Mr. Tittles

I am not a veteran of WWII combat nor any other conflict but I am a former soldier. People should know that C&C is just that. And it rolls downhill. The placing of orders at the squad level in CM should not be taken as the individual squad units decisions (usually). Especially when talking about movement. A squad would not displace without orders to do so in most situations. Platoons in WWII may be the smallest unit in the infantry side of the game that could be in radio contact with higher ups. That is why I am abstracting about the 'platoon' HQ sphere of influence.

I again mention that these TD wonder boys may have had access to HVAP ammunition that many tankers would not. A sherman 75mm may not 'do it' because he does not shoot a 76mm gun. A sherman 76mm may not 'do it' because he may not have the HVAP rounds the TD guys have. The Tankers were trained in offensive operations and had been conducting offensive operations typically right up to the Bulge battles. So they were not 'trained' in hanging back and skulking about which is what the TDs did. [ October 22, 2004, 05:15 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

The silly TD command envisioned some 220 battalions of TDs needed. Of course, this was just more waste and the training center cranked out many TD guys that ended up in tanks! So if they were such hot shots, they got to prove it in a sherman 76mm perhaps. The 76mm sherman had power traverse unlike the M10. I think Harry should read the report to Eisenhower regarding US equipment vs German equipment. US armor and TDs did not have the guns or floatation to fight in open tarrain. The US gunnery FM certainly shows that US tanks had AFV as targets. What exactly does 'trained to kill tanks mean'? I doubt that many of the late war towed units that were field converted to M18 or M36 were super Tank Killers themselves.

What you are describing is a planned move to contact. Once the shooting starts and the enemy reacts, most of what you are saying goes out the window. I see your point and you are describing the first turn of a game (which could be exempt from much of what I am proposing). Just as there is no artillery delay on first turns, there should be no orders delay IMO. But you are describing a drill not initiative. Anyone in the service knows the cover by bounding moves. Two men can do it, two squads can do it. Even companies. But the main thing that you are describing and where the game diverges is the one minute game turn parameter. IRL there is no such thing. The drill of allowing one squad to move forward and wave the next forward does not exist within the game unless you wait for one turn increment. You have to 'see' what the first bounder 'sees' before you can 'wave' the next bounder forward. The 'command-resolution' of one minute turns is a major game design decision. Its impact on the game is not discussed as much as spotting but it is a major part of the game abstraction. A player can command orders past the one minute time limit. He can also edit those orders in the next turn. The game is full of abstractions. It is also limited by what can be modeled or abstracted due to computer limitations. The problem with using IRL as an example is that it is nice to model/abstract things as close to IRL but not always doable. My idea is an abstraction that limits the omnicontrol an attacking player has which is very unrealistic. [ October 22, 2004, 02:52 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

I always thought that the amount of commands issued should have an effect on the delay element. The thought being, delays are not given till the total commands are issued. This is now done at the individual unit level but might model the situation better at the HQ level. So a commander who issues many commands is simulating an extreme amount of planning/coordination. This comes at a price in the amount of time it takes to get everyone on the same page. As a simple example; Platoon is selected (double-click on HQ unit to highlight all his sub0ords) and only one squad under his command is given these orders.. 1. split squad 2. half squad with MG gets a pause and advance order as well as a area fire at a close building 3. other half squad gets an assault to adjacent building (both halfs will end the 'attack' in same building). 4. 2 other squads in platoon get fire commands/arcs but no movement orders. This simple manuver could get delays that are presently modeled in CM now. This further example... 1. split squad and each half is given multiple movement commands (run, advance, sneak, etc) 2. Another squad is given a target and also several movement orders with pause, etc. 3. Remaining squad and HQ also get fire commands and pauses and movement orders and the HQ is also directing a 60mm mortar Here we see quite a burden of command AND action on this overachieving HQ unit. The delays for this type of busybody and his poor platoon members should be substantially greatre than the example above. Even extending into the next turn. The player would not know the delays till after he had completed the platoon (or actually the HQ controlled elements) commands. A super realistic element would be that there are no 'take-backs'. That is, just like chess, once you touch it, you cant reverse it. This stops those very long intricate turns. [ October 22, 2004, 10:32 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Abrams certainly drilled his tankers to fight tanks (and insisted on TC unbuttoning in most situations). It would depend on the command and if the Tankers were part of a Armored division or a independant tank battalion, etc. Terrain and circumstances weigh heavily on this. I dont buy into the Tank Killer theory if all the docs are from close in terrain and foul weather, etc.

Can Mr. Yeide show any docs that prove that TDs were any better than Tanks at 'Tank Killing'?

Many of the photos of the tanks/TD firing demonstrate the amount of smoke/flash that US weapons had.

The TD policy was largely slapped down and the rewrite of the FM reflected this in the later war years. The decision to go with half towed TD further weakened the TD org and showed just how out of touch the whole US policy was. This is because other nations WERE going for some form of SP AT assets. By the time the US finally got its head out of its assets, it was converting towed TDs to M18s and M36 on the fly with little or no real training (especially no commando training).

