Koenig

Sorry, I missed that a refinement of the air system is being considered for further developments. I hope it will. Koenig

In a battle against fortified positions it would be normal having massive minefields. Normally engineers had to provide safe corridors before any advance could be undertaken. This could even take a few hours. Are mines/engineers rules adequate to cover this issue? I wonder, as in CM the time of engagements was too short to consider serious mine clearance; in CMC it would make sense, instead.

I thought that later on in ww2 there were many developments between ground commanders and tactical air strike fighters. I seem to remember something about fighters queing up in the air awaiting targeting commands as and when required by ground forces ? Scott </font>

OK, I discovered that if insert disk 1 instead of disk 2 I can reinstall...lol I also discovered that the 1.03 patch, if merely directed to the 'run' folder as suggested will create a 'new folder' in 'Run' and it should not. Just delete the 'new folder' from the path generated by the installer and it will install correctly in 'Run'. I remember this is for the CDV version only. Thank you very much for your help. Koenig

I installed CMAK on a new PC, with XP SP2. After installing 1.03 patch the game would not run. Tried to uninstall, but to no avail, even from the control panel. I manually deleted the CMAK folder and went where I should not go, the registry, and deleted the CDV directory hoping for the best. Nothing else. It did not help. Now even with autorun nothing happens when I insert my CMAK CD. I'm sure autoun is working with other CDs. Setup is not an .exe file (it's labelled as Setup.W02) and if I double click on it I'm told it's impossible to open the file. I can't figure a way to install CMAK. It's a CDV disk and had no problems at all with my old PC running WIN ME. Thank you for any support you can give to me. Koenig

I'm sorry, The Enigma, as the map is well crafted, but there was no action at Mogadishu. After the feeble defense on the Giuba river was overcome, the Italian troops withdrew towards Neghelli and Harar, leaving Mogadishu undefended. There was only a one day delay action at Vittorio d'Africa, some 50 miles from Mogadishu; the small detachment was easily outflanked and overcome. When Vittorio d'Africa fell Mogadishu surrendered and the South Africans rushed to the town without firing a single shot. I wrongly thought the sites you had been directed to would give you this information. Well, you can always design a 'what if' scenario... Regards Koenig

A map of 'where'? Mogadishu? Koenig

The Blackshirts were the remains of the fascist revolution. They were difficult to control and opposed by the Army, which was monarchic. As such in 1940 they had a very limited military value, being poorly trained and under-equipped. The Blackshirts in East Africa were composed by farmers, technicians and civil servants who had come to colonize the new territories of the Fascist Empire. They were the poorest among the poor in Italy, and had come to East Africa with their families as settlers in the search of new eldorado, certainly not to fight a world war. The Blackshirts in EA were a militia meant to be used against local rebels and bandits, and it was largely composed by men in their late thirties or forties, with a family to protect in a hostile environment. A few were fanatic fascists, but the majority just the gave up the fight as soon as the situation became dangerous. The comparison with the German SS could not be more misleading, when we talk about their combat effectiveness. Actually the Blackshirts were among the worst Italian units. There was a notable exception, however: the Regiment 'Giovani Fascisti' (Young Fascists). It was made up of volounteering students of strong fascist faith and fought with distinction in North Africa. the_enigma, should you have specific questions about the East African campaign please ask, I hope I can help. Regards Koenig

Is ownership of CMBB a pre-requisite to enter ROW V? I'd like to enlist, but I just have CMAK. Koenig

