Mr. Tittles

I guess I just like to analyze policy from data and not your opinions.

There may be no enlightening you Andreas. You refuse to face that resources were devoted to T34/76 production. An additional factory was devoted to T34/76 guns. You can't get around that. Your claim that T34 production must be moved KV plants is silly. They actually relocated T34 production to new areas. The KV program devolved into another medium tank. The KV1S was actually stopped (I believe early 43) with less numbers produced than the KV1. I havent time to go through all of JasonC's 'production' now (its like a horde of T34/76 coming out of a factory) but his claim about a marginal increase in numbers of T34/76 being produced in 1943 (25% or 3248 turreted tanks!) boggles my mind. Thats more than the total of KV1 tanks produced in 3 years! Its close to triple! the number of KV1S!!!! Eh, maybe when I get time I can bother fending off the drift (I really don't know what my initial point has been twisted into by JasonC). But since I am a trooper, I will return. In the meantime, Andreas, address the facts presented and stop with your demanding of silly criteria. [ December 30, 2003, 06:32 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

General Rotmistrov said at proposal of the situation of the Soviet armored formations in 1942: "The difficulty is that while there is not much difference between the light [T-60] and medium [T-34] tanks on the roads, when moving cross-country the light tanks are quickly left behind. The heavy tank [KV] is already behind and often crushed local bridges which cut off units following after. Under battlefield conditions, that too often meant that the T34 alone arrived.; the light tanks had difficulty fighting the German tanks and the KVs were still delayed in the rear. It was also difficult to command these companies as they sometimes were equipped with different types of radios or none at all". Rotmistrov concluded that it would be more prudent concentrate industrial resources upon a single 'universal tank', instead of wasting them between different light, medium and heavy types. In Summer 1942 trials on the new vehicle ended and the production begun on August 20th 1942. In the meanwhile the war experience took other bad news for the heavy tanks in the Red Army as they were proving unsuccesfull. Gen. Katukov said: "The T-34 fulfillsall our hopes and has proven itself in combat. But the KV heavy tank ... the soldiers don't like it ... It is very heavy and clumsy and not very agile. It surmounts obstacles with great difficulty. It often damages bridges and becomes involved in other accidents. More to the point, it is equipped with the same 76 mm gun as the T-34. This raises a question, to what extent is it superior to the T-34? If the KV had a more potent gun or one of greater calibre, then it might be possible to excuse its shortcomings". New KV-1s being delivered to the Red Army Effectively the KV has spent its best time of 1941 and early 1942, when Soviet tankers requested him as king of the battlefield. As a temporary measure the KV heavy tanks were removed from the mixed brigades and concentrated in separate heavy tank regiments for use in infantry support role. The situation led to a radically new project for a 'universal' tank retaining the armor protection of an heavy tank and the weight of a medium one. The design team of the KV proposed the KV-13 while the T-34's design team proposed the T-43. KV-13 weighted about 31 tons, had 120mm front hull and 90mm turret armor; gun was the usual 76,2 mm L41. As for the KV-1s the appearance of the heavy German Tigers and Panthers made clear that the ideas were going in the wrong direction. [ December 30, 2003, 01:53 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/bookshelf/stats/stat3.html Cause its all about sharing. Notice that the Soviets also made new factorys for the new 122mm tank guns.

25% more T34/76 is actually more than the total 1943 production of panzer IV longs... its 3248 turreted tanks (like 125 more than the panzer IVlong 1943 production). I hate to do this but the SU122 and SU85s went from 25 in 1942 to 1371. T34/76 production in 1942 jumped? So did the number of kill rings on german tanks and antitank guns on the eastern front.

25% more is marginal?

