasize that brutality and misery have always been a constant presence in war. And that's true enough. But a lot of people seem to take it to mean that absolutely nothing in war ever really changes. And that's total garbage. At first there appears to be some supporting evidence to the claim that "war never changes". There are certain elements that seem to remain more or less constant in any war. Numbers have always mattered. River crossings have always posed a significant challenge. War has always taken a psychological toll on those who participate in it. High ground has always been important. Logistics, communication, and coordination have always posed serious challenges. But even those elements that appear, at first glance, to remain constant have had significant changes in their weighted importance, in how they manifest, and in how they are addressed. Numbers have always mattered. But changes in technology have significantly altered how much of a numerical superiority it takes to overwhelm a determined defense, or how few troops you can get away with using to hold a choke point. Changes in the mobility of armies, and in the mobilization systems of nations, have effected how quickly a relative numerical balance can be altered. River crossings have always been a delicate operation, but changes in the firepower available to armies has changed their ability to support a crossing from the opposite bank, while changes in the available recon assets have changed how easy it is to determine where your enemy will attempt a river crossing. War has always taken a psychological toll on its participants, but the nature and causes of that toll and how we address it has changed. A thousand years ago soldiers faced the terror of edged weapons in close quarters on tightly packed battlefields, while modern firearms with supersonic projectiles produce a suppressive effect that has never been seen on the battlefield before (the tiny sonic boom (crack) of supersonic bullets suppresses enemy infantry far more effectively than even the subsonic bullets that were in use until the late 19th century (noise seems to be more important than lethality for producing a psychological effect)). And then there are things that are completely different. Entire new domains of warfare that have cropped up in the last hundred or so years (air, space, cyber, etc...). Air and naval combat are both completely different, to the point of being unrecognizable, to how they were 70 years ago. A full description of how war has and hasn't changed (and there is a decent amount to be said on both (smaller scale stuff seems to change more rapidly than larger scale stuff, with considerations on the tactical layer changing more rapidly than operational considerations, and operational considerations changing more rapidly than strategic considerations)) would require a full book (or possibly a series of books), but this post is probably long enough for now.
  23. Yeah, I suspect there is a significant amount of variability in warfare that is distinct from changes over time. Just as, in WW2, the fighting in North Africa was very different from fighting on the Eastern Front, and both were different from the fighting in the Pacific, I suspect that if another high intensity war between two different peer or near peer armies broke out in another part of the world it would look very different from this one in a lot of ways. It's not that this war has its peculiarities, so much as every war has peculiarities. Differences in objectives, scale, level of commitment, doctrine, force structure, and terrain may create a massive amount of variability even in wars fought in the same time period. Time period/technology obviously does make a big difference. If you reran WW2 with modern technology, but all other factors kept identical, it would still be a very different war. But I think it is far too simplistic to think of time period/technology as being the only thing that makes wars different. For an obvious example, there is probably a comparable amount of difference between a modern land war in eastern Europe and a modern air/naval/amphibious war in the Pacific as there is between a modern land war in eastern Europe and a 1940s land war in eastern Europe, or between a modern air/naval/amphibious war in the Pacific and a 1940s air/naval/amphibious war in the Pacific. So I don't think we should be talking about how modern war is different from war of decades past, as if modern war and war of decades past are homogeneous things, but about how specific types of war are different from their older counterparts. How is modern European ground war different from European ground war of decades past. How is modern counter-insurgency in desert/jungle/etc... different from counter-insurgency in desert/jungle/etc.. in decades past. How is modern air/naval/amphibious war around scattered island chains different from air/naval/amphibious war around scattered island chains of decades past. How is modern peer vs peer desert combat different from peer vs peer desert combat from decades past.
  24. Through a willingness to tolerate higher casualties. It's not that it's impossible to fight a war without tanks. It's just really inadvisable. I'm with you that tanks are critical to modern warfare (and UGVs really do just sound like next-gen tanks to me), but when you are arguing fervently for or against something it can be easy to paint yourself into a corner by making absolute statements. The trouble with absolute statements is that your opponent only needs to find a single counter-example to defeat your argument. Breakthroughs can be achieved with infantry and artillery only, and no tanks. They are just harder, require a higher tolerance for casualties, and have a lower chance of success.
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