Mr. Tittles

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/bookshelf/losses/losses2.html Heres another case of data that has to be read carefully. At first, I was confused about the columns. But it appears that July 11-14 during the battles at Prokhorovka, these units left a majority of their vehicles on the battlefield. Total KOs (fully destroyed) typically being a lesser cause than abandonment (left on battlefield). But I could be wrong about what exactly the data represents. Its clear what fully destroyed means (KO) and evacuated (dragged to a workshop), but the first two columns are vague. do they mean (should have) and (had)? That is, authorized strength, actual strength?

wow, i find that amazing! i knew the soviet tank loss was high, but that's 98%! i used to think the allied landings at normandy was a side show, but i'm not sure the russians could've taken berlin without us now. makes me feel a whole lot better! </font>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_tank_production_during_World_War_II Heres a breakdown of soviet tanks by number and type.

Yes I remarked about that earlier. Ideal info for a unit (battalion/regiment/etc) shows available (working and non-working), operational (working), replacements and write-offs. If this information is given in time units, then the smaller the time unit, the better. Production can be decieving. Production numbers are sent to the front as replacements, to strategic depots and to training units. Panther tanks were shipped to the front initially as units. They were new vehicle types and training had to be completed before they could be fielded. T34/85 were actually delivered to T34/76 units (less training needed) and familiarization done in the field. The Germans liked to raise new units with new vehicles. Old units had to make the most of what they had. In any case, more information is needed to determine if the Soviets gains (they did win didn't they?) were 'losing the war of attrition'. It is not easy information to find online. An interesting stat would be operational ssoviet vehicles at the end of the war.

Offensive Operations into Belorussia in Fall 1943 and Winter 1944 (mud and all!) German and Soviet historians cover in detail the dramatic series of Soviet offensives which followed the Kursk defense in July 1943 and the subsequent Soviet advance to the Dnepr River from August through October 1943. Volumes have been written on Operations "Suvorov," "Rumiantsev," and "Kutuzov" at Orel, Belgorod-Khar'kov, and Smolensk. Equal attention has been devoted to the various phases of the Chernigov-Poltava operation, operations designed to breech the Dnepr River line (the Chernigov-Pripiat, Kiev, Gomel'-Rechitsa, Krivoi Rog, and Nikopol' operations), and operations on the flanks, such as the Nevel' and Melitopol' operations. The Germans, quite naturally, focus on Soviet failures, such as the unsuccessful multiple attempts to crush their Nikopol' bridgehead. Thereafter, Soviet accounts focus on their successful and spectacular advance into the Ukraine, commencing with the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation in December 1943 and culminating with their encirclement of German First Panzer Army in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy operation and the arrival of Soviet forces along the borders of Rumania and southern Poland in April 1944. Lost in this coverage are important and repeated Soviet attempts to conquer Belorussia in late fall 1943 and early winter 1944.

Well I will leave bastables to his own devices. He's well on his way. Somebody please email me and let me know if the Soviets win the war or not.

Thats good, good, bastables, now answer yourself and get a good conversation going. Don't forget to misquote yourself and add stugs in italy to the eastern front! 'cause the soviets were prosecuting a war of attrition against the italian front too right?

Operational armor in Panzer divisions east front including stug-PIV-PV-Tiger May 31 1944 Total 1103 Damn that mud.

Again, never said they won the war of attrition. Thats something that you came up with. Would you be better off just arguing with yourself? Seems you don't need anyone since you conjure up assertions anyway? Look. You are trying too hard. You made blunders and got snagged. Be a man instead of trying to be a weasel.

Again: In January the Germans were about 53% Operational. They built up to 88% Operational for Kursk (impressive). Just for you Bastables, in case you missed it.

You do realise it was the muddy period and what that effect that has on operational tanks don't you? Please do show how this shows that the Russian tank fleet was better off after a total loss of 62% of their total fleet versus an increase in the German tank fleet. It also ignores the damage that a 50% operatioanl Panzer div can do to full strength Soviet tank army ala Kursk or even the orel counter offencives. Oh wait a min I guess you won't actully deal with the issue. You would prefer carrying out mor manic antics to "please" the crowd. Mud huh? Germans were at 50% operational at Kursk (dont bother reading the previous threads but it was a wee bit higher..)? Germans sent panzers to the west because they didnt want them getting muddy? They retreated because they wanted to? Great stuff.

