Dandelion

Uh... basically. In many cases, Nafziger is the only easy to find source for orders of battle. I have several of his books and individual orders of battle. All of them that I have been able to check against other sources have glaring errors. </font>

Try German Amazon (don't worry, they speak English). They don't have any of their own I'd think but they...er...whatsitcalledinEnglish - they help other people and companies sell products via Amazon, for a fee. You can find stuff that way. The reprint is Munin Verlag, you can always write them directly. Cheerio Dandelion

Yes German, though I don't imagine there is a lot of linguistic challenge since he is so extremely brief. It's basically data. (Most of) Tessins works are numeric. The SS divisions never reached very high numbers so yoiu'll get very far indeed just by owning his first three volumes. Of course, it's not easy to find single volumes like that. And Tessins works also include a lot of other type of data, apart from the pure unit data. Prices, well, there is a newprint which last time I looked was at some 1300 USD or so? I have collected my own series peu-en-peu and I think the tag ended at around 700 USD, but of course I have no reprints but old volumes falling apart on me. Cheerio Dandelion

Well when they start posting the screenshost, you'll know it's too late to influence any core design decisions. So we don't want screenshots just yet. We want what happened a few months ago, with company representatives opening up debates on fundamental design ideas. That's power. The rest is just execution. Not that I hate execution. I'm just more of a decisionlevel person. Cheerioops Dandelion

It - or they as it were; there were two scrapped such attempts of the very same nature - are CMAK files. Do you own CMAK? Ceerio Dandelion

I'd love to but I don't actually own CMBB, I went from CMBO to CMAK. Same game as CMBB but not same files. You'll be playing a .cme file, which I cannot open in CMAK. I understand the dilemma though and if I was your opponent I'd be reading whatever you wrote here as well But you could always mail screenshots. I'll reply on your previous mail so you'll have the adress, hang on. Sincerely Dandelion

Hmm... - Absence of enemy mistakes to offer an opening. - Unable, or at least too slow, to identify and act upon an important turn of events. - Poor battle morale (focus on the limits of my possibilities without exploiting or even considering the limits of my enemy's possibilities, overly sensitive to casualties, exaggerated estimates of enemy strength etc). - Infatuation with a brilliant plan leading to failure to adapt to developments. - Narrow mindedness, tendency to restrict planning to realistic enemy behaviour regardless of game mechanics and opponent. - Frustration or other loss of temper, usually from successful enemy harassment or evasion. - Stress (timelimits), forcing reckless behaviour. - Having a very interesting person at the other end writing really interesting e-mails so I lose my focus, try and be finished with the turn and focus all energy on writing an equally interesting return letter. Yes those will be the major ones. Boredome should be reckoned with as well I guess. Realising halfway into the game that you don't really enjoy the setup or environment as a game experience, regardless of how things are turning out. Bored is quickly synonymous with reckless and sloppy. Cheers Dandelion

The works of Georg Tessin is vastly superior to Nafziger, but not cheaper. Since you'll need all 15 bands in his series, covering about a metre shelfspace. Also out of print, prices are bonecrushing. I cried for days after paying the bill. That was a trip to the Carribean. I am myself looking forward to Niehorster, a few months passes so quickly these days anyway. And really, you'll find anything that you'll find in Nafziger on the internet anyway. it's not a lot more than that, and certainly no more accurate. So my personal advice is to save the money, accumulate, and if you go from very interested to blind fanatic, buy Tessin. Yours Dandelion

Well I wouldn't know the objective value but to me that's actually worth quite a lot, so thank you right back at ya! Cheerio Dandelion