I can't believe that JasonC and Andreas are so naive about tank building. I imagine them on a hill, overlooking a tank 'plant', watching raw materials (iron, rubber, etc) coming in one end and completed tanks coming out the other end. "I feel I know a lot about factories now" says JasonC to Andreas. Anyway, Heres a quote.. From June to September 1942, the Stalingrad Tractor Factory was the main supplier of T-34s. The Kharkov Locomotive Factory were moved to the Uralmashzavod (Ural Machine Building Plant) in the Urals and merged with the Nishni Tagil auto factory. During 1942 the Ural Heavy Machinery Company in Sverdlovsk started to produce T-34s. The Ural-Kirov Tank Factory in Chelyabinsk was setup by the People's Commissariat for the Tank Industry to produce T-34s. It was later known as Tankograd. There were a total of 8 large tank factories, 6 factories produced hulls and turrets, and 3 produced engines. So kind of sounds like concentrating on T34/76. But, I don't know, you tell me. [ December 29, 2003, 11:42 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

One good thing about cannabilism is that common types supply common parts. If I can take guns, engines, ammo, sights, wiring harnesses (these burn in small fires), wheels, treads, carbs, filters, plugs, turrets, hydraulics, electrical motors, starters, fuel tanks, etc , etc , etc... And share these amongst the majarity of my main battle tanks AND supporting assault guns, then a lack of spare parts is less significant concern. The Panzer IV and Panther did not share guns, engines, ammo, etc. The Germans would have been better off with lt. panzer divisions having one battalion of Panzer IV and two small battalions of PanzerIV/L70 vehicles. The heavy Panzer division would just have two Panther battalions and no panzerjaeger/AT company.

The soviets produced more T34/76 in 1943 than 42. Most anyone would agree with this. Tank plants are assembly plants. The major sub components are made in other plants. Engines, main guns, etc. The soviets made another gun plant, just for the T34/76 gun. It was factory #13. Why? So they could meet demand at the assembly plants. The added production from the ceasing of production of KV1 (in 1942), also was put into (you guessed it) more T34/76 guns. This is a major criteria put forth by Andreas. It is, unfortunately for him, the truth. I sense a drift in thought in the thread. I never said heavy tanks were given up on, just that 1943 was a 'building-year' and the Germans picked a wrong time to make changes. I also see the AGs and SPs and what-not throwing into the mix.

What if the Soviets started up a whole new plant that ONLY produced T34/76 guns? Lets say they geared this up in late 42 and it cranked WAY up in 43? What say if it only went on to produce 85mm guns for the T34/85 series? Would this be concentrating some production effort on T34/76? But what if not only the above was true but that plants that were producing KV guns now stopped making so many of them, and started making more T34/76 guns? What would you say Andreas? What would you say?

Ive seen the Tiger II that the soviets shot up. It looks like swiss cheese.

Many tanks use reinforced ammo bins also. The brass in the tank shells is very easily penetrated. Once the powder starts burning, it will chase anyone out of the tank. If enough powder from enough shells go off in rapid succesion, it will lift off the turret. Gasoline fires are very hard to combat. The T34 was a diesel powered vehcile so it had this advantage. Supposedly the high explosive used in the T34 tank shells would cook off and detonate. A single HE shell detonating in the confines of a tank is bad enough, but it would then detonate all others by sympathetic detonation and the tank would literally blow to pieces. Most well made explosives do not do this. Fuses may also cook off or go off if actually hit/penetrated by a fragment.

I would be interested to hear if in actuality any factories were switched from KV to T34 production (switchover to the SU series or IS does not count). I doubt that was the case, and that would be the only proof for your theory. If, as I believe, it did not happen, your theory falls apart. The numbers are meaningless, they can mean all sorts of things - most likely increased efficiency of production at the T34 plants, that were not lumbered with switch-overs. Not sure why you think that would be 'proof'. Why not switch from light tanks to T34 tanks? Would that meet your criteria? (not that I think that matters either). What about building a new plant or expanding existing ones? What if IS-2 tanks were built at neither light tank, KV plant but at new plants? What would this mean to you? (not that it means anything but I would be curious to hear it). Update: (yes Ive been Googling Andreas..) If the Soviets switched over production capability of major components of the KVs to the T34, would that satisfy your criteria? (hint: the answer is only available online). Even you must know that all the parts of a major weapons system are not made inside the confines of one plant. [ December 29, 2003, 06:24 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Light tanks ---------1940----1941---1942----1943---1944--1945 T-26----1549 BT-7----706 T-40------41-----638 T-50--------------48-----15 T-60------------1385---4660 T-70-------------------4913---3483 1942 shows 3 types of light tanks being produced. 1943 shows one type being produced. T70 production numbers go down in 1943. Heavy tanks ----------1940----1941---1942---1943---1944 KV-1------141----1258---1860 KV-1S--------------------585---621 KV-85--------------------------148 KV-2-------102----100 KV-8---------------------102----35 KV1 production stopped in 1943 and the numbers decreased from 42 to 43. ---------1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 T-34/76 117 3020 12572 15820 4100 T-34/85-----------------------------10615 21108 [ December 29, 2003, 05:53 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