Heres some more info regarding tank retrieval. Hopefully, Bastables will not think its directed at him (has a tendency to I suspect). Such disparity in an Eastern Front battle is not terribly surprising in light of such Soviet catastrophes as the Kiev pocket in 1941. Yet Kursk was not a meatgrinder for either army, despite its portrayal as a decisive battle. In 1943, Germany suffered 1.6 million casualties on the Eastern front; the 56,000 German casualties at Kursk accounted for only 3 percent of that total. Russia endured a staggering 7.8 million casualties in this period, with the 178,000 Soviet casualties at Kursk only comprising 2.3 percent of this total. The authors suggest that that the bloody fighting really began after Kursk, when the Soviets relentlessly pushed the Wehrmacht across the Ukraine. Zetterling and Frankson seem more comfortable with obtaining statistics than in analyzing them. Yet embedded in their numbers are numerous interesting facts. For example, military theory holds that the attacker normally suffers more losses than the defender. Yet superior German tactical skill created the reverse at Kursk. On the attack, the panzers could conquer the battlefield and recover damaged vehicles. It was in the retreat after Kursk, when any vehicle that couldn't move was abandoned, that tank losses mounted. http://www.themilitarybookreview.com/html/Kursk1943.shtml [ December 27, 2003, 09:27 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

I never said they won the war of attrition. They started a war of attrition and did so on the belief that they could outproduce the Germans. Thats how anyone would win a war of attrition. They could have also falsely hoped the other fronts would open up. But my main point (you can miss it or not, doesnt matter), was that they kept the T34/76 MBT and decided that attacking was the best course of action. [ December 27, 2003, 08:14 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Again missing the point (or twisting data). The latter half of 1943 and the first half of 1944 saw less soviet tanks to blow up because they (Soviets) were low on numbers and wished to husband their tank strength and rebuild after the catastrophic (for soviet tank strength) "summer" offensives and counter offensives. Both the Soviets and the Germans preferred committing tank units to their own major attacks or counter offensives so when fighting tails off so do casualties, surprise surprise. The later half of 43 saw a tail off in fighting? The German operational panzer numbers got beat down to 30% (600 odd panzers roaming around the whole eastern front?) by a tail off????? Great stuff Bastables.

I never said they 'won the war of attrition'. Thats a Bastablism. You often misdirect threads and try to put words in other peoples mouths. I said: Actually, most of 1943 was a showdown. The Germans big show was Kursk but the armored battles raged in intensity for most of the year. The Germans were being bled and the Soviets were willing to practice attrition as long as both sides bled. They prosecuted this strategy with T34/76 mostly. They knew that changing over a model design during this time would give the Germans a break. The Germans, with the new Panther, old Panzer IV and limited Tigers, were changing horses at the wrong time.

How did the Soviets magically move those front lines towards Germany? This is getting too easy.

Again, with the 'missing points'. Its pretty obvious that you want to change the focus of the discussion because you can't handle being wrong about something. I am discussing the Eastern Front and the Soviet post-Kursk actions. The name of the thread is T34 Lifespan.

German vs. Soviet AFV losses - 1941-45. Period: Ratio: Period: Ratio: 06/41-02/42 1:5.0 12/43-06/44 1:1.4 03/42-05/42 1:6.6 07/44 1:4.0 06/42-10/42 1:7.9 08/44 1:2.0 11/42-03/43 1:1.3 09/44 1:1.0 04/43-08/43 1:5.7 10/43-11/44 1:1.3 09/43-11/43 1:2.5 - - I copied this from http://www.achtungpanzer.com/prod.htm Notice the reduction in kill ratio during 09/43-06/44 (uh, before Normandys losses). Uh whats this? Kill ratio goes up during Normandy? This data seems to support my 'unusual' theory. The soviets pushed big after taking horrendous losses at Kursk. They knew they could make the tanks and they used them.

