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Dandelion

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  1. Thanks Mike A general note on the German army use of "cadre". In the German army, the meaning of a "cadre" was that a man received training to do his own job, plus the job of his next superior in line. Thus a squadleader was also a fully trained platoon leader. The whole of the Reichsheer was trained like that. That way one can take a limited group of men, say a band of squadleaders, to fully man the need of platoon leaders in a sister unit. The donor unit would not be critically bled white. It was a point to take a cadre from one unit, using men who knew eachother and who had fought together. It rarely worked, as the war progressed, to get everyone from a single donor unit. But that was the ambition anyway. During the war the pre-trained cadres were rapidly exhausted, and when using cadre to form new units - such as that given by LSSAH (and many other units, including army) to the 12th SS - you also needed a period of time to train the cadre for their new (one step higher) positions. As this could be done while the recruits were being trained (by the cadre), it was not a problem. That's how it worked. Thus Andreas is quite right to assume that the majority (bayonet side) of platoon commanders and up in the 12th, and any other cadre created division, were veterans. Just thought I'd add that. Yours Dandelion
  2. Wonderful debate to return to after a satisfying vacation down the Mosel and Rhein. On the 12th SS, they went into action June 6th and were pulled out September 18th. They were incorporated into the Ardennes offensive and moved to staging areas December 12th. Thus they enjoyed a 2 month rest in between these major battles. At no point was the division destroyed, the structural integrity of the division remained. I wish to reinforce Andreas' point on the men being led by a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs, the majority of these had seen at least on year of war before transfer to the 12th, and all of the higher (battallion and up) leadership had seen four to five years. Good point IMHO by Steve there also on the training, the men received training from the same veterans who led them. And in fact, 18 year olds make better soldiers than mature men, so age was a success factor rather than a handicap. As it was, the majority ages of this division were 19-21 years, i.e. same average age as US in Vietnam, UK in Korea etc. She did not fight the 3rd Can Inf alone Michael. Between June 6th and August 20th she had hurled at her nine separate infantry divisions (2nd Can, 3rd Can, 4th Can, 15th UK, 43rd UK, 49th UK, 50th UK, 51st UK, 53rd UK) supported by their 9 Amd Bdes, plus three separate armoured divisions (4th Can, 11th UK, Gds). I was asked to expound some here, but I find that several others have already done so. In very short, the reference to unfailing methods in the East was aggression. German assault units, such as the LSSAH, were in a role of perpetual attack. As any frontline - expanding or contracting - stabilised, they were pulled out to assault someplace else. In the greater scope of things, the Germans were on the defense. But for these units, it meant little difference, since they were tasked with counterattack, rather than static defense. Principally, infantry divisions did the defending. The officers of the 12th SS came from LSSAH, her sister unit. They implemented the same shock assault methods with the 12th as they had always used. Their previous experience from the East was that it always worked. And as the 12th SS was pulled out of the West and deployed to Hungary, they again picked up the same methods, and these again worked. Cheers Dandelion [ July 23, 2005, 03:47 AM: Message edited by: Dandelion ]
  3. Athletic, yes. It grew to be a problem real quick you know. The rate of students managing their Abitur (13th grade sort of) sank from around 300 000 a year in 1933 to some 20-30 000 in 1939, as a consequence of Nazi rule. In a nation of 60 million people - and recall that demographics looked different, it was a much younger nation than present Germany. Even the students who made their Abitur made very sharp drops on performance at the, er, whatsthemcalled - army recruiting tests. Education hours was increasingly being filled with nonsense, such as racial theory, German soul theory, family values discussions (Nazi model) - ball crap to be brief. The German army complained bitterly, they had increasing problems finding people who actually knew anything about geography, chemistry, the sciences etc. They were appaled by the complete lack of general knowledge displayed by conscripts. The Nazi ideal was a healthy body, and it could be seen as politically correct to perform badly in school. A sort of protest against establishment. The time of the students was increasingly filled by party duties, to the point of them not managing their schoolwork anymore - of course this was not seen as a problem. Well, I'll tell you all about it when I get my text on the interwar years finished here. I'll put it on the web somewhere. But you're right - athletics was the ideal of the Nazis. People like Rudel and Meyer, being no intellectuals but physically prime specimens, of course thrived in a society that celebrated their virtues rather than disregarded their shortcomings. I'll be glad to bring you along. Cheers Dandelion
