panzersaurkrautwerfer

It does. We used the Command Launch Unit (the launcher sans missile) in lieu of other optics. It was a bit easier to use than the PAS-13s, while also not being actively strapped to a weapon system. Also did not weigh 200 lbs like the LRAS3. I haven't gotten the impression there's some sort of magic spotting going on. Stuff that's got ultra sensitive thermal optics tends to pick up stuff better than stuff that lacks it. The seeing through woodlines, I just haven't seen anything that was certainly wtf lol noscope or whatever.

It comes up in other treads, mostly about how unfair it is, and makes QB impossible or something.

For me it's very much the historical aspect. The Bulge was the largest single battle for the US forces in Europe, fought in conditions and terrain starkly different than Normandy. The forces involved, both Allied and German were much different than the forces that fought it out in the summer (in terms of material and manning), and just when you get down to it, there just is not the sort of carry-over you really need to make it a module. If you're going to do games about the western allies, with D-Day at the starting point, the initial landing, the breakout, and then the end of that "home in time for Christmas!" phase with the collapse of Market Garden is a really good range for the first game to cover, with the battles to breach the Siegfried Line (Aachen for instance) through VE Day serving as the second game+modules serves quite well. The centrality to Normandy to all World War Two games is a bit annoying at times given the seven or so months of fighting that occurred after France was pretty well wrapped up. Having a game that is not struggling to give us both St Lo, and Remagen is the best choice.

Hear hear. Let's cut down the performance of late war German and Soviet tanks in CMRT too as they're entirely unfair!

In a continued foreign policy platform, yeah we're still involved in the middle east. As a mission the US Military is oriented on, not so much. The sort of equipment, units, and training that was oriented on operating a conventional ground force for an extended time in the middle east is largely gone at this point. You still have Kuwait and some ongoing missions, but it's a big change from the degree to which the US military used to pretty much be focused on Iraq/Afghanistan, and things touching Iraq/Afghanistan. The post War On Terror military is....still very much evolving. The Pacific Pivot though, should not be seen as a "screw all for the Pacific" and the current US plans and intent have certainly seen a shifting focus back to Europe given recent events.

Universal application is a bit out there, but fairly common is not. The pre-1991 build up saw conversion of several hundred M1A1s to M1A1HAs (which includes changing the armor array, not a small act!) and adding LRFs and other neat tools to the M2A2 platforms (to the degree that remaining M2A2s are "M2A2 ODS" for "Operation Desert Storm" after the upgrade package became standardized). While there was a lot of rumbling about the hillbilly armor, there was a lot of Army designed and purchased factory upgrades of various types, and the various C-IED systems made you feel like if you blinked you missed three or four generations of system. The large system stuff moves slow, and involves a lot of politics, but when the US military needs widgets and needs them next week, we're one of the few forces in the world that can afford to throw money the problem until it goes away. And to that end, effectively buying out the Trophy assembly line, and keeping USAF C-17s idling at the nearest airport to receive delivery is something that is well within reason should the US military decide it needs APS tomorrow. The downsizing is net total Brigades, however the remaining Brigades are increasing their "line" battalions by one (so instead of each ABCT having 2 CABs, they now have 3). There's only four Battalions of combat power going away across the Army, and while I forget the exact breakdown, it's not all armor. In terms of tank procurement, it's really embarrassing but we've been at sufficient tanks to fill out the Army, Marine Corps, and several preposition ships and depots, and then have a surplus. The Lima Tank factory is a congressional thing that refuses to die. The Pacific Pivot ran straight into the Ukrainian crisis. It's better to say we're seeing a Middle East divestment. The Army, and the ABCTs especially remain in a posture that doesn't preclude deployment to Europe on short notice (as 1st CAV has done on a few occasions).

There are flaming bits and the like. It's not always a catastrophic tank ending explosion. Odds of crew survival are not good to put it mildly, but even some Soviet type tanks that are prone to explosions failed to cook off in the 1991 and 2003 fighting despite being struck with a sabot. An Abrams with a decent fire suppression system, and lacking stuff that'll still burn after a halon dump might not be as entirely destroyed. In terms of impacts, I thankfully never got hit myself, but things like RPGs and non-penetrating KE strikes certainly made a racket, and MG fire was at least somewhat audible from conversations I can recall. On the other hand if none if it is coming through it's hard to judge how bad it might be, it could be the optic has been jarred a bit and needs to be reset, or the whole assembly could have been simply sheered off somehow. In terms of reasonable effects, something similar to the laser warning backup is about right. Generally not getting hit, even by non-penetrating strikes is a state the tanker prefers to be in. So unless I've got a good reason to sit still and take some hits, I'm going to pop into reverse and get behind cover (and try to find the guy messing up my paint job, so I can smoke him).

