[Where are all the Allied SMGs?]

Well, I think 36,000 SMGs in an army of ~4 divisions is rather a lot. I'd expect that is one man in 3-5, or 2-3 per squad even if they were no more common in the infantry than in other parts of the formation. It is also more than 1000 SMGs for every infantry-type battalion in the units you listed (2 ID, 1 AD, 2 AB that is), counting engineers, recon, and MG battalions.

Not that that was where they were, but enough for that, which is more than the front-line infantry establishment of the whole formation therefore. Meaning no physical lack of Stens for the infantry is involved, but purely a question of doctrine or choice of weapon.

Stens and Grease guns were very cheap weapons. The Sten apparently cost about 2 pounds to make, and production occasionally reached 50,000 in a single week. The grease ran about $25 dollars. Thompsons are a more intricate weapon, but cost the army only about $100 apiece. Incidentally, for the fellow wondering about the German production numbers, the "burp" gun is the term the Allies gave to the MP40, and the 908K figure I gave is for combined MP38 and MP40 models.

Another fellow gave figures for total UK forces, adding up to around 8 million and perfectly believeable. But most of the commonwealth forces did fight in the European theater, not in the far east. Indian and Australian divisions fought in North Africa and Italy, for example - it is not like they were all in Burma or New Guinea. 18 million served in the German armed forces at some point during the war.

Undoubtedly the Brits dropped many Stens to partisans, probably in the hundreds of thousands, but even a generous estimate there will leave an equal number of SMGs for a smaller armed force, thus more per man. As for throwing them away, all MPs have short life expectancies in combat, simply because the men using them do. But retreating defenders will lose more weapons and advancing attackers, simple because the latter will tend to own the field after a given fight, more often than the reverse.

As for the comments about "avoiding deductions from production figures", it is simply irrational. The Germans issued 1.3 million MP varieties and ten times that many rifles. The Allies did not build more than 6 times as many SMGs and eat them or drop them down wells. A -doctrinal- dislike of them is perfectly possible, though the production figures sort of belie that idea in any extreme form.

If the troops actually preferred rifles in practice, though, a somewhat stronger cause would have to be operating. There would have to be some actual point to using rifles. Which CM does not seem to me to model terribly well, since everyone knows SMG-heavy infantry performs better in CM than rifle armed infantry does, other things being approximately equal.

Personally, I have explained a theory on that subject before. I think the CM ammo system does not fully reflect the much higher ammo expenditure from SMG equipped infantry. The advantage of the rifle is greater accuracy per bullet fired, and thus more hits over the whole ammo load that can be carried. While the advantage of the SMG is greater firepower per unit time, at the expense of a more rapid expenditure of the practical load carried.

Or in CM terms, rifle armed infantry ought to have more shots than SMG armed infantry. The CM system just abstractly gives them 40 shots apiece. It thus translates a properly modeled greater firepower per unit time for SMGs into a greater firepower overall, over the whole ammo load, well above the level of historical realism.

If rifle armed infantry got 50 shots and pure SMG armed infantry 25, then true relations would be clearer. SMG infantry would still have much higher firepower per unit time. But it would only achieve higher firepower over the whole ammo load carried, if almost all shots were traded at quite close range. Then the reasons some preferred rifles would be modeled reasonably well.

But there should still be more Allied squad types. It might be best of all if the weapons load-out of squads were a designer tweakable item. In the absence of that, the Germans have units with ~1/4 SMG, 1/3 SMG, 1/2 SMG, 2/3rd SMG, and pure SMG. The Allies have units with 1/10 SMG (standard), and with 1/3rd SMG (airborne only). I consider this rather silly, and also think the loadouts in the airborne squads are probably closer to ad hoc realities than the vanilla "TOE", pure rifle, types.

If you doubt it, consider the 1st Canadian army example. At one per infantry squad, CM accounts for about 1000 of the Stens (around 30 infantry-type battalions), out of 33K authorized and 36K actually held. Undoubtedly some are in rear areas or carried by crews of various sorts. But 97% of them can never fire a single CM burst, no matter what force mixes are chosen or what events occur.

[Tips on attacking with Armor against Armor]

There are two key issues attacking with Shermans. The first is elementary, that you do not attack with Shermans by physically moving them onto the places you are trying to take over, but instead by getting LOS to the locations. This involves an entirely different way of looking at terrain and cover than infantry fighting involves. The second is teamwork with other arms and between tanks. Each lone tank can only do a few easy things, but working together they can accomplish far more than just adding those solo achievements up.

First the "taking" and "terrain" stuff. First the way it is for infantry, then the differences.

Infantry takes things by sitting on them, because infantry firepower rises very rapidly as the range drops to zero. It also exploits the fact that it can go anywhere, making the interior of bodies of cover a pretty safe place with lots of options, from moving to this side of cover or that. And infantry benefits from cover in a simple way - it gets a cover bonus mechanically from just being in cover. So with infantry, all you have to do is figure out where to go, and go there while using cover.

But on the scale of CM, tank firepower does not appreciably change with range. HE is accurate at anything the tank can see, penetration against enemy armor is mostly a function of enemy facing (front or flank), occasionally of ammo used, but rarely changes significantly with range. Tank MGs have decent firepower at all ranges, and they generally have enough ammo to blast away from a fair distance and still do damage from the cumulative effect.

And tanks do not go everywhere, or benefit from cover primarily from being inside it. Generally they move through open ground only, and the significance of cover is its LOS effects, and secondarily hull down effects from stone walls or being behind rises. Thus for tanks it is almost always a matter of being -behind- this or that cover, not in it.

So, summing up, you are behind not in cover, you don't go everywhere, and you don't need to get close to things. But angles to things matter, what everybody can see matters, hull down matters. Which means you should look at the map not in terms of patches of ground that infantry can live in (cover), but in terms of -areas- of -sighting-. You look at the open areas, not the "cover holes" between them, and think in terms of the "fields" or "ridges" you "own" because your guys can -see- them, not because you are -on- them.

Now, the way you attack with armor is to "walk" those sighted areas into the enemy position, one step at a time. First, a bunch of your tanks and other units can see field A. Some defenders may be there - if so, you shoot the heck out of them, many on few. They are neutralized or pull back. Only then do you advance, not even to get into field A, but in order to -see- the next position, field B, wherever that is.

Because the issue is sighting and control by fire, their is no reason for the tanks to go first. The infantry scouts ahead for the tanks - it is the first to "peep" into field A, for example. That will identify enemy vehicles actually in that area. Infantry teams and FOs can also set up "overwatch", in order to suppress any enemy guns that fire when your tanks look into the field.

What you do not expect the infantry and its supporting teams to be able to do, is kill tanks in a given field, or destroy or drive off all the enemy infantry that might line it on this or that side. All they have to do with those is -spot- them. Then the tanks kill them, or force them to withdraw to avoid that.

