Zeleban

Developing the theme of Ukraine’s unsuccessful summer offensive. Mashovets just wrote a post discussing the long-term prospects of this offensive
Review: Tokmak direction: prospects and options, or why General Zaluzhny is right...
Regarding the events in the Crimean-Tavrian and Donetsk directions, we slightly lost sight of the events in the Tokmak direction. Meanwhile, certain changes are also taking place there.
In particular, over the past few days, north of the village. Verbovoe, the enemy had a certain “incident”:
🔺 The enemy's 247th Air Assault Regiment apparently lost control of the heights northwest of this settlement. (level 140), which made it significantly more difficult for himself to maintain the northwestern outskirts of the village.
🔺Moreover, probably in the direction of the village. Novopokrovka (southwest) units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces also have some success in the defense sector of the enemy’s 108th airborne infantry regiment. In fact, from now on, only one forest belt separates them from the village itself.
🔺West of the village Rabotino units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, apparently, a few days ago also managed to push back units of the enemy’s 136th separate motorized rifle brigade towards the village Kopani.
🔺Further to the west, in the area of the village. Nesteryanka and on the segment between it and the village. Kopani, in the defense areas of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, the 104th and 234th Airborne Regiment from the enemy's 76th Airborne Division, quite intense fighting is taking place. The advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine almost came close to the village. Nesteryanka and advancement northeast of the village. Kopani.
By the way, about the last point.
As far as I understand, the commands of the enemy’s 19th Motorized Rifle and 76th Air Assault Divisions have strict orders to hold the Nesteryanka-Kopani line “under any conditions.” And it’s clear why.
However, in the case of Nesteryanka, it will be quite difficult for the enemy to do this. The fact is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, at one time, advanced not only to the north of the village, but also to the west of it.
The main communication regarding the logistical support of the enemy's 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment units defending in Nesteryanka itself and its environs stretches from the village of Mirne in a southwestern direction. But thanks to the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces units managed to approach it between Nesteryanka and Mirne (precisely to the west of the first), they can keep this communication under fire.
It is the village of Mirne that is quite strongly fortified from the northern direction (there is a whole system of enemy strongholds there), but there are windows between it and Nesteryanka. The distance from the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to this road is just over 2 km.
I don't want to hint at anything, but any military man would see certain possibilities in this. Why does the enemy cling so stubbornly to the village of Novoprokovpka?
Because BEHIND it, to the south, the first position of the main line of defense begins with a fairly well-equipped “defense center” in the village Solodka Balka.
Hold s. Novoprokopovka allows the enemy command to prevent the advance of the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this direction (Novoprokopovka - Sladkaya Balka), while simultaneously concentrating and massing its forces and assets on a relatively narrow front area east of this village, where Ukrainian troops were able to wedge into the first defense position - between Novoprokopovka and Verbove.
This is precisely what allows the enemy to hold, with the available forces and means, with a few exceptions, the first position of his main line of defense in the Novoprokopovka-Verbovoye section. Otherwise, he would have to stretch his troops over a wider front. And it’s not a fact that they would be enough for him.
Moreover, BEHIND Novoprokopovka and Sladkaya Balka, closer to Tokmak, the enemy has equipped a second position of the main line of defense with an even more powerful “defense node” in the area of the village Kamyshove. This, in addition to the fact that the city of Tokmak itself is equipped with a separate system of fortified and prepared enemy positions, almost “in a circle.” The second position in this direction stretches from the village Krasnogorka to the village Ocheretuvate.
 

This is what it looks like when a Shahed UAV is shot down by a mobile group. For the last six months, Russia has been launching long-range strikes on Ukraine exclusively at night (closer to the morning)

Thus, it becomes clear that in order to simply reach the “outer perimeter” of the enemy’s fortifications in the area of the city of Tokmak, in the Rabotino-Tokmak direction, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ strike group will have to gradually and sequentially solve several extremely complex tasks at once:
🔺"break through" the first position in the Novoprokopovka area
🔺assault a fortified area in the area of the village Solodka Balka
🔺 reach second position in the area of. Krasnogorka, expecting at any moment enemy counterattacks on its left flank from its powerful defense area in the village Ocheretuvate
🔺break through the second position in the area village Krasnogorka
🔺and only after all this - approach the city of Tokmak
At the same time, if you act “a little to the right”, on the part of Nesteryanka and Mirny, you will have to:
🔺 overcome the supply line with the enemy defense area in the village. Mirnoye, which is not even close to comparable to what is equipped in the area. Sweet Balka
🔺reach the first position of the main line of defense equipped by the enemy south of the villages of Pobednoe (upper), Ternovatoe, Stepnoe
🔺break through it, and the enemy’s fortified positions there cannot be compared with those located in the Rabotino-Tokmak directorate, reaching the Novogorovka-Chistopolye line
🔺and only then, reach the “external perimeter” of the enemy’s fortifications in the area of Tokmak through the village Pokrovskoye
At first glance, this seems more realistic than the previous option, which was implemented recently in the direction Rabotino - Novoprokopovka and towards the village. Verbovoe. But, as always, there is one “but”. And, well, quite significant.
The fact is that the distances that the Ukrainian Armed Forces units will have to travel in the first and second options are completely different.
And this is one of the key, if not decisive factors, because it is directly related to time.
Distance from the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the village. Novoprokopovka to the outer perimeter of enemy fortifications in the area of Tokmak in a straight line - 18.4 km, at the same time, the same distance from the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the village. Nesteryanka to the outer perimeter of enemy fortifications in the area of Tokmak - almost 26 km.
Yes, at first glance, the difference of 8 km is not that big. But it’s not for me to explain to you what today at the tactical level means every “extra” kilometer of advance of your troops on terrain that has been comprehensively prepared by the enemy for a stubborn and long-term defense.
Of course, there are several more options for further actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Tokmak direction, in addition to the ones I described above. For example, you can also “turn” towards the city of Pologi (there the distance between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the enemy fortifications equipped to the west and north of the city is generally less than 10 km). You can shift your efforts to the Vasilievka direction, and in general, there are still options, as they say.