  4. Nope, I think you're doing fine. The brigade really is a mystery. The English shed some light on the inner meaning of the term "brigade" by making it a verb as well. It's all French you know, the terms. Army, corps, division, regiment, battallion, squadron, company, platoon, squad, corporal, sergeant, Lieutenant, captain, major, colonel, general, marshal - the lot of it is from the French. Terminologically it all starts with Army. Division means "subdivision of army", regiment means "subdivision of division" and so on. Corps, as Brigade, are things apart and initially only used by such people as cavalrymen and artillerymen notoriously unable to grasp the beauty of an orderly arrangement. It's all French just the same. That's why it is so similar in all nations, everybody just copied it straight off and now pronounce it all according to their limited French language skills. The German army stayed strangely true to French spelling - Germany otherwise emphasises the connection between spelling and sound very much, a trait for which the French are not known. There are some exceptions. You mentioned one - Gefreiter, is pure german meaning 'liberated' (from manual labour). Webel, as in Feldwebel, Hauptfeldwebel et cetera, is a medieval German feudal, non-noble military rank. Hauptman is a derivate of the German word for Chieftain (compare UK/US "chief of staff"). Rittmeister is also genuine German as are all the other -meister titles common in logistic services, or such as Wachtmeister (Wacht in this case meaning watch, as in "not on my watch" to speak with Mr Bush). Meister means a person having completed their professional training. The Fahnen- titles, such as Fahnenjunker and Fähnrich, are German translations of French titles of officer candidates. Fahne of course meaning banner or flag, Junker means boy and Fähnrich is a kind of diminutive for a person attached to the regiment (flag). And so on. But most of it is pure French. Wonder why they didn't rename them all to Freedom Company Commander and Freedom Platoon Commander etc Nah kidding, no intent to begin that debate here. Cheers Dandelion
  5. Michael, Yes he did, took it between the wars. I'm writing on a text on being an officer in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht and was actually planning to use him as an example of how academic studies became regarded as something positive in the German army, and how officers were enabled and even encouraged to study within the frame of their service. Of course, the "Dr.Phil." is an academic title - in his case meaning history, not philosophy as such. Cheers Dandelion
  6. Sooner or later you'll win, Flames. Keep at it. Cheers Dandelion
  7. Frenchy, those maps are reported as unavailable at the bottom of the maps. Says they were probably not published. Great site tho, unusual to find 1910 maps. But hey. What happened to the capitol? Cheers Dandelion
  8. Real nice to have faces to names like that. Hope more guys get together and take a few snaps. I mean snapshots. Cheers Dandelion
  9. Aragorn Hans Speidel was severely disreputised in David Irvings book on Rommel. In it, Mr Irving accuse Speidel of selling an innocent Rommel out to the Gestapo. Though Mr Irving is not very credible as a researcher we don't see a lot of disputing the description of Speidel. Mr Irving is not alone in his belief either. People like President de Gaulle had the very same conviction long before Irving had, and vehemently opposed Speidels position of NATO commander in the early sixties. Other German army officers have aired similar opinions. Speidel did push a lively argument for the closing of a separate peace with the Western powers in the summer of 1944. He was up to his neck in the conspiracy against Hitler. Speidels recorded reactions to the allied landings stand out as... peculiar. He did nothing at all even as he receives reports of massive airborne landings and later on the arrival of the largest fleeting force humanity had ever seen just off the coast. On the other hand, Speidel came to Rommel recommended by Zeitzler, a Nazi fundamentalist. Wöhler had also recommended him, a convicted war criminal who was into the Einsatzgruppen hobby in the East. Speidel even had connections with Schörner who, apart from being an extremely disagreeable character, was also in the inner circle of the dedicated Nazi Generalship. To round the collection off, Sepp Dietrich lay a word for him during the proceedings as well. These were his buddies. What then to make of this enigmatic, reputedly intelligent, pianomastering, womanizing, alpinist General Staff general? God knows. Question marks remain around his character and one cannot unreservedly discard the notion of treason. In this particular case, I fail to see the gain of treason. If it was the counter-attack as such that he wished to abort, he will in his position have had information enough to know he needed to do nothing at all. Counter-attack with what three divisions? It was just another impulse of Rommels, a spur of the moment idea that he himself discarded before the passing of eight glasses. That's leaving aside the practical problems of contacting the enemy, leaving this kind of information, being believed and trusted and so on. What does Speidel himself say in his book on the Normandy invasion? Sincerely Dandelion