The tanks do this not by movement into the field, but by fire into it. They creep to spots with LOS to particular parts of the field - peek around a corner of house or woodline, creep over a ridge. The goal is always many-on-few -differential- sighting. Meaning, all your guns bear on just a few units of the enemy, which you then outshoot, before moving to the next.

Against thick-fronted German armor, like Panthers and Tigers, special additional tactics are necessary. These come in a variety of forms, but the three basic ideas are (1) a special shooter, (2) flank shots via seperation or closing, and (3) distraction or rapid engagements.

Special shooters are the simplest case. You want some TDs - M-10, Hellcat, or Jacksons - or upgunned 76mm Shermans.

T ammo (tungsten core, hyper-velocity armor piercing ammo) is the clearest case, e.g. when you have one tank with 5 or 6 rounds of it, thus likely to use it on a heavily armored target right away. The key issue with specialty ammo use is having a -complete- ID of the target vehicle. Not "tank?", not even "Tiger?". No question marks. Until you have sighting without a question mark, do not risk a shooter with all your T ammo. The crew will use the right ammo, but only if they know -for certain- what they are shooting at, and thus that they need it.

Know the capabilities of the gun you are using, and the enemy vehicle. You can see stats on either by selecting the unit and hitting return. Remember also that enemy armor is often not full quality, so e.g. a Panther turret may well be penetrable, because of only 85% quality, when the raw numbers would suggest otherwise.

In general, the 76mm and better guns on improved shooters will kill -anything- with a flank shot using normal AP, provided the "side angle" to the target isn't too steep. StuGs and Panzer IVs and such, the front armor is no problem regardless of the shooter. Intermediate cases like Jadgpanzer and Hetzer fronts can often be handled by any improved gun, where a plain 75mm Sherman would not do the trick. In more heavily armored front shot cases, T ammo or a 90mm gun will often by the difference between killable and not. Do not guess. If you must, fire up a seperate test game and check the stats.

Achieving flank shots is done through two general means, seperation and closing. The seperation idea is simply that an enemy tank cannot present its front armor to two widely seperated locations at once. If a German tank is in the middle of the map, and you have tanks along each edge with LOS, he cannot face both at once. One or the other will get a flank shot.

Seperation alone will not ensure flank shots because the other guy has the expedient of cover, or use of "keyhole" sighting. That means he picks a spot from which the LOS is long only in one direction, while on the sides it is blocked nearby by buildings, woods, or higher ground. This limits the area of danger for you, but presents only his front armor. To counter keyhole use of cover, you have to suppliment the seperation idea with the closing idea.

In its simplest form, the idea of closing is simply that the angular seperation of your tanks increases as the range to the enemy drops, if the distance between your tanks stays about the same. If the enemy is 2000 meters away, your whole line might be in a 30 degree cone from the direction he is facing. But get alongside of him, and that will widen out to 180 degrees.

Enemy keyhole positions are vunerable to closing because they give up wide fields of fire, which means some places will be uncovered. In the extreme case, you run clear around the building the enemy tank is hiding beside, staying out of his LOS the whole time, because the very building that is protecting his flank prevents him from seeing you. Smoking one location will often let you through an "overlapping" set of "keyhole lines" from several enemies, too.

The third idea is distraction and rapid engagements, which exploit the generally slower turrets (or complete lack of them in the case of TDs) on the German side, compared to fast US turrets and gyrostabilizers to improve shooting while on the move. Again the enemy can't face two directions, but now it is a matter of what he can shoot instead of which of his armor plates is vunerable. So e.g. an infantry squad or a fast moving tank or armored car runs through an enemy LOS, and shortly after that a shooter pops into LOS from a different direction. Done right, the enemy tracks the hard-to-hit or low value target, and is still traversing back to your shooter when your shooter pops him.

This idea works very well against enemy AT guns as well as tanks, since the AT guns typically rotate quite slowly, and are rather vunerable to simple HE. If the gun is initially pointing 90 degrees away from a location you will attack from, a tank can take on an AT gun with confidence. Popping into LOS over a rise then backing up into cover again is another example.

Those are all suppliments to the basic idea, however, which is to walk the LOS of your tanks through the enemy position in discrete stages, taking on a small portion of the enemy force at a time. When an area is cleared by fire - defenders driving back out of LOS - the infantry secures the far side of the "field", which is an area of "cover" almost by definition. Then the tanks come forward and the process repeats. In a covered area is particularly large, so tank fire cannot clear it out completely, then off-board artillery can be dropped on the "inner" portions too.

Avoid rushes by tanks into the enemy position ahead of your own infantry. Remember that the enemy has infantry AT weapons and can be counted on to torch anything within 40 meters of his infantry, and often kill tanks out to 100-150 meters. You do not have to get close - his infantry AT firepower rises dramatically as the range drops, while your anti-infantry firepower is almost constant regardless of range.

Late in a battle, with many enemies broken and his main positions accounted for, it can ooccasionally pay off to get more aggressive running tanks through his territory. But often you can get the same results by changing the line your tanks are fighting along, by a shift through your own, safe territory.

Once your fire can cut up his position and prevent easy redeployments, you can throw most of your weight now at this piece of his force, now at that. You do not have to run into the middle of him to do this, and the middle of his position is probably the only place most or all of his men can fire at. Which is not where you want to be. Eat the "edges" in other words. Many on one is the name of the game. Don't worry too much about objectives. If you kill off his force, they will fall easily near the end.

I hope this helps, and good luck.

[Arc of Fire , Penetration, Underage Girls and other LOS issues]

The way to check the LOS "arc style" is to turn on the LOS tool and then drag it around instead of releasing the endpoint. You can "scan" by dragging the aim point over the map, and where the line is blue is where you can see. The brighter the blue, the clearer the LOS.

[ 06-27-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[A squad's special weapons...]

They fire automatically, as the other fellow said. The rifle grenades will generally be used at 50 meters or less, and are nearly sure to fire only when a vehicle "bypasses" an infantry unit with one, driving through the same or an adjacent tile. Even then, the infantry needs to be relatively unsuppressed, and can miss. I've taken out StuGs (from a flank) and Pumas with them. They seem to penetrate around 35-40mm of armor.

Demo charges are point blank weapons, at close combat distances - around 10-15 meters, in the same tile basically. Their effect against infantry is laughably small - about like a grenade - so forget about trying to use them to kill infantry in buildings or foxholes. They can KO bunkers or the rear of pillboxes, and can take out armor if you get lucky. Engineers (only) that have one remaining can also use it to blow a lane through a spotted minefield to "clear" it, in ~30 seconds to 1 minute. They have to be stationary within about 20-25 meters for that.