I see there is a general incredulity about the option of an Allied airdrop on Rome to cut off the German defenders in the south. This was not an armchair general's fancy, but was a planned operation by the Allied GHQ. As part of the Armistice signed at Cassibile on 3rd September 1943, the Americans agreed to support the Italian withdrawal from the war by dropping the 82nd Airborne Division on Rome. 100 AT guns were to be landed on the coast and ascend the river Tiber to the capital. The Italians were to provide trucks for the entire division, alert to AA defences not to open fire during the airdrop and delimitate the landing areas with lights. The operation was called Giant II. It must be said the Italian were not told when the Armistice was to be divulgated and, subsequently, Giant II take place. They were to be ready when called. It was not the case. Why? Rivers of ink have flowed on the subject. Each of the persons involved has his own personal truth on what happened on those dramatic days. Incredible, bizarre, distasteful, absurd...these are some of the adjectives that come to my mind when I think about it. Explaining the events of September 1943 would take several pages. And even after that many misteries would remain, many contraddictions. Just take the words that Eisenhower had for the Armistice: 'a crooked deal'. He even refused to sign it, demanding the task to Bedell Smith... Let's stick to facts. At 18.00 hrs of 7th September General Taylor secretly lands at Gaeta to prepare Giant II, due the day later, and is transported to Rome in an ambulance. After a series of meetings ranging from farsesque to surreal, at 11.30 hrs of 8th he communicates the signal to stop Giant II because the Italians can not assure the control of the airfields. At 13.00 Eisenhower order to cancel Giant II: 5 hours before the planned take off of the paratroopers!!! You may question the soundness of the plan, but certainly Ike believed in it. You are wrong when you doubt the Italian units would fight Germans. They did it in many places, Rome included. This is an extract from the War Diary of the German 3rd Pz. Gre. division advancing on Rome on 9th September: 'The Italian defence is very skilled, capable of surprise attacks, well camouflaged, with the employment of single tanks. Near Bracciano strong enemy resistance, the village is taken as night approaches. ... Locally we suffered considerable losses.'. What is completely lacking is...command. Well, if only the units had orders to obey, apart from a generic resistance... The King, the Government and all the GHQ flee Rome, leaving the soldiers alone without a guide. So the men of the Ariete, the Granatieri di Sardegna and many other units fight and die...for nothing! It's one of Italy's darkest pages. Eugen Dollman, commander of the SS in Rome, says about the 9th September: 'at 3 a.m. I went to Frascati...where I met General Student: pessimism in the offices was rampant...at 11 Student was very worried: a detachment of paratroopers landed at Monterotondo was in dire straits. Some (Italian) units of Grenadiers and Carabinieri were fighting gallantly. There were rumors about the escape of the royal family and the government, but nobody believed them.... Student, after examining the charts on the table, said that everything was lost if during the night American paratroopers would land...' A missed opportunity. The problem is that on 8th September 1943 the political conditions for the defence of Rome did not exist. But from a military point of view it was feasible. The best, modernly equipped and most loyal units of the Italian Army were placed around Rome. The only exception was the Centauro division, ex Divisione M (Mussolini), equipped and trained by the Germans, which had many fascist elements. In fact this unit did not take part to the fighting around Rome. The responsibilities of the King, Badoglio and the many other major and minor Italian actors of this tragedy are enormous and unforgivable. But...there is a but. If the Allied had trusted the Italian at least a little and had revealed them in advance the date the Armistice was to be made known, probably Giant II would have been undertaken. But this would give the Italians too an important role. I can guess Churchill considered this unacceptable. The Armistice was not only to be an unconditional surrender, it was to be the fall of a ruling class who thought to absolve itself from all its responsibilities of the war blaming it all on Mussolini and the fascists. So it happened, and probably it was right it happened. The Allies certainly did not need Italy's help to win the war. Had they accepted it, however, maybe the thousands of deaths of Cassino and Anzio could have been avoided. And without doubt the landing at Salerno would have been much facilitated. It is not rare to see the reasons of politics to dictate a military campaign, even when these reasons are in contrast with its strict military aspect. The capture of Rome in September 1943 was possible, but at a political price the Allies were not willing to pay. The King and the Italian government made a gamble on this and they lost. And when they had to face the risk of countering the Germans, they were caught unprepared and decided to abandon the country. Anyway the players of this tragedy had the option to try to drive the Germans south of Rome in September 1943. Ike was ready to bet the 82nd Airborne on it. They decided otherwise. Koenig