  10. King, Very esoteric matters of course, and not easy to carry a non-technical argument, but no, I don't think it had "sunk in" on June 8th-10th. I think there had been created a strong feeling of doubt within a number of key players. I think a number of commanders had lost faith in their abilities, making them cautious and passive, reluctant to undertake the previously so predominant high-risk activities. I think the feeling spread and kept spreading, until it had finally actually "sunk in". I cannot see the return of the extreme spirit of aggression that characterised German arms in the war and was, as I see it, the fundamental reason for her success on the field (tactical level I mean). Such a spirit requires a belief that anything is possible, that everything that could be done should be done, and a substantial degree of self confidence. If you have no self confidence, everything seems impossible, and doing nothing is perceived as better than making a mistake. As such, the battles of June 7th confirmed the credibility of German arms, I do not believe they were a boost as much as relieving confirmation of normality. For the men fighting these battles, it was their baptism of fire and I guess it was probably very relieving for them to see that they could all manage, and that their veteran leaders were everything they had promised to be. Bretteville and Norrey came after these battles and after being halted here, there were no German advances or gains of territory in that sector. No dashing shock assaults or smart manoeuvres, just dreary battles of attrition. We see extreme fighting morale in some German formations long after June 8th - the battles of Caen being good illustrations. While loss of confidence creates passive troops, it need not mean they are not prepared to give their all in a situation they feel they can master. Such as defence. Villers-Bocage was regarded as a "Husarenstreich" by Wittman, a lone hero roving in a long German tradition of roving hussars and lancers (Uhlans). German arms needed these heroes just like the UK needed their commandos. Wittman was already a myth and so was the Tiger. It will have boosted morale and faith in German arms, but not necessarily the self confidence of the German troop commanders. Regards Dandelion
  11. Yes Michael, eyewitnesses, and Meyer himself didn't mind being openly emotional, although this is the only instance of crying that I can recall him mentioning himself. Meyer was a spontaneous character, quick to laugh and quite amiable in a social context. He liked teaching, liked being a leader, liked to be around young people and he handled rigid hierarchies by providing comic relief. He had a very fatherly approach to leadership after his transfer to the 12th, and had he not been a convinced Nazi (which he remained until his dying breath) and had there not been a war, I imagine he might have been an ideal athletics teacher at some University, or the coach of some football team or something (that's soccer in your house). Wünsche was quite another character. I actually came to think of him watching that US TV series Brothers in Arms. There is a lieutenant there, reputed to have murdered German POWs and so everyone is afraid of him. He says little and is obviously slightly insane, yet he very very consciounsly builds and tends his own mythos, so he can use it in his leadership. Wünsche was a bit of the same on all counts really. Everyone around him worshipped him, but it wasn't like anybody used to hug him or cry on his shoulder. It must have been a staggering shock for his men (kids of 19-20) to see him lose control. He never did. Maj.Gen. Reynolds also came to think of Wagner, though in his case the Ride of the Valkyries. Hey Brooklyn, that was an impossible sig to use in conversation Meaning no disrespect to your unit there, the 187th. Keegans theory sounds very plausible to me and being no expert on ULTRA, but having rather good insight as to the volume of communication at a Army Hq (which Pz.Gr. West actually was), I am prepared to believe him. Right, I'm off to the Rhein valley tomorrow, and will have a go at the Mosel (Moselle) as well. Anyone need anything from that area? Photo's of something or maps or the like? I plan to go South from Cologne down to Strasbourg then Colmar following Rhine/Rhin, then up to Trier, then up along the Mosel to Koblenz again. For once I plan to not stop at the BA/MA My wife will not accept another turn there, will have to do it when travelling on my own. Will visit the Köln-Wahn war cemetary to pay my respects to a number of relatives, will put a flower on a grave belonging to your family if you want. Sincerely Dandelion