German fausts are overpowered rifle grenades, in the above sense. They can take out just about any armor, but their effective range is about half the listed range rating (15, 30, 50 meters for the three types), and they can be frustratingly slow to fire. The best chance is from ambush, with the shooter unspotted and unsuppressed and the range ~20 meters, or 40 meters for the best faust 100s. A platoon ambush marker from their HQ while within command radius, also seems to increase the chance of their use.

If you think of all of them as confering a close combat ability against enemy armor right on top of your squads, provided they aren't pinned or panicking, you will have the general idea.

[demolishing buildings, wirbelwind vs StuH]

On production of German Flak vehicles, the Ostwind proper and the Whirblewind were indeed both rare. 87 Ws and 81 Os were made. But there were another 240 37mm AA tanks like the Ostwind, just with a different turret and gun (the FlaK36(Sf) auf FlakPzIV). There were also 142 single 20mm FlaK mounted on Czech chassis as light AA tanks. All told that is 550 Flak tanks.

The haltrack versions of all three (single 20, quad 20, and 37) were more common, with 610, 319, and 462 of them produced. All told that is ~1400 Flak halftracks.

Thus the whole category was about as rare as Tiger tanks, with halftrack versions about as common as Tiger Is and tank versions about as common as King Tigers. Of course, they were doled out in platoons, pairs, or single vehicles, rather than ~45 at a pop, so more formations had them. And 3/8th of them were only single 20mm mounts, not the better, heavier pieces represented in CM.

[ 06-27-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Improved Anti-tank gun behavior in CM2]

Here is an idea to impliment some sort of diminishing returns to many eyes looking with minimal changes in coding and procedure. Instead of using a one-bit 0-1 flag for spotted or not, use 4 bits with states 0-15. The first bit records spotted or not, same as today. The other 8 states are available to impliment diminishing returns.

Whenever a spotting attempt is made on the unit, this 0-7 "looked at" flag is incremented by 1, unless it is already at "7". Every n seconds, reduce the "looked at" flag by 1. When resolving spotting chances, a unit with the "looked at" flag at "7" is very hard to see, a unit with the flag at 6 is hard to see, a unit with the flag at 0 is spotted normally, with the flag at 1 is a little harder, etc. Perhaps the spotting chance is allowed to double all told with 7 eyes, instead of rising 7-fold.

A unit that is not spotted by the first 7 attempts will remain hidden. Every "n" seconds the counter will reduce and one of the spots will get an improved chance, at the "6" setting before going up again. All other spotters will be trying to see the unit at a "7" setting.

If you like, you can easily reduce the flag for conditions like "unit fires" or "unit moves", and even alter the amount of the reduction for the speed of the movement, etc. This will give a high chance of spotting the target all over again, when a triggering event occurs (e.g. unit fires again), until 7 failures have "blown it" and the chance falls again.

For what it is worth...

[Where are all the Allied SMGs?]

I have been wondering about the lack of SMGs in Allied squads in CM, compared to the common SMGs in German force types. I do not doubt that Germans made extensive use of their MPs, and I am well aware of western Allied doctrine's love of the rifle. But there is a mystery here, which grew as I looked into the overall production figures for SMG makes during the war. I am sure the Russians will have plenty of SMG infantry in CM2. I include their figures to give a sense of the whole match up.

The Germans produced 908,000 MP38 and MP40 "pure" SMGs in the whole war. They also produced 426,000 MP44s, though not all of them made it to the troops by the end. Overall then, 1.3 million SMG types, certainly a considerable number. But on both fronts, all war.

Looking into it, I find the US produced 1.2 million Thompson SMGs and another 600,000 M3 "grease guns" during the war. The figures I have seen for the super-simply Sten start at 2 million and range upward from there. The Russians made 5 million PPsh SMGs.

Now, I am aware the Allies fielded more men overall, and sure some of the Allied SMGs went to the Pacific. But that is more than 6 Allied SMGs for every German one, while in CM today one typically sees ~10% Allied SMGs compared to 33% and up for German small arms.

So, where are they? In CM, the Paras have a few more per squad, but that is only a handful of divisions. No doubt in CM2, the Russians will have pure SMG troop types as a possibility. But what is the breakdown east to west of the German ones? Certainly half in the west can be taken as an upper bound, since the east had a much larger front and longer fighting. Similarly, no more than 1/3rd of the US, and only 1/10th of the Brits (if that), can be written off to the Japanese theater.

Which still leaves more than 4 1/2 Western Allied SMGs (~1.2m US + 1.8m UK) for every German one (less than 650K). The overall infantry odds were nothing like that high. Therefore, the SMGs per man were higher in the western allied forces than in the Germans facing them, despite the impression created by CM.

So, where were they, and where are they? Tank crews? Gun and infantry teams? Drivers? Rear echelon you-know-what-ers? If so for a large numbers, it raises two additional interesting questions. One, isn't it rather distorting to disallow these "side arms" to fire (e.g. mortar crews, etc) while infantry does, when the weapons mix varied along the lines of this rule? (I.e. Allied crews more likely to have SMGs, German crews more likely to have rifles?). Two, how many of these abundant SMGs found their way to the front?

[Soviet Amphib. light tanks.]

These little jobs weren't very common, actually. The Russians did have around 3000 of them all told, which may sound like a lot. But it is dwarfed by the ~12000 T-26s and ~8000 BT series that made up the bulk of the pre-Barbarossa Russian armor fleet.

The amphib "tanks" are MG armed, halftrack armored, glorified armored cars really. Their primary importance is as forerunners of the T-60 light tank design (20mm light tank built in 1941 and 1942), later the T-70 (45mm uparmored light tank produced in 1942 and 1943) and eventually the SU-76 (the use made of the light tank chassis from mid '43 on).

The main Russian tank at the time of the invasion was the T-26, which had a 45mm gun and 2 MGs, and 25mm of armor (early versions had only 15mm). A fair match in gun and armor terms for short 50mm Pz IIIs with 30mm of armor, although the latter had a better 3-man turret and radios. The next most important type were the BT "cavalry" tanks, quite fast and 45mm gun armed as well, but with only 13-15mm of armor, like armored cars have.

Compared to those two, the heavier T-34 and KV series were rare in 1941, and so were the light amphib "tanks". In 1942, the Russians had a mix of surviving 45mm light tanks, new 20mm T-60s, and the rapidly growing fleet of T-34s. By 1943, the T-34s were overwhelmingly the most common type, but supplimented by some 45mm T-70 light tanks and some KV series heavier ones, TDs, etc. The older tanks were long gone by then.

The main "transition" is from 45mm armed light tanks pre-invasion to mostly T-34s by the begining of 1943. The Germans moved from Pz IIIs with short 50mm to Pz IVs with long 75mm, plus long 75mm StuGs, in about the same time frame.