However, for all this there is no main thing - the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to carry out these tasks (for a variety of reasons). In their current state, they are simply not able to overcome the echeloned and prepared enemy defense system in this operational direction (I suspect that in others too) with an acceptable and adequate pace and scope. For those who have forgotten, let me remind you that this was the “main” direction in the last summer-autumn campaign of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Therefore, General Zaluzhny is entirely right in his assessment of the general (strategic) situation that has developed, no matter who and no matter what objects to him from among the official (and unofficial as well) representatives of our military-political leadership. General Zaluzhny cannot, in his assessment of the situation, proceed from any considerations other than purely military ones.
He, as the Commander-in-Chief, is directly responsible for the planning, organization and practical use of the troops under his command. It makes no sense to him to say black and white or vice versa. He is not a politician, not a businessman.
The only thing that can be “discussed” with General Zaluzhny’s point of view is the methods and forms through which, as he believes, it is possible to correct this situation, and regarding the causes and mistakes that led to it.
But again, I repeat, this discussion should be non-public and exclusively among those people (officials) who are directly involved in making management decisions at the appropriate level. To organize a farce and “showdowns” in the public information sphere on the topic “what did Zaluzhny mean” or “what did Zelensky mean” means very significantly harming the overall implementation of the war strategy of our state.

Thus, it becomes clear that in order to simply reach the “outer perimeter” of the enemy’s fortifications in the area of the city of Tokmak, in the Rabotino-Tokmak direction, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ strike group will have to gradually and sequentially solve several extremely complex tasks at once:
🔺"break through" the first position in the Novoprokopovka area
🔺assault a fortified area in the area of the village Solodka Balka
🔺 reach second position in the area of. Krasnogorka, expecting at any moment enemy counterattacks on its left flank from its powerful defense area in the village Ocheretuvate
🔺break through the second position in the area village Krasnogorka
🔺and only after all this - approach the city of Tokmak
At the same time, if you act “a little to the right”, on the part of Nesteryanka and Mirny, you will have to:
🔺 overcome the supply line with the enemy defense area in the village. Mirnoye, which is not even close to comparable to what is equipped in the area. Sweet Balka
🔺reach the first position of the main line of defense equipped by the enemy south of the villages of Pobednoe (upper), Ternovatoe, Stepnoe
🔺break through it, and the enemy’s fortified positions there cannot be compared with those located in the Rabotino-Tokmak directorate, reaching the Novogorovka-Chistopolye line
🔺and only then, reach the “external perimeter” of the enemy’s fortifications in the area of Tokmak through the village Pokrovskoye
At first glance, this seems more realistic than the previous option, which was implemented recently in the direction Rabotino - Novoprokopovka and towards the village. Verbovoe. But, as always, there is one “but”. And, well, quite significant.
The fact is that the distances that the Ukrainian Armed Forces units will have to travel in the first and second options are completely different.
And this is one of the key, if not decisive factors, because it is directly related to time.
Distance from the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the village. Novoprokopovka to the outer perimeter of enemy fortifications in the area of Tokmak in a straight line - 18.4 km, at the same time, the same distance from the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the village. Nesteryanka to the outer perimeter of enemy fortifications in the area of Tokmak - almost 26 km.
Yes, at first glance, the difference of 8 km is not that big. But it’s not for me to explain to you what today at the tactical level means every “extra” kilometer of advance of your troops on terrain that has been comprehensively prepared by the enemy for a stubborn and long-term defense.
Of course, there are several more options for further actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Tokmak direction, in addition to the ones I described above. For example, you can also “turn” towards the city of Pologi (there the distance between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the enemy fortifications equipped to the west and north of the city is generally less than 10 km). You can shift your efforts to the Vasilievka direction, and in general, there are still options, as they say.