  12. Could happend, both ways so to speak, I mean the KTB being the source for Reynolds. But it is unlikely that the Germans would be in doubt of what day area control was transferred to I.SS-Panzerkorps (an order is only as effective as the echelon signing it), and given that the War Diary of area control of that unit starts on June 10th it seems unlikely that the Hq was hit June 11th. But hey, no way to really know. Of course, no search on the net will clarify. This site here (German) gives the date 10, and though this account is ambivalent (open for interpretation) it does seem the Canadians mean June 10th as well. But no stating of sources. No it doesn't make sense. By all means; he might have wanted an attack to happend (they all did), he might have continued to make plans for a limited attack given realities et cetera. Maybe he planned on getting Dollman and the others onboard and to argue for it. Plenty possibility. But seeing as he had very little time to continue planning, if the air raid did take place at 2030 June 10th, and given that he knew Rommel would cancel any order to continue the previously planned 3 division attack, I also do not see the point in continuing, nor that he had very much time to continue at all. As you can see, the War Diary as read by our two independent researchers state no difference in opinion between GvS and Rommel. Nor that GvS continued planning. It means a superior officers never gives detailed instruction to a subordinate (=no micromanagement, of for instance UK type (at the time)). Instead he describes the effect he desires, and leaves entirely to the subordinate to achieve this effect with the assets at hand - or the further assets demanded. Any which way the subordinate chooses. It was a matter of honour and professionalism, not to interferere with the work of subordinates even though they might choose strange paths, as long as they kept reaching desired goals. That's why Rommel was found so disagreeable as a commander. Anyway, this order-methodology has a long history to it, being born when the Germans realised orders had become too long to be practical, but I'm not sure you're interested and the end effect of it is an extreme degree of delegation (freedom for subordinates) anyway. Cheerio Dandelion
  13. Not sure I get it. I know the destruction of the enemy force as sole prerogative is a viable thesis in Army level operations, but I didn't realise it was one at tactical level as well. Lets get concrete. Setup is Defence, I have three flags weighing 900 pts total, and a force of some 300pts total potential casualty points to defend them with. Enemy comes on with a force of 750 potential casualty points, thus odds are the usual 1 to 2,5. How do I implement your advice in this very common global situation? Or lets have another very common global situation. I have a force of 300 potential points that is to exit on the far side of the map, thus another 300 points potential nonexit points for the enemy to earn if I don't make it. The enemy is between me and the far mapside with 200 potential casualty points. How do I implement the advice? Or how about this one - not so common but not unusual. Enemy has paradropped or are for other reasons scattered irregularly throughout a large area, with 500 potential casualty points at unkown locations. I sit by flags with 300 points VP, with a force of 300 potentil casualty points. There is a further 300 points worth of flags unattended out there. What do I do? Cheers Dandelion
  14. It sure turned out to be Pseudo. Charles chooses to remain enigmatic though. Always did. Cheers Dandelion
  15. I have never had the AI cheat on me actually. At least in no manner that I have not order it to. As Panther has pointed out, flags carry a specific value (one of two optional values as decided by the designer). This means the designer is free to regulate the total amount of points for flags versus casualties. That way, he can make sure the players are going for the objective he wants them to. Of course, it's basically a decent thing to do, to inform the player what the ultimate objectiove of the operation is - geographical progress or attrition. Jasons advice will be directed at a scenario of geographical gain, where the VPs for flags outnumber the VPs possible for casualties. Such advice will probably be nullified if the entire scenario is set on force conservation, with casualty points exceeding the value of objectives. Cheers Dandelion
  16. Come to think of it Steve, how do you guys at the BFC look? Is there an introductory page displaying your happy smiles somewhere to be found? Cheers Dandelion
  17. The information is from "Kriegesgeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend", written by Hubert Meyer, the former Ia (Operations officer - I think maybe you call him S3 in your army) of that division. Published by Munin-Verlag in Osnabrück and arguably the best KTB (War Diary) I have ever read - with the reservation that I have not yet read the KTB of Pz Lehr, which has similar repute of quality. There is apparently an English translation of this work? Also, the very same information is served in Maj.Gen. Michael Reynold's "Steel Inferno", published by Sarpedon in NY. An excellent, lightweight (as in easy-to-read, not as in poorly researched) alternative. In addition, it is Mr Reynolds who provides specifics about allied aircraft types and numbers participating in the attack, Meyer didn't know these things when he wrote his works. The Hq attacked was not located in the village itself but in the Chateaux of La Caine, a Calvados (apple growing) producing Chateaux of little repute in those days. Of course it was completely obliterated. Another piece of obscure information obtained from Meyer. He, Leo. Or he, Geyr von Schweppenburg. Leo had per se the authority to issue any orders to the entire Pz Grp