DreDay

Steve, while I generally agree with your points here. I would be curious to know whom you consider to be the credible historians on this subject matter (as someone who had done a ton of valuable research for CM: Afghanistan)... Again, I am not challenging you on this, just curious what sources you had used...

I would like to add my few personal notes in reagrds to this topic, if I may... I have been following Colonel Cassad (amongst other Russian and Ukranian observers) for quite a while. He is a very intelligent and well informed analyst, but a military expert he is not. He has also never made any effort to hide his pro-Russian (anti-Maidan) agenda, so there is no need to call him out on that. He does have very close ties to anti-Kiev forces in Donbass and Russia proper; so his reporting is definitely notable. When talking about GRU Spetsnaz, he is refering to DNR GRU (Russian abbreviation for Chief Intelligence Directorate) units; as opposed to Russian spec ops operatives. DNR GRU was created by Colonel Petrovski (aka "callsign Gloomy") who was a Chief of Intelligence for 22nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade prior to his retirement. He also happens to be a Donetsk native (going back for multiple generations); so he is not exactly an outsider to this conflict. It is very hard to tell how much of the DNR GRU Spetsnaz are Donabass natives vs. how many are Russian nationals... However, there is absolutely no evidence (that I have seen) to suggest that the rebels are Russian troops in most cases. There are some Russian troops there for sure (Cassad would refer to them as "vacationers" or "north wind"); but their size and their role in this winter offensive is highly debatable.

You are absolutely correct, but those are subtle difference that might mean a lot to you and I based on our exposure to operational lingo; but I am not so sure that most laymen would understand or appreciate the difference. Either way it does not look good for the Ukranian government and General Staff if you ask me… Again, I generally agree; even though we still don’t know the actual numbers of ZSU losses in their retreat from Debaltseve (or their efforts to break through to it), they do not appear to be as bad as what they had suffered at Ilovaisk… But I hope that ZSU command does not use that as a measuring point. Ilovaisk was a complete disaster, so not suffering quite is much as not necessarily something to be particularly proud of. So far we have seen minimum repercussions for Russia that can be tied to the capture of Derebalseve; yet the cost to the Ukrainian side both in human lives, morale, and prestige is quite sizable as we have been discussing it for a past couple of days. My personal take is that Poroshenko had actually trusted his troops to be able to hold Derebaltseve, at least until the Russian regulars had shown up (a-la Illovaisk); but his hopes were in vain. Again, that is my personal guess and I might very well be mistaken.

Of course, any first-person accounts are highly slanted and cannot be used as a sole (or even primary source of evidence). Yet they are still very relevant (especially in this case where we have no independent reporting from either side)… and many of those reports tell a story of a bloody and disorganized retreat. There are also quite a few videos of roads lined with destroyed Ukrainian (and some rebel) hardware and dead Ukrainian soldiers (it’s quite possible that there were dead rebels there as well, but their bodies would have been retrieved before the filming) which seem to indicate that ZSU escape was far from well-executed. That kind of evidence simply can not be ignored. Sorry Steve, old habits die hard… I only mean it as a sign of respect. Yeah, no doubt about it. There is no easy way to gauge rebel losses and Russian losses (however few) are almost impossible to confirm. I’ll have to go back and to re-examine Porshenko’s statements and Ukrainian news coverage post Minsk-2. My recollection is that he had claimed that Debalseve would remain under Ukranian control, but I might very well be mistaken.

My Russian is not stellar, but I believe that it says "Novorussia" on top and "Kupol" (Parachute Canopy) at the bottom. I don't know if there is any particular unit associated with it (obviously the rebels don’t have an Air force, so they would not have any paras either). It might just be a privately purchased patch like those "Polite People" patches with a Russian Soldier and a cat that seem to be so popular with the pro-Russian fighters... Perhaps the native Russian board members can correct me on that?

Thank you for your reply sir. I find it very informative and your analysis is very prudent and rational. BTW, (and I don't want to turn this into a love-fest) but your mastery of English language is terrific as well! But back on topic - it is very interesting to see how other major “non-aligned” countries approach the issue of US/EU/Russia/China relations. Unfortunately we get very little exposure or even acknowledgement of such dynamics over here. I love my country but I don't particularly care for our eagerness to speak of the "free world" that we supposedly represent.

Oh I completely agree. The only relevant game that comes to my mind is The Operational Art of War that is hopelessly outdated at this point. I would love to see a modern reincarnation of it; but I still fear that you and I will be in a very small pool of die-hard wargamers that enjoy that kind of stuff; evern when compared with the CM seriesl; so I don't know how commercially viable such a project would be... I would love to be proven wrong on that though!