[Best commander of WW2]

Erich von Manstein.

He planned the 1940 blitz of France on the staff. It was his operationally design.

He commanded part of the northern panzer spearhead in Barbarossa and led AG North.

Transfered to infantry, he reduced the Crimea cheaply in a frontal, fortress, infantry and artillery attack. Without needing acres of reserves or large expenditures of men or time.

He nearly relieved Stalingrad when it looked completely impossible on the map. When Hoth, his armor commander leading the attempt, was criticized (in scapegoat fashion) despite his efforts, Manstein threatened to resign if Hoth were so much as reprimanded. He ordered Paulus to break out of Stalingrad even if it meant disobeying a direct order from Hitler, but Paulus declined to do so.

He saved AG South from total destruction in the winter of 42-43. That involved restoring a front that had a few burnt out hulks of divisions to cover a gap hundreds of miles long facing half a dozen Russian armies, when he took over.

By February 43, he directed the Kharkov counterattack and returned the initiative to "neutral".

He advised against Kursk. He advised against holding at all costs in the Dnepr bend. He relieved and evacuated pockets in the Dnepr fighting on his own authority, ignoring "hold" orders from Hitler, and lost his command for it.

He thus showed throughout the war that he had mastered the operational art - on offense and defense, with armor and with infantry, from the staff and from the front, from corps level to army group, in victory and in disaster, in counsel taken and in counsel spurned.

And he added a very rare additional quality - moral courage toward superiors, putting the welfare of the men under his command above his own position, not to mention his safety. His weapon was only the technocrat's threat of resignation - eventually accepted - and his reasoning.

No doubt someone will note that he was also very arrogant and self-serving in his judgements. But that goes with the job description. Senior generals are prima donnas and self-aggrandizers as a matter of course, and one can count the exceptions on one hand. The converse, however, is not true. Just being an arrogant prima donna will not rack up that record.

[How do you play as the Americans?]

Buildings go down ridiculously fast in CM. You can still fight in the rubble of course, but it does not have any elevation/second story. This makes direct fire HE way too effective against building cover.

Urban fighting did produce streets of rubble, but not from light cannon, or even tank guns firing a few scores of shells. They were rubbled by air bombardment in the hundreds of tons of bombs, or artillery fire kept up over days or weeks and running in some cases over a million shells fired.

If one imagines some very light shacks for which the rate of destruction in CM seems realistic (e.g. for a one story wood building perhaps), then the question becomes, where are the more serious buildings?

You know, the air forces went to the trouble of making bombs of several thousand pounds for a reason - because bombs up to 250 or even 500 lbs just did not level city blocks. Up to half the weight of a large air-dropped bomb can be explosive.

The TNT in a tank round is 1-2 lbs, and in light guns rounds (20mm etc) it is measured in grams. Engineers used 5-10 lb bags of TNT to blow holes in brick walls large enough for a man to fit through. The size of explosive charges that bring down the fronts - but not all - of large buildings in terrorist attacks, run into the hundreds and sometimes a few thousand pounds.

A few 1-2 lb HE charges are not going to bring down a 2-4 story brick or concrete building, even if you planted them on supports, which tank fire through a wall does not do.

CM seems to use a cumulative total HE charge received measure to collapse buildings. A more accurate way would add up something like the square of the blast, to make small rounds largely irrelevant and the largest ones the only ones likely to result in collapse. They should be far more robust against blast ratings under 50 or so, and somewhat more robust (especially larger and heavy building types) against even the big shells.

It would probably also be better if it were somewhat probabilistic. The current system encourages systematic elimination of every building in an attacker's path, occupied or not, which is not what they actually did, or could even attempt with just a few tanks.

[Worst Military Commander of WWII?]

Um, it is not a rumor or a secret, and no they didn't know it was going to be at Pearl in particular. But the war department sent out a war warning in the last week of November, 2 weeks before the attack, saying that hostilities were imminent.

The idea that PH was a "bolt from the blue" is pure fantasy - no one has every maintained that it was, outside of comic books and revisionists peddling their wares, anyway.

The truth of the matter is the US simply underestimated Japanese military capability, and drastically so. War was expected, no one was certain where but Southeast Asia was the leading candidate. The Japanese had occupied Indochina recently, from the Vichy French. Troop convoys were seen leaving Shanghai, but later put in at Saigon.

What nobody expected was that the Japanese would manage to hit Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, Guam, the Philipines in half a dozen places, Hong Kong, Thailand (which quickly changed sides and joined them), and Malaysia (on the way to Singapore), all at the same time. PH and Mac alerted their commands for sabotage when they got the war warning, and Mac cancelled leaves and put the men on alert. Which did little. Readiness was still in the basement.

The pre-war plan expected the Japanese would try to seize the Philipines, as they did. It expected that the US navy would then lead a drive across the central pacific, making use of some island bases and thus needing small contigents of marines and engineers for support, to reopen supply to the Philipines. The Japanese navy might give battle there, or that might come later when the US fleet steamed into Japanese home waters. In any event, there would soon be a decisive surface naval action, akin to the ones that decided the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars, and the US expected to win it by bringing more battleships and through superior gunnery (including analog fire control "computers", etc).

The war plan thought all of the above would take around 6 months. They were off by a factor of 7. The Japanese, incidentally, also thought a decisive surface battle in their home waters would decide the war. But they hoped to reduce US battleship strength before then by the Pearl strike, "sniping" by torpedo-carrying G4M "Betty" bombers, submarines, and night torpedo attack by DD flotillas, before the final engagement. They then counted on the 2 secret super-battleships Yamato and Mushashi, with their 18 inch guns and 70,000 ton bulk, to turn the scales in their favor in the final surface battle. The Japanese rightly forecast that for six months they would "run riot", but afterward the US would have the strategic advantage.

In all of the above, what is clear is that the US simply underestimated the Japanese, and both sides underestimated the importance of the air power revolution for naval warfare. The reason the fleet could not steam across the Pacific in 6 months is that operating too close to enemy land based air, underreduced by friendly planes, was suicidal - as the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse to Japanese air attack off Malaysia showed at the outset of the war.

So first air bases had to be built on isolated islands with no infrastructure, and from them the Japanese air forces had to be defeated, and then new bases farther forward had to be seized, and new bases built, and the whole process repeated clear across the Pacific. Which is why it all took so much longer than the US had expected. This did fit the Japanese idea of "sniping", but they never got another battleship that way because of the methodical US advance.

The final "decisive surface engagement" actually did occur in the battle of Leyte Gulf, and resulted in a clear US victory. But by then US naval air power was so strong, the battleships were a side show to the affair. The key issues turned out to be the 100 new carriers (most of them small CVEs, but more than a dozen large ones) the US built during the war, and the thousands of naval aircraft they carried - an order of magnitude more than anything the Japanese could field.