West as he pleased, but there would be little use issuing orders he knew beforehand would be cancelled by his superior, Rommel. As he had been enlightened about Rommels opinion on the attack, there seems to be little point in continuing progress in a direction undesired by his superiors. You know, before the invasion took place, there was a most heated debate with Rommel on one side, and von Rundstedt and Geyr von Schweppenburg on the other. This was due to the extremly confused command structure of those days. Even though Rommel was a Field Marshal, Geyr von Schweppenburg - not holding this rank - was able to speak up to him by virtue of his then independent command, directly subordinate to von Rundstedt, another Field Marshal, and not Rommel. Very much has been made of this argument and most literary coverage of the Normandy invasion spend a lot of text on it - and rightly so as it affected adversely the preparations. But as soon as the first allied paras landed, the chain of command was by-and-by set straight and Geyr von Schweppenburg had by June 8th securely landed under the foot of Rommel. At that point he no longer had a position from which he could successfully argue. Rommel was an extremly difficult character to work with, yet I find no evidence in my sources of them colliding once the firing had started. Geyr von Schweppenburg was a pragmatic man, he knew the region by heart since his days planning operation Sea Lion, and quickly grasped necessities once the action started. A skilled and scholared cavalry man, eventually Panzer man, by all accounts I find. Rommel, lacking staff scholarship, continued his style of improvisation, sudden changes of mind and his tradition of being perpetually unavailable when any action started. He issued conflicting orders as he happend to stumble across various subordinates. All of his subordinates, not just Leo, were chronically confused and left in the dark as to Rommels intentions. It had been like that since Africa and his various staffs always loathed working with him. I am thus not greatly surprised his Chief of Staff made that telephone conversation - he probably had no idea Rommel had long since changed his mind, but forgotten to tell his own staff. I firmly believe he had this freedom. Chains of command were actually loosely set in terms of freedom of decision in the German army. Sepp made an attempt at issuing those very orders on June 8th, at about 0800 hours, but was countermanded by Rommel at about 0810 hours. Nonetheless, he certainly felt free - and was free - to issue any such orders concerning his Corps as he saw fit. His commander would of course have kept the privelege of intervening as he in turn saw fit, and Rommel is known to have been extremely interventionist for a senior officer. But in general, we speak Auftragstaktik. That's the whole problem of the equation. Had they not been lovable as such, they would have never gotten away with all the mischief they have caused. Fate, Paul, not luck. Centuries of christianity had not done much to eradicate the heathen belief in fate. Five years of war, many freak incidents. This was just one more. Remember that in the first years, Allied bombing missions were so severely inaccurate that the Germans never actually understood what they were trying to attack. I'm serious, it presented a real problem for the German intelligence services. Any sending of any transmission brought about the danger of Allied air attack, although not at the level experienced on a modern battlefield, and the Chateaux was a real hub, with massive communications running out of it. It was not an unreasonable thought, that the sheer volume of transmissions had brought about the attack. Indeed, the Allies might have been after some other target, or just out roving - it could have all been true. Of course it wasn't, but it might have. Rather an impressive reaction time is it not? Message received at exactly 0439, airfields all in the UK at the time, still attack on target begins at 2030 hours. Almost modern standards. Cheers Dandelion
  18. Michael, Your sig there, the one with pestilence. It reminds me of a guy over here, a Swedish guy. He's the kind of guy who'd discuss any topic, enter any subject with no real sense of prestige or narrow mindedness. You know, a nice guy, the type of guy who'd normally always be welcome at any beer table. Problem is, he has these really huge biceps and on them he has tattooed these "tribes" lines you know, like these Very popular a while ago and very reminiscent of criminal practices. That way, nobody realises what a nice guy he actually is. In fact people shun him, as he looks really... dangerous. I've often wondered why he has those, seeing as he's a regular teddy bear and would literally not kill a mosquito having sucked his blood (female mosquito you know). But I guess it's a pact between us that I don't ask. So I won't ask why you have that horrible sentence in your sig. Cheers Dandelion