Developing the theme of Ukraine’s unsuccessful summer offensive. Mashovets just wrote a post discussing the long-term prospects of this offensive
Review: Tokmak direction: prospects and options, or why General Zaluzhny is right...
Regarding the events in the Crimean-Tavrian and Donetsk directions, we slightly lost sight of the events in the Tokmak direction. Meanwhile, certain changes are also taking place there.
In particular, over the past few days, north of the village. Verbovoe, the enemy had a certain “incident”:
🔺 The enemy's 247th Air Assault Regiment apparently lost control of the heights northwest of this settlement. (level 140), which made it significantly more difficult for himself to maintain the northwestern outskirts of the village.
🔺Moreover, probably in the direction of the village. Novopokrovka (southwest) units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces also have some success in the defense sector of the enemy’s 108th airborne infantry regiment. In fact, from now on, only one forest belt separates them from the village itself.
🔺West of the village Rabotino units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, apparently, a few days ago also managed to push back units of the enemy’s 136th separate motorized rifle brigade towards the village Kopani.
🔺Further to the west, in the area of the village. Nesteryanka and on the segment between it and the village. Kopani, in the defense areas of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, the 104th and 234th Airborne Regiment from the enemy's 76th Airborne Division, quite intense fighting is taking place. The advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine almost came close to the village. Nesteryanka and advancement northeast of the village. Kopani.
By the way, about the last point.
As far as I understand, the commands of the enemy’s 19th Motorized Rifle and 76th Air Assault Divisions have strict orders to hold the Nesteryanka-Kopani line “under any conditions.” And it’s clear why.
However, in the case of Nesteryanka, it will be quite difficult for the enemy to do this. The fact is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, at one time, advanced not only to the north of the village, but also to the west of it.
The main communication regarding the logistical support of the enemy's 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment units defending in Nesteryanka itself and its environs stretches from the village of Mirne in a southwestern direction. But thanks to the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces units managed to approach it between Nesteryanka and Mirne (precisely to the west of the first), they can keep this communication under fire.
It is the village of Mirne that is quite strongly fortified from the northern direction (there is a whole system of enemy strongholds there), but there are windows between it and Nesteryanka. The distance from the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to this road is just over 2 km.
I don't want to hint at anything, but any military man would see certain possibilities in this. Why does the enemy cling so stubbornly to the village of Novoprokovpka?
Because BEHIND it, to the south, the first position of the main line of defense begins with a fairly well-equipped “defense center” in the village Solodka Balka.
Hold s. Novoprokopovka allows the enemy command to prevent the advance of the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this direction (Novoprokopovka - Sladkaya Balka), while simultaneously concentrating and massing its forces and assets on a relatively narrow front area east of this village, where Ukrainian troops were able to wedge into the first defense position - between Novoprokopovka and Verbove.
This is precisely what allows the enemy to hold, with the available forces and means, with a few exceptions, the first position of his main line of defense in the Novoprokopovka-Verbovoye section. Otherwise, he would have to stretch his troops over a wider front. And it’s not a fact that they would be enough for him.
Moreover, BEHIND Novoprokopovka and Sladkaya Balka, closer to Tokmak, the enemy has equipped a second position of the main line of defense with an even more powerful “defense node” in the area of the village Kamyshove. This, in addition to the fact that the city of Tokmak itself is equipped with a separate system of fortified and prepared enemy positions, almost “in a circle.” The second position in this direction stretches from the village Krasnogorka to the village Ocheretuvate.
 

A new overview of the situation on the right bank of the Dnieper.
Probably, the command of the enemy grouping of forces "Dnepr" began to implement a plan to eliminate the tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the river. Dnieper.
General Teplinsky, apparently, quite logically decided to start with the most threatening one - the one located in the area of the village of Krynki.
As far as I understand, the idea is as follows..
Create an advantage in forces and means in the form of 3 tactical groups. And then, with two of them (flank), from the areas of the village of Korsunka and the village of Cossack Camps, respectively, to attack along the coastal road Oleshki - Novaya Kakhovka... near the general direction to the village Krynki.
While the third, frontal one will operate through the forest to the south of the village. Krynki...trying to push the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the northern part of the forest, first into the village itself, and then into the floodplain of the river...
It is the frontal group that will begin, or rather has already begun, to operate... which apparently includes units of the 26th motorized rifle regiment of the 70th motorized rifle division and individual units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade... one and a half to two days ago, they managed to advance almost to the south-eastern outskirts of the village (near its central part)...
In the area of Cossack Camps, the enemy concentrated another tactical group in the form of:
- 1445th and 385th infantry regiments of territorial troops (a battalion from each)
- consolidated tactical detachment of the 10th separate special forces brigade
- battalion BARS-4
Well, in the direction of the village of Korsunka - the village of Krynki, they are deployed:
- at least 2 battalions of the 810th separate marine brigade, and most likely - all 3 of its battalions...
- to the battalion of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade
- to the battalion of the 404th motorized rifle regiment of territorial troops
- consolidated tactical detachment "Storm - Z", of at least 2 assault companies of 110-120 prisoners each.
Judging by the volume and quantity of these forces and means, we can safely say that against only one Ukrainian bridgehead in the area of the village. In Krynki, the enemy concentrated almost 2 full-fledged “recruitment” brigades.
I won’t undertake to predict now whether they will succeed or not...
But, I must admit, General Teplinsky acts quite deliberately and logically, trying not to create a “pillar formation of troops” in front of the Ukrainian bridgehead in conditions of the advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in matters of reconnaissance and the effectiveness of artillery operations, but by involving exactly as many troops (forces) in active actions against our bridgeheads - how much do you need.
That is, in order to have an obvious advantage in forces and means, but at the same time, not to expose (or try not to expose) your troops to the effective fire of Ukrainian artillery in the areas and at the lines of their concentration and deployment. This is a rather rare professional quality among Russian army commanders (chiefs) at the operational level... who, for the most part, tend to try to act impudently, massing their troops in the offensive beyond any reasonable norms... trying to “crush the enemy with mass.”

Now, a few general comments regarding the situation in the Crimean-Tavrian direction...
In my opinion, nevertheless, the decisive factor in this attempt by Teplinsky will not be his own decisions and steps, but rather the decisions and steps of his Ukrainian counterparts... The fact is that the decision of General Teplinsky himself in the specific conditions that have now developed in on the left bank, for the most part, are quite obvious and predictable. That is, exactly how Russian troops will act is mostly clear. Another thing is the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which will be forced to solve a whole range of rather complex tasks to retain and preserve their bridgeheads. To do this, they will have to demonstrate not only fairly high combat qualities, but most importantly - flexibility, efficiency and ingenuity at the command level.
Also, another factor is no less obvious and important - General Teplinsky will have to make do with a fairly limited amount of forces and means to solve the task assigned to him. Heavy and intense fighting in the Tokmak direction does not stop, near Avdeevka, Bakhmut and in the Kupyansk direction too. Therefore, for Teplinsky, the “upper” Russian command right now does not have not only a “lost” army or division, but even a regiment or brigade... it will be necessary to “scrape off like a battalion” here and there...
- And one more thing... Many of our military experts and analysts have a rather false idea of the REAL immediate tasks and the meaning of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper. For some reason, they mostly fall into some extremes from “PR on blood” to “prospects for a breakthrough towards Crimea.” Please come to your senses... At this stage, the main point is not this at all... but the desire to obtain a fairly wide front section of the Dnieper coast on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of enemy artillery will not reach...
We are not talking about anything more now...
Another question is why the Ukrainian troops need this...?
Finally, one reminder...
The distance from the village of Pervomaevka to the village of Pokrovskoye on the Kinburn Spit in a straight line is more than 206 km, and with all the twists and turns of the front - all 250-260 km.
Therefore, I recommend that you, my dear readers, think about... in whose favor exactly CAN this circumstance play...?
Especially in the context of the question - how many and what kind of troops are needed to hold such a sector “along the front” and secure it from active enemy actions in the “across the river” style?
Moreover, in conditions when you are significantly limited in organizing and using a mobile reserve...