But nobody knew such things in 1941, on either side. And both sides underestimated the other. The Japanese underestimated US willingness to fight, as well as tech and econ strengths of the US. The US underestimated - drastically - the efficiency and skill of the Japanese naval and air forces. Wars often result from such underestimates, so it is not exactly suprising when they and wars are found together.

But there most certainly was warning about imminent attack from Washington. War department cable number 472 on November 27 to the pacific Army commands, 1941 for example - here is what it said -

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five (the war plan) so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

The Navy message of the same day was even more explicit - its first sentence read "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning". General Short in Hawaii and Mac in the Philipines acknowledged receipt of the messages, Mac placed his troops on alert (for what good it did), and Short took precautions against sabotage.

Back in Washington, the Secs of War, State, and Navy agreed the Japanese were "planning some deviltry", and "Magic" intercepts (from the broken Japanese diplomatic code - the navy code was not yet cracked) confirmed they were holding off a reply in the failing negotiations while waiting for something to happen. They thought an attack was about to occur, but did not know where. All of this has been well known and well documented, undisputed history since the 1950s and 60s, with nothing new about it.

The idea that there was no warning is simply false. Not enough was done with what warning there was, because the Japanese were not expected to be capable of what they actually accomplished in the first few days. That is all. Revisionists have made a minor industry out of alleging otherwise, but almost always by avoiding the whole subject of the actual warnings given, and the long-since published documents, and memoires of the participants, that show warnings were given.

[Worst Military Commander of WWII?]

The worst commander of WW II was Italian Field Marshall Rudolfo Graziani, commander of the 10th Army in North Africa from June 1940 until he resigned his command in February, 1941. He commanded an army of over 300,000 men, over 100 combat battalions including 10 battalions of tanks and 40 of artillery, he faced British General O'Connor in the Egyptian desert.

From early December 1940 to February, the British had available the 7th Armored division, the 4th Armored brigade, the 4th Indian division for only the initial stages, later withdrawn, and the 6th Australian division relieving it. The British forces numbered around 35,000 men. At the first point of attack, the Brits had 275 tanks to 120, while the manpower ratio was the same size in the other direction.

The Italians proceeded to lose essentially their entire force, inflicting only modest losses on a British force less than 1/8th their size. Graziani's passive positional defenses at coastal ports, in depth, allowed his positions to be destroyed in sequence.

First 80,000 Italians at Sidi Barrani fought the whole British force and lost, losing 40,000 prisoners after the British armor cut their line of retreat. The Italians then holed up in Bardia, and were surrounded again, and soon lost another 30,000 prisoners. Tobruk was next - a position that the Australians held against the Italians and Rommel for a year - and fell in 3 days, with another 30,000 prisoners.

The Italians then fell back along the coast road to Benghazi. But unable to secure adequate supplies for their masses in that limited port, they continued the retreat along the coast road toward El Aghelia, without a rear-guard holding the port. The Brits blocked their retreat with a single armor brigade, which was down to 3000 men and 29 operational medium tanks.

In the consequent fight, Beda Fomm, the Italians with 120 tanks - a number of them decent mediums - and tens of thousands of men, were defeated by the British, with 40 Italian tanks KOed on the field to only 3 British ones lost. The encircled Italians surrendered in crowds.

In less than three months, the entire Italian force in North Africa, the 10th Army - 300,000 men - had ceased to exist as a fighting force, while the odds had been 8 to 1 in their favor, and with the enemy doing the attacking. Graziani acknowledged his own incompetence as a field commander by resigning his command.

Nobody else even comes close.

[Gamey tactic? - your opinions please]

Breaking through on one narrow axis to come at the defense from another angle is fine. And a good defense will be able to adapt to it. But hugging the map edge with the entire force is gamey. It exploits an unrealistic bottomless pit of tartarus to secure half of the intruders problem.

There is, incidentally, an in-game "solution" to this problem, though not a foolproof one. Drop arty on that map edge. Units that break very close to an edge often run off the map. Another possibility at set-up is to put a few AP mines along the edges, particularly if they have covered terrain for a long "lane" of approach.

A turning movement that uses 1/3rd of the map is one thing, a column along the edge of "the pit" is something else again.

[T17E1 = Daimler?!?!]

No, those were called the "Staghound" in British service. The UK built Daimlers came out earlier, in time for the North Africa fighting, while the Brits only got the Stags in Italy in 1943. The Daimler had a 2 lber (40mm, Brit made ATG) while the Stags had a US built 37mm like on Stuarts.

Most "Stags" were actually issued to commonwealth troops - Indian, New Zealand, and Canadian. The Staghound was a larger vehicle, with a more heavily armored turret in particular (~32mm of armor, light tank rather than halftrack thickness).

The Staghounds weren't accepted because they are rather large and heavy for a light armored car, especially a 4-wheeled one. It weighed almost twice as much as the more thinly armored M-8 Greyhound, which has 6 wheels too for better off-road mobility.

I hope this helps.

[Historical Questions about those dang 20mm guns..]

Actually, most aircraft autocannons have the shells fused to explode after traveling some set range limit, to detonate them even if they miss their intended target. And prevent them from falling wherever. I know the 20mm in Brit aircraft did, and I've read combat reports that talk about the little white puffs in the air in dogfights.

[How do you play as the Americans?]

The Americans fight with combined arms and teamwork. They need to make greater use of arty support against tight terrain areas, while firefighting with infantry initially from farther out, 150-200 yards.

Vehicle fire and support weapons clear out the forward edges of enemy cover, supplimented by infantry overwatch groups. Arty drops on "reverse slopes" - meaning, places you can't get LOS to easily from a reasonable distance, whether caused by hills, woods, or buildings. Vehicle HE flattens the forward buildings too. Infantry mops up with close combat, at grenade and bayonet range, rushing in areas where the defenders have already been killed, broken, or forced to withdraw to break LOS.

Everything is a continuous movement of firepower then infantry onto the target. Americans win by expending -ammo-. US artillery modules always come with more shells than comparable German ones, US tanks come with more HE. Many US vehicles have large MG ammo supplies and large numbers of MGs, while quite a few common German types have less than 50 shots. The Germans have high ammo in some gun types, but they typically do not last long enough to use it all once spotted. The Germans also have good ammo for their HMG teams, so suppressing them is a high priority.

The SMG portions of German squads will fire along with the rest at medium ranges without doing anything to speak of; that is how you can draw their teeth. When you do have to close, close all the way. Numbers matter in close combat and US squads typically have them. Don't give SMGs time to blast away at you at 30-70 yards. 150-200 yards or 5-10 yards, that is where you want to be. Preferably with suppressed enemies between, obviously.

