[The Mortain fiasco]

I agree with s-e-ave that the 30th did very well, both in terrain chosen and in fighting spirit. I doubt those alone would have been enough if the Germans had the infantry and artillery to deal with bypassed infantry - but they never had "odds" in either of those categories.

I also doubt that a portion of the German tanks reaching the coast would have mattered very much. They might then have been in just the right place, but there still weren't nearly enough of them, and there were too many American tanks running about - supported by all arms while the German tanks would not have been, that far in - for them to have held the "cut" open, even if they had made it. Again, 350 tanks (and far less by the time they fought their way in) just were not going to beat 5 times their number, and overcome a large advantage in the other arms, just through clever placement.

I think the whole thing was desperation and a "map illusion" - the short length of the distances, the fantasy that anything "cut off" would die instantly, the illusion that 5 full strength mobile divisions (in name only) were taking part instead of 2 (actual strength available).

The Germans hit the Americans with significant armored counterattacks twice in the Normandy campaign. This one, in early August with ~2 divisions and the overall odds very strongly against them, failed in the manner described. The earlier one, by Panzer Lehr with about half a division's worth of actual front-line forces, was in mid July, and had a similar outcome. The tanks drove in a few miles, the infantry got stripped off them by ungodly artillery, the scattered forward tanks were hunted down by TDs (mainly), reserve armor from the US ADs, jabos, and bazooka teams.

American force designs and especially artillery strength, as well as their deployments, just were not fragile. They had infantry, zooks, 57mm ATs and FOs forward, with plenty more infantry available to reinforce from flanks or rear (reserve battalions, 2 up one back deployments, etc), plus TDs and armor, supported by massive artillery. The initial break in with the armor was far easier than making something of it.

Portions of the Bulge fighting saw the same problems, but the scale there was much larger, and the Germans did have infantry and artillery odds at first, which is when they made the big advances. Armor that pushed on further was cut apart, because bypassed infantry behind them refused to die and set the whole sequence in motion as described - Peiper was, and later the lead elements of 2 Pz near Celles likewise.

In Normandy, I think part of the fascination with the Mortain attempt is simply doctrinal. Many today agree with many on the German general staff before D-Day, that the right way to stop the invasion was a large scale armored counterattack. Rommel, in case anybody forgot, thought differently and cited superior air and artillery as reasons the beaches were the best chance they'd get. I do see merit in the armored counterattack view, but the Germans blew their shot at it long before Mortain. Two month after the invasion, with gobs of Allies ashore, and after the German armor had been attrited 75%, was hardly "le moment juste". I'll discuss what I think their best chance for the armor idea was, in another thread. I think it probably would have failed for the same general reasons, even launched at the right time - but it might have had a serious chance, while Mortain did not.

[SMG thread annex]

Well, I am not Jeff, certainly. And I never told Slapdragon to "shut up", as Steve would have it. I merely pointed out that indifference is not a reason to use one player-set setting rather than another, when a potential opponent has a preference in the matter.

Player set items are not the same as BTS programming changes. It is perfectly reasonable for BTS to avoid making any changes unless they see a strong need for them, since it involves their time, the stability of code, one size must generally fit all (with some room for varied settings of course).

But which type of infantry players choose, and what unit details scenario designers tweak, are not in the same category - the things used are not scarce, and accomodating agreement between the players (or between scenario designer and the player who chooses to play that scenario) is the thing needed.

Indifference may be an argument against changes in the first category, but it doesn't present much of an argument in the second sort of case. "No, we can't do it your way, because I don't care one way or the other", is not much of an argument, directed at a gaming partner.

I thought that Slapdragon rather overlooked this distinction, but I took him at his word that he does not think infantry type choices and modest ammo tweaks matter much, one way or the other. That's fine by me, and if everyone is as accomodating in practice, that's all I can ask for. Doubtless he will use default settings and any infantry types when playing people who think as he does, simply out of convenience. But if he is indifferent in the matter, there isn't any reason he can't humor players that prefer the tweaks, when he plays them.

In general, I agree with Steve's last post - the point is, indeed, that there are several ways to play CM. I would quibble about the comment that there is no need to promote alternatives, simply because people need to know about and to understand a proposal to use it - but I do find the strindency of opposition I've sometimes seem, rather silly.

The absurd length the subject has gone, I put down to several parts, some more reasonable than others - hashing out decent proposals, discussing points of realism and game experiences, making proposals workable with what we've got - plus a fair amount of denial the issue exists, and opposition to any alternatives to the default settings and free for all unit choices.

I find the last of those unreasonable for several reasons. One, because we are talking about player settings, exactly Steve's "whatever two people do". And two, because I find in practice that some people already make de facto stipulations about subjects like infantry types, often in a vague manner, with plenty of room for misunderstanding etc. And three because the previous basically arose from widespread player experience (which fits my own), by tests, and by analysis - so I find arguments no issue exists unconvincing.

Somebody else might, but that then just defaults to the first. Play people who think that way, if you like, or if you really think it doesn't matter then just accomodate your opponent's preferences. That part all seems obvious enough to me.

[ 07-19-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[SMG thread annex]

Olandt has a suggestion, but I don't think it addresses much of the issue. I suppose there may be some players out there taking 100% VG SMG platoons, but I've not seen it. The SMG infantry type has 77% automatics even buying companies; FJs have 70%, etc.

If the Allies have to buy paras by company, they lose quite a bit of flexibility. They can't mix glider and para types below the company level in that case. For the US, that also means the mix of support weapons becomes quite rigid. A couple of paratroop and one or two glider platoon(s), e.g., is often a better company mix, and accurate enough for what might be scraped together in a drop (let alone to simulate line infantry with extra carbines and SMGs). One platoon of engineers (pace Mr. Dorosh's other topic) is also a realistic item, so a hard requirement to "take a battalion if there are 9 platoons" or anything similar, seems too rigid to me.

Moreover, the number of possible weapons mixes for the Allies takes rather a dive with his suggestion (6 US platoons implies exactly 6 60mm mortars e.g.), but with all the German infantry types available, they can still pretty much pick the mix they want while still using companies to do it. It might make some difference in the largest battles, "requiring" whole battalions. The problem does not seem to me to be flexibility below the company level, and flexibility is already skewed toward the Germans. So reducing it further for both sides is not going to balance anything.

As for ASL vet, he seems not to have grokked my point about Slapdragon's comments - perhaps because he may not agree with those comments, I suppose. Half the reason I have suggested that skeptics try my proposals is to see the scale of difference they make, and that it is in the nature of a tweak. Not "test", mind, but try, as in new scenarios and ordinary competitive games. Regarding the change as not big enough to upset anything Slapdragon regards as important, is quite sufficient, whether ASL Veteran notices that or not.

An anecdotal analogy - one fellow I am playing right now prefers renumbering files for record keeping and back up purposes. I prefer overwriting, because my email is saved regularly, so retrieving a past file from the original attachments (time stamped etc) is simple, without cluttering my PBEM directory with numbered files. But my preference in the matter is trivial, mostly a matter of indifference, so naturally we do it the way he likes. There is no reason not to, because nothing serious is involved as far as my preferences go on the subject. It costs nothing to do it his way.

Similarly, if someone likes the changes and regards them as improvements, obviously it is a gain to them when they are used. If someone else doesn't care one way or the other because they doubt it makes any real difference, then it costs nothing to indulge the first fellow. To not do something that one party to a game thinks improves it, requires not indifference on a partner's part - which is what Slapdragon expressed - but a definite preference in the other direction.

But so far, despite plenty of whining and moaning, I haven't heard anyone say that they have tried the suggestions, found they did make a significant difference, and that they dislike the differences they made. Perhaps some people think that would be the case even though they haven't tried it. Perhaps some people have tried it and found it so, but haven't bothered to tell any of the rest of us. Or to say just what earth shattering impact they found the proposals had, that they think so unacceptable.

Personally, I think there aren't any earth shattering impacts, but that they do make a difference and for the better - obviously, otherwise I wouldn't have made the proposals. I suspect some people think they would have marginal impacts that they wouldn't like (perhaps making a favorite force mix less effective, calling for revisions of some system, whatever), and carp about the suggestions because of that. But then don't come out and say so directly, perhaps because they think said marginal impacts being undesirable to them, is something they can't defend publically, or don't wish to at any rate.

