Krater

The problem is two fold: 1) Ukrainian industry has a limited capacity to produce "NATO-standard" weapons. While Ukrainian defense sector is relatively large, it's not very productive or efficient. The R&D capabilities have been allowed to atrophy, and production of new equipment has happened in only a handful of areas. Most of current factories have experience with rehabbing old-Soviet era equipment at best. To produce new, NATO-compliant equipment and weapons would require large investments into the defense sector - but the quandary is that this money would be competed against the current needs of the army, which is starving for more of what it has right now -not a new artillery system 5-7 years down the line. 2) Ordinarily this could be solved by purchases from abroad, as Georgia has done earlier but Ukraine has been essentially frozen out of the international weapons market. There are difficulties with purchasing even nominally dual-use equipment like engines for use in APCs. Neither Europe, Israel nor Chinese will sell it weapons at this time.

Is there any rhyme or reason as to which tanks get upgraded? Would they upgrade M1A2 SEP2 -> SEP3, or would they go to the "base" M1A1->M1A2 SEP?

Not really, no. The gun systems for artillery and tanks were never produced in Ukraine, so their production would have to be started from scratch. I would expect that there would be more emphasis on conserving the life of existing artillery systems while moving to greater use of MRL. Ukraine still has considerable stock of rockets for them (though they need to be reconditioned) and they are easier to produce and maintain.

Some general opinions on problems in Ukrainian army and Separatist forces, gleaned from reading Ukrainian and Russian sources. Quality of soldiers continues to be uneven. While many soldiers have notional experience of combat, for significant percentage of them this mostly translated into personal survival skills. Those are not to be underrated, but they do not contribute to performance in high-intensity, mobile combat, in either defense or offense. Alcoholism continues to be a serious problem. In many units, about 10% of soldiers are non-functional alcoholics, meaning that they cannot be relied to consistently do simple tasks. Another ~10% are functional alcoholics, who will be OK most times but will go on binges periodically. The procedure to kick them out of the army, or even to transfer them to a rear unit where they will do less harm is so laborious that most commanders don't bother with it, and basically try to sideline them. Ukrainian army has suffered significant losses in light armor - BTR and BMPs. Those vehicles were both more vulnerable to enemy fire and had less resources devoted to their upkeep. The industry has focused on heavy armor, and as a result infantry units are not well supplied with replacements. This is especially true of motorized infantry battalions (former territorial defense battalions), but applies to regular army as well. Potential issues loom with artillery, as barrel life is exhausted First two issues equally apply to separatist forces. The separatists also face problem with low motivation of local recruits. Many of them joined basically to get a paycheck, as LNR/DNR economy is in shambles. Their desire to engage in combat is correspondingly very low. And as cease fire continues, the amount of ideologically committed volunteers from Russia has shrunk - many Russian recruits are equally motivated by basic desire to get a paycheck. The industrial base of LNR/DNR is clearly insufficient to maintain their armed forces, so their rear is extremely dependent on the Russian support. On the other hand, ability of Russia to supply war material to LNR/DNR far outstrips Ukrainian capacity, especially as desire to maintain a fig leaf of deniability becomes less important.

Is there another game that could be used to give us operational view? The only one I can think of is TOAW, but it's pretty long in the tooth and the editor is pretty horrid.

Yeah...no.

Soo...some thoughts. First, that means that there will be two heavy brigades in Central/Eastern Europe - one prepositioned equipment set, and one fully manned. That's in addition to the 2nd Cavalry Stryker brigade and 173rd Airborne. I'm curious in which states the new brigade will be stationed. I'm also curious - where does the 3.4 billion dollar price tag come from? The RAND study cited $13 billion for procuring equipment for 3 ABCT, which is pretty much spot on for Pentagon request...but as they said, the new brigades don't necessarily mean Lima Arsenal cranking out new M1A2s. It's can't be personnel costs, either, as this new brigade will be a rotational unit.

My impression was that Spain's contribution was mainly organization, in that VJTF will be using NATO Rapid Deployable Corps HQ- Spain (NRDC-SP) in 2016. But I could be wrong.

Most will probably be light units, but some appear to "heavier". "Noble Jump" was supposed to be a rehearsal of VJTF's functionality. "MONS, Belgium – NATO’s new high readiness ‘spearhead’ force is being deployed for the first time, as Exercise NOBLE JUMP gets underway in Zagan, Poland. Units assigned to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) were given orders to deploy on Tuesday afternoon (9 June 2015), and will exercise until 19 June. Over 2,100 troops from nine NATO nations are participating in the exercise, which continues the process of testing and refining the force. Among the units rapidly deploying to the manoeuvres in Western Poland are Czech and Dutch air mobile troops, German and Norwegian mechanized infantry, Polish and Lithuanian special forces, Belgian artillery, U.S. helicopters and a Hungarian civil military cooperation unit."Specific units I saw listed were: 11th infantry bn (air assault) / 11th Air Mobile Brigade - Netherlands43rd airborne battalion / 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade - Czech Republic371st Mechanized Infantry Brigade / 13th Panzergrenadier Division - GermanyTelemark Battalion - Norway

As many as two heavy brigades. "The lack of air defenses in U.S. maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counterattack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga. Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superiority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counterattack. 17 This again was a scenario in which NATO’s posture was assumed to be improved beyond its current state."