The prewar exercises had the tanks needing to crush the antitank guns to get a victory and the antitank guns just needed to fire to score a kill. It was like kids playing at war. I think the British approach was a better use of M10. If the US had given each infantry division a TD battalion consisting of half towed 76mm and half M10 as an integral part of the division, it would have given them much better antiarmor protection. If the towed 76mm could have been hauled around by turretless M5 tanks, then a reasonable offense could be undertaken by the infantry divisions also. The armored formations should have used just M18 and M36 combinations. I do not think a 30 ton M10 added that much to the armored formations. [ October 20, 2004, 03:58 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

In Seek, Strike and Destroy: U.S. Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, its very clear that the the US 'proved' its TD theory in silly wargames that had nothing to do with battlefield realities even at that time they were proved. German 'blitzing' in the desert was not a fleet of massed AFV sprinting about. They used slow methodical combined arms attacks that was covered by long range antitank fire themselves. They exploited situations by applying fire superiority. In the report to Eisenhower at the end of WWII regarding US and German equipment, its very clear that in situations where terrain dictates long range fire and vehicle flotation, US equipment was badly out classed.

The 76mm gun in most US TDs was not effective against German heavy armor unless they had HVAP (and even then was marginal). This ammo was very rare in tank units but the TDs may have had some more than tankers. The US 90mm gun was the most effective gun using conventional ammo but was still outgunned and out-shot (low rate of fire) by turreted tanks and German SP. This gun may not have had HVAP till very late in the war also. The M36 did have power traverse though and was probably the most successful TD solely due to its gun. I find the whole commando aspect sort of funny and while the early training may have emphasised such heroics, in battle a bailed out TD crew would be more concerned with applying first aid and evacuating the area. Supposedly the British had M10s in the infantry divisions as part of the AT regt. This gave a mobile response force to help the stationary 17 pdr and 6 pdr guns. [ October 19, 2004, 12:38 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Its funny that US tanks had the gyro stabilizer and the TDs didnt. For a group of commando trained tank killers, that sought to Seek, Strike and Destroy, they didnt have the equipment. The US M10 TD did not even have power traverse! I corresponded with a towed 76mm TD soldier and he sent me his memoirs (rough draft). They were hardly commandos. They often fired indirect missions and even had ammo with different charges for indirect fire. Some of these defensive towed units were converted late in the war to M18 Hellcats. It would be good to know if the TD units had first dibs on special ammo like the HVAP.

Mortars drop at extremely steep angles. Artillery does not and strikes top armor (even when thin) at a disadvatagous angle. Artillery does come in at higher velocitys (typically). Again, fuzes would play in.

For company sized engagements, the present system is a good combo of realism and fun (but more fun than real). I was thinking of the following for Tank/Infantry combined arms engagements: For large scenarios with both large amounts of infantry and armor (on one side), the player elects to be either the Tank commander or the Infantry commander. If he/she is a tank commander, then playing the tank/afv units is the same as it is now but the playing of the infantry elements is at a platoon orders level. Platoon orders (for the infantry 'non-command')would be slightly macro managing in that tedious commands would not be given to each element of the platoon. The TACAI would handle how the platoon would use its resources (READ: Improve TACAI first!). Information such as delays and individual strength of each friendly infantry element is not known to the armor commander (who is actually the overall force commander of course). He is slightly fogged out of what is actually going on on the infantry side. Artillery elements near the TC could be directy commanded but those near infantry elements would be TACAI. [ October 18, 2004, 03:08 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Did they finish the Aussie CMAK for the DOD?

This relys almost entirely on fuze setting. An instantaneous fuze would detonate the HE on the outside of the roof and the blast alone would have to cave in the roof (unlikely for most roofed afvs). On delay, for larger diametr/mass mortar bombs, there might be a chance of velocity making some penetration before the HE detonates. Mortar shells are very thin walled and it would take a rather large mortar bomb with considerable velocity to penetrate most afv roofs. The panther had a thin roof and perhaps something like a soviet 120mm set on delay could punch a hole before detonating. [ October 18, 2004, 12:06 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Depends on fuze setting. 81mm with a delayed fuze setting would KO most log bunkers IRL. Thats what made the US 81mm heavy bomb so useful. It was no better than the light bomb against troops in the open. It was really a thin walled HE package and HE does not cause great casualties as a function of distance. Fragments will. The US heavy 81mm set on delay had enough mass to punch through roofs and reinforced positions and the healthy HE load did the rest.

snapshots sent. manual is too big to email btw.

I can send the pdf file for the manual if you have email.

Avtually they show the unique gun action in different positions. Would you like a snapshot of the back of the gun? The bAck of the gunshield has a very detailed firing chart printed on it btw.

I have the US manual on it. It shows the gun broken down into its pieces.

SeaMAK? Will there be a Das Boot Afrika Corp version?

This is a very interesting statistic as it reconciles two somewhat contradictory facts: (1) the fact that technologically the Panther was clearly superior to the Sherman; and (2) the fact that this superiority did not seem to matter on the battlefield. (I'll note in passing that the much repeated "need five Shermans to take out a Panther" quote was US doctrine for engaging Panthers; it does not mean that the US lost 5 Shermans (or four or whatever) for every Panther, as this was not the case. </font>

The above stat shows this armored division losing about 25 tanks a week (med+lt+AG). These are total write offs. They are repairing about 50 a week. So roughly 75 tanks a week are getting whacked. An odd thing is that TDs are not listed (perhaps they are 'others'? This unit had other units attached and the losses for those units may not be included also.