Others perhaps can't be bothered one way or another, but why any such would regale us with their indifference then becomes something of a mystery. Then there are the one liner dismissals even at this late date, perhaps with the excuse of coming late in some cases (I am not sure, I don't keep track), that pretend the content of the proposals hasn't been hashed over at (frankly rather absurd) length, already. No Virginia, the soil is quite well tilled.

It was two weeks ago that I suggested the skeptics try them before pretending to judge them, and two posters to their credit say they have. But a fellow who thinks it makes a big difference but a bad one, and therefore should not be done - and ready to say why, based on having tried it, and argument about the results seen - has yet to show himself.

As for the idea that they aren't relevant at all, I cite the anecdotal evidence of my most recent three PBEMs. One involved a stipulation "no SMG hordes" from a fellow who effectively offered me the Germans; so I took a low automatic infantry type of course. The other two, without any stipulation, had me with German infantry once and using a low automatic type against vanilla Allied infantry, and a return game had me with vanilla Allied infantry while my opponent took VG infantry.

Everyone is being sportsmenlike, of course; I have no complaints whatever. But I think I would have prefered an agreed "low automatics" understanding to the first (vague) "no SMG hordes" stipulation, and a previous understanding that "high automatics" were fine (or a "anything goes", just as well), to the way the second pair went. And if a 3rd party "ref" / map chooser could have tweaked ammo levels, I would have used it, and found the choice of infantry types more interesting - trading off ammo staying power and close-range fp, etc.

For the latecomers who may not have heard my suggestions about using the settings, I reiterate the way I see them being used. Someone who wants such tweaks or infanry type restrictions, announces so to his partner. If the other agrees that is that. If not, the first fellow should offer the second a choice - either no such changes or restrictions will be used *but* first fellow gets choice of side, or the second fellow gets choice of side but the proposals are used. Incidentally, I also suggest the same sort of thing for Fionn's armor categories - do both at once as a package.

The benefit of this system is that both sides are encouraged to pick the suggestion they think comes closest to balancing the game - while still being flexible enough for anyone more concerned about a seperate idea of realism, or with strong preferences about the kind of battle they'd like to see, to be heard. It is a formula for fairness every child can understand - if you cut, I choose.

[German security troops?]

LOL - quite right. Hiwis, as in easterners serving in the German army - not New Zealanders...

[SMG thread annex]

So Slapdragon concludes "it doesn't matter". He therefore has nothing to offer against humoring those who prefer the suggestions.

Next?

[SMG thread annex]

So from Mr Johnson I see an "I liked it", and two substantive points. One, yes it can be a pain to change the ammo levels for every squad when making a scenario. I'd personally like to see a global setting for ammo, like fanaticism is now, with "+5, +10, -5, -10" ammo options for regular squads, different from the default 40. Then if that ammo level is appropriate for the force type, you hit that once and don't have to dial in all the "35s". It can also be used just to simulate high or low ammo, units that have already been engaged slightly, or that have dumped ammo available, etc. As designers see fit. That is a suggestion for BTS, for CM2 e.g.

As for the problem with "playing fair" in unit selection and then the other guy takes all paras and Churchills, I agree that can be a problem. In two senses - one, when it isn't anything discussed beforehand and one gets "surprised" by the practice of an opponent, and two when one needs lectures beforehand about what one can't use, etc. Half the point is to *avoid* the "you can't take SMGs" whines.

What about a Fionn like set of agreed settings? It can be anything goes, like now. As alternates agreed levels (akin to "75" and "76"), one can specify "few automatics" or "many automatics".

"Few automatics" would mean Allies avoid overuse of paras i.e. you can take paras but don't mix force types, use them with armor, etc, while in return the Germans use infantry types with 1 LMG per squad and some rifles in each (rifle 44 and 45, security, VG rifle, pioneers, etc), not all SMG or all 2-LMG squad types. "Many automatics" means the Germans can take the other types as much as they want, and the Allies can use paras mixed with other force types, with armor, etc, as much as they want.

As for the other comments, none of them make any reference to actually trying either suggestion, so they strike me as rather silly. Saying "it is no big deal" or "what's to fix?" is kinda vacuous, when you haven't tested the proposals first, to see what the heck you are discussing.

[German security troops?]

Actually, I think that dubious palm goes to the "einsatzgruppen", 4 battalion sized SS units that followed the main Panzer spearheads, and had no other job but to machinegun Jews and "commissars", which in practice meant any state official, party member, or intellectual. Murder was euphemistically just a "special task", without any ulterior motive of "security" being alleged...

[The Mortain fiasco]

On another thread, someone made the following comment about the Mortain counterattack (the attempt to cut off the Normandy breakout in the 2nd week of August) -

"had TAC Air not responded in such force the Germans would have broken through as the Allies only had light forces in the area"

This is false. The Mortain attack was a ridiculous overestimate of German capabilities and an entirely predictable fiasco as a result. Air power helped but the result was overdetermined - the Germans would have lost had the skies been overcast. The rest of this post is about some of the cards stacked against the attempt, and why it was doomed from the get-go, tac air or not.

At the time of the attack, the Germans had less than 600 operational AFVs in the theater. More than half, around 350, were assembled for the attack. The scale of the attack was approximately two Panzer divisions, with KGs or loaned units from several other formations rounding out 2SS and 2 Pz. 116 Pz lent its Panther battalion to 2 Pz; 1SS sent a KG including its full tank regiment, and scratch remnants of 17SS accompanied 2SS. All told 350 tanks and the equivalent of 10-12 battalions of panzergrenadiers took part. They had 5 days notice from the idea of the attack to execution. By the time the attack failed 10 days later, operational AFVs in the attacking units had fallen 80%, and overall German AFVs in the whole theater fell to 200.

What were they up against? On the first day, they ran into elements of the 9th infantry division (one combat team), and the brunt fell on the 30th infantry division. That day they penetrated up to 6 miles, and took Mortain itself, but without taking the high ground around it. The infantry force match-up was never better than equal. Bypassed US units continued to call down artillery fire, with one regiment alone getting the support of 10 firing battalions. Individual artillery battalions were firing 5000 rounds per day; the weight of shellfire dwarfed anything tac air was doing. The rest of US VII corps was soon engaged supporting the 30th, and the Germans made no further headway. Then 2 more infantry divisions (4 and 35 ID) and one armor division (2nd, a large 1942 pattern AD) hit the flanks of the attack. The infantry odds were by then 4:1, while the weight of artillery might have been as high as 10:1 against the attacking Germans (e.g. 2SS entered the battle with 19 105mm and 9 150mm howitzers in the division).

Several TD battalions were quickly added to the US infantry divisions, and it is doubtful the Germans had even local armor superiority (numerically) by the 3rd day or so. They certainly did have armor superiority on the first day - when they made their initial gains - but it was limited beyond that (perhaps 3-2:1 on day 2-3) and gone in a few days. Understand that the bulk of the US armor, ~1500 AFVs in the armor divisions, had not been committed at all until the breakout fighting in the previous ~10 days. 2nd AD's losses from the breakout through the end of July were only 600 men, so it was basically at full strength.

The US matched the tanks the Germans had concentrated (by assigning the 2nd AD to hit the counterattack), and still have more than a thousand AFVs left to flank the attack and create the southern wall of the Falaise pocket, race through Brittany, and seize several crossings over the Seine to ensure the fall of Paris - simultaneously.

The idea that 350 AFVs thrown pell-mell at more than a US army corps supported by heavy artillery and serious reserves, would somehow magically defeat them all, cut of the breakout, and save the day was delusional from the outset. The Germans faced overall armor odds of probably 5:1 in the theater. No amount of concentration or placement of their "1" was going to prove decisive. The actual result was to lose 2/3rds of their remaining armor, which left the foot elements of the army practically defenseless against the breakout, ensuring no successful defense of the Seine crossings, etc.

The nature of the tactical failure was simple. They Germans never had either the infantry or the artillery strength to destroy the US infantry forces bypassed by the tanks. This meant the US artillery (supplimented of course by tac air) got juicy observed targets, which meant soft-skinned vehicles and infantry didn't get anywhere. Which meant both no fuel for bypassing tanks if they pressed, and unsupported tanks facing reinforcing US TDs, bazooka teams, and light ATGs deeper in the US defended zone. A few days of that, then the US had brought tons of additional force to the area - including armor and along both long flanks of the drive - and it was hopeless. 73 operational AFVs made it back.