Err no tits. Again even with the larger number of Jan 2803 Panzers the Dec number of 2053 panzers for the eastern front you have to add fig of 31 Dec 1943 Panzer/StuGs in the West 827 has to be added as does the med fig of 970. This results in a net gain for German Panzer/StuG fleet strength at the end of the year of 1943. Also the Soviet tank fleet contracted while only fighting a "one" front war. The Soviets were losing the Armour attrition war. </font>

No. Its simple. The Panzer fleet over the entire year shrank. You made such a big deal about it and now are showing you cant grasp the fact your wrong. Again (I love saying Again!) 'So, since its so important to Bastables, the Germans did actually end the year with LESS operational AND available panzers than they started with!! 750 less available (uh, 26%) and 432 less operational (29%).' You also do not want to grasp that the Germans were being pushed back 100s of miles! [ December 27, 2003, 06:34 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Bastables mis-thinking is based on the low numbers of Panzers following Jan Feb Mar 43 losses. These are 2152 WRITE-OFFS! Thats more than the number of Panzer IIIL60 made in 1942. Heres detailed information regarding replacements, available, operational and total losses: Jul 42 186-2060-1337-198 Aug 42 366-2644-1669-232 Sep 42 192-2705-1702-298 Oct 42 180-2731-1789-200 Nov 42 245-2677-1907-169 Dec 42 196-2758-1723-159 So for these months we see an influx of new tanks and fleet strength reaching a steady level and losses varying between 159 to 298. But Jan 43 shows 392 replacements but 456 total writeoffs! Feb 43 shows 394 replacements and 1105 total write offs! mar shows 275 replacements and 591 total writeoffs! This is where Bastables is getting his start point. A beaten up panzer force is where he wants to start the year! Funny!!

Tsk, Tsk, Bastables.. lets look at Panzertruppen pg. 110 chart also pg. 43 (you forgot Jan and Feb my boy) Available (Operational) Panzers on the eastern front 43 Jan 2803 (1475) Feb 2422 (981) Feb 28 1686 (902) Jun 30 2584 (2287) Jul 20 2471 (1471) Aug 31 2022 (821) Sep 30 1953 (605) Oct 31 2198 (962) Nov 30 2287 (817) Dec 31 2053 (1043) These are operational numbers. Bastables has been tossing around Availability numbers. Available means every piece of shot-up, run-down and broken AND working panzer. Operational means 'runners' or those that fight. The relationship between the two, shows whats going on. In Jan the Germans were about 53% Operational. They built up to 88% Operational for Kursk (impressive). The rest of the year, the part where the Soviets siezed the initiative, reduced Operational panzers down as low as 30% at the end of Sep 43 (thats right, the germans had 600 some panzers fighting on the eastern front). So, since its so important to Bastables, the Germans did actually end the year with LESS operational AND available panzers than they started with!! 750 less available (uh, 26%) and 432 less operational (29%). And the whole years panzer production did not go to the eastern front. [ December 27, 2003, 06:05 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Again the Stug had more platoon/company command radios per unit than panzers (using 3 vehicle platoons and 10 vehicle companys). Again they used multiple radios before the panzers (who used recieve only radios initially). Again, I have provided a website that says the typical panzer had one transmitter/one reciever. Later war panzers may have copied the StuG typical arrangement. I have email from someone that said StuG battalion command vehicles had TWO recievers AND two transmitters.

I believe the data shows 'irecoverable' losses. That is, burnt out tanks from battle damage. There are also technical failures. These can be as mild as small engine fires that would be repaired (long term), to failure of major welds that are not worth fixing. These vehicles are then written off for spare parts. All military casualties are either final (KIA or severly wounded that won't return for the duration of the conflict or burnt out tank, etc), or repairable (wounded that will recover, tanks that get new turrets, etc). The best way to destroy a tank is to get it to burn out. Fuel fires being even better than ammunition fires. The heat will turn the vehicle into unusable scrap. When attacking, you better take the field full of your damaged vehicles. That is, if you lose and pull back quickly, you lose big. The enemy will recover or burn the vehicles they can't move themselves. The Soviets may have adapted this strategy to attack and not stop till the enemy engages its armor against the attack. Once the German armor was brought into play, the soviets could attack with the objective of either encircling the forces or capturing the enemys tank maintenance units. Once a tank-park of vehicles under repair is over run, the enemy has been crippled. Its source of repaired tanks and parts has been lost. The soviets, like everyone else, repaired tanks. having commonality of parts for its major MBT/SPs (and employing other models in massed units) makes great sense. Since they were taking ground in the later half of 1943, they were recouping many recoverable tanks.

Not 10X but the numbers are available online and even in this thread. The German MBTs for 43 continued to use Panzer III (they were still around in 50L60 and 75L24 form), Panzer IV long and short, Panthers and Tiger Is. They all had different ammunition. They all had a multitude of different parts. Its much easier to keep 'runner' numbers up if parts/ammo is shared.