Michael, please don't take this the wrong way; but you are stating the obvious. It is better to be healthy and rich than sick and poor - we all know that and there is no need to dwell on it. Yes, all the best training and morale and initiative would not help you if your weaponry is incapable of hurting the enemy (as was the case with Japanese Imperial Army AT artillery and armored forces). There is no need to take it to such extreme. That was not my point, and there is no need to debate it based on such assumprtion.

Yes indeed, there was no real fighting in Gori or Poti, largerly due to the rapid Russian advance of VDV spearheads that had precluded the Georgians from organizing their defensive perimeter. There was some fighting in Tzhinvali, but most of it was done by local defenders who were eventually joined by Russian elements of the two MRR regiments that you had mentioned. However the BTG from 76th VDV division did "fight" their way to Gori (overrunning several supply points, scattering retreating Georgian units, and destroying an AT battery that was guarding a key entrance to the city) - the fact that they were chosen for such role and had performed it successfully (eliminating the need for costly urban combat) speaks to my original argument. Successful maneuver and decisive advances are more important in operation art than the actual battles (that you want to keep to a minimum). That is not something that's well reflected in wargames (as it is not particularly fun to play with), but real-life operational art is based on those principles.

Please note that I had placed training (which certainly includes tactical skill) on pretty much the same level as high morale and initiative; so I am not exactly sure what you are taking issue with here...

My bad. I do happen to love Argentina, it was actually our honeymoon destination and (for all my other travels) it was still an experience of a lifetime. To keep it on topic - one of the many things that had impressed me about the Argentinians was how politically savvy and worldly they are... Just out of curiosity - I know that your political establishment and especially your president are not exactly pro-American (to put it mildly). I also know that the Russians (including Putin himself) have made many overtures to them lately that seemed to be well received... so what is your local coverage of Ukraine like?

You definitely have some knowledge of this, I did not mean to suggest otherwise; but I am afraid that you are missing the point of our discussion. The two MRR BTGs that you focus on went into South Ossetian friendly territory first because they were stationed localy (right across the border) and they were designated as first responders. If you really want to get into the specifics of it - they were completely outgunned by the Georgian forces for the first couple days... but that is besides the point... I was referring to the Russian advance into Georgia proper from South Ossetia and Abkhazia that was spearheaded by "light" but highly trained and motivated VDV units that were rushed to the battle zone ahead of other "heavier" formations...

Well, as you don't follow the Ukrainian political scene (which is perfectly understandable), you are simply not aware of how a "Political Fallout" works in Ukraine... let me just say that it is very different from what we would expect in our country (I am assuming that you are an American, please forgive me if I am wrong). But yeah, their government and military is going to move on to other things (as will the rebels) and the war will unfortunately go on for even longer... Many local experts on both sides predict the next spike up in violence to happen in late March or early April.

Fair enough sir. I will be the first one to admit that 1st Marine Division opps in 2003 is not my area of expertise. Unfortunately most of my knowledge of it is based on Generation Kill (the book) and some AAR reports that I was able to access relating to it; so I simply don’t know enough about this subject matter to contest your points and I will gladly accept them. Now the war of 8.8.8 is something that I am a little more comfortable discussing… I am glad that you have read The Tanks of August, which is a good (although a bit disjointed) account of that conflict. But I am sorry to say, with all due respect, that you simply don’t have any clue about what you are trying to debate here. The first two units to cross the Roki tunnel were in fact the BTGs from 693rd and 135th MRRs as those local units were designated as an RDF for South Ossetia. Their mission was to join the friendly South Ossetian defense forces in Java and then to rescue the trapped Russian peacekeepers in Tzhinvali. However, by the time that Tzhinvali was cleared and Russian command had issued orders to push into Georgia proper - their spearhead was made up of the BTG from the 76th VDV division (that was flow-in and rushed to the front ahead of other arriving units). This BTG eventually became separated from the 693rd MRR, but yet they had pushed on to Gori and took the key strategic positions around it while destroying Georgian units that stood in their way. Only at that point was Gori abandoned by the Georgian forces despite massive amounts of heavy weaponry that was stored there. As for Poti – it was far from undefended. It (along with Senaki) was protected by an entire infantry brigade, not to mention smaller army and navy units stationed there… Yet they all ran at a site of single Russian BTG from (as I recall) 7th VDV Division (along with supporting 45th VDV Spetsnaz units) despite Georgian absolute superiority in manpower and heavy weaponry. As I’ve said - wars are won by initiative, skill, bravery, valor, and superior weaponry (in about that order).

On top of that, some of VDV units (i.e. 7th and 76th Divisions are actually Air-Assult capable as well); so they might also be used as a tactical force to capture improtant objectives in heli-borne assaults.

Oh wow, really? You don't say, Captan... well guess what - they didn't stop and they had performed their objectives quicker and "cleaner" than a heavier force that would have been expected to perfom the spearhead role under a more conventinal doctrine. That was exactly the plan of their operational command and it had worked out perfectly. Nothing in war is absolute.. it is all relative. And in this case the relative "human factor" advantage of Marine Recon units was more improtant than the absolute armor thinkness or gun size of their opponents...