Speaking of "Russian army under equipped" - "Russian armed forces are currently equipped with modern equipment and vehicles at 47%. This coefficient is equal to 52% in the air force, 39% navy, 35% land forces and 41% airborne. Nuclear forces are updated at 55%." http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2612717 МОСКВА, 26 января. /ТАСС/. Вооруженные силы РФ на данный момент оснащены современным вооружением и военной техникой на 47%. При этом данный показатель в ВКС составляет 52%, в ВМФ - 39%, в Сухопутных войсках - 35%, а в ВДВ - до 41%. В то же время "ядерная триада" оснащена современным оружием на 55%. Об этом сообщил 11 декабря 2015 года министр обороны Сергей Шойгу

1. The presence of pre-positioned equipment apparently was modeled in at least some play-throughs. There is also the issue that the pre-positioned equipment is going to be spread through the entirety of the Eastern Europe. The Baltics get 1 heavy battalion, Poland 1 and Romania/Bulgaria/Germany share 1 and miscellaneous attachments. It's fairly unlikely that the equipment stored in Bulgaria and Romania will make in theater on time. So even counting those, for heavy forces we're probably looking at 2 US heavy prepositioned bns + 1(2?) Striker Bns + whatever NATO forces may be rotating through on "persistent presence" exercises. 3. The primary issue (I think) would be availability of trained Javelin users. Javelin operator course is 10 days, and while I guess it can be compressed somewhat it would presumably impact the quality of the end product. It sounds like Latvian reserves and Zemessardze were not considered at all, which I think is pretty fair. I suspect their current ability to create functional units during short-term mobilization is pretty limited. Estonian Kaitseliit looks to have not been considered either, which I have a bit more of a problem with. The key of course is that even when mobilized, they are very light infantry forces and when acting in high-threat environment their capabilities are very limited.

I wanted to contribute with a little bit of info I have regarding the state of Latvian army. First off, as Vanir Ausf B already noted, the active land force component is the smallest in the Baltics, with only 2 line infantry battalions. These battalions are currently mechanized in BV 206, but thanks to purchase of ex-GB CVR(T)s will be transitioning to a new platform within the next few years. The battalions themselves are somewhat on the largish side - with 4 line infantry companies, a CSS company and several platoons (see TO&E from NATO.int site) . There is also a SF component, of roughly company strength. Latvia has been participating in Iraq and Afghanistan missions, so at least a portion of the force has recent combat experience. Recent acquisitions, mostly driven by Ukrainian experience include Harris Falcon III (AN/PRC-117G) radio sets, new digital camo uniforms reflecting Latvian terrain (prior uniforms were "desert"), new body armor, abovementioned CVR(T)s and a reset of army helicopter force. Uniforms and body armor will be used by NG as well, though I don't know in what quantity. The other major portion of the Land Force is the National Guard (Zemessardze). They consist of 18 infantry battalions, and are primarily a territorial defense force. During emergencies, they also act in aid to the police and emergency services. As far as I know, most servicemen leaving active service do not transition into National Guard. The preparedness level of Zemessardze for high intensity combat is fairly low. The men train about for 30 days during first year's basic training and about 20 days a year in the following years. There is some movement towards improving the readiness levels, with each battalion designating a "High Readiness Company" by 2018. This company will consist of best prepared and most experienced soldiers within the battalion - and probably will have first priority on receiving any new equipment as well. In terms of resisting a hybrid force backed up by Russian armed forces using the Ukrainian model (i.e. SF, EW escalating to direct involvement of Russian armored and artillery forces), Latvian land forces are insufficient in both quantity and quality.

The author was in charge of communications platoon for the LNR "August" battalion, participated in the fighting during the fall and winter. As he fought around Lugansk, he has relatively little to say about Debaltsevo, except to note that his impression is that DNR forces are better organized then LNR forces. The main points he makes are: 1) The expansion of DNR/LNR forces during fall and winter has resulted in critical dilution of combat-experiences personnel by new recruits. The local recruits are motivated primarily by having a chance to get a steady paycheck. Their interest in fighting, as such, is minimal and they are prone to quitting. 2) Decision to combine separate battalions into brigades and corps has introduced an extra level of supervision, without providing it with experienced staff officers. In practice, brigade HQs are useless and are acting as logistics distribution points. Individual battle groups are commanded straight from "Corps" level. 3) The issues mentioned above has led to heavy casualties during the offensive. 4) Russia is supplying DNR/LNR with AFVs, IFVs, APCs etc. however the spares and tools needed to keep the equipment running are consistently very scarce. Same is true of the radio equipment. That leads to very low servicability levels and issues with C&C. 5) He has not seen Russian army formations being currently deployed, however he acknowledges that such formations were deployed during the summer. http://kenigtiger.livejournal.com/1555492.html

