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panzersaurkrautwerfer

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Everything posted by panzersaurkrautwerfer

  1. Again if you're denying presence, you don't announce it with systems that frankly could only be flown in by C-17s flown by Americans, and driven by crewmen named Park and Kim. It's not even really an American move as much as something most countries do when trying to keep a low profile (see the early Russian efforts in the Ukraine, only using equipment that at least could be claimed to have came from Ukrainian stocks). As the case is the US lacks the national will to commit that sort of action, and given the current situation, it's a very doubtful proposition. Re: Crazytalk What Sburke is saying is that there's a sort of accepted level of off topic here, and connection to reality. This is really not the place where you're going to find a receptive audience to discuss the Germanwings thing because most of us prefer some Occam in our razors if you get my drift.
  2. The argument for Strykers was not "let us go toe to toe with panzers" it was "we can get light infantry anywhere in the world in 24 or so hours, and have no mobility when they hop off the plane, or we can wait four months to get armored forces on location." They're very much a product of the end of the cold war, and the "new world order" of not-crazy speak that anticipated the need to go anywhere in the world overnight and defeat militia to low capability conventional forces, and be supported via airhead. In a Syrian situation they're not at all a bad tool, and even in complex environments they give you a lot of mobility. But they straight up die against near peer threats on the offensive or in open terrain*, and every training mission or simulation confirms this. To this end I've always viewed the SBCT as the "heavy" end of a COIN operation, while it's the "light" option in the full spectrum fight (effectively being a way for infantry heavy formations to keep up with combined armor-mech forces) *All infantry of course, is hard to dig out of complex terrain. Not unfair. Can still be more useful given precision of direct fire weapons vs flex mount .50's, but they really need to be screened by infantry to not get thrashed.
  3. This is much more reasonable than the "All will be Armata in 2017" threads we were seeing for a bit. Again curious to see how many of them actually see service and how they are allocated. Re: Fifty shades of BMP To put in in comparison, the current Russian system would be as if the US kept the M60 in service and updated, and maintained M113 based mechanized infantry units to the modern day. While the T-90 and T-72 are very similar, if they were just the same damned tank you'd be able to build one upgrade package, or at the least fleetwide compatible upgrade kits. You wouldn't need T-90AM or T-72B3 etc, you'd just have T-81UMBSKwhatever (split the difference in numbers). This is especially questionable because neither tank is vastly superior when properly upgraded. They both have the same weapons system. They both rely on the same sort of ERA arrays, etc, etc, etc. It does not make sense to maintain both a T-90 and T-72 line, and then still have T-80s, T-62s in some corners of the Empire, and now the Armata clattering about. When we dive into APCs and somesuch the question becomes a bit of a why have the variety? And to that end you have the BMP split, and then the greater question of why so many PCs? I don't believe the BMD or MTLB need justifying simply because they both have clear niches that cannot be easily filled. BMDs are the one really airdroppable IFV (the utility of that role is another discussion, however if you want an IFV to drop out of planes, it's pretty much your only choice), MTLBs offer a very good choice in mobility over some very marginal conditions. But when you get into the realm of BTRs and BMPS you sort of have to ask "why." The Stryker type motorized vehicles, as much as I do not like them, are designed around being a homogeneous force of vehicles with similar mobility, logistical, and transportation requirements, that can all be stuffed into airplanes and rapidly deployed. In theory it does not need augmentation for most missions (in theory. practice is a very different matter). The BTR based units make a similar look, but you still have significant "heavy" assets that are traditionally aligned against them. Which opens a question to the utility of a wheeled, fast transport that is tied to tracked armor logistics and mobility. A formation is as fast as its slowest piece, as thirsty as its biggest vehicle, etc, etc. So to that end you lose a lot of the wheeled advantages of the BTR (which is not a bad vehicle at all), while saddling tanks with forces that cannot keep up with them (off road, or in terms of survival). In terms of the BMP-3 vs BMP-2, it really should be one or the other. Having two fleets and keeping them both relevant is prohibitive if in broader terms they're the same sort of role. So either going all in because by god, BMP-3s are the future (I differ there) or committing to a total and complete overhaul of the BMP-2 fleet (more practical, and allows a much easier incrimental upgrade fleetwide) is more sound than having the BMP-3 with a whole host of updates and upgrades that often do not carry over to the BMP-2, while pursuing various BMP-2M designs. And so forth. There's needless replication of capabilities and systems, or questionable alignment of tools and assets pretty much across the board. This also goes fairly well hand in hand with the frankly bipolar Russian defense planning which amounts to an interesting pursuit of NATO's old 1960's "All conflicts threatening our borders automatically are nuclear" while trying to still maintain the sort of force that is designed to go head to head with NATO. It indicates a lack of mission focus or understanding, no one is going to Barbarossa the border if it means nukes are a popping, which negates the need for the rather large (and to a degree wasteful, which is something even the Russian military recognizes) forces, but on the other end of the stick, Russian forces have no realistic military targets that they cannot handle with a smaller, much more focused force (see Georgia, Ukraine, etc). A lot of units are frankly redundant and best dissolved with a stronger focus on forces better designed for the missions at hand, with equipment that's fleet standard. Re: prototypes Again, you've got "standard" helicopters like the MI-28, then KA-52s (flying often in the same roles as their cold war stablemates), extended evaluation programs like the AK-12 or whatever, the whole Armata package with extended testing phase for a whole fleet of vehicles, all the various "next generation" Russian fixed wing assets that are currently in service in the 20-30 airframe range, one off things like the BMPT, and all of it being done by state owned assets. While some of it is certainly replicated by US and other free market agencies, it does deeply tie the R&D cost for programs not pursued significantly more on the overall economy which is again supporting a very large military on a GDP the size of Italy. Pair this with a slumping economy, and slipping deadlines, and the fact that the Armatas are not even really complete as prototypes, and it starts to raise questions about the practicality of new equipment barring some major changes in Russian defense planning and focus.