Right, I get what you're saying, but that is precisely what a spearhead force is supposed to do. They had not only "probed" enemy defenses, but actually assaulted and captured major objectives... basically fighting "rather than scouting" their way to Baghdad. Of course this trick would not fly against a more competent opponent, but they were exactly the right force to use in 2003 as a spearhead due to their high level of initiative, training, and morale when facing an enemy that was lacking those key traits... In the same vein, Russians had used their VDV BTGs as spearheads in the war of 8.8.8 during their advances on Gori and Poti. Whatever those units were lacking in durability and firepower, they more than made up in morale, initiative, and training... and again their enemies were just not good enough to capitalize on the weaknesses of such light spearheads.

I am sorry, I am not sure what you mean by this. Can you please elaborate?

I don't get why have even considered being oblique about it. Your point is completely valid. Airborne drops are extremely dangerous now (compared to WW2) due to high sophistication and dense coverage of SAM systems (not to mention enemy AF). Yet there is still a role for them - mainly as a rapid deployment force to third world countries that don't have sophisticated AD net; or as a follow-on to comprehensive SEAD/Jammer assulat on enemy AD network (whcih is very hard to do, but is certainly feasable and viable).

In theory, dropping a VDV regiment somewhere between Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov could have huge strategic impact, as the roadways connecting those two regions are responsible for majority of Ukrainian industrial transportation and are fairly lightly guarded. But in practice, if the Russians were to invade (which I don't see happening for now); VDV would probably be used as a spearhead force for their advancing formations due to their high training, morale, and initiative. Much the same way that 1st USMC Recon Battalion was used as a preached for US invasion of Iraq.

In theory, that would certainly be the case; but things get much less "black and white" when you don't have a clear command structure and your communications are disrupted. At that point every commander is out for himself (and his men)...

Oh sure, I did not intend to dishonor the memory Ukrainian soldiers that gave their lives in that battle by any means. My only point was that the control of Shakhtersk was not nearly as contested as you seemed to imply; but rather it was decided in the opening rounds of the battle due to the unfortunate tactical choices made by the 25th VDV brigade. I agree. And I would also like to add that apperantly there were a couple of Russian (not sure if organic or improvised) BTGs clearing the routes around Snezhoye at the same time. Again, I agree with you 100% here.

It might be new to you sir due to a lack of good English language source on this, but it has been a known claim by Ukrainian survivors for quite a while. I would like to respectfully caution you from making such strong definite statements on a very conspicuous and secretive conreversial subject matter. Strelkov (or Girkin if you prefer) had entered Salvyansk with about 50-60 fighters. About half of them were Russian nationals, while the rest were either Crimeans or anti-Maidan activist from other regions in South- East Ukraine. The major reason for his choice of Slavyansk (according to Strelkov himself) was the fact that there was already a very strong separatist network there that was ready supports them. As he had built up his forces there, they were joined by both Russian (National) volunteers and local supporters. I have no idea what the actual break down of one vs the other was, but it is significant to note that his retreat convoys from Slavyansk had included hundreds of families of local fighters… so they were far from just a foreign invasion force. Ummm, yeah… Common John… last thing that I want is to sound condescending to you, but we are talking the basics of seperatists vs. federal forces struggle here. That paradigm has been played out a million times over already and the conflict in Donbass is not that different (if not for the involvement of major world powers in it) I mostly agree, except for two (perhaps minor) point. A) You have absolutely no authority to deny this being a civil war with 100% conviction. I can see why you will question it, but that’s as far as I am willing to let you get away with it. Please don’t take it the wrong way, but I find those kinds of statements beneath your well deserved reputation for thoughtful analysis Rebels efforts to take control of Debltseve had started during this “winter offensive” (i.e. mid Jan) – I have no idea where you get the 5+ month figure from. 100%. No disagreement here sir. I understand what you’re saying, but I am not sure where you are getting the 5 month figure from, nor do I understand why you are so eager to give the Ukranians the credit for skillful withal. To be quite honest, the disparity in manpower and firepower between the ZSU and the rebels is so one-sided (even with all the Russian support), that I consider any major battle loss to be humiliating for the Ukrainian side… Well yeah, that’s pretty much implicit; although I do not except the simple notion that Russian forces are involved in fighting whenever the ZSU faces stiff opposition… of course I don’t dispute certain level of Russian involvement either… No arguments here sir. Perhaps, the only thing that I will add to this is that Ukranian political (more so than military) command had underestimated Russian resolve to get involved in clearing out their border with Donbass at the time that Sector D was created.

Again please discard. Sorry for the confusion.