Interesting that there's no apparent IR lights (unless they're mounted apart from the normal light arrays). What are most Russian night driving systems these days anyway?

Sort of confused why this is on the CMBS forum. I think the mentality of the day was killing the Japanese until they quit trying to kill us vs any sort of grand humanitarian post war plans of Japanese freedom.

Yes. And never forget this, and never forget to prostrate yourself before the Abrams gods, lest you invite their fury. And like every other thread that has touched on this topic, Abrams vs T-90 at range is weighted in favor of the Abrams by several degrees. The sensor and weapons imbalance is most profound at the +1KM range. It's not an especially fair fight to the degree of going into a fight against Panthers with T-34/76s or M4A1s, or T-34/85s and M4A3E8s if you're going the T-90AM route.

Only if the size of the vehicle is comparable to the man.

Nah. The naming scheme has generally been armor, cavalry, or non-armor officers who became sort of armor officers (general officers from other branches who were armored division commanders and the like in World War Two). HR MacMaster is really the one guy I can think of in modern times that'd be a good namesake for a tank. Schwartzkopf would be a good choice for an IFV name though.

And are hilarious when their fanclub pops up. A certain dude of eric also comes to mind.

Nah. You can fit two additional dudes in if the gun is not in operation but other than that its four or four crewmen. Re:30 mm If a tank has no main gun and cannot drive itself to the maintenance collection point then a 30 mm doesn't really change the equation. Re: driver mechanics Thats pretty much standard for all tankers. There's usually a workload for each crewman, driver tends to do the engine and suspension stuff, gunner does the weapons systems, loader the breach, coms and helping the driver. Tank commander helps out when he is around. Milage varies though based on the commander workload. Re: sleeping Popular spaces are: Rear turret deck. The army sleeping bag and its waterproof outer shell work well enough to make this practical. Engine deck. Best with gun elevated and traversed to rear. Then you throw a tarp over it for super comfy tent. Sleeping inside, the drivers position is awesome so long as you are not actually needing to drive soon. Racked out face into the gunners primary sight works too if it's been a 36 hour day. Loaders can usually do the fetal position on the floor with enough padding or the before mentioned 36 hour day.

M1A2 gunnery is easier once you've spent a few hours in the MAGTS and are doing it with humans in the other crew positions.

Again this thing is just sort of clipping along, so small shots: Re: Concentration of assets The whole Soviet system works very well when you have a nearly endless supply of men and material, and strategic intiative. It breaks down if you lack any of those items. Swapping out units in contact is one of those military operations that ranks up there with rocket surgery in terms of complexity, and to built a system that doesn't just anticipate a need to do so, but requires it to be done when one unit degrades to a point (because you chose not to maintain it enough) to have to be sent to the rear on a regular basis is just silly in the extreme. No matter how good of a relief in place you conduct, the best you can hope for is a modest loss in momentum. If you're facing a more agile army he's going to exploit this slack to do a whole host of bad mojo. Having units that broadly remain in motion for longer because they're maintained as they break vs get fixed once they're broke better retains the initiative. Same goes for fires, the ability to mass is great, but given the ranges involved and a good communications network, it is much less critical to have a lot of fires that are highly managed, and by far more useful to have potentially mutually supporting, but generally aligned against lower echelons as responsive fires are critical to mobile military warfare. The Soviet system worked when it did, because it did not have to worry about the sort of resource crunch the Russians do. I wouldn't see fit to call it a "good" system nearly as much as one that well identified how to be functional given the people and equipment available. But it simply is not practical in a post-Soviet world. Re: Aratatata I think hat consumption will be low. The dubious of Armata crew, myself included have always assumed "something" would be at the march. The more extreme opinions were an entirely plywood float over a UAZ sort, while the less extreme was prototypes of marginal functionality, made able to conduct the road march, but they still cannot shoot or go in reverse without catching fire (like the T-50 apparently). The plywoodian option is looking less likely, but the functional Armata is looking about as likely as the "it goes forward and turns right. Left turns completed by total revolution with right turn" level of operation. In terms of skepticism, there's really three separate realms of doubt for the Armata: 1. The performance of the vehicle itself. As discussed at length with the unmanned turret conversations, there's some pretty reasonable doubt to if an unmanned turret is a good idea, and doubtless as more details will come out, there will be more questions to if it really is that good with only so much thermal resolution/weight to power/the coffee maker is prone to fire. 2. The performance of Russian high tech projects. Separate from the vehicle itself, Russia has had a not so good record with "new" equipment. Improvements to old stuff? Not so bad! But the T-50 gives a good example of how derailed Russian programs with ambitious goals can get. The question for me at least is if the Armata will be the T-64, stumbling out of the box but after some work, a good tank, or a T-35, a host of immature technology strapped to a marginal design choice. 3. Performance of the Russian economy. While it wanders into politics, the reason why Russia has not done major upgrades to any of its various vehicle fleets has always been chalked up to poor economic situation and lack of funding. The economic situation has not gotten better, and by many estimates it is actually quite poor. The plans Russia has stated for modernization and new vehicles are very ambitious for countries with much stronger economies and much better future prospects. This does not rule the plans out, but it does raise questions about making ends meet, and the long term practicality of such plans. None of these have really been addressed too well from the Armata club for Armatas. None of them preclude "something" happening with the Armata being an okay tank, and being fielded in numbers, but all of them cast a lot of doubt on the Armata procurement going to the scale that has been claimed.