For antitank work, the TDs are best with Sherman 76s next. T ammo will torch almost anything, and 76 and better guns will kill anything from the sides with straight AP. But you want your shooter moving up on a spotted enemy from an angle he isn't facing. Never "fight fair", head to head. Also, remember that German turret armors are typically weaker, and thus they can be KOed more easily (relatively speaking, i.e. compared to them getting you) in hull down duels than in exposed ones.

For forces, use the faster cheap teams. A zook costs only 3/5ths what a schreck does and gets 8 rounds rather than 5. They can even blast buildings for you, and I have often set tiles on fire with them. Use MMGs rather than heavier types, then use them in pairs as an "MG squad". They don't have enough fp alone, but a pair of them are quite robust, and medium speed is very useful compared to slow. Stick with the 60mm mortars from one company purchase.

Use your weapons HQ and the company HQ as additional "support" "platoons". The company HQ can borrow a squad from one of the line platoons if you like, too. The FOs, MMGs, and mortars should go with those two, though sometimes 2 MMGs for an "overwatch" infantry platoon works well. Do not keep the 60mm too far back or you won't get LOS with them. They have medium speed too. Use them in at least two places, so one patch of trees or crestline doesn't take all of them out of the battle, LOS wise.

Buy straight infantry platoons with additional infantry points, not a second company or engineers. If you want close assault ability, take more zooks not flamethrowers. If you want more ranged fire ability, take more MMGs in pairs, not HMGs, 50s, or additional mortars.

Use the heavier arty, not just 81mm mortars. Your artillery edge comes from faster barrages with the heavy types as much as from more shells. Use the 105s and the 155s. 81s are fine for smoke or enemy troops in the open, or moving through woods, but they will not seriously hurt troops in foxholes or buildings. When you do bring down arty, fire it for at least a minute and a half, up to two and a half minutes (1-2 close adjusts included). That is long enough to hurt something with the heavier shells. Your barrages are fast enough to cancel missions and start again.

For vehicle screen types, you want to use the M-8 Greyhounds, the M3A1 halftracks (but not more than 2 or you are spending too much), and if you want to scout then add M-20 scout cars with 50 cals. The M-20s have limited ammo, so they do not fight as well as the other two vehicles, but are cheap enough for scouting work. Jeep MGs are speedy but too easily KOed by infantry fire - use the M-20s instead.

For armor points, others have mentioned the gamey M8HMC. Realistically, a pair of those with Stuarts or M-8 Greyhounds is reasonable, but more is not. A pair of TDs is a good "core" for a combined arms force type, able to do the anti-tank work you will need and cheaply (unless you know the enemy has the infantry force type - then use vanilla Shermans instead). With an armored force type you can afford to take Shermans and include improved types - a W+ or jumbo point tank, 1-2 76s, 0-1 105s, 2-3 vanilla 75s as "wingman" for the better tanks and for infantry killing.

Spend anything left over on more zooks. You will find plenty of uses for them.

[Historical Questions about those dang 20mm guns..]

The Germans did indeed produce a large number of 20mm AA guns counted by tube, but only 18,000 single mounts and around 2,000 quad mounts were produced for the -army- as -dismounted- guns, over the whole war. Around 8,000 of the singles and 1,400 of the quads were made before 1944. There were also around 2300 heavier 37mm FLAK made for the army, most in 1943 and 1944.

20mm were also used as aircraft guns in the Luftwaffe (4 per FW-190 e.g.), on moderate numbers of Panzer IIs plus armored cars of various makes, and some on halftracks (like the SPW-250/8 in CM), and also mounted as AA on tanks (a few hundred), halftracks and trucks (a few thousand combined). The Luftwaffe also had many for close air defense of rear areas in FLAK formations, not under army control.

All told perhaps 150k -tubes- were produced, but often in multiple mounts, on aircraft or vehicles, or in rear areas. The dismount 20mm single FLAK guns for the army were only about 1/4 as common as 81mm mortars, and less common that PAK of all types by about 1/3. Still a common weapon, but not flocks of them with every infantry battalion.

As for armored panzergrenadiers (one battalion per panzer division) platoon command vehicles, they were supposed to have a 37mm PAK (a type not included in CM). Some probably used 20mm instead (SPW-250/8 e.g.), or halftrack mounted 75mm infantry guns for that matter (SPW-251/9 e.g.). The idea was any sort of heavier direct fire weapon to suppliment the MGs on the 'tracks. But this is only a matter of about a dozen vehicles in each panzer division, since it was only one battalion (occasionally two) that was mounted on 'tracks to begin with.

[Historical Questions about those dang 20mm guns..]

The problem with Pacos' otherwise interesting document is its date and place, 1940 and Spain. As such, it reflects (as he says) the experience of fighting against early model, pre-war tanks. 20mm FLAK could penetrate the thin sheet metal protecting light armor, but the major combatants in the real war - even in the west in 1940 - were using tanks with heavier armor, generally proof against 20mm FLAK.

They were certainly used in a ground role. But nothing like 6 per battalion, as one fellow implied. Entire infantry divisions often had only 12 of them (as one company of the divisional AT battalion), and sometimes none at all. They were typically deployed with four as a battery, or two as a section, to defend a key point or a particular unit - such as HQs, artillery batteries, bridges, and sometimes forward infantry positions.

In practice, the Germans used them along with heavy machinegun teams, 81mm mortars, 75mm infantry guns, and 37mm, 50mm, and (only late in the war) 75mm PAK, as "heavy weapons". These heavy weapons provided the direct fire -reach- of infantry strongpoints, enabling them to suppress infantry attackers a long way off and above all to cover the gaps between strongpoints by fire. Only the PAK provided serious AT capability at range, and in the case of the lighter ones (37mm especially) even they often did not provide much. But the rest provided good anti-personnel firepower, and could stop thin skinned trucks and such.

The direct fire of the heavy weapons, supplimented by artillery barrages called from farther back, were supposed to stop infantry and force any motorized units to unload. If some infantry got through the zone of heavy weapons fire, it was supposed to be depleted enough that it could not reduce the strongpoints directly. It could infiltrate between them, but disorganized and reduced. Then counterattack forces would hit the sides of the penetrations and wipe out the intruders.

It was not the number of any one type of heavy weapon - including 20mm FLAK - that could produce this effect, but the cumulative firepower of all of them combined. An infantry battalion might or might not have 2-4 20mm FLAK. But it would have 6-12 81mm mortars (2 per company and battalion level ones, but sometimes only one or the other), 2-4 75mm infantry guns, 2-4 PAK, and a dozen or more heavy machineguns. A supporting artillery battalion would add the fire of a dozen more heavier guns when possible. So overall, soft targets trying to penetrate the strongpoint zone would encounter the fire of 25-50 support weapons, and often the fire of a dozen of them (overall) on any given avenue of advance.