A new overview of the situation on the right bank of the Dnieper.
Probably, the command of the enemy grouping of forces "Dnepr" began to implement a plan to eliminate the tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the river. Dnieper.
General Teplinsky, apparently, quite logically decided to start with the most threatening one - the one located in the area of the village of Krynki.
As far as I understand, the idea is as follows..
Create an advantage in forces and means in the form of 3 tactical groups. And then, with two of them (flank), from the areas of the village of Korsunka and the village of Cossack Camps, respectively, to attack along the coastal road Oleshki - Novaya Kakhovka... near the general direction to the village Krynki.
While the third, frontal one will operate through the forest to the south of the village. Krynki...trying to push the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the northern part of the forest, first into the village itself, and then into the floodplain of the river...
It is the frontal group that will begin, or rather has already begun, to operate... which apparently includes units of the 26th motorized rifle regiment of the 70th motorized rifle division and individual units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade... one and a half to two days ago, they managed to advance almost to the south-eastern outskirts of the village (near its central part)...
In the area of Cossack Camps, the enemy concentrated another tactical group in the form of:
- 1445th and 385th infantry regiments of territorial troops (a battalion from each)
- consolidated tactical detachment of the 10th separate special forces brigade
- battalion BARS-4
Well, in the direction of the village of Korsunka - the village of Krynki, they are deployed:
- at least 2 battalions of the 810th separate marine brigade, and most likely - all 3 of its battalions...
- to the battalion of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade
- to the battalion of the 404th motorized rifle regiment of territorial troops
- consolidated tactical detachment "Storm - Z", of at least 2 assault companies of 110-120 prisoners each.
Judging by the volume and quantity of these forces and means, we can safely say that against only one Ukrainian bridgehead in the area of the village. In Krynki, the enemy concentrated almost 2 full-fledged “recruitment” brigades.
I won’t undertake to predict now whether they will succeed or not...
But, I must admit, General Teplinsky acts quite deliberately and logically, trying not to create a “pillar formation of troops” in front of the Ukrainian bridgehead in conditions of the advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in matters of reconnaissance and the effectiveness of artillery operations, but by involving exactly as many troops (forces) in active actions against our bridgeheads - how much do you need.
That is, in order to have an obvious advantage in forces and means, but at the same time, not to expose (or try not to expose) your troops to the effective fire of Ukrainian artillery in the areas and at the lines of their concentration and deployment. This is a rather rare professional quality among Russian army commanders (chiefs) at the operational level... who, for the most part, tend to try to act impudently, massing their troops in the offensive beyond any reasonable norms... trying to “crush the enemy with mass.”

Toyota produces enough Hiluxes and LC70s (and enough of them exist already) that someone would just have to open their checkbook.
However, Europe and US are not going to subsidize Toyota. That’s why pages ago I suggested we literally send all of the luxury pickups in the US that aren’t selling to Ukraine:
Subsidize US industry? Check Subsidize US workers (or NAFTA ones)? Check American trucks towing weapons and looking badass? Check I don’t think you realize how many pickup trucks exists in the US (or Latin America, or SE Asia). I bet even a medium size US city could spare a thousand plus between all the dealerships.

A new overview of the situation on the right bank of the Dnieper.
Probably, the command of the enemy grouping of forces "Dnepr" began to implement a plan to eliminate the tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the river. Dnieper.
General Teplinsky, apparently, quite logically decided to start with the most threatening one - the one located in the area of the village of Krynki.
As far as I understand, the idea is as follows..
Create an advantage in forces and means in the form of 3 tactical groups. And then, with two of them (flank), from the areas of the village of Korsunka and the village of Cossack Camps, respectively, to attack along the coastal road Oleshki - Novaya Kakhovka... near the general direction to the village Krynki.
While the third, frontal one will operate through the forest to the south of the village. Krynki...trying to push the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the northern part of the forest, first into the village itself, and then into the floodplain of the river...
It is the frontal group that will begin, or rather has already begun, to operate... which apparently includes units of the 26th motorized rifle regiment of the 70th motorized rifle division and individual units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade... one and a half to two days ago, they managed to advance almost to the south-eastern outskirts of the village (near its central part)...
In the area of Cossack Camps, the enemy concentrated another tactical group in the form of:
- 1445th and 385th infantry regiments of territorial troops (a battalion from each)
- consolidated tactical detachment of the 10th separate special forces brigade
- battalion BARS-4
Well, in the direction of the village of Korsunka - the village of Krynki, they are deployed:
- at least 2 battalions of the 810th separate marine brigade, and most likely - all 3 of its battalions...
- to the battalion of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade
- to the battalion of the 404th motorized rifle regiment of territorial troops
- consolidated tactical detachment "Storm - Z", of at least 2 assault companies of 110-120 prisoners each.
Judging by the volume and quantity of these forces and means, we can safely say that against only one Ukrainian bridgehead in the area of the village. In Krynki, the enemy concentrated almost 2 full-fledged “recruitment” brigades.
I won’t undertake to predict now whether they will succeed or not...
But, I must admit, General Teplinsky acts quite deliberately and logically, trying not to create a “pillar formation of troops” in front of the Ukrainian bridgehead in conditions of the advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in matters of reconnaissance and the effectiveness of artillery operations, but by involving exactly as many troops (forces) in active actions against our bridgeheads - how much do you need.
That is, in order to have an obvious advantage in forces and means, but at the same time, not to expose (or try not to expose) your troops to the effective fire of Ukrainian artillery in the areas and at the lines of their concentration and deployment. This is a rather rare professional quality among Russian army commanders (chiefs) at the operational level... who, for the most part, tend to try to act impudently, massing their troops in the offensive beyond any reasonable norms... trying to “crush the enemy with mass.”