  4. Yeah. that's a K2. They're hardly even operational in the ROK, let alone in Ukraine. The reality is if the US did under the table lethal weapons, is they'd either be Russian sourced for lol, or otherwise correct for Eastern Europe. It was the same playbook for Afghanistan (largely Soviet weapons from Egypt, swapped for American hardware), and with only a few exceptions the policy for the Cold War and beyond* OP article is good though. Foreign Policy is pretty reputable when it comes to at least voicing interesting opinions. *About the only exception to the "arming" vs "arms deal" method was the supplying Stingers, and that was more a reflection of the state of Strelas. If the US did supply weapons, a large stock of Russian/Polish/"hey look this fell off a truck in Siberia!" type weapons, a smaller one of very common US weapons (TOWs are great for this) is much more likely, with possibly a very few signature US weapons provided (so as to say "we have sent only a hundred Javelins and six hundred missiles!" while not owning up to the thousands of AT-14, RPG-29s, later model RPG-7s we acquired to ship to the Ukraine). This is not to imply that is what is happening now, merely that the whole "AND HERE IS A US TANK MURDERING RUSSIANS IN DONBAS!" meme is idiotic to the extreme and should be treated as such.
  5. One of these days I'll get back to this thread (I'm moving my wife into my house, leaving the Army, and getting set up for college all within the same month or so of time. Only posting because I am stuck in line turning in equipment). Surprised at the apparent move to larger tanks and acceptance of heavier weight. Bit of a sea change. Otherwise looks like combination of known hardware in similar general concept to most tanks. Likely upgrade to capability but not the revolution to armor balance promised. Final procurement will be interesting.
  6. I always shoot three against MBTs. Often with light AFVs I'll just point target with a battery salvo with conventional shells. That'll usually make some sad faces. Buildings I prefer the same three shot barrage as it seems to increase lethality against both the structure and contents.
  7. Not just the fire. The thick white hot smoke will make buildings and fieldworks affected uninhabitable. Not really a super important thing for the game though. You get about the same lethality through other means.
  8. Re: Abrams in Ukraine I did not think anyone was so stupid or buried in propaganda to believe such things. Re: painted over names If the army was mum on the unit it sent I would be tempted to say it might have been OPSEC. However given the lack of secrecy more likely to me is its hardware from a prepo ship, which would have had the marks from the unit it once belonged to painted over to make it ready for a new user. Given the way these deployments go 1 ABCTs organic vehicles are still in Georgia.
  9. Russia is operating several totally different flavors of MBTs, IFVs, APCs, rifles manchine guns, etc, etc etc. If it just picked one and said "okay, screw you T-80/T-72/T-62 etc, everything from now on is T-90 based" it'd save a lot of money and result in a force structure that was not nearly so uneven in capabilities. While some of it is a reflection of the cold war leftovers Russia has been saddled with, it's also a reflection of the sort of dualistic pretending it's still 1989 and that mission set is both valid and realistic, while making robot guards/bearsuit body armor/not being able to figure out which more or less the same rifle it needs to buy to replace a rifle that honestly just needs a better way to mount accessories to prepare for a "future" conflict that's still pretty poorly defined. More focus in equipment (with something more realistic than the Armata given the budget at hand), and a more realistic mission would likely go a long way in allowing Russia to accomplish national security objectives with less overhead and redundant capabilities, or questionable thinking.