Organizationally, some of these weapons were at the company level (HMGs and 81mm mortars), others at battalion or regiment (the infantry guns, a few PAK), or assigned to a regiment (or KG) from divisional assets (heavy PAK from the divisional AT battalion, light or heavy FLAK likewise or in a seperate divisional FLAK battalion, artillery support from the artillery regiment, etc). Tactically, they were sited in company or battalion level strongpoints along the line, or in a second "tier" of strongpoints ~1 km or less behind the infantry ones and covering gaps between them in checkerboard fashion, to make greater use of their range when terrain allowed it.

Facing only a few heavy PAK, full blown tank units could usually get through such a defensive zone, between the strongpoints. With only a few tanks supporting infantry, the up-front PAK could handle them easily enough, and they might take out a few from a larger tank unit, and prevent it from sticking around in the defended zone. The main effect on massed tanks, though, was to strip them of infantry support and button them up.

A mass of buttoned, unsupported tanks rummaging around in an unscouted enemy rear then made a fine target for counterattacking assault guns or tanks, or could be hunted at night by infantry AT teams with grenade bundles, molotovs, magnetic mines, schrecks, or fausts. If the attackers could not break through the "soft" defense someplace in the zone and re-establish both combined arms and supplies rapidly, the tanks could accomplish little, and were in serious danger if any sort of armor were available to counterattack.

The heavy weapons, including 20mm FLAK, were not expected to KO enemy armor and did not need to, for the whole defense system to work. In CM terms, a realistic number to have on one field is 2 or 4, not more. But a dozen guns of all types is perfectly reasonable in a battalion-sized fight. Just do not take all 20mm FLAK. You can take 2-4 of them, and the same of 75mm infantry guns, on-map 81mm mortars, and/or 50mm or 75mm PAK, plus a few TRPs and 75, 81, and/or 105mm FOs.

E.g. 2x20mm, 2x75mm inf, 2x81mm on-map, 2x75mm PAK, 2xTRP, 1x81mm FO, 1x105mm FO. That heavy weapons and artillery load-out costs 500 points as regulars, 40% of it is the artillery and 60% of it the direct fire stuff. In a smaller fight where the artillery budget won't fit, substitute 75mm support for 105mm and use only 1 infantry gun, for ~400 points. If you need to economize further, you can reduce the PAK to 50mm or use just one, drop the on-map 81mm mortars, etc. Defending infantry uses that sort of gun mix instead of spending points on armor and vehicles. The "armor" is provided by digging in and by hiding until the right target appears.

[Pershing vs. Super Pershing]

On armor in Korea, I second some of the previous fellow's comments but disagree on several of the points he made. First, the NKs had no SU-85s or SU-100s. They had less than 100 SU-76s, open-topped SP guns not dedicated TDs. They had around 150 T-34/85s, counting all the replacements they received. The NK tankers were not veteran quality at all, and displayed extremely "greenness" in their first encounters with US forces - such as driving single file along roads past a battery positions one at a time, not locating targets while buttoned, getting well ahead of the infantry without cutting off withdrawl routes, etc.

Second, it is true the first US tanks they encountered where M-24 Chaffees, from the divisions first sent from Japan. The Chaffees scored a moderate number of kills and lost practically nothing to the NK tanks. They were however commonly cut off by the superior NK infantry infiltrating behind their positions and cutting their roads out, and many were abandoned by their crews in such cases, with the men escaping over the hills, between NK roadblocks.

Other early killers of NK armor included napalm from tac air, 105mm HEAT rounds, and once airlifted to the theater 3.5 inch bazookas (aka schrecks). US armor also rapidly reached the theater in strength, and by August the NKs were heavily outnumbered in armor terms and reduced to using platoon-sized penny packets to support infantry. Only the 24th infantry division's earlier fight faced NK armor superiority, as well as the ROKs of course (who started the war with around 20 M-8 Greyhounds and nothing heavier).

E8 Shermans with 76mm guns were indeed among the first medium tanks to reach the theater. But Pershings arrived at the same time and in about the same numbers. The problem the Pershing had in Korea was its mobility. The road net was extremely poor, and the fighting in the southeast was in hilly terrain, often muddy as well. The Pershing was underpowered for its weight and mechanically unreliable off-road in such conditions. There was no absolute lack of them. It was a question of getting them somewhere where they could do something.

The M46 Patton was the answer to the Pershing's problems. It was based on the Pershing, with the main change being a new engine that drastically improved horsepower to weight and thus off-road mobility. At the same time, the M41 Walker Bulldog was developed (1951), mating a 76mm gun with the M-24 chassis to create a sort of cross-breed Chaffee-Hellcat. Upengined Pershings and upgunned Chaffees, in other words. But until they were available, the Chaffee and Sherman had the mobility Korean conditions demanded, and the Chaffee's gun was only suitable for fighting infantry.

But there were very few clashes of armor at the Pusan perimeter. The NKs had lost ~2/3rds of their quite limited armor force by then, and could not make good the losses. By that point, daytime road movement was also impossible due to tac air. The largest concentrations of NK armor one reads about in the histories from that point on are ~5-10 AFVs supporting whole infantry battalions or regiments.

The T-34 scare was basically restricted to the month of July - and US forces were only in action for 3 weeks of it. During which tac air cut the NK armor in half, and the various ad hoc means - Chaffees, artillery HEAT, and the new zooks - cut it in half again. This was done in a dozen small actions where sometimes 3, sometimes 7, and on one or two occasions 15 or so T-34s were KO'ed. By August the NKs had ~50 AFVs and the US had several hundred in theater. NK armor was never a problem again.

Korea was fundamentally an infantryman's war, and "mountain" infantry at that. It was well conditioned men capable of moving off road through the hills at speed, that possessed the advantages of mobility and ability to envelope anything road-bound. Not tanks, or trucks.

The US learned this the hard way, first on the Pusan perimeter and again after Chinese intervention (they were even better at it that the NKs, doing more in mountains in the snow than the NKs had done in hills in the summer). Initially US troops lacked the physically conditioning to execute large-scale maneuevers off-road. The troops were tied to their vehicles.

It wasn't until March of 1951, 9 months into the war, that the US forces really got up in the hills and got over their dependence on roads. Once they did so, they were able to use their superior vehicle support for a different purpose - better logistics for artillery supply.

This difference and the learning curve associated with it had much more to do with early US problems in the war than the armor match-up, which was over as an issue within 3 weeks of US ground forces becoming engaged.

US forces had air supremacy in a few days and armor supremacy in a few weeks. But the infantry lesson - get off the roads and up into the hills, with continuous positions to prevent easy flank marches - took months to learn, and had to be learned all over again against the Chinese.

[Help on the proper use of Shermans?]