Sounds like a really nice map. But you mean guarding the approaches and not the flags I trust? He'll have no use of the flags if he cannot reach them. Similarly, if possible you'll want to guard terrain overlooking the flags rather than the flags themselves. It's one of the main challenges IMHO opinion, to ignore the flags completely and just look at the terrain with a tactical eye. Shift-F helps. Better off setting up on the slopes behind the crest ("behind" is relative to the enemy) - Yes definately. Not in the middle of the valley, where you'll just setup on a lower flat and he'll claim the crests and shell you. Remember Dien Bien Phu But right now you do not really have sight 5-800 metres; your enemy has a juicy spotting opportunity of 5-800 metres on your units, enabling him to project his superior firepower into your inferior ranks. He can pin all of your crested units from afar and direct all kinds of extremely unpleasant indirects, snipers and whatnots at them. You know how the guns work in the game - one hostile mortar and you can forget all your AT stuff, there is no "re-crew" function. And you will also want to remember that it only takes a halfsquad some 5 turns to scout a 400m position effectively, if your opponent is indifferent about their lives. I know it is instinct, and powerful, and I suffer under the same slavery of thought, but you really must ask yourself why you feel that urge to cover incoming roads - is the enemy very likely to be coming down the road? You'll have to admit the possibility of him filtering through the fair amount of forest instead, in short leaps and using heavy support and possibly even smoke for every leap. Maybe he recces ahead before every leap as well. All of that would negate much of your Eagle Eye. But if you're waiting just across the crest, he'll still have to leap over it, and then comes your freebee first salvoe like a check in the mail. If he has AFVs and is careless enough to spearhead with them, you'll be offered a rare underbelly. But nobody ever spearheads with AFVs, one never gets to have any real fun. You'll want to deploy a wee bit into the fairly dispersed groves, to have frontal cover, so as to not expose yourself to his vengeful return fire once he does cross that crest and recovers. Another thing of interest is covered arc (as in visibility, not the CM command) - you mention them. A golden rule is to never have a covered arc that you cannot dominate, because it inevitably becomes an arc of incoming fire instead. I might have a wide covered arc covering the entire map, but it really only means that the entire map can fire at me. You'll want to narrow your arcs down to make sure that the barrel(s) having them will totally dominate and control everything appearing in it. This is very difficult on a crest. You can achieve it by keyhole arcs, e.g. by deploying someway into a grove or a house. Will be real neat if it works and you'll be God on the forum for weeks. But war even in wargame shape tends to be really primitive affaires. The simplest things tend to be the only things that actually work. Mines and wire are always placed in a place where one does not want the opponent to advance unhindered - this your foe will always be able to deduct. His second thought - why you don't want him to go there, is beyond prediction. He might assume you're really stupid and smile in reassurance, advancing confidently, or he might assume you're an evil genious, scheming, vile and villanous and simply freeze in his tracks. No real way of predicting. His third thought - what to do in order to foil your plans, is yet another step beyond predictable. Placing minefields as a double bluff requires precise prediction of his assumptions. Personally I do not try to manipulate my foes into any behaviour using area denials. They're all too irrational and strange, since I usually play Anglosaxons - who think in very alien and bizarre ways. I put a wire or minefield where I want him to halt, so I can aim properly and shoot him down. Placed in proper terrain or behind proper terrain, he'll discover it too late. And placed between me and him, he won't be able to extract immediate vengeance for my cheap trick. It is primitive, your opponent does not feel outsmarted one bit, but it always works. Hull Down is extremely simple in theory. It means that the hull (main body) of a (an?) AFV is not visible to the firer. Should be understood as "Hull not visible". He can thus only fire at the turret (or superstructure, if turretless), reducing To Hit chances quite considerably. But if he does hit, there is no further effect on damage calculations. It is almost impossible to spot with your mere eye if AFVs are Hull Down relative to eachother on a CM map (though I have faced these infuriatingly annoying foes who actually do have an accurate eye for this). Just looking, you need the "realistic" scale, level 1 and 2 elevation visual, rotate a lot and see if you can't find suitable positions. You have a visual aid in the LOS tool (can use Fire tool as well) for a given situation. Other known mischief is to use "hunt" movement up over a ridge, hoping that your AFV will stop and fire while stull Hull Down relative to it's victim. Or indeed to dig AFV down in a defensive setup, but I have never been that defaistist myself. It's a bit like chopping the legs off a race horse. Company or Battallion? What type of AT Stuff? What does the briefing say on his AFVs? Cheerio Dandelion

...I'd add that you'll always want to place automatic weapons on the outermost flanks, since they can then spray the ground in front of your position as they did IRL - problem is that in CMAK they won't really. Yours again Dandelion