"It all would have worked but for the failures of the luftwaffe" is just very stale propaganda. The Americans were in fact delighted over the attempt, since it meant no armor to face outside, since most of it was thrust into the "noose". The only dispute it gave rise to on the Allied side was how deep to go for the resulting encirclement (near side of Seine or far), and how hard to press to close the neck of the Falaise pocket.

[SMG thread annex]

Since the SMG threads have spun on for upwards of 20 pages and several hundred posts, and now seems focused on relative spotting whines instead, I thought I'd start over here.

I first have this question for the fans of the subject. Having pecked out more than War and Peace debating it abstractly, I wonder how many - if any - of the posters on that thread have tried out any of the proposals made. There is to me something rather silly about dozens of people having strident views in endless variety and at great length, about something they have never experimented with.

So I invite posters to relate their experiences with tweaked ammo levels (more shots for rifle-heavy, less for automatic heavy squad types) or the suggestions about force mixes (more rifle-armed, 1 LMG German infantry types, and more Allied paras). Have you tried either or both? With what results? What did you think of it, in feel, realism, tactics used, play balance, etc? Or is everyone just pontificating without any varied experience in the matter?

I will also address a couple of side issues from the old thread, but seperately.

[German security troops?]

No. The security divisions were different. There were many other police-type forces, German and local militia, as well as the infamous SS murder groups running around. And regular army units participated in most things you could imagine - and doubtless many you thankfully couldn't - which probably included the security divisions on occasion. But reprisals were nothing like their primary job. Their job was first and foremost to guard things - the railways, truck convoys, HQs, and supply dumps.

[German security troops?]

The security divisions proper were organized before the invasion of Russia for defense of occupied areas, supply dumps, and especially the railroad and road supply lines. Each army group had 3 security divisions, and the panzer armies often had one each as well, or a substitute static infantry division at the army level, doing the same sort of duty. The Germans also used a number of "700 series" static infantry divisions - and some in the 300 series - for garrison duty, effectively doing the same job. In the west the latter were mainly guarding the beaches, since partisan activity was relatively minor until the actual invasion.

Here is a description of the role of a security division, plus a number of seperate battalions, and added local militias to suppliment them, operating behind a German panzer army in Russia in 1943.

"All the security forces mentioned above were engaged day and night in antipartisan activities. They guarded the depots, bridges, and other vital installations. They furnished security detachments for the protection of trains that had to pass through endangered areas. On the roads they manned the control points established for security purposes and escorted the columns of supply trucks from one point to the next. In view of the large number of partisan bands and the vastness of the partisan-infested areas, it is not surprising that these security units fell far short of accomplishing all their tasks."

The primary target of Russian partisans was the rail lines. They raided other areas to recruit and to loot supplies from the population, and sometimes raided depots to seize weapons. And road ambushes up to 300 men were conducted where roads passed through thick forest or marsh. But the main target was cutting railway lines, typically using mines, and sometimes attacking a stopped train to increase the damage. To give an idea of the scope of these attacks, here is part of a report from a single month in 1943 for Army Group Center -

"Despite the employment of special alert units for the protection of the railroad lines, partisan activity increased by 25 percent during August 1943 and reached a record of 1,392 incidents as compared with 1,114 for July. The daily average amounted to 45 demolitions. In 364 cases the rails were cut simultaneously in more than ten places. Individual demolition points amounted to 20,505, while 4,528 mines could be removed. During the night from 2 to 3 August the partisans began to put into effect a program of large-scale destruction. Numerous demolitions were carried out which caused a serious curtailment of all railroad traffic and a considerable loss of railroad materiel. Within two nights the six to seven thousand miles of track in the area were cut in 8,422 places, while another 2,478 mines were detected and removed prior to exploding. Several lines could not be put back into operation for a considerable time."

In the Balkans, the Germans initially used 4, then 5 "static" infantry divisions of the "700" series. These were more than half filled with men overage for infantry service, including large numbers of WW I veterans. A few front line divisions - one of them mountain troops - were also in the area, deployed to defend against invasion. The Italians also provided a large (though quite ineffective) occupation army, the Bulgarians provided one corps of three divisions, and large local militia forces were also used, especially Croat. These proved inadequate, and 3 more regular infantry divisions were sent to the area. It was a few mountain divisions, a few regular infantry divisions, numerous static ones, plus the minor allies. The mobile German forces spearheaded occasional large sweeps, and most of the time guarded towns and rail-lines. They took relatively low losses until very late in the war (unlike the militias).

Mobile troops were sent to the area once Allied invasion became a serious threat, around mid 1943, and combined guarding railways with reserve readiness to meet any allied invasion. The "German" force (which included eastern kiwis, locally recruited SS, etc) rose to 14, then 20 divisions after Italy switched sides, and then as Bulgarians became unreliable as the Russians neared their eastern border.

In all cases, rear area troops were also pressed into front line defense duty when fronts collapsed and other forces were not available. Compared to line infantry divisions, security troops (whether true security divisions, or second-line divisions on security duty) often had less artillery and almost always had few motor vehicles. They got transport from the rail lines they were guarding, or from HQ or supply vehicles not organic to their unit, when protecting either. They either lacked heavy weapons (artillery etc), kept guns stationary, moved them only some at a time, etc.

The men were more likely to be overage, and the officers and NCOs were typically WW I vets (45-59 years old). You see some divisions without artillery, some with one battalion, some with a full artillery regiment - quite varied, some certainly did have 105mm support. Compared to partisans they were quite heavily armed. Some of the divisions had 2 infantry regiments, some 3. They effectively freed up younger manpower and scarce vehicles for front line work, by replacing full strength mobile infantry divisions in rear areas.

In CM terms, they are like standard rifle-44 infantry but with a 3rd SMG per squad, and a weapons platoon of 2 HMG and 2 81mm mortars in each company. They would generally be green or regular quality, with green more common. The CM security heavy weapons company is also an interesting little force for small infantry defenses, with 2 LMG, 4 HMG, 2 50mm PAK, and a 81mm FO. Costs 34 more points than buying those items direct (as regulars), but you get 2 platoon and one company HQ in return, to command all the small teams.

["SMG Gap" A Proposal]

On the suppression argument, people are failing to realize the effects already built in to the sound CM system. If an SMG has the same killing power over ammo load as a rifle with more CM shot, it will still suppress more, precisely as it should. Because its fp per unit time is still higher.

A longer period of time means more time for continuous recovery from suppression results. The faster a given amount of CM firepower is delivered, the more sharply the target unit drops down the morale states. And the lower you go in the morale states, the slower the recovery is to the next higher level.

CM has already modeled the difference between killing power and suppressive power, quite accurately. Small doses of fp continually applied result in less suppression and breaking than the same all applied at once, even with the same number of casualties caused.

There is thus no justification for "double counting" the fp, by giving SMGs higher fp over total ammo load as well. The latter *does* measure men put down, and not men merely suppressed, in CM systems today. Whereas fp per unit time does measure men suppressed, and SMGs will remain better at it due to their higher rate of fire, regardless of the ammo changes. Firing faster inherently suppresses more, and the CM game system already "knows it". It is not necessary to pretend it also kills more, directly, by fudging fp numbers on the causalty side.

All of which was gone through more than a month ago with BTS.

The other aspect of the case that people seem to me to be overlooking, is the logic behind the "where are they?" question about Allied SMGs. It is possible on the one hand that SMGs were dramatically more effective in combat than rifles, and it is possible that CM overmodels them on the other hand. In the first case, however, it is unbelievable that the more abundant SMGs the allies had available did not make their way to the front. In the second case, it is possible.

You see, CM as it stands today shows two distinct estimates that it seems to me cannot simultaneously be correct. The first is that SMGs are dramatically better than rifles, and the second is that none of the allies acted on this in squad weapon composition. Because they had the SMGs, somewhere. If they did not feel any need for them at the front, it was probably because they felt SMGs had weaknesses.

In other words, something any tactical dunce can figure out about CM after playing "a chance encounter" three or four times for the sake of his amusement, escaped the notice of several hundred thousand professional military combatants whose lives depended on noticing it, for months on end. If the difference were a slight edge this might be believable and chalked up to doctrine. But when it is as huge an edge as CM purports it to be, it is not believable.