Now, a few general comments regarding the situation in the Crimean-Tavrian direction...
In my opinion, nevertheless, the decisive factor in this attempt by Teplinsky will not be his own decisions and steps, but rather the decisions and steps of his Ukrainian counterparts... The fact is that the decision of General Teplinsky himself in the specific conditions that have now developed in on the left bank, for the most part, are quite obvious and predictable. That is, exactly how Russian troops will act is mostly clear. Another thing is the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which will be forced to solve a whole range of rather complex tasks to retain and preserve their bridgeheads. To do this, they will have to demonstrate not only fairly high combat qualities, but most importantly - flexibility, efficiency and ingenuity at the command level.
Also, another factor is no less obvious and important - General Teplinsky will have to make do with a fairly limited amount of forces and means to solve the task assigned to him. Heavy and intense fighting in the Tokmak direction does not stop, near Avdeevka, Bakhmut and in the Kupyansk direction too. Therefore, for Teplinsky, the “upper” Russian command right now does not have not only a “lost” army or division, but even a regiment or brigade... it will be necessary to “scrape off like a battalion” here and there...
- And one more thing... Many of our military experts and analysts have a rather false idea of the REAL immediate tasks and the meaning of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper. For some reason, they mostly fall into some extremes from “PR on blood” to “prospects for a breakthrough towards Crimea.” Please come to your senses... At this stage, the main point is not this at all... but the desire to obtain a fairly wide front section of the Dnieper coast on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of enemy artillery will not reach...
We are not talking about anything more now...
Another question is why the Ukrainian troops need this...?
Finally, one reminder...
The distance from the village of Pervomaevka to the village of Pokrovskoye on the Kinburn Spit in a straight line is more than 206 km, and with all the twists and turns of the front - all 250-260 km.
Therefore, I recommend that you, my dear readers, think about... in whose favor exactly CAN this circumstance play...?
Especially in the context of the question - how many and what kind of troops are needed to hold such a sector “along the front” and secure it from active enemy actions in the “across the river” style?
Moreover, in conditions when you are significantly limited in organizing and using a mobile reserve...

A new overview of the situation on the right bank of the Dnieper.
Probably, the command of the enemy grouping of forces "Dnepr" began to implement a plan to eliminate the tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the river. Dnieper.
General Teplinsky, apparently, quite logically decided to start with the most threatening one - the one located in the area of the village of Krynki.
As far as I understand, the idea is as follows..
Create an advantage in forces and means in the form of 3 tactical groups. And then, with two of them (flank), from the areas of the village of Korsunka and the village of Cossack Camps, respectively, to attack along the coastal road Oleshki - Novaya Kakhovka... near the general direction to the village Krynki.
While the third, frontal one will operate through the forest to the south of the village. Krynki...trying to push the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the northern part of the forest, first into the village itself, and then into the floodplain of the river...
It is the frontal group that will begin, or rather has already begun, to operate... which apparently includes units of the 26th motorized rifle regiment of the 70th motorized rifle division and individual units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade... one and a half to two days ago, they managed to advance almost to the south-eastern outskirts of the village (near its central part)...
In the area of Cossack Camps, the enemy concentrated another tactical group in the form of:
- 1445th and 385th infantry regiments of territorial troops (a battalion from each)
- consolidated tactical detachment of the 10th separate special forces brigade
- battalion BARS-4
Well, in the direction of the village of Korsunka - the village of Krynki, they are deployed:
- at least 2 battalions of the 810th separate marine brigade, and most likely - all 3 of its battalions...
- to the battalion of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade
- to the battalion of the 404th motorized rifle regiment of territorial troops
- consolidated tactical detachment "Storm - Z", of at least 2 assault companies of 110-120 prisoners each.
Judging by the volume and quantity of these forces and means, we can safely say that against only one Ukrainian bridgehead in the area of the village. In Krynki, the enemy concentrated almost 2 full-fledged “recruitment” brigades.
I won’t undertake to predict now whether they will succeed or not...
But, I must admit, General Teplinsky acts quite deliberately and logically, trying not to create a “pillar formation of troops” in front of the Ukrainian bridgehead in conditions of the advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in matters of reconnaissance and the effectiveness of artillery operations, but by involving exactly as many troops (forces) in active actions against our bridgeheads - how much do you need.
That is, in order to have an obvious advantage in forces and means, but at the same time, not to expose (or try not to expose) your troops to the effective fire of Ukrainian artillery in the areas and at the lines of their concentration and deployment. This is a rather rare professional quality among Russian army commanders (chiefs) at the operational level... who, for the most part, tend to try to act impudently, massing their troops in the offensive beyond any reasonable norms... trying to “crush the enemy with mass.”