You'll want to group defenses around the focal weapons. Infantry as close protection for AT barrels. Riflemen as close protection for machineguns. And so on. If you have higher firepower than the attacker (in which case he really shouldn't be attacking), you'll want to remain on high ground. If lower firepower (the norm in any defensive setup), you'll want to keep a low profile instead (low ground, keyhole firelanes, abandon externalmost row of buildings in a builtup area etc) and force the enemy to close with you. Or he'll just reduce and suppress you with ranged firepower and spotted indirect fire. The four principal defensive measures of any modern combat are Reverse slope. Means in effect a reduction of combat distances to lethal range, and the ensuring of getting the first salvoe. On a reverse slope you are immune to ranged direct fire (an attacker will have superior firepower, or he cannot attack). Not sure if it is modelled that you are also a much smaller target for indirect fire (the spotted variant of which in any case being difficult to direct at you, unless the spotter crosses the crest and exposes himself). Flanking fire. Most important aspect being frontal cover, with each of your units having fields of fire 45 degrees ahead but not directly ahead. This makes you immune to enemy direct fire. In order to reduce your position, he has to move up to a 45 degree angle in front of them, exposing himself. Is not effective if not combined with... Interlocking fields of fire. Several flanking fire positions placed in a row produce a mesh of interlocking firelanes in front of the positions. As the enemy advances, he must expose himself to hostile fire befiore being able to project firepower into your positions. If firelanes are not interlocked, flanking fire has no real effect, since the enemy is able to advance in your "dead" 90 degree angles. Of course fire into a flank, whether against infantry or AFV, is much more effective than frontal fire. Allround defense, meaning any position will be able to defend itself in any given direction. Since your sly foe will unfailingly appear in a place you really don't need him. Easiest achieved by the good old "two up one rear" positioning of units. You'll need to focus defensive effort and will rarely be able to hold a Napoleonic line. The creating of resistance nests covering the vital terrain will inevitable also create gaps in your defense. Such can be screened with small units, but if the enemy really wants to (and manages to ID your gaps), he will penetrate, and start appearing all over the place- This need not be a cause for panic if you can defend in all directions. Basic principles of the attack are find, fix and flank. There are few other options actually (one can always hope for that frontal assault but it never materialises with human opponents). Patton called it holding him by the b***s and kicking him in the butt - same basic idea. Screen thin ahead, pin everyone you find, use reserves in a concentrated strike against a vulnerable point, roll up enemy position from the flank(s). If he succeeds, you are finished, there is no effective countermeasure. Very simple in it's essence. To frustrate him finding you, you need mobile patrols and static ambushes in front of your main effort to eliminate his recon attempts. He'll find you anyway, especially if you're in static positions. But time is a force multiplier in itself, so frustrating is good. Who knows. Maybe he wastes his focal indirect fire assets to eliminate your rewcon team, having nothing left for your MLR. To frustrate him fixing you, you'll want to avoid at all times the committing all of your force to combat. Until you have identified his focal effort, you'll want to keep about a third of your force in reserve, rear of the MLR and rested. A squad can successfully engage a platoon, and as a defender you'll want to make sure it is your squad engaging his platoon and not the other way around. He can hit your line with a screen, engaging everyone, and then hit your flank with a focal effort that you cannot meet because none of your men are able to move. To frustrate him flanking you, use resistance nests with allround defense rather than defensive lines. Your reserves will ensure defense at depth automatically. You'll not be very worried about your flanks (in fact, very unrealistically carefree) and might even cut his pincer off with your reserves. You'll want to keep any armoured assets rear when defending. They are counter attack assets (not applicable to TD's or kin). ID enemy armoured focal effort and as it assaults, hit it's flank in a concentrated effort of your own. Same principle applies to heavy firepower, high mobile infantry assets. Some or all of this can always be applied in a given CMAK setup of company size or so. Smaller than that, it all becomes rather academic. Trenches and foxholes are merely force multipliers for your defensive positions. They're good if you are. Both are horribly mismodelled in so many ways, and cannot be used even remotely historical. Basically, see them as body armour for your men. Units in trenches enjoy some 95% reduction of incoming fire, which is actually a massive benefit. Wire and mines are delaying and area denial measures. Basically intended to fix your enemy in positions where you feel it particularly pleasant to have him. Typically right under a particularly potent barrel or two. Both are temporary and cannot be trusted to stop anyone, nor of course kill anything (though admittedly mines can stop AFVs and kill men - just don't count on it). Bunkers are as silly as John has explained. You'll want to invest in other types of defenses. Having said all that - and yes I know it's one of them posts that few will have the energy to read - I designed a scenario using a IRL trench system map with wires and mines. Turned out to be quite impossible to defeat when defended by a reinforced company. Aside from being a very boring scenario, we scrapped it as unplayable. We had two heavily supported battallions hurl themselves at it with no real effect. So defenses do work, however gruellingly silly they are modelled in the game (and they are). Happy hunting Dandelion