An important point: the invasion of mainland Italy was a prerequisite of the Italian surrender, according to the armistice clauses. After Mussolini's arrest on 25th July 1943 Germany (rightly) questioned Italy's loyalty. From then on, it was a race with time. The Allied wanted to put Italy out of the war. The Germans wanted to occupy the boot before such a thing happened. A delay would allow the German to seize the peninsula. If I remember well, the armistice of the 8th September was just one day ahead a German ultimatum that pratically cancelled the Italian sovranity and gave the Germans units complete freedom in Italy. The idea of invading Sardina and Corsica was not bad at all, but it should be considered that it was easy to do because the Italian troops had already surrendered. Well, actually they did more than surrender as there were several clashes with their former ally when the Germans tried to seize Italian positions. Invading them before the armistice would require a much more considerable effort. As I already stated, the most effective option would be an American airdrop on Rome on 8th September. Mutual mistrust, misunderstandings and a general incapacity to grasp the political situation by several characters on the Italian side provoked the cancellation of the operation on the eve of the armistice. If successful it would have spared the Allied a long and bloody campaign. But honestly I think that most of the blame for this not to have happened is on the Italian side. Koenig

I think the risk with Stalin was a separate peace with the Germans. Before Kursk it was not seen as completely impossible. After the failure of the offensive the Russians felt strong enough to refuse any compromise. Koenig

And how, how much harder Kesserling's task would be, had the American executed the planned airdrop on Rome immediately after the Italy's armistice, assisted by the Italian army? Here the question is political, not strategic, but in the mix of greed, misunderstanding and incompentence, all dressed with a great dose of cynism that characterized the armisticial negoziations lies the great missed opportunity of the campaign. Koenig

This report seems to indicate two things: 1)Crew losses are affected by the the calibre of the offending gun. This might explain the reason of ligher losses in early war tanks and the discrepancy within AT and tank losses according to the theatre. In the desert war the 88mm 'AT' was king, as most tanks were 50mm Pz III; in Europe the situation was somehow reversed, with tanks armed with 75-88 mm and 50mm AT guns given higher chances by the terrain. 2)Crew losses we see in CMAK are maybe too light. Generally crews escape wrecks with only one casualty, or 20-25%. A solid shell penetrating the crew compartment does nasty things to those inside and often kills or injures more than one man. An explosive shell penetrating can be even worse. Koenig

For tank commanders training would be at the C.A.C. Later the crews would train together at their own unit too. On 12 March 1942 'Centri d'istruzione' (Instruction Centers) were created in North Africa, to teach newcomers the peculiarities of the theatre. A note: Semoventi crews were drawn from the Artillery (Infantry for tanks and Cavalry for light tanks), which in Italy was without doubt of better standard than Infantry. If you plan to use the Semovente 75/18 watch out: 1)Each platoon (battery) was lead by a command tank, armed with a twin 8mm Breda gun INSTEAD of the 75mm. Later tanks had a 13.2 mm MG. This vehicle had better radio and range finding equipment for spotting indirect fire of the battery. The tank was unpopular, as it had to lead the other tanks in combat virtually un-armed and was easily recognizable by the enemy, who would likely target the command semovente. Unfortunately we miss it in CMAK. You could simulate the combat tank by giving it 0 ammo, but were are the MGs? 2)I can't understand why the Italian tanks are denied their AA weapon: it was widely, and in the case of the Semovente I can say universally, used. Early models had a 6.5 mm Breda, which was soon substituted with an 8 mm Breda 38. The weapon was stored inside the tank and fitted to an AA mount when needed. Being supplied by clips instead of belts mounting and dismounting it wasn't a very diffucult operation. 3)In combat zone it was standard practice to protect the Semoventi with addictional steel plates, tracks and sandbags. Crews scavenged the desert wrecks to get what they needed. High echelon commaders forbade this practise as it reduced the already scarce performances and reliability of the vehicles, but the addictional protections magically reappeared as soon as commanders turned the corner. 4)I don't know when the 75mm HEAT round was introduced, but I suspect from the onset. Without doubt after the 21 July 1942, as there is a document of that date quoting its effectiveness on the field. In CM the Semoventi have only a few HEAT rounds. According to Pignato's book 'GLI AUTOVEICOLI DA COMBATTIMENTO DELL'ESERCITO ITALIANO', the reference work on the subject, the Semovente da 75/18 had 1/3 HE, 1/3 AP and 1/3 HEAT rounds. This makes sense, as the Semovente would never be able to achieve its reputation with the ammo set we are given in CMAK. I must add that in combat accounts I never read about the scarsity of Effetto Pronto (HEAT) rounds. On the contrary, it was the standard ammo used against tanks. This is a major question that scenario designers using the Semovente da 75/18 must take into account. Unfortunately in quick battles the problem can't be cured. 5)Ammo for the Semovente da 75/18 is 44-50 rounds, but the crews went into combat with about one hundred rounds, stored on the floor! No, it wasn't written on the manuals, but the room was there and ammo were precious in the desert warfare. It was standard practice. I hope I've been of help. Regards Koenig