A new overview of the situation on the right bank of the Dnieper.
Probably, the command of the enemy grouping of forces "Dnepr" began to implement a plan to eliminate the tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the river. Dnieper.
General Teplinsky, apparently, quite logically decided to start with the most threatening one - the one located in the area of the village of Krynki.
As far as I understand, the idea is as follows..
Create an advantage in forces and means in the form of 3 tactical groups. And then, with two of them (flank), from the areas of the village of Korsunka and the village of Cossack Camps, respectively, to attack along the coastal road Oleshki - Novaya Kakhovka... near the general direction to the village Krynki.
While the third, frontal one will operate through the forest to the south of the village. Krynki...trying to push the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the northern part of the forest, first into the village itself, and then into the floodplain of the river...
It is the frontal group that will begin, or rather has already begun, to operate... which apparently includes units of the 26th motorized rifle regiment of the 70th motorized rifle division and individual units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade... one and a half to two days ago, they managed to advance almost to the south-eastern outskirts of the village (near its central part)...
In the area of Cossack Camps, the enemy concentrated another tactical group in the form of:
- 1445th and 385th infantry regiments of territorial troops (a battalion from each)
- consolidated tactical detachment of the 10th separate special forces brigade
- battalion BARS-4
Well, in the direction of the village of Korsunka - the village of Krynki, they are deployed:
- at least 2 battalions of the 810th separate marine brigade, and most likely - all 3 of its battalions...
- to the battalion of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade
- to the battalion of the 404th motorized rifle regiment of territorial troops
- consolidated tactical detachment "Storm - Z", of at least 2 assault companies of 110-120 prisoners each.
Judging by the volume and quantity of these forces and means, we can safely say that against only one Ukrainian bridgehead in the area of the village. In Krynki, the enemy concentrated almost 2 full-fledged “recruitment” brigades.
I won’t undertake to predict now whether they will succeed or not...
But, I must admit, General Teplinsky acts quite deliberately and logically, trying not to create a “pillar formation of troops” in front of the Ukrainian bridgehead in conditions of the advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in matters of reconnaissance and the effectiveness of artillery operations, but by involving exactly as many troops (forces) in active actions against our bridgeheads - how much do you need.
That is, in order to have an obvious advantage in forces and means, but at the same time, not to expose (or try not to expose) your troops to the effective fire of Ukrainian artillery in the areas and at the lines of their concentration and deployment. This is a rather rare professional quality among Russian army commanders (chiefs) at the operational level... who, for the most part, tend to try to act impudently, massing their troops in the offensive beyond any reasonable norms... trying to “crush the enemy with mass.”

Now, a few general comments regarding the situation in the Crimean-Tavrian direction...
In my opinion, nevertheless, the decisive factor in this attempt by Teplinsky will not be his own decisions and steps, but rather the decisions and steps of his Ukrainian counterparts... The fact is that the decision of General Teplinsky himself in the specific conditions that have now developed in on the left bank, for the most part, are quite obvious and predictable. That is, exactly how Russian troops will act is mostly clear. Another thing is the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which will be forced to solve a whole range of rather complex tasks to retain and preserve their bridgeheads. To do this, they will have to demonstrate not only fairly high combat qualities, but most importantly - flexibility, efficiency and ingenuity at the command level.
Also, another factor is no less obvious and important - General Teplinsky will have to make do with a fairly limited amount of forces and means to solve the task assigned to him. Heavy and intense fighting in the Tokmak direction does not stop, near Avdeevka, Bakhmut and in the Kupyansk direction too. Therefore, for Teplinsky, the “upper” Russian command right now does not have not only a “lost” army or division, but even a regiment or brigade... it will be necessary to “scrape off like a battalion” here and there...
- And one more thing... Many of our military experts and analysts have a rather false idea of the REAL immediate tasks and the meaning of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper. For some reason, they mostly fall into some extremes from “PR on blood” to “prospects for a breakthrough towards Crimea.” Please come to your senses... At this stage, the main point is not this at all... but the desire to obtain a fairly wide front section of the Dnieper coast on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of enemy artillery will not reach...
We are not talking about anything more now...
Another question is why the Ukrainian troops need this...?
Finally, one reminder...
The distance from the village of Pervomaevka to the village of Pokrovskoye on the Kinburn Spit in a straight line is more than 206 km, and with all the twists and turns of the front - all 250-260 km.
Therefore, I recommend that you, my dear readers, think about... in whose favor exactly CAN this circumstance play...?
Especially in the context of the question - how many and what kind of troops are needed to hold such a sector “along the front” and secure it from active enemy actions in the “across the river” style?
Moreover, in conditions when you are significantly limited in organizing and using a mobile reserve...

To clarify to those that didn't know, the above  is the update today from the Ukrainian Konstantin Mashovets