Hey David Did you ever toy with the idea of converting pre-44 setups as well? Exchanging the desert and so on? That would enable some pretty decent 1940 environments wouldn't it? Cheers Dandelion

Looks real good there David. Sterling work. I am actually a fan of the AK/Italy theatre. A mod meaning I would lose it would not have been interesting. But having the option of a NWE copy alongside AK solves the problem entirely. But happiest of everyone will be Kingfish. He has this series of Normandy scenarios that he is working on... I am grateful you distribute this huge chunk of manhours free of charge for the furthering of our community. Sincerely Dandelion

Then you should be thrilled to be in adequate company Oren, Max Wünsche was then just what you are now, you are only more insignificant and less pretty a knave. Max Wünsche was never accused of, nor tried for, any warcrime. Kurt Meyer served nine years for the murders of Canadian and British POW's. It was irrelevant if he knew of these crimes or not, since the Tribunal applied the Principe responsibility, a Roman code unknown to international law but very familiar in both Anglo-Saxon and German law. Means in this case that a commander is responsible for his men - there is no other way to get at commanders, and not just perpetrators. Like fighting the Mafia, it's the same problem. Meyers mild sentence and early pardon was due to a bad conscience. The trials were ill administered and there were loud protests, among others from people such as Lidell-Hart. But even if it wasn't an example of fair trial, the men listed were still murdered and members of the 25th were still the perpetrators. And Meyer was their commander. Max Wünsche escaped these proceedings, since he had not committed crimes against Western humanity and Eastern European humanity does not really count it always seems, but he still remained a convinced Nazi until his dying breath in 1995. Having a Nazi as a hero is something I would myself not normally associate with Australians I must say. But it's a big world isn't it. One point is particularly aggravating. What do you mean Panzertruppen? Max Wünsche volunteered for the HJ, then volunteered for the Waffen SS. He never wore army grey, and he never served in the Panzertruppen. He was SS, member of an organisation created to suppress internal unrest, and even if he did not murder enemy prisoners he still signed on to be a kinslayer, a party thug and a policeman in a totalitarian state. Chop chop Dandelion