Before the war the C.A.C. was at Bracciano; it was transferred to Civitavecchia on 20th June 1941. I must point out that there were several institutions charged of training tank crews, and ad hoc courses were made according to necessity. Needless to say, the system did not work very well... Regards Koenig

Generally speaking I agree, modelling mechanical breakdown is quite out the scope of CM. There is an exception, however. I think of difficult terrain, that stresses the track/suspension system. Rough is impassable in CM, rocky instead poses no problem... Brush could hide a large stone, too. Sometimes the effect of terrain could be devastating on tanks. For instance, during the battle of Gallabat (East Africa, 6 November 1940) the British attack was supported by six cruiser and six light tanks of the Royal Tank Regiment. Even cross-checking several sources I've been not able to ascertain the exact cause of individual losses in this battle. However it is certain that after the attack only one cruiser and two light tanks were in condition to fight, all the others falling victim to mines and breaking their tracks over sharp rocks hidden in high grass. (The Italian defenders also used Boys rifles captured during the invasion of British Somaliland, but their effectiveness in this battle remains unclear). Anyway, according to several sources rocks seem to have been the major issue. I think it could be worth modelling this chance in CM2: tanks don't just get bogged down, they can throw or break a track in difficult terrain. Maybe an ad hoc terrain (heavy rocks?), passable by tanks but with a chance of breakdown, could be the solution. Individual rating of tank reliability (I can think of three classes: high, medium, low) could affect the chance of a breakdown. Regards Koenig

Bidwell in his 'Gunners at War' deals briefly with the question of the employment of the 3.7" gun in the AT role. The lack of a good telescopic sight, being the weapon meant to aim following electrical data from a predictor (an elementary computer) was not seen as an insuperable technical difficulty. The debate was over the opportunity to divert scarce AA resources. The 25-pounder proved to be an effective stop-gap AT-weapon, waiting for the arrival of the 6-pounder. To have any influence in the desert warfare, at least 50-60 guns would have to be converted to the anti-tank role. Plus reserves, as losses among AT-guns were heavy. Crews would have to be trained, but they should mantain they ability to use the gun in AA role. A doctrine for the employment of these guns would have to be developed from scratch. Moreover the Anti-Aircraft Branch of the Royal Artillery had become a highly specialized, somewhat separate service, with a very strong tie to the Royal Air Force. This meant both doctrinal and political difficulties in diverting them from their expected AA role. Unfortunatly the author doesn't quote names and dates of this interesting debate, so the whole argument remains somewhat conjectural and clouded in mistery. Bidwell only writes that General Sir Frederick Pile, chief anti-arcraft gunner in Britain, supported the adoption of the 3.7" as AT gun. It is plausible to believe that the question was not given a high priority. Anyway the 3.7" was given a chance to operate in a pure AT role during Operation Aberdeen, in June 1942. The CO of 2nd R.H.A. was given an unasked troop of four 3.7" to bolster his AT defence. As the position was already crowded with guns, he accepted only two of them and sent the rest back. He was infuriated when he saw them uncamouflaged and surrounded with tables and chairs! It was clear that the crews had no proper training. Anyway the position was not attacked by tanks, and it seems that it was the first and last attempt to use the 3.7" in this role (the 3.7" of Tobruk had previously fired at tanks, but from their AA positions). Bidwell ends the controversy with the following statement: 'Whether the combined commanders-in-chief were right or wrong in deciding against any major reduction of the air defences is a finely-balanced question. The Germans were faced with exactly the same problem and decided differently, and most people agree that they were right.' IMHO the situation was not the same. The Germans had to deal with the menace of the Matilda, which was nearly invulnerable to the guns of their 1941 tanks. The adoption of the 88mm was a necessity. On the other hand, the British 25-pounder, widely and easily available, could dispatch most German tanks until the arrival of the Tiger. The strategic, technical, logistical and doctrinal problems posed by the employment of the 3.7" in AT role were enough to discourage its adoption, considering that it was not a priority. It is clear that the 17-pounder definitively solved the question. Regards Koenig