Regarding a few points that were raised .... oh, about 10 pages ago. It's of course wise to keep in mind the motivations of various personalities who are talking about the conflict. In some cases - like "RT" - it's fairly easy to discern the slant in it's reporting. But there are interesting factional splits which sometimes make it more likely to determine whether somebody is hewing closer (or farther) from the truth. For example - Girkin has been making snarky comments about Givi ever since he came back to Russia. They clearly don't get along, so if I ever read something positive about Givi from Girkin, I'll give it more weight. On the Ukrainian side, Biryukov has been generally anti military establishment, however since he has been appointed advisor to both the President and Minister of Defense, he has been taking government's side much more often. Gone native, I suppose. On the other hand, Yuri Butusov (editor in chief of Censor.net.ua) is still very much of the opinion that MoD/General Staff are making a total mess of the the war. That makes his estimates of combat losses to be more believable, at least as the upper boundary of the range. Regarding employment of battalion/company tactical groups - that's something Russian army has been practicing for a while. It certainly has an effect of allowing a lower-readiness formation to detach a composite sub-unit composed of assets which are ready to be employed. I suspect that's the main reason for Ukrainians adopting this method. If they could be consistently fighting 2 up - 1 down, or even 3 up, they would be doing so. Also, there seems to be at least some level of throwing ad-hoc units into the fighting, wherever there is a need for them. That results in units being deployed at significant distance from their immidiate parent HQ - which creates serious difficulties for C&C.

Oh, definitely, MRAPs are hardly the best solution to Ukraine's APC crisis. An IFV would suit their current needs much better. However, MRAPs have one very strong advantage - US wants to get rid of them one way or the other. I'm sure their "cost" in the aid package would be very reasonable.

Perhaps you could expand your scenario, so we can tell what you have in mind. Is Russia shipping a dozen Iglas to ISIS? Or a brigade package of S-400s? What will be the escalation sequence? There is a significant difference.

A few sophisticated SAMs are not likely to make a large difference, and a large number would pretty much spell the end of his one remaining client in the Middle East - Bashar Assad. Syrian AF is one remaining equilizer of the Syrian government. If ISIS can shoot down sigificant number of them, it's likely to result in fall of Damascus.

If we're to take current fighting into account, I would say that Ukrainian units would clearly improve. I would rate them right now to be comparable to Russian units towards the tail end of the First Chechen War (95-96) - they have "seen the elephant", but there is still a LOT more work to do organizationally to incorporate the battle experience into unit training/structure, etc. If we presume that 2015-2017 consist of fairly low-intensity fighting (like Nagorny Karabagh, for example), they may have time and space to implement the reforms. As far as Russian units, it's hard to tell. Units of Russian armed forces (as opposed Russian armed forces personnel) are getting involved only episodically, so I would not expect the experience to have much value for them.

As far as I understand, the separatists staged a fairly large offensive meant to pinch off the Debaltsevo salient. As a repetition of Illovaysk, it was meant to surround and reduce the Ukrainian forces there. However, the operation was at best a partial success. Reportedly the separatist casualties have been heavy - or at least heavier than in many similar operations priviously. There has been several explanations offered for this: 1) Lack of support from Russian army units, unlike in Illovaysk 2) Lack of coordination between infantry and armored units 3) Actual sabotage by the Russian government, meant to destroy specific units participating in the offence - units in question reportedly being composed of people opposed to negotiated solution. Ukrainians have suffered minor territorial reverses, and their casualties have been significant - but lighter than separatists'.

One of the article I've read on Caiman MRAPs suggested that US army mechanics were unable to service them beyong very basic maintenance, and therefore almost any work on them required a trip to rear areas where civilian company personnel could work on them. That could be very problematic for Ukrainian military.

I think the maintenance state of the equipment is playing a larger role than tech level. Ukrainian equipment serviceability levels are likely far below the separatists' (not to mention the regular Russian forces). As an example, when ~10 APCs and tanks were assembled for one of the thrusts in Donetsk airport counter attack, only 2 (or 4, depending on the source) actually made to the jump off area. The 70% of ATGMs being unusable are a reflection of this, of course. I agree with your point that Ukrainian high command perfromance has been lackluster - at best - up till now. The fact that separatists have dominance in C3I is a factor, but operationally Ukrainian forces have been extremely passive.

According to RT.com, US is considering to transfer MRAPs from Afghanistan to Ukraine. This could be true, or could be attempt by Russian to preemptively prevent such transfer from taking place by raising Afghan sentiment against it. It's certainly true that Ukraine has an urgent need for armored transport for it's troops. The 6 newly formed motorized infantry brigades (rebadged territorial defense battaionls) are very short on transport in general -hence the need to requisition 2000 trucks from the private sector to give them wheels. In general, a decent guess can be made by looking at the equipment made available by US via Excess Defence Articles database.