Regimental HQ Coy first out then. This is the K.St.N.1104, Ausf.B (Ausf A concerned 2 battallion regiments, B 3 battallion) issued in november 1943, with the adjustments made by 12.SS.HJ due to shortages and other necessities. The following is the HQ Coy of 25th regiment mind you, all officers named are 25th names from June 6, 26th differs a trifle in organisation and of course had other officers Official name is Stab und Stabskompanie eines Panzergrenadier-Regiments STAB - Regiment Commander (Staf Kurt Meyer) - Regiment Aide (Regementsadjutant - Ostuf Schümann) - Vehicle park officer (Offizier der Kraftf.Parktr. - this was a Beamte) - Staff Officer (Ordonnanzoffizier - Ostuf König) - Provisions officer (Verpflegungsoffizier - Ustuf Gille) - Regimental Intelligence (and signals) officer (Nachr.Offz - Ustuf Stejskal). - Regimental train officer (Führer des Gepäcktrosses des ganzen Rgts - Ostuf Bäder) - Regiment Doctor (Stubaf Dr Gatternigg) - Regiment Dentist (Ostuf Dr Stift) - Regimental clerk (NCO) (Gefechtsschreiber) - Commander (NCO) of the motorcycle messenger group (Führer der Kraftradmeldestaffel) - 2 messengers (Melder), one of which is also the Scherenfernrohrträger). Riding a motorcycle with sidecar. - 5 motorcycle messengers, bikes with no sidecars. - 4 Drivers. - 2 light cars (Kübelwagen type) - 2 medium cars (Kfz 11-15 type) Sum: 7 officers, 2 NCOs, 11 other ranks, 11 rifles, 7 pistols, 2 MPi, 4 cars, 2 motorbikes with sidecar, 5 motorbikes. STABSKOMPANIE Kompanietrupp - Company Commander (Ustuf Kneipp) - Kompanietrupp Commander (NCO) - Medical NCO - Messenger - 2 Motorcycle messengers with bikes - Motorcycle driver for Medical NCO (the NCO rides sidecar). - Driver - 1 Medium car (Kfz 11-15 type) SUM: 1 officer, 2 NCOs, 5 other ranks, 5 rifles, 2 pistols, 1 MPi, 1 car, 2 motorcycles with sidecar, 2 without. Recce (Erkunder) platoon Zugtrupp - Platoon commander. - Zugtrupp commander. - Messenger (motorcycle) - 3 motorcycle messengers with motorbikes. - 2 Drivers. - Medic - 2 light cars (Kübelwagen type) and 3 Gruppen each with 3 Kraftfahrradschützengruppen (motorcycle squads) mounted in 18 motorcycles with sidecars. SUM: 1 officer, 5 NCOs, 46 other ranks, 34 Rifles, 14 pistols, 4 MPi, 6 lmg, 2 cars, 21 motorcycles with sidecars. Heavy antitank platoon (schw.Panz.Jäg.Zug) Zugtrupp - Platoon commander - Commander of the Zugtrupp - Messenger - Motorcycle driver - Driver and 3 Geschütze - Three Pak 40 with crew, light towing vehicle (Sdkfz 11 type) - 1 3t ammunition truck (terraingoing supposedly - but 12.SS.HJ had acute shortages of terraingoing trucks and will have used non-terraingoing type). SUM: 1 officer, 4 NCOs, 26 other ranks, 17 rifles, 10 pistols, 4 MPi, 3 lmg, 3 Pak 40, 1 truck, 1 car, 3 towing vehicles. Signals platoon Zugtrupp - Platoon commander - Commander of the Zugtrupp (who is actually one of the troop commanders below) - 2 Signallers (wire)/motorcyclists - 1 Signaller (wireless)/motorcyclist - Driver Signal troops - 1st to 3rd Medium Field Cable troops (mot) each with troop commander, 4 signallers (wire) a driver and a 2t truck. - 1st and 2nd Portable Wireless troops (12.SS.HJ. used Gustav) each with troop commander, five signallers (wireless) and two light cars (Kübelwagen type). - 3rd and 4th portable Wireless troops each with troop commander, five signallers and a 2t truck. - 1st to 4th Light Radio Troops each with troop commander, 2 signallers (wireless), a driver and a 2 tonne truck specially equipped with Fu8. SUM: 1 officer, 9 NCO's, 41 other ranks, 50 rifles, 1 MPi, 11 vehicles (both car and truck), 1 motorcycle with sidecar. Note here: I am unsure if the 12.SS.HJ exchanged some of these trucks for armoured cars (specially equipped). I think they must have. This would concern the Light Radio Troops (1st - 4th) and would replace these with a radio AC (wheeled) with crew. Maintenance (Instandsetzungstrupp) - Troop commander (traditional title Schirrmesiter, the schirr being the leather bands that horses have around their faces, whatever you cal lthem). - Vehicle NCO - 3 mechanics (vehicle) - Radio mechanic (Panzerfunkwart) - Driver - A car (vw type) and a 2t truck specially equipped (normally a Kfz 2/40 but this need not be the case with 12.SS.HJ). SUM: 2 NCOs, 5 other ranks, 6 rifles, 1 pistol, 2 vehicles. Combat Supply (Gefechtstross) - The Spieß - Radio (Mechanic) NCO (Funkmeister) - Ammunitions NCO with the traditional title Feuerwerker - Equipment NCO - Field Kitchen NCO - Signaller (wireless) - Radio mechanic/Driver - Weapons mechanic - Clerk - Field cook - 3 drivers - 3t truck (supposedly terraingoing) for fuel transport. - 3t truck (supposedly terraingoing) with field kitchen. - 3t truck equipped with Fu8 (wireless signal set). - Light car (vw type) SUM: 5 NCOs, 8 other ranks, 10 rifles, 2 pistols, 1 MPi, 4 vehicles. Medical transport group (Hilfskrankenträgerstaffel) Also the music corps of the regiment. - Commander (also Musikmeister) - Assistant commander (also Korpsführer (as in Musikkorps) - 26 Musician NCOs (of which 8 were Musician NCOs). - 10 Musicians (of which 5 were corporals) - A bus with more than 30 seats. SUM: 1 officer, 27 NCOs, 11 other ranks, 1 rifle, 38 pistols, 1 vehicle. One must remember here that the 25 and 26.SS.HJ. were ordered to provide a music corps each. In effect however, these guys were stretcher bearers and medics. Weapons maintenance (Waffenmeisterei) - Weapons Officer(Waffenmeister, specialised in Pak and i.G.) - Weapons NCO (Waffenmeister, specialised as above) - 2 Weapons mechanics - Driver - 3t Truck. SUM: 1 officer, 1 NCO, 3 other ranks, 3 rifles, 1 pistol, 1 vehicle. Train (Gepäcktross) - Regiment clerk - Regiment Paymaster (Rechnungsführer) - 2 drivers - Tailor - Shoemaker - a light car and a 3t truck. SUM: 2 NCOs, 4 other ranks, 5 rifles, 1 pistol, 2 vehicles. TOTAL SUM: 11 officers, 1 Beamte, 59 NCOs, 160 other ranks. 78 Pistols, 13 MPi, 9 lmg, 3 sPak, 33 vehicles, 32 motorcycles (27 with sidecar). Of the 160 other ranks, three positions were manned by "Hiwis", don't know which. Well that's that, be back with the others. Cheerio Dandelion