  10. It's why spaceflight will become cheaper and every home will have its own helicopter. In so many words, the honestly epic struggle to get an automated truck to drive down a road without crashing, and the very restricted situational awareness of an unmanned system make me have some pretty strong reservations about something able to maneuver and fight on a level of a manned tank, existing in the near future. There's no much armed robots do now that humans do much better (outside of flying platforms), which really accounts quite well for why things like SABER and other UGVs are limited to EOD and "camera on wheels" applications.
  11. I have to wonder if Russia cut back on one off prototypes or limited run super specialist tools how much better the rest of their forces would look.
  12. Its just not especially feasible at this point. It also magnifies all the situational awareness issues a tank can have by like 10.
  13. Argh. Can't believe I got the morning calm thing wrong.
  14. I'd totally forgotten about UO. They used it at career course but mostly we still called it MOUT (just like "high intensity conflict/low intensity conflict" is long gone, but still more useful than the current terms so they tend to endure when you cannot quite articulate Full Spectrum Operations or Contingency Operations, or whatever we're basically calling HIC and LIC by different names now)
  15. The other unstated advantage of unguided artillery is area suppression. If you can tell exactly where the enemy is, and he's broadly stationary, sweet, you're good to go. But if it's just an area where you have contact coming from, or a battle position the enemy hasn't quite presented a good target with, laying down a few battery salvos with dumb rounds will still be quite effective. You can still get very good results when you're using modern FCS and navigation equipment (which is to say, if you're thinking WW2 type artillery, the real exact location of the artillery, and the real exact location of the spotter were both fuzzy, the map was based on something much less precise than satellite imagery, and the sort of computations you can do now with digital fire control systems are the sort of things you'd needed several math savants attached to your battery to achieve quickly).
  16. Yeah. It's a bit odd having one of the historically strong military forces being something Poland could take if it really wanted to.
  17. The scenerio I always used for when I played microarmor was that the DPRK had a fairly quick coup, before the ROK and US could intervene (basically the ROK gets 80% mobilized, additional US troops arrive, enough to call them both war mongerers), new DPRK government gets snuggly with Russia, exchanges goods (labor really) for weapons claiming it needs to protect itself from American imperialism. Russia obliges as it has more than enough tanks and semi-obsolete (but way better than North Korean's current fleet!) equipment and could use the manpower to work in Siberia (which is already a thing). DPRK brings in outside investors, plays the "we're authoritarian but business friendly!" card, and then a year or so later launches itself across the DMZ because reunification is the divine mission, but hey suckers, thanks for the tanks and money! Old habits die hard and all. *Edit* I consider the scenario well below Battlefront's standard. Basically it was an excuse for me to play with the newer GHQ miniatures South Korean tanks, and fight out battles in places I knew of. Me too! I'd love to have a circa 2018ish fight in Korea, largely because the equipment wouldn't be so changed from when I was there, and it'd be fun to play at "if it really did go down" I'm just picky about the scenario for obvious reasons. Oh god are they angry at everyone for everything. Also huge racists (read "The Cleanest Race" for a good summary). They hate pretty much everything that's not North Korean, and the mythical legions of South Koreans longing to be North Koreans. Nope. Camp Casey is in the less adventurous part of Korea in terms of cuisine. Think like...the sort of stuff farmers make. Mostly hearty, not especially sophisticated, but delicious (eat you some bulgoggi son, and you'll agree). On the other hand, go to Seoul if you're visiting. It's full of insanity and awesome. Stay out late, if you're anglo with short hair, you'll get an extra special prodding from the US and Korean MPs to make sure you're not a soldier breaking curfew, but you'll see some epic stuff.
