BTR

Those are T-80U's (or potentially UD's). The vehicle that looks like a BMP-1 is actually a BMP-1KSh (0:11). Then there is a logistical vehicle that appears to be BREM-1 (0:12). After that comes BTR-D (0:15) as far as I can tell followed by 1V119-1 Reostat (0:17). After that come BMD-2's (0:24), then 2S9 Nona's (0:30). More BMD-2's followed by BTR-D right after (0:36) with BTR-ZD (0:46) and potentially BTR-RD at (0:49) however I'm really not sure about the last one. More BTR-ZD's at 0:51 with more BTR-RD's right after. There is definitely one there at 0:54. Maybe a R-149BMRD at 0:57, but that's another one I'm not sure about.  
 
Aaand, that's it really. 

Then put forward actual evidence. 
 
-4 BTG's (4200 men) in active Russian service active in Ukraine before.
-X amounts of whatever formations crossing the border in Ukraine now.
 
In the age of everyone owning a camera and almost everyone having access to internet, that shouldn't be impossible.
 
There is no doubt in my mind about consultancy and hardware support for separatists (which is sort of logical given the geopolitical objectives). Russian nationals have also been involved on their own accord. Now, that's what we can clearly see and prove. The rest is really up to faith on both sides. What I don't like is some sort of self-righteous attitude of some members here, like you know better. Facts and figures, that's all that counts.  
 
 
Which is a slightly childish thing to say, I hope you don't get offended. This begs a question of why? Because Ukrainian media reports fall within a certain mentality's pre-conceived notions? Doesn't make it any more valid, and over the course of the conflict, from the beginning in last year, Ukrainian media has been caught red-handed way more on average, not only twisting the story, but outright creating them out of thin air.   

About Ukraine I like how supporters of Poroshenko don't take in fact the videos they have where they execute a man by cracking his spine with a kettle. Or the countless videos of bombardment of residential areas, And a ballistic missile was used but, all they think is "Putin is a bad man he is still communist" or just the simple "We hate Russia" mentality that is being presented by the government of certain countries to the population. Same type of people who believe in this stuff also believe that Russian forces shot down flight MH17

Peeling potatoes is a supreme way to occupy a soldier. Everyone knows that a soldier with free time is a disaster waiting to happen. 

That was one of the main reasons I wanted to become a vehicle operator actually. My Father was a career officer in the 336th Naval infantry brigade back in the 80's, so I heard plenty horror stories not to use feet as my main locomotion in the army.   

2010-2011 BTR-80 Operator (Driver), western military district. 
 
If we go by "oh crap" moments, three APC's sinking into a bog one after another because our CO decided to play the tactician would be one of the best. Taking them out wasn't as fun as getting stuck though. 

Peeling potatoes is a supreme way to occupy a soldier. Everyone knows that a soldier with free time is a disaster waiting to happen. 

Peeling potatoes is a supreme way to occupy a soldier. Everyone knows that a soldier with free time is a disaster waiting to happen. 

That industry did not receive any significant domestic arms orders prior to the GPV2015/2020.

First off I want to thank you every one for participating in this interesting discussion! Please do continue presenting your visions/speculations about the tactical and strategic nature of this hypothetical war.
 
I will now follow with my "case study" for a Ukraininan defensive delaying action in a strategic location along the E101 Highway near town of "Krolevets"
When planning this study I was struck by the enormous distances each military unit will have to cover. Gone are the days when battalions, brigades or even divisions would share common borders with their Areas of Operations. I was also struck by what seemed at first glance as impossible terrain to defend or even to conduct delaying action of any sort. However after some late nights spent with google earth i began to find some defendable locations along the Moscow-Kiev Highway, wich would be vital to clear and capture regardles of the ultimate goal of the war. It is simply strategically very important if you are going to attempt offensives towards Kiev.
 
One of these locations is Krolevets with it's surrounding terrain of forest, marshy riverbeds, hills and gullies with broken farmlands and minor villages. It is by far NOT a perfectly defendable location, (if there ever is one) and would be bypassed eventually, but the aim here is to buy as much time as possible and deplete the enemy as much as possible, even with the prospect that the defending troops never get to go home again.
 