Well like I wrote this is my idea of having fun Uh-oh... :eek: Yes that reference was a bit shady, I'll restart from scratch rather than invite you to my calculations (I was trying to trace all guns in the division). The division as a whole reports 24 Pak 40s on (in?) June 6th. 6 guns were at Regt Hq (3 in each). All infantry battallions (that is, all six of them) had 3 each (in a platoon in the heavy companies), a total of 18. All in all 24. In addition they report four "7.62cm I.K.II.290 ®". Whatever that means, but obviously they were Soviet 76mm Paks. The 12.SS-HJ thus had 4 Paks in excess of authorised strength (total 28, authorised was only 24). These four served in the divisional escort company. All Paks accounted for then but, of course, any such serving in the unofficial companies would not have been reported so it does not necessarily help. But following deliveries I can see 16 Pak 40 delivered in october 43, then a further 8 in december 43, then four more in february 44. Nothing more before june, so it seems we might trust the 12SSHJ had the 28 guns that they reported. "Silly Dingo" I wonder what type of reaction we will see to that comment. I'll go fetch the org's for the HQ Coys, Heavy coys and escort coy, with 12SSHJ adjustment june 6 (or 1st if it's not in the 6th report), and list them for you separately below. Cheerio Dandelion

Oh sorry, Bath is a wonderful city in the UK of no relevance whatsoever here, unless you're as fond of Jane Austen as my wife is. But The British Public Records Office - situated in Kew actually I think - is for reasons I have never really grasped called "Bath" in British research references. I never spend time to try and understand the British, since one cannot, no matter how one tries. I just repeat what they say, and smile. If you need the British records, you should go here instead. It's not an online site (yet) but you'll be able to find your way to the documents you need online, probably, and then order them. But you don't. Seeing as you're a Canadian [spying in profile] it will be considerably easier, faster and cheaper to collect your needs here. Unless of course it is war diaries of UK units you want. Mhm. Just playing around in there (first visit) I found this orgasmic page which - though wrong war - seems to indicate you have an unfairly facile path ahead. In fact, having played around in there, I am aggravated. Research is for grave people and real information should be fought for, yanked out of the cold dead hands of the corps of some vengeful archive employee, hidden behind incomprehensible series of numbers in a paper archive and even if you do find it, it should be half-possible to read at best. Hieroglyphs - now that's a challenge. This... this is turning the whole struggle into some kind of frolic internet playground, where quite ordinary people might acctually stumble over information. What sad times we live in. Cheerio Dandelion

That looks like a quality compilation of available sources on the Bretteville action, offering both sides perspective. Interesting analysis there by Haller, IMHO. He does not at all take such a grim view upon the allies as Reynolds does. Haller sounds German but this is a Canadian right? Kurt Meyer is best read like this IMHO, referred to and compiled, so you get the many fascinating (subjective) accounts out of him, but need not labour through his boybook style of writing. In his book Meyer also mentions that the 15th company men used what motorcycles they had, and the rest mounted the Panthers. "As in the East" or somesuch comment. Meyers thoughts as presented was marked by his latest experience of the Western Allies - which was in Greece in 41 - and his experiences in the East. Bluff and brute force had always paid off and saved German lives. But against a resolute opponent who calls the bluff it totally backfires. In 41 a defending allied unit might well have collapsed before a massed tank shock assault - indeed it happened several times. Meyers problem was that he didn't realise that the enemy could no longer be shocked into submission, and when they just stayed put and returned fire I don't really think Meyer knew what the h*** to do next. I believe Max Wünsche was in the same frame of mind. Well, my personal analysis there. But we were at the 15./25 here, I'll try to stick to topic for once. Cheerio Dandelion