  18. Having lived in Korea...eh. The government is so in the pocket of those businesses I think you'd be hard pressed to see a shift left to a meaningful degree. And the nationalism of South Koreans (Koreans in general!) is something to behold. And you're really underestimating how BAD DPRK is these days. It's not simply a matter of giving them several dozen Type 98s, and some rations and you're good to go. The primary use of many military formations is not training or even military tasks, but has been more or less turned over to fishing, harvest tasks, or mining. Reports from defectors indicate that 10-20 rounds per soldier per year is the accepted training standard for rifle marksmenship, and much of the "advanced" gear claimed exists in a secure magic bunkers that their commanders swear exists hidden under the base that no one is allowed to see ever. You would really have to see a disastrous catastrophic fall with an equally meteoric rise from the North before you see anything sort of resembling parity. When I was over there what we worried more about wasn't them coming down, it was the more likely possibility that we would have to go North. There's no happy ending to a sudden collapse of the DPRK government, and the reality is someone would have to go in, secure the dangerous stuff like nuclear or chemical weapons sites, restore order, put down the various "True Korean Republic" or "Juche State of Joy and Love" fiefdoms set up by the various DPRK generals, and do it all in a country so improvised that simply dealing with all the disease and total lack of functional infrastructure was going to be a bigger roadblock to mission success than the former DPRK forces. Also just the reality of working with a population and infastructure so badly degraded and managed to be called maldeveloped vs underdeveloped. There's virtually nothing remaining in terms of efficient or practical industry, and the people's education is amazingly poor which precludes a rapid handover of much of anything advanced. Most estimates show that in the event of a ROK takeover, the best way to keep running the country would basically be the same, only without deathcamps for several years simply because it's too hard to change so much so fast, so it's going to have to run very badly for some years to avoid having everything just collapse into dark(er?) ages. This is really the question of what China would do comes in. China hates the DPRK. With a passion of a thousand suns. However right now they're happier to have it contained and on a sort of leash than in a state of turmoil. If the DPRK starts a war, China is almost certainly not coming in to help the DPRK (and depending on the circumstances may actually fight nominally allied to the ROK and US). In a collapse situation thought it might be something modest, like invading in a few KM into the DPRK to secure a buffer zone, to a more ambitious plan to go all the way to Pyongyang while the US and ROK try to claw through the DMZ, install a recently discovered son of Kim Il-Sung who's shockingly pro-Chinese and call it good. China is pretty opaque about what it would do. I think the buffer state option is most likely though as it presents lowest risk to China, offers a high degree of control, but leaves the cost of putting North Korea back together again in the hands of the US and ROK.
  19. It would require the ROK to be doing very, very badly, and the DPRK to have secretly disguised itself as Greece, and taken all the loan money from the EU and funneled it strictly into building a time machine to go back and undo everything that happened about 1985-present before the DPRK would be a serious threat again.
  20. Not a lot actually. There's a map out there somewhere showing the range rings, but there's only a small part of the DPRK artillery can fire from and reasonably hit a part of Seoul, but it's mostly the outskirts. TBMs like Scuds would still be a problem, but the sea of fire thing is mostly a myth. It'd be some bad mojo, but not quite catastrophic unless there's tanks in the streets.
  21. There's actually a lot of evidence that the average DPRK citizen knows things are pretty jacked up/the ROK is actually the better place by far, just their ability to act on that information is about nil.
  22. Won't look so nice after they've had to go block to block against the ROK. We're talking hightech Stalingrad with chemical weapons tossed in if that all goes down.
  23. There's no T-72s in number to wonder about. The DPRK is rumored to have maybe a company of them bought to steal ideas from, but the actual main tanks of the DPRK are all T-62 derivatives or T-55/Type 69 based. It does get weird trying to figure out just what the various DPRK tanks are actually capable of. It's doubtful to be good....but there's a wide range between "useless" and "less useless." This is a bit of a skewed understanding of defending the ROK. A lot has changed since 1950. The main fighting of the war on the ground would be by the ROK itself, with the US military ground forces being an interesting footnote to be honest. One Brigade doesn't mean as much when you're talking about working alongside a very large modern army. In terms of the US: 1-2 ABCT is going away, and is being turned into a rotational position (under the new ABCT MTOE). There's also an ABCT or so worth of prepo gear so flying in another ABCT, or making good some pretty serious losses is a go. 101 and 82nd IBCT type units would beat 25th ID to Korea, followed by 25th ID, and then likely 1st CAV's ship lifted units. The Marines would show up when the Marines showed up, but give decent odds they'd be held in reserves for something like supporting a ROK seaborne attack. The threat may be overstated. I won't say much more because maybe classified? I'll imply heavily the actual capabilities, especially in terms of insertion do not match up with realities. Re: Invasion The most likely scenario I saw was a limited DPRK attack to take Seoul as sort of an attempt at the largest hostage standoff in all time in order to secure concessions or forestall a DPRK total collapse. Most of the Chinese stuff seemed to revolve around to the degree the Chinese would cooperate with a ROK attack across the DMZ.
  24. Re: tank to infantry cost Think of it like this. How many boxes of cereal can you buy for how much money you spend on gas? Likely more than a few. However it doesn't help if you need to drive your car to work if you've got more breakfast cereal. This isn't an RTS in which units are balanced that the combat power of 300 dollars of tank=3 100 dollar infantrymen, they're very different tools for different jobs. The tank is just a very expensive tool per unit, but it does things flatly no infantryman can do. 1. Find low ground or concealment 2. Hey look, you just killed your way through the enemy front line. Why stop here when there's delicious logistics and support units awaiting you behind the next terrain feature?
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