You tell me what you think my theory is and I will tell you if you are mistaken. As far as this.. I mean 1941. I suggest you do a bit more googling (or even better reading 'Germany and the second world war' would be a good start) if you seriously believe that Germany could win the war by Spring 1944, even with the slimmest chance of all. I don't seriously believe the Germans could have won any war in the last century or this century. I said what the Germans believed. Doesnt matter if they were delusional or sane or just a bunch of disagreeable troublemakers (no offense), it was the frame of mind of the Germans. Realitys such as the folly of the eastern front could even get through their thick skulls. Please understand its not what I believe. Its not a hard concept. Not that I am saying you aren't a wonderful fella Andreas. [ December 29, 2003, 05:25 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Good points, I agree the Soviets had previous experience with concentrating against non-panzer forces (and trapping panzer forces in the encirclement..perhaps the best way to write them down) but.. Developing operational skill was more important than attrition. Unfortunately for 11 million soviet soldiers, Operational Skills came from their Operational kills. The Soviets practised a very costly war. Even towards the end, it was a bloodbath in Berlin. But thats another debate I suppose. Tanks: If you look at the Russain production numbers, 1943 was the year they produced the least heavy tanks (less than a third of what was produced in 42). It was also the year they dropped the number of type of light tanks AND production (again about a third the light tanks produced in 43 than 42). They DID increase by 25% or so the number of T34/76. 1944 saw a resugence in heavy tanks and a small falloff in t34 (both types)total numbers. T34 was tank of the year in 1943. I think the numbers back this up. Post spring 1941 the Germans could not win the war. It took them to May 8th 1945 to catch up with that reality. Any strategic wriggling inbetween was just pointless idiocy. The German strategy was never informed by what it 'knew', it was informed by what it wished for, no matter how outlandish. I think you mean 44? But even if thats what you mean, the Germans only chance WAS in the West (as slim a chance as it was) after spring 44. They could possibly beat the Allies on the beach or develop a war of attrition across France. But in any case, they do not have your hindsight. They blew it. But again, another debate.

In WWII, many accounts describe the US Garands, BARs and MGs giving away the position because the powder used was not smoke-less. Accounts from Italy describe units changing over to all AP rounds as the war went on. I have read that US Paratroopers used AP exclusively also.

Utterly clueless </font>

http://www.magweb.com/sample/sgmbn/sgm80sov.htm This website claims: For example, in 1944, the Red Army lost 52.7 percent or 13,800 of the medium tanks which included the number available at the beginning of the year and those received from production. The pdf file is worth dowloading from this page.

Excellent points. The russians pushed hard with their numbers, relying on the T34/76, because they knew that through attrition, they would gain ground and beat the Germans tank modernization program. I think that 1943 saw them concentrate more on the T34/76 and drop programs like the light tank and 'heavy' KV1s. 1943 was probably the year of the medium tank for the soviets. The Germans, who were stopping production of one tank, introducing another and fielding two more, were getting bum rushed. My theory is that the Soviets learned that counter-attacking panzer units with tank armys during the German Kursk attack, while necessary, was very costly. Post Kursk soviet operations probably focused T34/76 attacks against non-panzer units, forcing teh panzers themselves to counter-attack and that is how they drove the German operational numbers down after Kursk. The soviet gains and encirclements made before the introduction of the T34/85 (spring 44) probably swung German war strategy towards the West. The Germans knew they could never win the war in the east unless the war in the west was won first. [ December 29, 2003, 01:33 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

http://www.34infdiv.org/history/34lessons.html

The wet stowage was meant to douse any ammunition powder fires. Powder burns hot and fast and the wet stowage would flood the ammunition bin if penetrated. The anti-freeze was just that, so the liquid would not freeze and burst the bins. Sherman tanks used gasoline and a hit in the fuel tanks would still lead to a burn out. [ December 29, 2003, 12:44 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Information was cut n pasted from 'Lessons Learned' reports. These are US reports produced about the campaign in Sicily/Italy in this case. These pdf files are available online.