If SMGs were as good as CM shows them, then allied SMGs (which were more numerous overall, as I have been at pains to show) would have migrated to the front. If that did not happen to any large degree, then the drawbacks of SMGs must of left them reasonable close to rifles in overall effectiveness - even if each stood out in a different aspect.

Now, as for the post war move to assault rifles, and later (less mentioned so far here) to smaller rounds and then to shorter burst fire, what all of them have in common is attempting to maximize not just rate of fire - which could easily be maximized with high cyclic rate SMGs, cheaply - but instead to maximize fp over whole ammo load.

Accuracy does that, and assault rifles have more of it than SMGs. More rounds carried does that, and 5.56mm is easier to carry than 7.62mm. 3 round bursts does that compared to full auto. The move has obviously been not toward the maximum rate of throwing stuff at the enemy, but toward doing more with the whole carried load. Yes, with high peak ROF for rushes and suppression.

But ROF alone is not considered adequate. ROF alone has weakness, therefore it then had a weakness too. And that weakness is obvious - not putting down very many men before running out of ammo, at all but the closest ranges.

If anyone thinks SMGs would not be effective after my proposed changes - or would not suppress more - then they obviously have not tried what they pretend to judge and condemn. In any fight in which the first few shots establish a fire ascendency (through greater suppression) that is never let go, but pushed "a l'outrance" to the closest range, SMGs remain just as deadly as today, when they have 30-35 shots per squad.

It does not take the 31st or 36th shot to suppress a nearby target or move close enough to hurt it badly while it remains suppressed. What you can't manage to do with the changes is sit down SMGs 100 yards from riflemen and shoot the heck out of them all day. You simply have to use them as SMGs, rather than pretending they are just souped up ordinary infantry.

Incidentally, it also brings out the superiority of the MP44 to the MP40. With 35 shots to 50 for rifles, the MP40 has 10% less fp over whole ammo load of an M-1 at 100 yards (9x35 = .9x7x50). But an MP44 has 20% more. Both deliver their fp faster and so suppress more than the M-1. But the MP44 is accurate enough to also kill more over the long run, while the MP40 is not.

I have had my say on the whole matter and leave it to you all, as I am going to be out of town for a while anyway. My parting recommendation to the skeptics is to *try it* before passing judgement on the proposal - especially the ammo tweak proposal, as opposed to the infantry type recommendations.

Play a game or three with heightened ammo for rifle squads and reduced ammo for squads heavy on the automatics. I think you will find the changes moderate, realistic in feel, and that they make choice of weapon types and use of the type choosen rather more interesting than the present "autos rule" settings.

[Historical use of support units]

Guns were generally assigned to higher level commands for organizational purposes, but integrated into the front line wherever they were needed, or doled out among the units under the parent formation. There is some variation, though.

German divisions had an anti-tank battalion at the division level, of three companies. The composition varied - sometimes all three were towed PAK, 12 each, sometimes Marders or Stugs were available for 1-2 of the companies, and often the 3rd company had light FLAK instead of PAK. These weapons would be assigned to defense sectors. Infantry regiments also usually (but not always) have a PAK company, with a few PAK (50mm or 75mm, generally 3 of them) plus schreck teams. The last were almost always doled out among the line troops.

The regimental level also had the infantry guns when they were available. They could fire indirect as a battery from nearby (75mm FO), or be posted at the front line in sections (2 guns). Mobile troops (Panzergrenadiers) tended to be nearer TOE in PAK, and some of them used heavy 120mm mortars in place of infantry guns. They also generally had more light (20mm) and heavy (88mm) FLAK than the line infantry.

The way the Germans used these higher level light guns was spread out in company or battalion level infantry strongpoints, along the main line of resistence. They were meant to provide ranged direct fire to link one strongpoint to the next. The presence of the infantry in the strongpoint also protected the guns themselves from infantry. Sometimes the guns were in small nests a way back from the main infantry strongpoints - less than a kilometer back - when open terrain or hills allowed long fields of fire.

You would expect to see 2-4 of a given type of gun, but several types could be present in a large strongpoint - along with 81mm mortars and HMGs, the infantry "heavy weapons". So 3 75mm PAK and 2 20mm AA, or 2 75mm infantry guns and 2 50mm PAK, would be perfectly believeable. With 2 81mm mortars and 4 HMGs as well. 15 20mm AA, no. Things like puppchens and recoilless rifles were also rare.

The US had 57mm ATGs assigned at the battalion level (3 each), more at the regimental level (another 9, 18 all told per regiment), and then a divisional anti-tank battalion with 36 76mm pieces. But the divisional TDs were often M10, M18, or M36 tank destroyers rather than towed guns. They would have one or the other. The towed AT guns were around half of the mix in June 44, falling gradually to more like 1/5 by 1945.

US regiments also had 6 105mm pack howitzers, but they usually operated as an additional indirect battery. Sometimes a pair of them might set up forward for direct fire, but that was relatively rare. The battalion level also had 81mm mortars of course.

As for AA, each US division generally had 1 AA battalion attached, and its batteries were usually split up and assigned to the subunits. All told such a battalion had 32 40mm AA plus the same number of quad 50 cal MG mounts. Some generally protected the div arty, HQ, and supply points, but in a static defense 2-4 of either might be available for a forward battalion, especially at an important point, like a bridge or summit. 90mm AA were almost exclusively assigned to rear areas, and only saw ground action when the front moved a lot - like in the Bulge fighting.

The most common crew serves weapons you'd see in a US infantry defense would be 57mm ATGs and 81mm mortars, plus heavy machineguns (AA and battalion MG platoons, etc). 76mm AT or TDs in reserve - one of the other - would also be common, and a few 40mm AA not uncommon. The 57mm ATGs and 81mm mortars were spread all along the front, the other types were more concentrated on a "where needed" basis.

The Brits had 57mm ATGs and 3" mortars at the battalion level, and 76mm ATGs higher, again spread over the front. The battalion level weapons were moved by tracked carriers while the 76mms were moved by truck. Armored TDs were comparatively rare in the Brit formations. Seperate MG battalions provided MGs and heavy mortars too, often doled out to the "up" infantry battalions, though in CM the heavy mortars are an FO not on-map gun teams.

I hope this helps.

["SMG Gap" A Proposal]

I know that less than half were sunk, which is all I need for my conclusion. Those dang inequalities again! "But you can't possibly know that less than half were sunk". Sure I can, by overall sinkings and the law of averages. "But that is unscientific". Works well enough for marine insurance companies...

["SMG Gap" A Proposal]

So, taking your own figures, you think the MP40 has 2.4 times as many bullets, 92% of the firing time, and 2x the killing power per unit time. But CM gives it 2.8 times the killing power per unit time (and thus implicitly has the M-1 firing slower) plus equal firing time. Off by 1.4/.92 = 1.52 times. Which would be corrected by 35 shots vs. 50 (1.43), or 30 shots vs. 45 (1.5).

It doesn't matter how you slice it. You are not going to get 2.8 times the cumulative firepower out of a less accurate gun with less than 2.8 times the bullets.

And incidentally, I think you are using the wrong weight for the M-1's round. 27.4g is indeed the exact weight of the standard 30-06 springfield cartridge, but that is a bullet of 180 grains. The wartime cartridge, the M2, was only 152 grains for the projectile, 15% lighter than the common 30-06 round used today. I mentioned that once already but it seems it went unnoticed.

I also note in passing that the weight of the 9mm with mags is 20 grams (640g / 32 rounds). And I also point out (again) that M-1 men often carried additional bandoliered ammo (up to 200 rounds), that the same rounds were used for the BAR, etc.

[ 07-02-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

["SMG Gap" A Proposal]

Sure, Mr. Dorosh, and since all the infantry are really using is strong language, you won't object in the slightest if they do so with +/- 5 shots and +/- 2 weapons of this type rather than that. After all, since they don't matter, you have no reason to think changing them does.

["SMG Gap" A Proposal]

Germanboy has a problem. First he hears things that aren't said, and then he ignores things that are. On marksmenship, I never said anything about "small squares". I said if you can't hit a man sized target at 200 yards with a properly zeroed rifle you can't pass basic rifle marksmenship, which is true. I know I did, and I'm no great shot. And nobody disputes that the accuracy of rifles is much higher than that of SMGs, nor does anyone dispute that SMGs are innaccurate at medium ranges.