In East Africa the majority of the Italian Army was made up of colonial troops. On 1st June 1940 there were 74,055 nationals and 181,895 colonials. Talking about large units, there were 2 national divisions and 14 colonial divisions. The absence of Italian colonial troops in CMAK is a major overlook for all those interested in the East African campaign. Colonial troops were employed by Italy in North Africa too, but to a much lesser extent. Best Regards Koenig

This is what my men are saying in my current battle, mostly hammering British light armour with ATRs. Bel colpo! - Nice shot! Bel colpo, è andato! - Nice shot, it's finished! Evvai, preso! - Hurrah, we got it! Distrutto - Destroyed Bersaglio: carro nemico. Spara! - Target: enemy tank. Shoot! Sissignore - Yessir Contatto, fanteria nemica. - Contact, enemy infantry Unità nemica, spara! - Enemy unit, shoot! Carro nemico, fuoco! - Enemy tank, fire! Contatto, unità nemiche. - Contact, enemy units. I hope the tenor of the messages doesn't change, but generally they are more dramatic. :cool: As my adversary is getting close with his infantry, you should hear different comments very soon. Let me know if you want me to continue. Best Regards Koenig

I agree with you Birdstrike. High ground is without doubt a double edged weapon. What specifically concerns me is the fact that infantry fired from above doesn't seem to suffer addictional exposure, as when fired from the flanks. The problem came to my mind after reading accounts of the battle of Keren, where charging up-hill in Rough ground was a nightmare. In CMAK one would just move forward under decent cover... Best Regards Koenig

Is the advantage for firing from higher ground modelled in CMAK? It is clearly so as far as HE is concerned, as direct fire just a little long will go over the ridge without doing any harm. But I have the impression that men firing from high ground to others in a lower position in the same terrain are exactly in the same situation. High ground should work much like being behind a Wall, as units fired from above should generally be more exposed (a little more in Woods or Buildings, much more in Rough). Also, hand grenades range should be greatly affected. I'm concerned by this as I don't see high ground as a major factor of defense in CMAK; actually it is more an invitation to set up a reverse slope defence. With all due respect to the proponents of the latter tactic, attacking higher ground has always been considered a tough job. Koenig

In the scenario editor you can define if vehicles are to be dug in. You can also put them inside sandbag emplacements. Doesn't work for QB's with random maps, of course. </font>