Lessons learned (5) Grenades. First Lieutenant JOHN C. AILES, 133rd Infantry. "It is my opinion that more emphasis should be placed on the use of the rifle grenade. On about 28 June, near CASTEGNETO, a right flank platoon was partially surrounded by about 50 Germans armed with machine guns, machine pistols and rifles. This platoon was in a dry river bed, and the surrounding country was very flat with a network of drainage and irrigation ditches that were somewhat grown up with brush. The Germans were about 100 yards from our positions so that we were unable to employ our mortars. The platoon had no grenade launchers, and were unable to dislodge the Germans by small arms fire. It is my opinion that these machine guns could have been knocked out or forced to withdraw if rifle grenades had been used on them." Captain ALBERT J. HOIHJELIE, 135th Infantry. "A white phosphorus rifle grenade can be made from a regular AT rifle grenade and a WP hand grenade. These were used to a good advantage at ANZIO. They should be made up by an ordnance company.

A Military Encyclopedia Based on Operations in the Italian Campaigns, 1943-1945. Section 8.Grenades Grenades were used extensively by all Infantry units with excellent results. The fragmentation grenades were very effective for close-in fighting, for stopping hostile assaults, mopping up pill boxes and MG positions, and for clearing houses. In the attack and on patrols, Infantry soldiers habitually carried at least two fragmentation grenades. The fragmentation rifle grenade was also very effective, and with a little training soldiers became very proficient in its use. It was used against groups of personnel in the open, against MG positions, and in clearing houses by firing through open doorways and windows. Frequently it was used in conjunction with AT [Anti-Tank] grenades in attacking occupied houses; AT grenades were fired through doors or windows and the rifle grenades fired close to the house to inflict casualties as the occupants came out. The AT grenade was effectively used against armored vehicles, pill boxes, houses, and dug-in gun positions. This grenade had a terrific concussion effect as well as penetrating power. In one instance the use of AT grenades broke up a three tank attack on a company position at a time when artillery support was not available. [p. 176] In another instance a light tank was knocked out and the crew killed by hits from two AT grenades. The smoke (WP) [White Phosphorus] grenade was very effective in clearing the enemy from caves and dugouts, where at times fragmentation grenades would not do the job. On occasion they were used as incendiaries. Some preferred the WP grenade to the fragmentation grenade for general use. The offensive grenade was used very little when fragmentation grenades were available. Troops found the fragmentation grenade would do the same job as the offensive grenade and do it better. Section 23. Assault Team Weapons Assault teams armed with the rifle, the BAR, and the Bazooka were employed to a great extent against fortified houses and dugouts. The BAR formed the nucleus of the team. It was usually employed with a few riflemen as a base of fire, while the building was being investigated. The bazooka rocket had little effect on thick stone or concrete walls but was very effective through doors and windows. In many instances the anti-tank grenade was used in the same manner. The flame thrower was seldom used as an additional weapon in such assault teams. It was found that they were not essential in attacking houses since the bazooka rocket or anti-tank grenade fired through the door or window of a house usually sufficed. The flame thrower, however, was used to great advantage in assaulting pillboxes or well protected dugouts, since the bazooka rocket or anti-tank grenade failed to penetrate their reinforced walls. One reason for not using the flame thrower to a great extent was the lack of specialist operators. To operate it successfully in combat the soldier must be very proficient with the weapon and be able to keep it in proper adjustment. It was generally believed that these specialists should come from Combat Engineer units, and should be made available to the Infantry when needed.