Which relies on a slower operational tempo, and an enemy that is largely unable to mass elsewhere. When it was just going to be dogpile on Fulda then it makes some sense, but a long march to Kiev or something would likely be a nightmare in terms of recovery and maintenance. Which is something that's always boggled my mind a bit, one of the great killers of Soviet tanks in World War Two was vehicles breaking down and being unable to be recovered. Even if maintenance was still withheld at higher levels, recovery should certainly be much more available.

But again, if I have A TRP 1-1 CAV screening the flank of the Brigade, the mechanics sufficient to support the day to day stuff are already part of the formation. If one of the vehicles goes down hard it can then be pushed higher until the vehicle receives the level of repairs it needs. Fires is a little different but given the advances in joint type fires, it's less important that all batteries exist under one formation, controlled by higher, as much as the assets may be flexed to where they are needed. This flexiability is essential on the modern battlefield, and especially essential once you try to leverage technology over quantity, which at least nominally is what the Russians are trying to do with this modernization thing (and really have to do if they're serious about Armata and associated equipment). Nah brah. I just think you're whiny and immature, and the 'murican thing, combined with basically flapping around the American bias flag any time something that reasonably was inferior to US equipment performed inferior basically validated that position. And needless to say you're well on your way to showing I did not jump to conclusions, so carry on!

I was once a M1A2 SEP V2 company commander. So I'm sort of attached to them (even if ours lacked ERA or the APS).

Oddly enough the SBCTs use consolidated maintenance (at the BDE level). It's widely regarded as a terrible thing and in every.single.AAR I've seen from an SBCT training rotation, the consolidated maintenance setup is something that always comes up as needing improvement. I've heard various reasons why it was tried (mechanized unit designed by paratroopers, original Stryker mission assumed fairly limited radius of action from BDE HQ), but again without dispute something regarded as a mistake to be mended rather than our eyes opened to the genius of operational level superiority warfare. It might have been changed since I left the schoolhouse even, I sort of stopped caring about Strykers when I went back to an ABCT. Our Squadron mucked with it a bit in Iraq, we retained our maintenance teams, but our Forward Support Company conned our leadership into believing recovery service would be improved by putting all the wreckers under the Squadron level recovery platoon. It added hours onto getting any vehicle recovered. Prior to the consolidation, getting a MRAP pulled from a ditch took about 20 minutes to spin up (basically our mechanics kept two mechanics on a sort of on-call status to man the wrecker, and the Squadron's QRF would do security to move the wrecker to the element in need of help). It took 2-3 hours to get a wrecker after the consolidation. Honestly terrible. Consolidated mechanics and fires elements make sense if you don't have the professional core of dudes to fill out lower echelons, but it's a way of making do with less, not a superior way of mission accomplishment.