The relevant facts for the claims on the thread - that rifles are more accurate than SMGs and by large amounts at medium range - are not in dispute. Germanboy needs to pretend otherwise because he needs to manufacture irrelevant disagreements about side matters to avoid engaging on the central point involved in the accuracy discussion. Which is that CM as it stands effectively gives higher accuracy to SMGs than to rifles per bullet fired, which everyone knows is off.

On ammo weight, I started with two to one carried loads, which incidentally is what BTS said quite a while ago - it was disputed; I gave the weights of the projectiles in basically the same 2:1 ratio - it was disputed on the grounds that it was cartridge weight that was wanted; I then quoted the cartridge weights in the same 2:1 ratio, which incidentally shows that the projectile weights are not in the least misleading, and Germanboy just flat ignores it. Then he pretends I didn't address the issue. Four times the firepower with lower accuracy and equal CM shots would require four times the ammo carried, not twice. With only twice ammo carried, four times the firepower with lower accuracy, due to higher rate of fire alone, means running out of that ammo faster.

Slapdragon does the above "irrelevant" act one better by reposting himself without any comment on my response to his statements. Jarmo accurately condensed my main point about implied accuracies and CM ammo levels.

John Waters providesa more interesting comment in passing, when he states as fact an increase in automatics in German infantry from 1/11 early on to 1.3 to 1 in VG formations late. While I agree that was the direction certainly, there are a few problems with this. First, it would seem to be TOE information rather than weapons provided, not the same thing. Second, CM does not give 1.3 automatics per rifle in VG companies, it gives 69 automatics to 21 rifles or pistols, thus 3.3 to 1. 1.3 and 3.3 are different, last time I checked, and 3.3 is larger.

Third, the Germans issued only 1 automatic out of 6 weapons issued for the whole war average, because that is all they made. The late war average is undoubtedly above that figure just as the early war figure was probably below it. But the CM standard "rifle" infantry types with 3/9 to 4/8 automatics are a more believeable late war average (1/3 to 1/2), given that overall war-long 1/6 average as a "budget constraint", than 3.3 to 1. Particular units might still have 3.3:1 of course. I'd find it much easier to believe Mr. Water's 1.3 to 1. Which incidentally would fit with every other VG company having one SMG platoon, with the other five VG rifle - rather than 2/3 having pure automatics and the rest of the formation half automatics. In other words his 1.3 figure is more consistent with using VG rifle squads - which is one of my recommendations - than with using the CM structure of VG companies.

Fourth, we know German infantry was not equipped at TOE in small arms generally in the late war, from the MG returns, which were kept track of carefully. TOE in MG42s was two per squad for every vanilla line squad in the Heer infantry (TOE of 63 MGs per battalion). But we know for example that even the FJ only had about 1 per squad in Normandy, according to detailed returns from the divisions, in OOBs available on the web. Their average MGs per battalion was no higher than for Heer infantry. What one actually sees is MG returns varying from 50% of TOE to 90% in a few units.

If one imagines 50%-90% of TOE in automatics generally, what would one see for Mr. Waters 1.3 to 1 as TOE for VG formations? You'd see a range from the number of automatics in three platoons of rifle 44s, and the number in 3 platoons of VG rifle. What about if we applied 50-90% of TOE in automatics to the CM 3.3:1 VG structure? Then the range would be from security or rifle 45 squads on the low end, to about the existing VG structure for a few formations on the high end. With a mean of 40-50% automatics. What reason is there to think the Germans were always at TOE in MPs when we know most of them weren't, in MGs?

Last, on the subject of the idea that the U-Boats got 'em all, that hardly applies to the trip across the channel for the Stens. If half of the US ones sank (and it was certainly less than half) then the western Allied SMGs would still amount to several times what the Germans could field in the west.

You can knock off 600K for US vs. Japan (1/3), and 200K for Burma et al (Brits), and 400K for partisans (all early Mk. Stens), and a laughable 600K for U-boats (half the US production not sent to the Pacific), and you've still got 2 million left - which is more than Germany had for both fronts. Ignoring every German MP lost to similar causes on their side. Once again the mere debators fail to grapple with the numbers, and instead wave their hands about possibilities that do not explain the case.

There are two obvious possibilities that will explain the case. One, SMGs were not as effective as CM shows them to be, because of the simplifications of the CM ammo system. Then the Allies had SMGs available but preferred to use rifles even after front-line experience. (It is too much to expect everyone who has played CM three times to be smarter than the participants on the point, after all).

Or two, that the Germans were below their TOE in autos (evidence? MG returns for one) and Allied squads were above their TOE in autos (evidence? Mr. Dorosh's extra 3000 Stens in a formation of 30 infantry battalions for one).

Or both. Case one is addressed by my ammo proposal (shots per squad 30-50 instead of a uniform 40). Case two is addressed by my troop use proposal (Allied paras kosher, German types with 1 MG and rifles in each squad recommended).

I would like any of the critic chorus to address what they think would be *innaccurately* modeled if my proposals were acted upon, and how all-fired serious it would be. Just how, exactly, would an Germany FJ platoon with 35 shots instead of 40 (from 6 LMGs, 8 MP40s, 9 MP44s, and 10 rifles), grossly misrepresent the historical realities of the FJ? Just how, exactly, is it completely unbelievable that a US platoon might have 3 extra Thompsons and 6 M-1 carbines, in place of 9 of the rifles?

[Where are all the Allied SMGs?]

Thanks for the supercilious lecture Slapdragon. I don't think I need any informing about advising BTS; they have already taken quite a few of my suggestions over the last six months. You still seem incapable of grasping the fact that I am advising the players and scenario designers, not the BTS programmers, in my proposals in this and the related "SMG proposal" thread.

BTS can't make the TH ladder allow use of SMG squad types, can they? They can't inform my recent opponent who wrote to me "I'd prefer if you didn't buy SMG hordes" that he ought not to say such things because all is perfectly balanced in balmy Gilead, can they? You talk as though it were nearly unquestionable that SMGs with exactly the same ammo as other types, are perfect, when it is notorious that SMGs as currently modeled are "gamey", and BTS itself has identified numerous points about them they intend to change for CM2 (from revamped rush behavior to rariety based cost to varying ammo per squad).

I breathlessly await your conclusion from discussions with off board experts about whether, in fact, SMGs are truly more accurate per bullet than rifles. Or about whether, in fact, SMG gunners routinely carry 3 times the weight of ammo of riflemen. The fact that you consider such questions "balance" issues rather than "historical", or feel unable to decide on them without "expert" advice, is rather amusing.

As for the "importance of stating it clearly", I've stated it if not clearly, at least at great length, a dozen times by now over the course of several months. Changes have already been announce to several related systems. You are still at the "go ask the off-board experts" stage, it seems. You might try coming to a conclusion instead.

Simply put, the next time you play Germans what infantry type do you plan to use? If the next time you played Germans, the Allied player took some Brit paras, some Brit rifles, along with tanks, what if any comment would you have to him on his force selection? Would you refuse to play a scenario that tweaked ammo for squads with different weapon types, or welcome it?

They are not theoretical questions, nor are they about the consensus of the College of Cardinals. They are practical ones about what you do in CM games.

[Where are all the Allied SMGs?]

Yes Spook, BTS did say they would vary shots per squad for CM2. And do you remember why? Do you remember who Steve was discussing it with? Yours truly. Same argument.

But contrary to your implicit assumption, I am not addressing BTS here. (I already did that). I am addressing scenario designers and players. Because they are the ones that can make the changes I recommend, not BTS. And for CMBO, not just CM2. BTS could of course offer options for squad ammo varying by side of type, and I've recommended that to them in the past, and that would help with QBs that don't have a 3rd party set up.

But it is players that make rules like "no SMG hordes" or "only one force type", so it is players that can change them. And it is scenario designers that edit unit details, not BTS. Not everything about CM is about the holy code. Quite a lot is about what people do with it, which depends on their agreements with one another, which depends on their sense of realism and balance, not BTS's sense of them.

[Where are all the Allied SMGs?]