Not at all. Essentially I am providing you with a number of sources to further your own research. You must decide what you believe in yourself of course, I am merely attempting to provide basis for your decision. BA/MA microfilm rolls contain photographs of documents. They are not wrong, simply photos. When referring to a such in a footnote, you usually name the document, then the roll ID and if you're nice, the flick. That way the reader can idnetify the roll and find it himself. But we are not informed by Zetterling what document he has been studying on this roll, thus we do not know what this source really is (an Army report? Army Group strength return? Could be a recepie for Lasagna, it doesn't say). Thus we have no possibility of evaluating the comparative accuracy of this document. Only a person actually visiting the BA/MA looking the roll up will ever know. Here is where Dr Tessin enters the stage. This crazy geezer spent decades in the BA/MA compiling information available in thousands and thousands of rolls into his various works. Nobody knows how he kept his sanity (if indeed he did), but what he created was a tremendously handy reference for researchers of the German army. God knows how many thousands of man-hours it has saved. Anyway, Dr Tessin is strong on static fact but weak on events. You never cope by just reading him (and Dr Niehorsters errata, which is essential since nobody corrected Tessins typos before print, and typos are lethal in military history). In our case, Dr Tessin merely mentions that companies 9.,10.,11. and 12./26 were armoured and mounted in halftracks, whereas 15./26 was not. Same goes for 15./25. Not much but an obvious contradiction. If you're in real luck, you have a quality unit history or two to lean upon, to complete Dr Tessin. Regrettably, these are very few but one of the very best available is that on the 12th SS. Hubert Meyers book (he was the Ia - operations officer - of the division). Zetterling makes very frequent reference to this book in his text on the 12th. Which is puzzling - Meyer explicitly lists the 15th companies as non armoured, containing no Paks, no flamethrowers. Meyers book contains rare strength returns and interviews with members of these companies. Meyer also explain the K.St.N. tables ordered and their local adjustment - the exact content of a K.St.N. can be found with Dr Tessin. What you will also need for a complete picture is the enemy point of view. Here Michael Reynolds has done sterling work (be it overly mean against the allies IMHO) with his Steel Inferno - a popular book on the forum here. Reynolds makes about half a dozen references to these companies, they figure in several pages and appear in several battles covered in some detail, and nowhere mentions any Paks or flamethrowers or any armour. In fact in his appendix to the book, he explicitly states the companies have "motorcycles". Though Zetterling does not mention Reynolds, the casualty analysis that he implies is unique to Reynolds book, so he must have gotten it from someone who did read it. One need not read Reynolds. One can acquire the splendid Canadian War Diaries, many of them well publicised and some available for free from Bath (well, printing costs of course). Here the Reginas - who fought and utterly spanked the 15./25 - makes no mention of any Paks. They encounter Paks, but these can readily be identified as 12./26 guns. Zetterling also makes no reference to Kurt Meyers Grenadiere. Embarassing as the tone of this book is, the author does make frequent reference to the 15./25 which was a special company to him, especially detailed is the disastrous attack on Bretteville where Horst von Büttner died (June 8th). He also mentions 16./26. Again no armour, no Paks, no flamethrowers. He also calls them motorcycle companies - their actual title, be it that they didn't have as many bikes as they were supposed to. Meyer also states that 15./26. had amphibious vw's, i.e. schwimmwagen. He describes one blowing up. I find no other reference to these, maybe that was the one they had. So in my estimation of available data, I seem to end up with an array of passive sources (i.e. sources not mentioning phenonema that would normally demand attention, e.g. flamethrowers and heavy Pak and armoured halftracks), two sources specific about how the companies were actually organised and equipped with one of them being very detailed indeed. Sources include unit commanders and unit administrators, and together the authors can present rather a formidable research. Against this we have the roll ID from Zetterling, containing a document, the identity of which we do not know. Apparently it lists the companies to have heavy weaponary identical to HQ companies of corresponding regiments, possessing (together) six of the total of 12 Paks available in the 12th SS on June 1st. Plus flamethrowers. We also have a link to miniature wargaming that confirms the presence of the paks. That is as far as I am able to come in this isue. You take it from there. Cheerio Dandelion [ May 13, 2005, 04:25 PM: Message edited by: Dandelion ]