Not really. On the other hand if something is coming through the frontal slope with enough velocity to kill the gunner, let alone the commander it isn't going to leave enough of the FCS to make the tank especially combat worthy. It'd also have to pass through the thickest armor on the tank so it's...a bit of a stretch right now for most anti-tank systems. Nope. I'd rather have that crew going back to pick up a "float" tank from the Brigade's reserve of such vehicles, or working with the BN maintenance guys to drop in a new gun tubes. Longer they're on the battlefield, longer I have to wait for a fully capable tank. And I'd much rather have a fully capable tank than a well armored 30 mm carrier. The short version is the mechanics themselves are not anywhere near the tanks, and usually exist at BDE levels. The response is much slower, and while western type mechanics are less concentrated, there's much larger numbers of them, and it allows for better triage of repairs (crew handles minor fixes, company team handles replacement of larger parts and some battle damage repairs, BN covers major end system repairs and more significant battle damage repair, BDE handles tanks that are very broken and more practically arranges for replacement of tank and dispatch of broken tank to depot level facilities). Like I said, we usually roll in fours. The degree to which we're on alert depends a lot on the threat, if we're in the howling open desert in a Company coil, there might be a driver and man on the turret while the other two crewmen do post operations maintenance. On the offensive into North Korea, likely only one tank is doing anything but watching for North Korean SOF and stay-behinds. Generally actual repair operations are conducted with the maintenance team located one terrain feature behind the front line when possible though. The actual rest cycle is usually completed on a by tank basis, someone awake in the driver's hole, someone in the TC's seat scanning for targets, while the other two crewmen rack out for a few hours. This allows the platoon to still conduct movements while allowing for crew rest. By god and how. Concentration of maintenance assets rarely ends with good service, and slows down fire responsiveness to an appalling degree.

I have to differ. I'd rather better realized "real" vehicles and the like, than CM turning into adverts for General Dynamic's Fall 2018 catalog, or a mouthpiece for Russian claims of industrial might. What's reasonably expected to show up to the fight in 2017+a few modest reaches (US APS, and Russian employment of export upgrades) is really the optimal setup. For modules a really well rounded out NATO and uncon lineup is a better use of time.

This is pretty much already the official word. If it's 2016 and the first Armata BTG is rumbling along, then cool. If it's 2016 and it only shows up for parades, then best left out.

But we know nothing about what they're actually capable of, there's strong doubts the Russians could build or maintain them in quantity and there's some pretty serious questions into the actual design. LOL OPSEC does not make those issues disappear. Your 'murcia tantrums do that by far more effectively honestly.

Pretty much. The whole small size thing comes with pretty vast trade-offs. That's always been the case (the Korean tank on tank fighting is a really good illustration of this simply because each engagement was fairly well documented, and nearly all of the knocked out T-34s/UN tanks were recovered or available for analysis). Just going off how we tended to lose dudes on occasions that the Abrams was penetrated in Iraq. EFP isn't a bad model for ATGM strikes, and more than a few got hit by later RPG-7 warheads from the rear/sides (pre-ERA), and there were even a fair number of RPG-29 strikes. Losing more than one guy usually required a massive tank destroying event like a buried aircraft bomb. That's generally what happened, so I'm inclined to believe it's not an unreasonable result for a short of tank destruction hit. Even if Abrams had a 30 MM I'd still be pulling it off the line if I lost the main gun. Even then there's a lot less to go wrong on the tank, and I've seen enough breach issues, or rounds fail to fire that I'm dubious of being unable to get at the gun to troubleshoot it, or work it in a degraded mode (manually operating the breach, firing via the "master blaster" etc). For the Abrams it depends pretty wildly. A lot of the electronics are plug and play, and each company has a stock of spares with their unit maintenance team (which is generally 1X M88 recovery vehicle, 1X tool truck, 1X FRSH for lack of a better way of describing it, mobile garage, and usually a cargo truck for spare parts). The sort of stuff you won't have in stock will be complete engines, gun tubes, entire optics assemblies etc, but most of that will be kept at Battalion level. So to that end, I've watched an Abrams go from "pretty much a brick" after a small electrical fire to "ready to rock" in a few hours while sitting in a muddy field with no more assets than the tank crew and the mechanic team. If the allocation of mechanics was better, or more extensive in the Russian army, I'd be less dubious, but right now it's sort of like, you want to do this amazingly complex tank with cutting edge technology....and your mechanics are still at echelons above reality? We usually do not operate in sections by themselves. They exist mostly for inter-platoon maneuver (so first section covers second section while moving through open terrain) or as attachments (1st section is attached to mechanized infantry platoon 1, while 2nd section is attached to mechanized infantry platoon 2). We did platoon vs section training because of the size of the training space, and to give a more realistic attacker/defender ratio rather than a common deployment of sections. Generally if you see one US tank, there's at least another three out there somewhere. Yep, but if I claimed the US Army had ninja battle robots, but you don't get to see them because OPSEC, you'd have reasons to be incredulous. As more than a few posters have stated the ability of Russia to crank out Armatas, and the capabilities of the vehicle itself are somewhat in doubt.