I thank Wreck for his comments. I realize agreeing can seem pointless, but I am interested in how many others see the problem, what is done about it in practice today, and whether people doing various things about it think my alternatives would work. In the end it is all simply a matter of whether people use the suggestions, not a matter of academic debate here at all. In that respect it is quite unlike a debate of an historical controversy, or about recommendations to BTS.

Wreck said "most games at TH avoid allowing SMG infantry." That is just the sort of thing that concerns me. Personally, before a recent game I got the comment "I'd prefer if you didn't buy SMG hordes, but you are welcome to do so if it suits you", which was sporting enough, but the meaning was clear. Any victory with super automatic infantry would be hollow, and to a sporting player that is tantamount to a ban.

I would much rather have tweaked ammo and a mutual understanding that Allied paras in the mix are perfectly kosher - even with armor etc - than either the forced ground rules or the ad hoc honor-based comments that amount to the same thing in practice. If I take rifle armed German infantry I'd like to do it for better ranged fire and more ammo, or because I like the supporting weapons mix in that company type, or because it fits the force I am imagining involved in the battle - not because doing otherwise is notorious knavery.

People who think anything BTS has touched must be holy writ, of the type Jeff was talking about, sort of overlook the fact that many of their fellow players don't exactly act that way in practice. Pretending it is all perfect as is ignores the realities of what players do. It also, incidentally, prompts me to invite those that think so to take the Allies - sans paratroopers - against my (unrestricted) German infantry sometime.

And that momentary notion can be generalized. Anybody who thinks the present default systems are perfect should have no problem granting his opponent choice of sides in every fight. So my proposals might be used this way - if one player wants to use them, *offer* choice of side if they are used, but *ask* for choice of side if they are not, with no infantry restrictions in that case.

Either way, it would become possible to play SMG types again. But they'd either be balanced, or yours - LOL.

[Where are all the Allied SMGs?]

1) Define the problem (ie. how does reality differ from the game).

Problem One - SMGs in CM are more accurate than rifles.

Problem Two - German SMG armed infantry fights absurdly well.

2) Support #1 with a list of facts

Problem one

Fact one - SMG ammo loads were about twice rifle loads.

Fact two - SMG firepower is 3-6 times rifle firepower at close range.

Fact three - SMGs get the same ammo as rifles.

Fact four - 3-6 times is more than twice.

Deduction - SMGs are modeled as more accurate than rifles.

Problem two

Fact one - the allies made far more SMGs than the Germans.

Fact two - CM gives Germans far more SMGs than allies.

Fact three - CM overmodels SMG effectiveness (see problem one).

Deduction - German infantry rocks because of CM innaccuracies about SMGs.

3) If needed, defend your evidence in a rational manner.

1.1. BTS stated SMG loads were around twice rifle loads, MP40 vs. M-1. You maintained on another thread that SMG men could carry "2 to 2.5 times the rounds". SMG rounds weigh somewhat more than half as much as rifle rounds.

1.2 The firepower tables gives SMG types 45, 39, 36 fp at 40m, vs. 13, 10, 6.5 for the M-1, Enfield, and K98 respectively. 3 times 13 equal 39. 6 times 6.5 equals 39.

1.3 All infantry types get 40 shots in all QBs. Squads with 1 LMG and the rest rifles get 40 shots. Squads with all SMGs get 40 shots.

1.4 3 is the number that comes after 2. 6 is twice 3. Multiplying by 2 increases numbers.

C1 Over their whole ammo loads, SMGs will generate 3-6 times the fp at close range as rifles (by 1.2 and 1.3). By 1.1 and 1.4, this means each bullet carried by the SMG generates more fp than a rifle bullet does. Thus, SMGs are modeled not merely as shooting faster, but as shooting straighter. This contradicts the historical reality that rifles are more accurate per bullet than SMGs, at all ranges.

2.1 The US made 1.2 million Thompsons and 608K grease guns in WW II. The Brits made more than 2 million Stens. The Russians made 5 million PPshs. The Germans made only about 1-1.5 million MPs - some say 908K for MP38 and MP40 combined, those who give higher figures are well under the above end of that range. Discounting 1/3rds of the western Allies figures for Japan and partisans etc, still leaves 2.5 million SMGs. Facing only what the Germans had on one front, the shorter one in time and distance. Out of all small arms provided over the war, the Germans only had 1/6 automatic weapons, or being generous perhaps 1/5 on the highest estimates of MPs. The Allies had about the same, 1/5 weapons provided.

2.2 The most SMG intensive squad on the Allied side is the Brit Para with 4 SMG and 1 LMG, or half automatics. Most Allied squads have 2 (late 3 for US) automatic weapons and only 1 SMG. The German squad types average slightly more than half automatics (126 out of 243 weapons, listing all squad types). The only German squad types with as few automatics per squad as the average Allied one are a few pioneer types. The German *average* is more heavy on autos than the Allied *maximum*. The Allied average is the same as the German *minimum*.

2.3 In addition to the reasoning in problem one, tests presented showed a 2:1 point odds US infantry attack by airborne and engineers on German SMG infantry in foxholes, defenders in regular woods attackers moving through light woods. The result was a clear German victory, with the Paras and their target platoon exchanging off, and the engineers wiped out for slight loss. A reciprocal attack with the same set up but with only 1:1 point odds for attacking SMG-armed Germans against regular US infantry in foxholes, resulted in a crushing win for the German attackers. Nothing about rushes or assault movement was involved. It was not the run command. The SMGs gained fire ascendency in a few minutes in either case.

4) Present an alternate reality and possibly suggest how the game should be changed (the paradigm shift as it were).

For problem 1, the ammo levels should be varied by squad weapon type, between the range of 30 shots for pure automatic weapon mixes and 50 shots for mostly rifle weapon mixes. Specifically, units with less than 25% automatics should get 50 shots, units with 25% to 39% automatics should get 45 shots, units with 40% to 56% automatics should get the default 40 shots, units with 57%-75% automatics should get 35 shots, and units with 76-100% automatics should get 30 shots.

For problem 2, Allied players should be allowed to choose paratroop infantry types at will and to mix them with other types, even to represent non paratroops, without it being considered "gamey". And German players should make regular use of the rifle-armed infantry types, and especially the ones with limited automatic weapons overall (rifle 44, rifle 45, VG rifle, security e.g.), instead of always using either SMG hordes or 2 LMG infantry types with majority automatic weapons.

5) Support this new way with facts, which may be the same ones as listed in #2, or may not.

Comparing rifles to SMGs in the extreme squad types with this proposal, an SMG would have the following relative characteristics to rifles (MP40 vs. M-1 match up, the closest case) -

At 40 meters

fp per unit time - 2.77 to 1

fp over whole ammo load - 1.66 to 1

assumed ammo load - 2 to 1

implied accuracy - 83% of M-1 accuracy per bullet

At 100 meters

fp per unit time - 1.29 to 1

fp over whole ammo load - 0.77 to 1

assumed ammo load - 2 to 1

implied accuracy - 39% of M-1 accuracy per bullet

This change would encourage use of the German infantry types that include rifles, as they would have greater ammo per squad to make up for their smaller short range firepower. It would eliminate the need for current ad hoc rules restricting the use of SMGs (like "no more than 3 SMG platoons", or "no SMG hordes"). It would allow rifle armed infantry the ammo needed to engage in some long range fire without breaking the bank. It would more accurately reflect the true strengths and weaknesses of SMGs. And it would force SMG infantry type users to strive for close ~40m ranges to outperform rifles in the long run, rather than only needing to close to ~100m, as things are today.

US para types have 25-30% automatics plus a few carbines, while Brit para types have 50-57% automatics. If Allied players use them to reflect front line small arms mixes, and if in addition German players make use of their "vanilla" squad types, which have 33-50% automatics, then the ratio of automatics on the two sides will be closer to even instead of 2-6 to 1 weighted toward the Germans. The ratio will at any rate close somewhat compared to the regular gaps seen now - ~1/5th allied autos to ~2/3rds and up for german ones. Players may respond to the ammo incentives and the "skew" toward automatics may reduce as well.

Reducing ammo levels of squad types with many automatic weapons will more accurately reflect the relative strengths of small arms types. Greater use of Allied para infantry types and of German rifle-armed types will reduce the wide gap between German and Allied automatics as well. SMGs will no longer generate more than twice the fp over their ammo loads at close range; they will no longer be modeled as more accurate than rifles. Automatic infantry will still have just as much peak firepower as it does today, but it will not fight as absurdly well in other respects, notably "wind" or staying power.