Now, a few general comments regarding the situation in the Crimean-Tavrian direction...
In my opinion, nevertheless, the decisive factor in this attempt by Teplinsky will not be his own decisions and steps, but rather the decisions and steps of his Ukrainian counterparts... The fact is that the decision of General Teplinsky himself in the specific conditions that have now developed in on the left bank, for the most part, are quite obvious and predictable. That is, exactly how Russian troops will act is mostly clear. Another thing is the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which will be forced to solve a whole range of rather complex tasks to retain and preserve their bridgeheads. To do this, they will have to demonstrate not only fairly high combat qualities, but most importantly - flexibility, efficiency and ingenuity at the command level.
Also, another factor is no less obvious and important - General Teplinsky will have to make do with a fairly limited amount of forces and means to solve the task assigned to him. Heavy and intense fighting in the Tokmak direction does not stop, near Avdeevka, Bakhmut and in the Kupyansk direction too. Therefore, for Teplinsky, the “upper” Russian command right now does not have not only a “lost” army or division, but even a regiment or brigade... it will be necessary to “scrape off like a battalion” here and there...
- And one more thing... Many of our military experts and analysts have a rather false idea of the REAL immediate tasks and the meaning of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper. For some reason, they mostly fall into some extremes from “PR on blood” to “prospects for a breakthrough towards Crimea.” Please come to your senses... At this stage, the main point is not this at all... but the desire to obtain a fairly wide front section of the Dnieper coast on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of enemy artillery will not reach...
We are not talking about anything more now...
Another question is why the Ukrainian troops need this...?
Finally, one reminder...
The distance from the village of Pervomaevka to the village of Pokrovskoye on the Kinburn Spit in a straight line is more than 206 km, and with all the twists and turns of the front - all 250-260 km.
Therefore, I recommend that you, my dear readers, think about... in whose favor exactly CAN this circumstance play...?
Especially in the context of the question - how many and what kind of troops are needed to hold such a sector “along the front” and secure it from active enemy actions in the “across the river” style?
Moreover, in conditions when you are significantly limited in organizing and using a mobile reserve...

A new overview of the situation on the right bank of the Dnieper.
Probably, the command of the enemy grouping of forces "Dnepr" began to implement a plan to eliminate the tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the river. Dnieper.
General Teplinsky, apparently, quite logically decided to start with the most threatening one - the one located in the area of the village of Krynki.
As far as I understand, the idea is as follows..
Create an advantage in forces and means in the form of 3 tactical groups. And then, with two of them (flank), from the areas of the village of Korsunka and the village of Cossack Camps, respectively, to attack along the coastal road Oleshki - Novaya Kakhovka... near the general direction to the village Krynki.
While the third, frontal one will operate through the forest to the south of the village. Krynki...trying to push the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the northern part of the forest, first into the village itself, and then into the floodplain of the river...
It is the frontal group that will begin, or rather has already begun, to operate... which apparently includes units of the 26th motorized rifle regiment of the 70th motorized rifle division and individual units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade... one and a half to two days ago, they managed to advance almost to the south-eastern outskirts of the village (near its central part)...
In the area of Cossack Camps, the enemy concentrated another tactical group in the form of:
- 1445th and 385th infantry regiments of territorial troops (a battalion from each)
- consolidated tactical detachment of the 10th separate special forces brigade
- battalion BARS-4
Well, in the direction of the village of Korsunka - the village of Krynki, they are deployed:
- at least 2 battalions of the 810th separate marine brigade, and most likely - all 3 of its battalions...
- to the battalion of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade
- to the battalion of the 404th motorized rifle regiment of territorial troops
- consolidated tactical detachment "Storm - Z", of at least 2 assault companies of 110-120 prisoners each.
Judging by the volume and quantity of these forces and means, we can safely say that against only one Ukrainian bridgehead in the area of the village. In Krynki, the enemy concentrated almost 2 full-fledged “recruitment” brigades.
I won’t undertake to predict now whether they will succeed or not...
But, I must admit, General Teplinsky acts quite deliberately and logically, trying not to create a “pillar formation of troops” in front of the Ukrainian bridgehead in conditions of the advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in matters of reconnaissance and the effectiveness of artillery operations, but by involving exactly as many troops (forces) in active actions against our bridgeheads - how much do you need.
That is, in order to have an obvious advantage in forces and means, but at the same time, not to expose (or try not to expose) your troops to the effective fire of Ukrainian artillery in the areas and at the lines of their concentration and deployment. This is a rather rare professional quality among Russian army commanders (chiefs) at the operational level... who, for the most part, tend to try to act impudently, massing their troops in the offensive beyond any reasonable norms... trying to “crush the enemy with mass.”

On one fine day, I was concussed when an enemy shell exploded literally a meter from a hole into which I jumped at the last moment. Then another stone flew into my ribs and I thought with relief that now I was wounded and would go to rest.
              But it was just a stone, and all I got was a very bad headache for the next few months. When the very active phase of the assault ended, the service was established, then I finally transferred to Petrichenko's gang to fly the Mavic. How it was and what it cost is a separate story.
              It was there that we encountered the moment when the enemy left Kherson. Yes, the enemy left in November. But in my opinion, these were the first steps towards them leaving. In the next thread, I will tell how they left, how we entered the villages, how I climbed the enemy's positions and how I almost died.
              Were there any wild moments? So. Were there any problems? So. But let me tell you about them after the war. Not to go storming Pisky now.
 
 

An interesting video from our famous sapper (unfortunately without translation). In this video, he reviews the new Russian POM-3 mine with a step sensor. The Russians claimed that the sensor of this mine has no analogues and there is no way to deceive it. However, in this video, the sapper criticizes the low quality, primitiveness and lack of thought of both the mine in general and its sensor in particular
Starting from video 56:28 The sapper conducts an interesting experiment testing the sensitivity of the seismic sensor of the mine (the mine itself is neutralized). First, he slowly approaches the mine with smooth steps, smoothly transferring his body weight from the heel to the entire foot. He approached the mine to within 1.5 meters without any problems. However, the sensor did not react at all.
Then, starting at 1:01:00, He decides to walk away from the mine at a free pace. The sensor again does not react in any way to his steps. Then he approaches the mine at his usual pace, again without results. Then at 1:01:20 he makes several jumps in place. And only after the third jump, the mine fuse goes off.
 