The following picture is the rough outline of defensive sector of single Ukrainian Mechanized Brigade (would be most likely the 72nd)
 

 
The AO for the brigade is way way too large but the problem here is that ukraine military does not have the brigades to defend along the entire border. Therefore we must make do with what we have and this is my estimate of a possible AO. Now the catch is this: There is also a ukrainian artillery brigade or at least elements of it, within the Mechs AO near "Baturin" wich should be able to use their BM-30 smerch (or similar systems) to strike at advancing RA-forces  along the E101 and as well as other locations of importance (demonstrated by the yellow "explosion" markers)
 
The brigades objective is to act as the first line of defence, buy time, wear down the RA-advance units and protect the artillery brigades assets while they pound the invading enemy as long as they can (asuming the first airstrike wont neutralise them withing first hours of war). Brigade has been divided into three separate mechanized combat teams: one in Krolevets, one screening the SE direction near Konotop and one in reserve near Baturin ready to reinforce either one of the two other combat teams and/or conduct counterattacks with or without support from armored brigade situated around "Borzna, Nizhyn, Ichnya" -area. If the brigade is bypassed or otherwise compromized, the remaining units are to fall back towards Chernigov for regroup and refit. Expected RA forces will range from 3-4 mech and tank brigades in strenght, attacking in battalion formations. Brigade must rely on recon screen in Shostka, Buryn, Terny -directions  to provide intel on enemy axis of advances and counter them by redeploying battalion combat teams accordingly as well as provide target info for the artillery brigade assets.
 
Next picture is the possible locations I have planned to map (if RL allows) in the Krolevets area:
 

 
Each should be reasonably plausible locations for actions ranging from platoon to company/depleted battalion scale. They can also be easily converted for use with more robust defensive formations (for example an entire brigade defending the locale) and should cover the most likely paths of advance by RA-units locally (naturally the entire locale is possible to bypass elsewhere)
 
Next three pistures are my very rough demonstrations of a possible defensive plan for the ukrainian Mechanized taks force defending Krolevets:
 

 
-the broken blue arrows represent the intended direction of retreat  and should these direction be compromized the battalion will be isolated quickly. The "toothed" blue lines are possible prepared defensive locations wich a mechanized company can occupy according to the situation at hand. As with the brigade, the battalion must also rely heavily on intel to be able to respond to the multiple possible directions of threat. This intel is to be provided by attached brigade level recon screen and drones.
 

 
-Likely russian routes of advance, the hollow arrows point out the threat of flanking through "Yaroslavets-Bezkrovne" -area but that is something the defenders will just have to live with.
 

 
and finaly the rough demonstration of planned demolitions and minefields to cut the highway E101 and provide some security along flanks. Naturally each mechanized company has own mine fields and other demolitions in their corresponding AO's  depending on available time and materiel. The primary taks of the attached brigade level engineers and corps level engineer assets is to deny the E101 from the enemy. The more time there is to prepare the better. If preparations are begun well before the advent of war, all of the avenues of advance will be covered with extensive minefields, demolitions, and AT-ditches.
 
The defending battalion must be proactive in it's defence and ready to pull back to secondary and tertiary defensive positions in timely manner before the inevitable RA artillery grinds to dust any known point of resistance. Concealment must be taken from built up and wooden areas. Krolevets will be the last stand before the remaining men and materiel are to fall back towards west and north west. (I seriously doubt there will be any!)
 
Any thoughts, comments and/or critique is much welcomed!
 
Cheers!
-H1nd
 

As the OP I would humbly ask people to refrain from turning this thread as argument war on nature of NATO/WP/Modern day Russia and instead let us focus on the tactical and strategic plausibilities. Thank you. 
 
-H1nd

Which is fairly inaccurate. Firstly, what time-frame are we talking about? A ) 1994-1995 or B )1999-2000? 
 
If it is A-
The realities of Grozny were the following:
-In a two days delayed response local civilian population was told to leave the city (a sizable number chose to stay);
-Heavily fortified positions across the whole city;
-5-12K enemy combatants in the area to 12K troops available (1:2.4 at best and 1:1 at worst is hardly enough to assault a city successfully);
-No sizable local guerrilla support;
-Air support was not available for the first two days of the operation.
 
If it is B-
-It was an enemy state capital with no accountable local support;
-Evacuation corridors were provided a month before the initial assault;
-Most of supporting actions for the monthly duration of the blockade were performed with Air instead of Artillery (which leads me to believe the same would be done in Ukraine).

I would think that RA would strive to achieve dominance outside major population centers, blockading roads, bases and other important objectives like they did in Crimea. All that while using local support with SF aid/integration to try and dominate cities in key areas (admin buildings, power plants etc). Shelling cities indiscriminately, like someone above me said is nonsensical since it deleverages whatever limited local support the RA has to achieve success inside cities.
 
Limited use of artillery on hard-points within cities that wouldn't support RA enough to warrant SF deployment only is debatable though. I personally still see air power as a more accurate and adequate method of combating hard-points inside population centers.