I can spend a few of words on the Italian Autocannoni. First, there were scores of them: many of them were not factory made but local conversions made in North African works. Just to name the most important: -The Fiat works in Tripoli made 7 Autocannoni da 102/35, using naval guns from Tobruk on the Fiat 634 truck, during spring/summer 1941. These weapons proved decisive during the battle of Bir-el-Gobi on 19th November 1941, where they engaged the Crusaders of the 22nd Armoured Brigade from a distance ranging from 1000 to 11000 meters, claiming the destruction of 15 of them. Although very effective against armoured targets, they proved not suitable to the desert warfare, and all the seven were finally lost owing to enemy air action, mechanical troubles and sanding up. -The Autocannoni da 76/30 and 76/40, on Fiat 634 or Lancia 3 RO chassis, were maily used in their intended AA role, even if occasionally they engaged enemy ground forces, as it happened at Bir-el-Gobi. -The most well known Autocannone was the 90/53. The first 30 were on Lancia 3 RO, the other 120 were on Breda 52, but it was the former to see most of the action in Africa. Even if very powerful it was also extremely vulnerable and with bad off-road performances. All the above Autocannoni needed to be prepared in order to fire, or serious damage to the chassis was probable. In the case of the 102/35 and the 90/53 damage after prolonged fire occurred even if the gun was properly emplaced! I don't know the time necessary in order to put them on battery, but certainly several seconds, if not a few minutes, were needed. In the case of the 90/53, there were 6 arms to be lowered, four fixed and two mobile to be rotated with a key. They all needed a jack to be lowered, and two knives per arm had to be driven into the ground. Two platforms had then to be lowered, after that the crew had a circular space to aim and load the gun. THEN the gun could be fired, unless you wanted to lock the rear elastic suspension, which allowed the arms not to raise by 3 cm when firing. It was considerd useful but not indispensable and it needed a hook to be locked to the leaf springs before the arms were lowered. Clearly the hook had to be unlocked before movement was resumed... That is: those large Autocannoni could not fire and move, and I seriously doubt they could even deploy under enemy fire. Their normal use was AA, and when they fought ground forces generally did it from prepared positions. Let's not forget that their 2WD chassis had poor off-road performances. Other Autocannoni were different. The Breda 20mm, the 47/32, the 65/17 and the 75/27, just to name a few, were fitted to a quantity of vehicles, including war-prizes; they all could fire without preparation, and most of them had a 360° mounting. Expecially effective was the 100/17 on the Lancia 3 RO, which was monted on an M13/40 tank turret ring and could fire deadly HEAT rounds. This complex was not as mastodontic as the 90/53 and could be effectively fired without preparation. An extract from field trials in North Africa: 'Trials were executed both with direct and indirect fire, at short, medium and long range, firing with different angles respect to the simmetry of the vehicle. The recoil of the vehicle was very small, and even less if simple wedge-brakes were put under the tyres. Because of the recoil, aiming was to be rectified after each shot and the rate of fire was slightly less than normally allowed; anyway 5-6 rounds per minute could be atteined with good results. Dispersion was not sensibly superior to the normal.' Being ligher than the 90/53, the 100/17 Lancia 3 RO off-road performances were considered satisfactory, even if on sand the lack of four wheel-drive was a handicap. The Autocannoni proved valuable support weapons in North Africa, however it should be understood that: - many of them were intended for AA duties - their normal use was long range direct or indirect artillery fire. They were remakably flexible in this role as they could move and deploy hastily according to the needs of the moment. -in the instances they were employed in a Combat Mission-like scenario, they should benefit of the protection of a prepared position with a long range field of view, or they would probaly retire from the field as they were obviously not intended to engage the enemy at close quarter. -In any offensive battle they should be represented by artilley support of the relative caliber. Talking about CMAK, the 75 and 90 mm are not realistic as they can fire and move at will. They should be limited to scenarios where they fire from prepared positions. Even so, I don't think they are realistically featured as the chassis would be nearly impossible to hit in those conditions, and even if it's the case, that would not prejudice the ability of the gun to fire: the Autocannone should be very similiar to any emplaced large gun. And in CMAK the Autocannoni can not be dug in like they were in reality. Smaller Autocannoni are better, but is should be remembered that if they are in a Combat Mission situation they are probably in the wrong place at the wrong time! Unless the map is very, very large...they were unlikely to fight at MG's range. A very important observation: small arms fire hitting an Autocannone should often just immobilize it, not destroy it as it does now. Destruction would generally happen only if it was set on fire. Many Autocannoni had a shield that protected the crew, so they should be close to not-emplaced AT guns. Others had no shield and without doubt the crew was likely to panic and abandon the weapon under heavy small arms fire. In conclusion Autocannoni in CMAK are very badly represented and, as they are now, far from reality. A final note: the above survey on the Italian Autocannoni is only superficial and well far from being exhaustive; any way their definitive history is probably yet to be written. Regards, Koenig

About the availabilty of infantry AT weapons in the Italian Army I'd like to point out this thread: Italian tank hunters Regards Koenig