The basic answer is teamwork. The infantry scouts ahead to find the German armor. It is hard to hide for long. They can also keep the schrecks away. Never lead with them, and remember you do not need to be close to infantry to hurt them, you just need LOS. If you want to scout "mounted", use cheap light armor like US M-20s or Brit Carrier MMGs, not full tanks.

Keep pairs of Shermans seperated from one another, with "inward", "crossing" LOS. That will give you flank shots. Use cover too, but by cutting up LOS rather than sitting in terrain (behind a house, peaking around the end of woods, etc). Distraction and smoke are other aides.

And get some "shooters" with more powerful guns (Sherman 76 or TDs) to help with front armor situations. One hidden M-10 with tungsten can change the whole outlook, by forcing the Germans to hide as much as you.

Also, watch out for the front-armored beastie sitting by a map edge and rotated inward to guard against flank shots. The way to get to them is bring zooks up the edge, to flush them like quail for the tank "hunters".

The goal is to have some Shermans left after the German armor is KO'ed. Then you go to town on the infantry. Shermans have lots of MGs and high HE loads, making them particularly effective infantry killers, using a stand-off, firepower attack.

If enemy infantry pulls back behind cover to break LOS completely, dump arty on them or rush them with infantry. Do not charge the tanks up to get LOS again at 50 meters - you will just eat a faust or schreck round. Wait until the arty and infantry have cleared that batch of cover, then move up around it. The tanks do the -front- side of enemy positions, arty does the middles, infantry clears out the remainder.

In the later war months, use the strengths of the various special Sherman types and the TDs, not just vanilla Shermans. W+ armor and Jumbos are good against enemy PAK. TDs, Sherman 76s & Fireflies against enemy heavy armor. Plain Shermans should pair off with those to lead, distract, get flank shots, kill infantry, etc. Think in terms of a "shooter" and his "wingman", with tactics like "split-up and double-back". Enemy tanks can't face two directions at once.

[AI attacking in QB's - implications for CMBB]

I have in the past suggested various improvements to the AI routines. This is a good addition. The obvious reason for the assymmetry on defense is more room to set up, and thus more cover to set up in, etc.

I think the AI could be vastly improved if some way can be found to give it a list of "don'ts". Mechanically applied, a few rules of thumb would make it a much stronger opponent.

1. don't put infantry squads out of command range. Trail company HQs to pick up stragglers. Use group moves by platoon to maintain "station".

2. don't send vehicles close to already dead friendly vehicles. Try another place 100 meters to either side.

3. don't fire an entire artillery module at the same location. Use 1/2 to 1/3 of it, then switch targets. Call fire missions soon when an enemy is spotted by anyone, whether the FO has LOS to the target or not.

4. don't move AFVs worth more than 100 points ahead of the farthest friendly infantry unit. Light armor is OK, but the big guys need protection from AT teams.

5. don't move slow dismounted teams across 100+ meters of open ground (slow means anything less than "fast"). "Hop" or "stop" in covered locations.

6. don't move a slow weapons team that has LOS to an enemy unit. If possible fire instead. Only exception is flamethrowers.

7. don't lead with HQs. Pause them 1-2 times to trail their units. When enemy aren't spotted, lead with a single squad one "pause" ahead of the rest (i.e. 1 squad without a pause), then the main body (with 1 pause), then the HQs (with 2). When enemy units are spotted, pause only the HQs and only once. Plot 2-3 minute moves.

8. don't open fire immediately with towed guns. Hide and use ambush markers instead.

9. don't bunch up on objectives. Target spotted enemies, or support from 100 meters on either side with about half the force available.

10. don't run under, or sit under artillery barrages, unless in stone buildings. Run to the rear instead, and return after 2-3 minutes.

I don't know if the AI can be "taught" to follow such rules, but if it can, its play would improve enourmously if it simply avoided such obvious and predictable "unforced errors".

[What does the date have to do with it?]

In addition to the factors already mentioned, one large infantry change with the date is German panzerfaust models available. They go from largely ineffective 30s in the first 3 months, to reasonable 60s after that, and the excellent 100s in early 45.

[Obscure equipment question]

I'd say that item was a misunderstanding. It looks like a 37mm AA gun, on a light infantry gun chassis. The Russians did have a 37mm infantry gun early on, and that is the sort of chassis and shield you'd expect for that kind of piece. But it is a much, much smaller item. It may have been a field mod to get some useful AT capable infantry support weapon. Or it may have been a museum display error, in the sense that they knew part A was a 37mm infantry gun carriage, and asked for a 37mm gun to put on it as part B, and got the huge AA gun instead of the little dinky infantry howitzer - LOL. That's my guess.

[How Do You Make An Attack/Defense Scenario Fair?]

That the AI is generally clueless is well known. That it is particularly clueless on the attack is also well known. Balance is only an issue between humans. Against the AI, playing a few times should be more than enough "balance". Still fun, of course, and fast to play which is nice. But not a serious challenge, after not very long.

[Exit Victory Conditions: Detailed info wanted]

Yes, units are tagged "should exit for points" or not on an individual basis. You can see for each one by selecting it and pressing "enter" for the unit details window. A little text message will say "should exit for points" for those units eligible, not for others.

Units exited successfully seem to earn 3x cost for the exiter. Units designated "should exit" that -fail- to exit, seem to earn the other side 2x cost. And the destruction of a unit is additional. Thus a dead exiter fails to exit (2x) and dies (1x), total 3x, which balances a successful exit (3x).

While "alive but not exited" has an intermediate effect - the "live or dead" points go to the owner, but the 2x exit points go to the preventer. So sacrificing an equal or smaller force to successfully prevent enemy exit, will generally count as a success, even if the prevented side mostly lives.

If any appreciable number of units have exit VCs, the outcome of the scenario will be dominated by -how many- of them successfully exit. Exiting -half- while the other half die and fail, will have no net point effect, but will tend to make the outcome closer to a draw from bigger "divisors" for overall points possible.

Exiting most will usually win. Exiting few or none will lose. A single exited tank is more important than a large flag, and even a single eligible squad is typically worth a small one.

Scenario designers should keep in mind how big an impact exit VCs have. And that they are not optional, not some sort of "bonus" points. The "should" in "should exit" is imperative mood, not a suggestion.

Exit VCs are most appropriate when the decisive action is occurring -off- the scenario map itself, so that whether forces get to that action or not, is the most important consideration in the on-map fight.

Also, if other flags and losses are to matter, scenario designers should limit the portion of the force or forces eligible for exit. For example, only making the tanks eligible, not the infantry or lesser vehicles, or part of the infantry rather than all of it.

And when balancing a scenario with exit VCs, keep in mind the "neutral" outcome is not "most alive but not exited". Instead, it is "half manage to exit", so physical exit of at least a portion of the force should not be too hard to achieve.

I hope this helps.