I don't know, I have read them too, German sources often state this. You know Seuss was an officer in the Bundesmarine after the war and a character known even to army guys like myself. Lots of mythos around him, dozens of anecdotes. I fear German sources will have a problem separating fact from fiction because of his symbolic value. I'd trust a US source. What do the Americans say, do they confirm it? Cheerio Dandelion

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You really want them to have those Paks don't you? Building a scenario are we? Well they didn't, sorry. Nor were they armoured, any of them. I'll refrain from commenting on Zet and his homepage. The original source that he is referring to is a microfilm roll in the army section (RH) of the BA/MA. Strength returns, it seems. The 15th companies did not exist officially, you need the Divisional history* to track them. They disappear in october 1943 from official rolls, after the Befehl zur Umgliederung*. their respective feldpostnummer disappears also. Leaves us all wondering what Zet is listing, doesn't it? Well... In the Zustandsbericht - the official strength return - of the 12th SS on June 1st they list that the Stab plus Stabskompanie of their Panzergrenadier-Regiment 25 (mot) contained a motorcycle platoon, a medic platoon, 3 heavy paks, 6 lmgs and a signal platoon. The HQ coy of 26th (gp) lists a motorcycle platoon, a medic platoon, 3 heavy paks, 6 lmg, a signal platoon (mot) and a SPW unit that I can't make out what it contains (blurred). Such a HQ company used K.St.N.1104. Comparing the strength returns above with authorised equipment and numbers reveal the deviance from official establishment. I used the same method for the K.St.N (and indeed KAN) 1111 that you asked about. The tables were used by all Panzergrenadier regiments of all Panzergrenadier divisions. Well some used 1112 but that's a long and boring story. The 12th SS was ordered to use this table as per Aufstellungsbefehl of June 24th. They couldn't be all true to it - my list included the 1111 with local 12th SS modification of exchanging a lot of motorcycles for vw's, plus reducing the amount of NCOs in the companies. These were the deviances from formal organisation that I know of. If you need a unit with three paks, use the HQ coys Pak platoons. Do you want the companies listed in detail for scenario design? Cheerio Dandelion * Kriegsgeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision "Hitlerjugend" (H Meyer) ** SS-Führungshauptamt, Amt II Org.Abt.Ia/II Tgb.Nr.1660/43 g-Kdos. [ May 13, 2005, 02:02 PM: Message edited by: Dandelion ]

Accuracy can destroy realism. A map true to the 20m square to a real map can look really bizarre in the CM engine. I'll not even get into built up areas or roads. At any rate, it is usually quite impossible to stay true to real maps given the severe limitations of the engine, leaving you with a lot of comprimising anyway. Units do not have historical impact on events - think: machineguns. I think we have all seen the ambitious and patient designer with extreme fidelity ending up with a strangelooking nonfunctional scenario. That's when you abandon fidelity and start making concession to enjoyability and believability. It is better that it looks and feels real, than it is real but looks and feels nothing like it. Having said all that, Panzerman delivered the golden rule in more appropriate brevity of course. If you enjoy historical research and setups, do them. You can always regulate balance by the modest "scripting" gagues in the game. Time, locked setups, exit conditions, flag numbers and values, condition and quality of the units. You know. Cheerio Dandelion

Hi King They had the ability and opportunity to direct their fire. Richard Seuss commanded the "Batterie Ile de Cézembre" which formed part of the six battery battallion "Marine-Artillerie-Abetilung 608". The others numbered 1-3 and deployed in and near St Malo proper, plus batteries "St Lunaire" and "Cancale" deployed on these islands). This was an integrated force and not independent batteries, meaning the battalion and all barrels could be directed and commanded from one headquarters - that of Endell in St Malo to be precise, he in turn having access to both mobile and emplaced observer teams. The batteries had the standard twin connection with mainland, i.e. a wire and a wireless such. Though a "Seeziel" (anti-surface vessel) unit, all batteries participated in the battle of St Malo and reduced land-, air- and sea targets (all batteries had a Flak component). My only source on the events as they took place, though, is "Das Buch der deutschen Kriegsmarine 1939 - 1945" (Mallmann) and I can't say it is too detailed on this battle as such. Sources on organisation, deployment and equipment are richer. So I don't know if they actually directed fire, or merely fired pattern harassing fire. I know that they could, and I can't see why they wouldn't have. Directed their fire I mean. Ok so it wasn't a conclusive answer but when did you ever get a such from me? Cheerio Dandelion