He notes that the fuse could be tuned to the footsteps of a person carrying a load, while he himself was not carrying any load. He had another such mine and decided to test the mine sensor with a load on him. However, the second mine turned out to be defective; its sensor did not work at all

An interesting video from our famous sapper (unfortunately without translation). In this video, he reviews the new Russian POM-3 mine with a step sensor. The Russians claimed that the sensor of this mine has no analogues and there is no way to deceive it. However, in this video, the sapper criticizes the low quality, primitiveness and lack of thought of both the mine in general and its sensor in particular
Starting from video 56:28 The sapper conducts an interesting experiment testing the sensitivity of the seismic sensor of the mine (the mine itself is neutralized). First, he slowly approaches the mine with smooth steps, smoothly transferring his body weight from the heel to the entire foot. He approached the mine to within 1.5 meters without any problems. However, the sensor did not react at all.
Then, starting at 1:01:00, He decides to walk away from the mine at a free pace. The sensor again does not react in any way to his steps. Then he approaches the mine at his usual pace, again without results. Then at 1:01:20 he makes several jumps in place. And only after the third jump, the mine fuse goes off.
 
He notes that the fuse could be tuned to the footsteps of a person carrying a load, while he himself was not carrying any load. He had another such mine and decided to test the mine sensor with a load on him. However, the second mine turned out to be defective; its sensor did not work at all

An interesting video from our famous sapper (unfortunately without translation). In this video, he reviews the new Russian POM-3 mine with a step sensor. The Russians claimed that the sensor of this mine has no analogues and there is no way to deceive it. However, in this video, the sapper criticizes the low quality, primitiveness and lack of thought of both the mine in general and its sensor in particular
Starting from video 56:28 The sapper conducts an interesting experiment testing the sensitivity of the seismic sensor of the mine (the mine itself is neutralized). First, he slowly approaches the mine with smooth steps, smoothly transferring his body weight from the heel to the entire foot. He approached the mine to within 1.5 meters without any problems. However, the sensor did not react at all.
Then, starting at 1:01:00, He decides to walk away from the mine at a free pace. The sensor again does not react in any way to his steps. Then he approaches the mine at his usual pace, again without results. Then at 1:01:20 he makes several jumps in place. And only after the third jump, the mine fuse goes off.
 
He notes that the fuse could be tuned to the footsteps of a person carrying a load, while he himself was not carrying any load. He had another such mine and decided to test the mine sensor with a load on him. However, the second mine turned out to be defective; its sensor did not work at all

An interesting video from our famous sapper (unfortunately without translation). In this video, he reviews the new Russian POM-3 mine with a step sensor. The Russians claimed that the sensor of this mine has no analogues and there is no way to deceive it. However, in this video, the sapper criticizes the low quality, primitiveness and lack of thought of both the mine in general and its sensor in particular
Starting from video 56:28 The sapper conducts an interesting experiment testing the sensitivity of the seismic sensor of the mine (the mine itself is neutralized). First, he slowly approaches the mine with smooth steps, smoothly transferring his body weight from the heel to the entire foot. He approached the mine to within 1.5 meters without any problems. However, the sensor did not react at all.
Then, starting at 1:01:00, He decides to walk away from the mine at a free pace. The sensor again does not react in any way to his steps. Then he approaches the mine at his usual pace, again without results. Then at 1:01:20 he makes several jumps in place. And only after the third jump, the mine fuse goes off.
 
He notes that the fuse could be tuned to the footsteps of a person carrying a load, while he himself was not carrying any load. He had another such mine and decided to test the mine sensor with a load on him. However, the second mine turned out to be defective; its sensor did not work at all

An interesting video from our famous sapper (unfortunately without translation). In this video, he reviews the new Russian POM-3 mine with a step sensor. The Russians claimed that the sensor of this mine has no analogues and there is no way to deceive it. However, in this video, the sapper criticizes the low quality, primitiveness and lack of thought of both the mine in general and its sensor in particular
Starting from video 56:28 The sapper conducts an interesting experiment testing the sensitivity of the seismic sensor of the mine (the mine itself is neutralized). First, he slowly approaches the mine with smooth steps, smoothly transferring his body weight from the heel to the entire foot. He approached the mine to within 1.5 meters without any problems. However, the sensor did not react at all.
Then, starting at 1:01:00, He decides to walk away from the mine at a free pace. The sensor again does not react in any way to his steps. Then he approaches the mine at his usual pace, again without results. Then at 1:01:20 he makes several jumps in place. And only after the third jump, the mine fuse goes off.
 
He notes that the fuse could be tuned to the footsteps of a person carrying a load, while he himself was not carrying any load. He had another such mine and decided to test the mine sensor with a load on him. However, the second mine turned out to be defective; its sensor did not work at all

An interesting video from our famous sapper (unfortunately without translation). In this video, he reviews the new Russian POM-3 mine with a step sensor. The Russians claimed that the sensor of this mine has no analogues and there is no way to deceive it. However, in this video, the sapper criticizes the low quality, primitiveness and lack of thought of both the mine in general and its sensor in particular
Starting from video 56:28 The sapper conducts an interesting experiment testing the sensitivity of the seismic sensor of the mine (the mine itself is neutralized). First, he slowly approaches the mine with smooth steps, smoothly transferring his body weight from the heel to the entire foot. He approached the mine to within 1.5 meters without any problems. However, the sensor did not react at all.
Then, starting at 1:01:00, He decides to walk away from the mine at a free pace. The sensor again does not react in any way to his steps. Then he approaches the mine at his usual pace, again without results. Then at 1:01:20 he makes several jumps in place. And only after the third jump, the mine fuse goes off.
 
He notes that the fuse could be tuned to the footsteps of a person carrying a load, while he himself was not carrying any load. He had another such mine and decided to test the mine sensor with a load on him. However, the second mine turned out to be defective; its sensor did not work at all