And players will get to explore actual tactics, instead of applying a cookie cutter formula that exploits CM ammo system abstractions and force type range of choice, to win mindlessly with gamey SMG hordes. Nor will they have to put up with charges of "gamey" when they do use SMGs, if they can get a scenario designer or 3rd party to tweak ammo levels for them, since they will be taking a compensating weakness to offset them - fewer shots per squad. And because it will be acknowledged "fair game" to meet them with paras if desired.

All of which I have said before. But apparently you haven't been paying too close attention. The proposals and evidence I have been offering have absolutely nothing in common with your straw man of "I lost my Tiger - BTS do somefink!" It is dishonest to pretend otherwise. In addition, my proposals can be implimented by scenario designers and players, with current code. So the address of the "do somefink" is rather off.

["SMG Gap" A Proposal]

20 rounds of 30 cal ammo certainly does not weigh a kg, it weighs more like a pound.

Full cartridge weights vary by a bit less than a factor of 2 for SMG vs. rifle ammo. A 9mm parabellum round weighs 14 grams, 303 rounds weigh 25 grams. A 180 grain 30-06 round can run 27 grams, but the army used 152 grain rounds (the M2 cartridge) more like the 303 in weight. 45 ACP weighs 21 grams.

MP40s don't get 2x the firepower at close range of rifles. They get 3-5 times. They are not firing only twice as fast, they are firing more like 4 times as fast. But they can only carry about twice the load, as BTS said long ago and as I have repeated over and over. Which is met with every sort of dodge but never a straight answer.

Do you think MPs only deserve 1.5 times the fp at close range of rifles? Or do you think MPs are more accurate than rifles? Or do you think MP equipped men magically carry 2-3 times the weight of ammo of riflemen? I don't care which untenable proposition in the chain of the logic you pretend to believe. I just want you to say which one it is.

If SMGs get 3-6 times the fp per CM shot of rifles at close range and are less accurate per bullet than rifles, then SMGs are firing more than 3-6 times as fast as rifles per CM shot.

If SMGs are firing more than 3-6 times as fast as rifles and carry only twice the ammo, then they use up their load 1.5-3 times as fast as rifles.

If SMGs use up their ammo loads 1.5 times as fast as rifles and upward, then giving pure SMG only 2/3rds as many CM shots as rifles is realistic.

If men carry what they can into combat and men can carry about the same weights, and SMG rounds weigh half (and up) what rifle rounds weigh, then SMGs have only about twice the ammo loads of rifles.

And what is there on the other side, to argue that exactly the same shots and exactly 3-6 times close range fp is proper for SMGs? Not a gosh darn thing. But if an SMG has 4 times the fp of a rifle with only twice the ammo, and gets the same CM shots, then supposedly each bullet fired from the SMG is twice as accurate as one fired from the rifle. Which is absurd.

The extra weight of a rifle round is buying something. It is buying 3 times the muzzle velocity, which means much better accuracy. If the range is quite close, the accuracy may not matter very much and the SMG might generate twice the total fp over its larger whole ammo load, or only slightly less than that. But not 4 times.

And at any range beyond very close, the accuracy is going to "pay back", because light pistol sized rounds fired spray and pray are going to start missing. A lot. The SMG may make up for that in fp per unit time by firing a lot. But it can't make it up in fp over the whole ammo load that way.

Once each bullet coming out of the SMG is only half as accurate as one out of the rifle, the rifle (with half as many bullets) will have higher fp over the whole ammo load. ROF just does not matter for fp over whole ammo load. Accuracy does.

[ 07-02-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

["SMG Gap" A Proposal]

SMG ammo weighs at least half what rifle ammo does per round, and often more (90-125 grains vs. 150-180 grains are typical figures for 9mm MP ammo vs. 30 cal rifle ammo - incidentally the .45 cal tommy gun has far heavier rounds). BTS said long ago they considered SMG loads to be about 2x rifle ones, for MP40s vs. M-1s that is. Which was not based on the real "all you can carry" deal, but standard issue loads, incidentally.

Nobody pretends SMGs are *more* accurate than rifles. They get 3-6 times the firepower of rifles at short range because they are firing more than 3-6 times as fast. If you fire 4 times as fast and carry 2 times as many bullets, you run out in half the time. The figures I recommend for SMG vs. mostly rifle squads is 3 to 5, less than double.

As for the statement that all loads were balanced to last the same time, I think it is nonsense. There is no rule of rate of expenditure in combat, for one weapon type let alone for all to compare them. Ask any vet how long ammo lasts and he'll say "until it runs out", because it depends entirely on how much shooting is being done, which depends on what is going on.

Field loads of ammo are also way above "issue" levels. In Nam while still using M-14s, men often carried 400 rounds per man, and M-60 crews carried 5000 rounds. A 30 cal bullet weighs about 1/3rd of an ounce - 100 rounds is about 2 lbs.

And I sincerely doubt German MP men carried 20-30 clips apiece. The usual figure is more like 7, which is large mags would weigh 10 lbs (one loaded 32-round mag weighed 680 grams). And that is fewer rounds than an M-1 riflemen with standard issue cartridge belt plus 2 100-round bandoliers, though it is more than the rifleman carried without bandoliers added.

The MP man was probably carrying grenades for close-in work or extra belts for the squad MG(s), if anything beyond his own clips.

As for not being able to imagine switching off ammo from rifles to BAR, I don't see why. If the range was long, the BAR had to do much of the firing anyway. The "lessons learned" stuff is full of comments like "the BARs and 30 cals (air cooled) do the ranged firing". CM incidentally does model the main German small arms strength, better MGs, even if one does make gamey use of overmodeled SMGs.

As for burst sizes, 6-9 round bursts is the typical "control" level for such high cyclic rate weapons. Which means ~4 bursts, maybe +/-1 for the level of control.

The idea that all squad types should have the same number of abstracted CM shots does not seem to me to have any basis whatever. It is obvious that it is simply an abstract logistical system, meant to be simple and easily comprehended and precious little else. Everything that matters, because everything that varies, is supposed to be packed off into the fp numbers, which BTS assured us quite a while ago they pulled out of their tail sections. Pretending equal squad ammo, or the numbers, or using only one number for "effectiveness", is holy writ, is just plain silly.

If an SMG has 30 shots and a rifle 50 (the extremes - some will be less far apart because of mixes, etc), then the SMG still has higher firepower at close range. MP40s to M-1s, they have 5/3rds as much fp overall if all shots are close. With around twice the ammo carried that implies the SMG is hitting 5/6 as often as the M-1, per bullet not per burst. I consider that quite generous. Of course, the firepower per unit time is higher still, by 5/3 again.

But then move out to 100m, which is twice effective range for most SMGs (the slow bullets - 1/3rd the velocity of rifles - have dropped half a foot from the aim point by then, etc), and the ammo matters. The firepower per unit time is still higher for the MP, by 4/3rds. Which again I consider quite generous, for that range. But now the overall firepower, shooting off the entire load, is higher for the rifle by 4/3.

Thus as short range the SMG shoots both faster and more overall. But at medium range it shoot faster, but has less effect for the whole ammo load than a rifle does. The issue of which one is better then turns on how important it is to fire fast (and e.g. thus suppress and avoid replies), vs. sustained fp over a longer period - as well as how close the MPs manage to get.

Nobody is talking about MPs firing at 250 yards, where they aren't going to do anything. MGs provide the fp at that range, which pins rather than kills and that only in the open, anyway. The point is that MPs should have "more" only in close, and at medium range they should only get "faster". Because the accuracy is already way down at 100 meters for an SMG, but a rifle hits easily at that range (if it has a target, naturally; that is true for both).

Someone might say that only certain knowledge of practical firing rates can address the question, but this is not remotely the case. Only relative accuracies need to be assessed. When you give fp numbers, have load estimates, and specify ammo points given to each type, you have specified a relative accuracy between the two.

Accuracy or "straightness" equals total fp generated divided by load carried. Rate of fire is irrelevant to "straightness". Fp and ammo numbers that imply MPs are more accurate than rifles are inherently unbelievable, and you don't need to know the practical ROF of either, to tell.

