Bulletpoint

It will, but at a very low rate of fire. Way too low for a semi-automatic weapon IMHO. At medium ranges, both StG44 and Garands should be able to fire off quite rapid aimed shots, but it's either full auto or very slow aiming for both of them.

I know she is on Ukraine's side, but that doesn't mean what she's saying is necessarily true. Disinformation can come from anywhere...

I think this woman posts disinformation generally.. If I remember, she was also the one spreading rumours of Russians using chemical weapons recently? In this case, no other news outlet is saying anything about Russia notifying the UN about imposing martial law. The only thing I could find is this article from TASS, saying "Amendments are expected to be made to Article 22 of the Law on Martial Law and Article 37 of the Law on the State of Emergency. The content of the amendments has not yet been published, but it may be related to the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe." https://tass.ru/politika/18467253 So not much to go by at the moment.

I still don't understand why the US seems so stingy with these things. 31 older variant vehicles? While they're sitting on a stockpile of around 6000 Abrams in total? I understand that it's not just the tanks, it also needs supplies, technicians, etc. but that goes for Challenger tanks and Leopards, too. Is there at least a roadmap to ramp up shipments ?

I think the issue is that SMGs in general are much more effective at longer ranges in this game than they should be. This has been tested out extensively. SMG lethality even increases at the end of their range, instead of dropping off very sharply as one might expect.

As I see it, there's only a problem when the tank that is getting fired on already had a spot on the enemy tank before, or at least has a contact marker for it. In those cases, I think they would quite easily pinpoint the source of the enemy fire. They'd already be looking at the right general location. But for WW2 tanks that have no idea where the enemy might be in the vast landscape in front of them - I think it's very realistic that they could get hit multiple times and have no idea where it is coming from.

Been there, done that. Back in 2007, a Danish artist paid each person in an African village a pig to change their names. The pig is a gift from a Danish artist. In return, George Sabadu changed his last name to Hornsleth -- after Kristian von Hornsleth, the artist who gave him the pig. Hornsleth, who on his Web site sometimes spells his name Horn$leth, says the scheme -- offering villagers here aid in the form of a pig or goat if they take on his name -- is a commentary on the hypocrisies of society. Its slogan: “We want to help you, but we want to own you.” https://www.reuters.com/article/uganda-hornsleth-idUKNOA14640720061211

I was thinking more along the lines of the as-yet uncommitted brigades. Throwing them into the south might simply not be worth it - instead they could go towards Bakhmut, which as far as I know is much less entrenched in massive minefields. And while there have been some gains there, it's not exactly fast progress. Whatever they decide, I think time is of the essence. If they wait a couple of months before shifting their focus away from the south, that means getting into the autumn rains. Not sure if continuing the offensive would be feasible during autumn and winter.

I'm no military man, so I wasn't going to comment, but since you didn't get many replies to this one, why not. From my very limited perspective, I think that at this point, it might be worth abandoning the original goal of penetrating to Azov, which would have been a real military success, and instead go all in on retaking Bakhmut. This would be meaningless militarily but it would have a lot of symbolic and political value. As I see it, Ukraine's biggest problem right now is that if no real progress is made on the ground before autumn, Western backers (political leaders and voters) might start to conclude that the war is unwinnable. The end goal then shifts and the overall strategy changes. Fewer weapons and supplies are sent. Political pressure ramps up for negotiations. And a Ukrainian defeat could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. So, better a smaller attainable victory now than grinding on to gain a bigger but not realistic victory. Please note that I am not saying the offensive is definitely lost at the moment. There's a lot we don't know. Hopefully things look better from Zaluzhny's desk than from mine.

While we're waiting for news of more Ukrainian advances, I've been thinking a bit about the drone attacks on Moscow. There have been several, but with very few civilian casualties. Russia tries to spin this as the result of good air defence, but I'm getting the impression that these attacks are in fact intended to be largely symbolical. They are intended to make people in Russia afraid (and realise that they are engaged in a war that also has consequences for them), but at the same time actively avoiding mass casualties, because those would be bad for Western goodwill. Imagine the propaganda win for Russia if one of those Ukrainian drones hit a school or similar. Even though the Russians are of course doing the exact same thing on a much bigge scale against Ukraine.

I'm not seeing them advancing 1 km a day though. Maybe 1 km on a good day, and then 1-2 weeks until next good day.

I'm not German, but maybe "Kampflust"? Or one of my favourite German words: "Fuchsteufelswild" - 'mad as hell, furious' Probably one of these guys would give a better answer: @Butschi @StieliAlpha @poesel

I think they drop most of the mines by MLRS...

They don't exactly look like mutiny prisoners thrown into a cellar to me.

You do not have a corrupt file.

Probably more in the kind of AI generator you use. The good ones cost money to use. Try going back to the free generators Bjorn posted at the top and see if you can prompt anything good out of them

What do you think happened when suddenly the captured prisoners were blurred out? At 10:36

I saw this on Denis Davydov's channel, and wondered what kind of shell could make this damage. Doesn't seem like HEAT or rod penetrator.. was it HE maybe?

I'm a bit puzzled about how you got that out of my post.

I agree with your argument here, but I just want to add a couple more points: 1: Cancer largely kills older people, while left behind cluster munitions often kill curious children. So a direct comparison is not really showing the true humanitarian cost. Disclaimer: Yes I know that it would be better for everyone if this war could be stopped as fast as possible. 2: Even if the intention is to only fire cluster munitions at areas already contaminated with land mines, in reality they will also be used elsewhere. Especially since they are much more effective once Russians leave their trenches and advance over open ground. 3: I think it's unlikely that detailed records of each cluster strike location will be made and kept in the heat of battle. 4: Ukraine is likely expecting that the cost of demining the cluster UXOs will be rolled into the rebuilding aid packages they will almost certainly receive after the war. So the cost/benefit calculation assumes someone else will pay the costs. Always an attractive proposition.

In theory, I agree with everything you say. In practice though, we're not seeing the front line move very much. And if trenches are death traps, then why are Ukraininians also digging them? I don't think I am the only one who was very surprised to see the re-emergence of trench warfare on this scale.

Yes, it all depends on what's going on behind the scenes. I can only speculate. But I still wonder if Russia would be able to take such serious losses without the frontline moving more than it does. Also, I wonder if most of Russian losses are nothing but cheap and expendable manpower. It is probably much cheaper to replace a Russian soldier than to eliminate him. And I think Russia might have mobilised many more troops than the official numbers indicate. Again, just speculation. But based on the only thing we can be reasonably sure of: The frontlines have not moved very much for a month now.

It's now been one month since the counteroffensive began. Gains have been extremely limited so far. Hoping to see it speed up soon. For all we have heard of Russian incompetence, the proof in the pudding is that the frontline is not moving very much. I've gone from "the counteroffensive won't win the war but it will be very succesful" to "there's now a real risk of this war ending in a stalemate".

Source? Closest I can find is that the Red Cross (not HRW) called the war a "non-international armed conflict" in 2014, which was then translated into "civil war" by TASS news Agency, which is a propaganda mouthpiece of the Russian state.