  19. I hesitate to agree with his suggestion as such. In a way - in another way I do agree. I mean I see the point - the plan entailed the 12th to pass Norrey and Bretteville, the very places they had been rebuffed. Technically, by the evening of June 10th, the 12th had lost 25 of her 175 tanks, including those lost at Bretteville and Norrey. She had lost about 900 men. She was still a most formidable offensive force, barely scratched by the heavy engagements so far. Had it been possible to pull her out of the line, she would have been able to participate with a vengeance. Given the highly academic redispositioning of artillery support to add weight to the three division attack, it might have worked. Had it not been entirely theoretical without any basis in reality whatsoever. As it was, there was no relief allowing her extraction. Technically, I rather agree with the German analysis of June 10th, that sheer lack or assets prevented the counter-attack. The infantry divisions called upon, to enable the pulling out of the Panzer divisions, had not materialised. There is another side to it however, as I most humbly see it. Norrey and Bretteville had the grave effect of significantly lowering the self-confidence of the LSSAH veterans commanding the 12th SS. It became obvious that the enemy could not be frightened by shock assaults, and that any bluff would be called. The Allied troops thus proved quite another calibre than that anticipated, and tactics unfailingly successful in the East were suicidal in Normandy. The SS lost much of their (subjectively perceived) morale superiority. The effects of such changes can be indefinately debated, but as I for one feel that battles are won and lost very much in the minds of men, I am inclined to believe the disbelief and frustration gave birth not only to the atrocities committed against the indomitable foe, but also the rather passive, confused and defensive posture displayed after Bretteville and Norrey. Though probably a mere figment of my overly lively imagination, I have at times felt that I could relate to that complete loss of self-confidence felt at Bretteville and Norrey. Is this not what Anglo-Saxons refer to as a "sinking feeling"? Meyer is often referred to as stubborn (to the point of idiocy) pressing the Bretteville attack. But I have never been entirely convinced that he was. I believe he was simply confused, and didn't know what else to do. But to press on. As his hyper-aggressive stance simply would not work - compare his entire carreer up until that point, from Greece and on - he had no other solutions up his sleeve. That's what he did, had always done, it had always led to success. In any combat zone, the man cool enough to know exactly what he is doing is the one who always comes out on top. As Meyer stands on the road in the flaming carnage that was the Bretteville attack, in the middle of the night, he cries. As Wünsche lost Lüddemans Panthers at Norrey, Mr Reynolds says "he could have cried" but in fact he did cry. Veterans of five years of war, of which three in the East, men known for the serenity of their countenance, their presence of mind, pretty centerfold boy-heroes of the Third Reich, winner-types, fall to their knees and cry, publicly. Is that not a display of utter defeat and helplessness? Feelings perhaps not dispersed by the mere cessation of those specific actions, but left smouldering, leaving these men confident only in the role of hugging on to Caen, or to an airfield, at all cost. Just sitting tight, as we see throughout the war, requires only bravery, no skills or genious of any kind. Any heroic idiot can sit in a hole and in this task, this task alone, confidence remained. Well, just a personal theory there. I know it is not very conventional. Cheerio Dandelion
  20. Hrm. Geyr von Schweppenburg 'stubbornly ignores' Rommel is a note one must take with some caution. You know the operational command of the I.SS-Panzerkorps was in Rommels hand. He delegates this command to Geyr von Schweppenburg on June 8th. The latter had always had the administrative responsibility of the Corps, but not operational control. Geyr von Schweppenburg was not really in a position to ignore Rommel by June 8-11. The counter-attack was Rommels brainchild, sort of, even though his hand was forced. It begins on June 8th when Dietrich insanely orders his Corps to perform this attack all by themselves - by then only consisting of the 21st Panzerdivision and 12th SS. The former was heavily engaged in defensive battle, the latter had offensive capacity but had not yet arrived in full strength. Rommel cancels this order the same morning, and decides to attempt a 3 division attack instead (awaiting arrival of the Panzer Lehr). He convinces both Dietrich and Geyr von Schweppenburg of this plan, and only then subordinate Dietrich to Geyr von Schweppenburg. But as Rommel travels along the front he obviously has a change of heart. By the evening of June 8th already, he tells von Bayerlein that he and his Panzer Lehr is not to take part in the attack, but go for Bayeux instead. Geyr von Schweppenburg on his end is also travelling along the front on June 9th, meeting with both Dietrich and Witt (and Meyer), all of them being very enthusiastic about the planned attack. With these impressions he returns to his Hq. By early June 10th, Rommel reaches Dietrich. By then, it was known that 21st Panzer could not take part, and the Panzer Lehr had been given other orders (Dietrich didn't know that). 12th SS was locked in combat and could participate only if relieved from the line. 1st and 2nd SS, 2nd and 116th Panzer were all too far away to take part. Rommel informs Dietrich at this meeting that there will be no attack. Rommel then calls Geyr von Schweppenburg to tell him the same thing, a few hours before the latter is taken out of action by the allied air raid. Maybe it is a projection of the heated disagreements between Geyr von Schweppenburg and Rommel before the invasion? Both Geyr von Schweppenburg and von Rundstedt had problems cooperating with Rommel. Cheers Dandelion