For example, a sten gun has 6 times the fp of a K98 rifle at 40 meters. Nobody imagines a short "bullet hose" is more accurate per bullet than a bolt action rifle, even at close range. Therefore, the fp number can only be justified by the assumption the Sten is throwing 6 times the bullets, or more.

Which is perfectly believeable, since at close range the Sten might throw anywhere from a short burst to a whole mag in a matter of split seconds, while the slow bolt action fires only 1-3 times. K98 men carried around 60 rounds, said BTS. Well then, the Sten man either carried 360 rounds (and they didn't, not in clip form certainly) or deserves fewer CM shots.

Accuracy and ROF can be modeled seperately if and only if varying firepower numbers are supplimented by varying ammo levels. You can hand wave all you want about unknowns and it will not effect the logic of that statement one iota. And everybody knows that rifles were (and are) more accurate per bullet than SMGs. Refusing the draw the obvious conclusion - that uniform ammo levels penalize what rifles are good at (accuracy) and do so unrealistically - is not reasonable.

[Where are all the Allied SMGs?]

Would those interested in discussing the sex lives of famous generals and each other's posting proclivities please get your own thread? Thank you so much. I am sure Goebbels will be oh so interested.

On the idea that it is only undermodeled M-1s behind the concern expressed in this thread, I can assure it is not. I developed the concern primarily by playing German SMG equipped infantry. I noticed all the ins and outs of their use and the way CM ammo limitations, and a few supporting HMG teams, mask all of their weaknesses and play to all of their strengths.

I am well aware that BTS thinks the issue is only about moving fire. But while I welcome their improvements to assault behavior, I never thought and do not now think the issue is one of assault movement. It exists in at least as extreme a form on defense as on offense. It exists in light woods no less than over open ground.

I've posted various tests on the subject here. For instance tests in light "open woods", with the defenders in denser full woods clumps and dug in. 2:1 point odds attacks with US paras and engineers are easily repulsed by outnumbered SMGs, while 1:1 point odds attacks by SMGs on standard US infantry results in crushing German wins. Not by rushing, but by fire and movement tactics, with the SMGs attaining fire ascendency in a few minutes and afterward shooting far more than their pinned opponents.

My initial diagnosis of the problem was point costs, that the SMGs were just too cheap, that greater odds would be needed to balance them. In fact, SMGs cost only the same as rifles, while in practice outperforming them. When I raised the issue to BTS, they responded, in effect, that they preferred to correct underlying problems with how items were modeled, instead of tweaking unit prices. A perfectly defensible position.

I then pointed out the ammo issue, that SMGs beat rifles because rifles cannot afford to waste fire at long range, since shots are limited and fp rises so fast as range falls. That if they try, the result is the SMGs have both more shots and higher fp to deliver at 100m or less, while costing less. BTS more or less dodged on the ammo issue, but then responded with the claim that realistic rariety factors in CM2 will make everything better, and that this will be more practical than point tweaking.

Thus I was lead to realistic rariety factors as an issue. So the question naturally arose, how rare were German SMGs compared both to German rifles, and compared to allied SMGs? Not in TOE terms but in actual terms? The result was this thread.

The balance issue was not underperforming M-1s - Enfields are just as "discriminated" against, or K98s for that matter. It was not a desire to get better performance from US infantry, but a sporting disgust at the ease with which German automatic weapon infantry blows away everything else - even with poor play, and whether rushing or not. My reaction in the meantime has been to play vanilla German infantry types - Security and Rifle 44-45 types in particular.

I have proposed two solutions in the meantime. Tweaked ammo levels that give rifle-armed infantry more overall shots than automatic weapon armed infantry, as one. That is meant to address the real balance issues between rifles and SMGs. And recommended unit types used for another - Allied paras mixed with other types as "fair game", and urging Germans to use some of the rifle-heavy infantry types.

Naturally the first also encourages the second - if one takes rifle 44 squads one can have 45 ammo apiece, vs. 30 for VG SMG squads for example, under my ammo proposals. Brits can choose between airborne squads with 4 stens but with 40 ammo, and rifle ones with 8 rifles but 50 ammo. So far, I have received a few passing comments in support of either idea (very much welcome) and an enourmous amount of flak, static, distraction, and changing of the subject.

My own hypothesis about the opposition is that it stems from four distinct sources. One, some here are so silly as to have already developed the attitude that anything I say must be opposed, even if it is about motherhood and apple pie. Two, some like anything that stacks the cards in favor of German wins, usually without having the imagination to notice that such stacking reflects on the honor and capability of both themselves and the historical counterparts being modeled. Three, some think that anything once done by BTS is chiseled into marble tablets by the direct finger of the Almighty and may not be questioned or improved in any way. And four, some have quite varied notions about how effective and common SMGs actually were, and at what - some based on anecdote, some on impressions that seem to me pure Hollywood, some based on official documents or doctrine.

From my point of view, I am trying to carry on a conversation with the perfectly respectable last group mentioned, amid the crashing cymbals of all the other three, who in my opinion haven't a leg to stand on between them.

["SMG Gap" A Proposal]

Yes, the proposed ammo changes will address the problem. All that is necessary to seperate the two concepts "effectiveness per unit time" from "effectiveness over whole ammo load" is to use two numbers - fp and ammo - instead of trying to make do with just one - fp only, with ammo's equal.

Differing fp numbers can certainly model differences in fp per unit time. Differing ammo levels can render that number independent of the "integral", fp over whole ammo load. The distinction between shooting straighter and shooting more is fully captured by the two numbers.

Of course, anybody could quibble with the existing numbers for either variable, but that is a seperate piece of minutae, and not a design problem. The design problem with the current all-ammo-equal system is that no way exists to raise effectiveness of SMGs in one sense, while also reflecting their wastefulness compared to rifles in another sense. One number cannot make such distinctions. Two can.

A parallel case from another genre of wargame may illustrate the issue somewhat. The napoleonic Battleground series games are a case in point. Infantry firepower varies dramatically for the same number of men, depending on their formation, in that era. A 2 rank line of 450 men can bring all 450 muskets to bear, while a column 15 deep can only fire the forward 60 muskets. And the BG series properly reflected this with varying fp numbers by strength and formation type.

But then they used an overly simple infantry ammo system, in which all units had the same chance of a "low ammo" result, randomly determined with each shot. The 60 men firing from the front of the column would run out as fast as the 450 firing from the line. This made it as though the line were not shooting faster (doing more, but also more likely to run out of ammo soon), but shooting straighter. This effected play balance, formation types used, and overall casualty rates.

The point is that designers often unintentionally introduce such secondary effects when they settle on some simple abstract ammo system. Firepower per unit time looks like the more important tactical variable so it is modeled closely and pretty accurately. The ammo system is not regarded as so important, and is kept simple for playability.

The "cross" of the two produces an unintended consequence - what was meant to be a rate of fire effect unintentionally mutates into something more like a greater accuracy effect. So 2-rank (British) lines or common (German) SMGs are artififically boosted in long-term performance, while columns and rifles run out of ammo just as fast. Instead of shooting *faster*, the former types shoot just plain *more*.

An adequate solution to the BG series problem would be to tie the "ammo loss" chance to the firepower modifier of the shooting formation. If 2 rank lines get 1.5 times fp, they get 1.5 times ammo loss chance. If columns get 0.2 times fp, they get 0.2 times ammo loss chance. This example is particularly simple because the guns and loads carried are acutally the same; the only thing changing is how many of them are firing.

In the WW II CM case, the ammo loads and ROF are both different from weapon to weapon. But the same principle applies - shooting faster, straighter, and more (ammo carried) have to be distinguished from one another. Which is easily accomplished, for unit to unit comparisons, with two numbers for each unit. Faster means fp higher and ammo lower. Straighter means fp higher and no change to ammo. More means ammo higher with no change to fp.

SMG men shoot faster by a large factor, shoot less straight at medium range by a large factor but similar at close range, and carry more by a small factor - all compared to rifles. So they deserve a higher fp at close range by a large factor, a lower ammo load carried by a small factor, and similar fp at medium range.

In fp per unit time they then become better by a large amount at close range, only even at medium range. In fp over whole load they are ahead at close range (but by less than the fp per unit time) and are behind at medium range.

Accuracy, rate of fire, and load carried are all accurately modeled. You just can't do that with only one number and ammos equal. It is easy to do with two numbers and ammos unequal.

[ 07-01-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]