  21. Hi Paul Yes. But only disagreeing with the very last sentence - Dietrichs role. Here's what is said in the war diary of the 12.SS-Panzerdivision "Hitlerjugend", which was to participate in the never executed attack (excuse my private translation here). And here is what Maj.Gen. Reynolds writes on the same theme: So it very much appears Dietrich needed not make any decisions at all after the transfer of command to him, after the airraid. Or is it air raid? And I note Anglo-Saxons misinterpret his name. It was Gen.d.Pz.Tr. Frhr. Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg. Leo was his first name, meaning you should write Geyr von Schweppenburg even when only using his last name (well don't look at me like that, I didn't invent these nobility names) Cheerio Dandelion
  22. Mol In Germany, after the reunion, we suddenly see a lot of groups desiring to remind us all of the mass evictions and ethnic cleansing that took place in 45. We have Sudeten German groups, and we have Prussian groups, and a much smaller Silesian movement - political movements all of them, coming from East Germany. Apparently there has not been the climate or opportunity to debate these issues in the East (we see no Alsatian or Lorrainean such groups in the West). I can't see them gaining a lot of weight in domestic politics, although recent processing in the High Court has given the issues some media (not issues of regaining lands - issues of being compensated for the loss of land). Also, Prussian groups remain close to Merkel, a prominent political leader of present Germany. This is not very comforting for westerners. Althoug there is no Prussia anymore, nobody wants her back. Silesia used to be a really sensitive issue, but that was some time ago. Silesia was controversial ever since the UN mandate of 1918, and the division that followed. Even then it was 40% Polish land - by now far more so. The industries coveted by both nations are now obsolete and worthless, the population long since either Polish, or turned Polish. Though we see a strange "reawakening" of ethnic Germans in Poland now, rediscovering their previously forbidden ethnic past. Hopefully, this means nothing. Eastern Prussia is an industrial, economic and enviromental disaster area of Europe. Nobody wants that piece of Russianized land anymore. Not even Poland, who appears the natural owner of the territory. It is not so much a land as a pollution problem, and a staging area for organised crime in the entire Baltic region. Whereas relations with Poland are quite promising, relations with the Czech Republic seem indefinately soured by the differences in views upon historical events. Not sure when they plan to end that hostility. Postwar rhetoric has never really been revanchiste, as in reclaiming land. It has always been an issue of compensation of individuals and recognition of crimes comitted. No other line would be possible in German domestic politics. As you point out - as the older generations die away, these issues lose meaning. More important and pressing issues are at hand, with the present and the future. That we have these debates at all will be a symptom of long surpressed feelings in the totalitarian East. My own family is actually from Altmark, in the East, although we fled the Soviets during the war and ended up in West Germany. Still bonds stay strong. The old family farm was confiscated by the DDR, not a foreign state Chiefly, the family is war weary still, with too many burials and not enough births in the family these last 100 years. Very few left. No energy to hate anyone anymore, no will to remain buried in any of the horrors comitted or suffered. Eyes sternly aimed forward. I imagine much the same goes for most of Germany. Cheers Dandelion
  23. Ok. Karelia was no big deal then. How do Finns feel about the loss of Petsamo, with the ice-free harbour (the sole Northern harbour of Finland) and wealth of raw material (I am thinking principally about Nickel), a growing tourist industry by the early 30s and a hydroelectric plant providing much of Northern Finland with power? A curious Dandelion
  24. I stand silenced in awe, tormented by the unaccustomed torture of thought provoked by your brilliant analysis.
  25. St Malo in particular was declared a fortress sometime between August 18th and 20th. Interestingly, that's after Lorient and St Nazaire had been declared such (August 13th). Most such declarations came in August, and since Cherbourg fell in late June that was after the fall of Cherbourg. But even Cherbourg was called a fortress in the staff meeting of June 17th. Hitler had started his no-retreat policy in the winter of 1942, and from that point all German units that were cut off or threatened to be cut off tended to end up in something called a fortress. Even Cherbourg asked permission to surrender, but was denied. Cheerio Dandelion
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