[Counterattack at Carentan]

[QB]Would it be correct to say that the USA has never had either the biggest army in the world / or the best trained army in the world at any one time in its history?

I don't think that is exact, but it is not misleading as a general statement. Most of the time, the U.S. army has been quite small. And most of the time, it has not been the best trained. It was big in 1865, though, probably bigger than the standing armies of anybody else, simply because we were at the end of a war and nobody else was in a hot one.

On the "trained" side, I think you might make a case from about the mid-80s to now the best trained probably goes to the U.S., or perhaps more realistically, for the early-middle portions of that period, say 1984-1992.

You might make a case in favor of much smaller armies, and those would certainly be true if you included U.S. national guard and such (reserves). Maybe Israel, although their training focus has shifted in modern times.

Most NATO countries do not have the kind of intensity that the national training center puts out (the Opfor guys out on the desert I mean). On the whole, NATO and Israeli training is as good as the U.S., but I don't think others do quite as much, large scale laser-tag type maneuvers. And there is no question such training helps, especially for the junior and field grade officers, who encounter realistic control and battle management problems, facing a tough enemy. Those are much harder skills to gain in peacetime than individual and small-unit abilities.

The NTC Opfor, incidentally, is probably the best trained unit of its size in the world, because it is on the other side of so many such exercises. Only the special forces units of the U.S, some NATO countries (e.g. British SAS), and maybe Israel (don't know) are in the same league, I'd think.

As for the other services, there it is much easier. The navy has been the biggest in the world since before WW II. It was about the same size as the British fleet then, and passed the Brits for good during the war. Japan was the only other power even close, and lost its whole fleet of course. Since then, the Russians have had a comparable fleet of submarines, without carriers and surface elements to fully match, but that's it.

In terms of training, the U.K., Japan, and the U.S. all had good training before the war, but probably in that order. Naval training and navy size tend to reinforce each other - big navies are at sea more, exericise against themselves more, etc. Post war, the U.S. was better in these respects than anyone else, clearly - the UK navy shrank as the colonies were given their independence, and the Russians got limited time at sea, only some of their submariners in the same league.

The air force was a WW II growth. Only the Russians were in the same league by size by the end of that - though Germany and Britain had important ones during the war, obviously. By the end of WW II and down to the present, the U.S. air force has been larger than all others, except the Russians at various times, and more capable by type for the whole period. In terms of training there is no comparison, U.S. to non-NATO air forces. NATO pilots do not get as much training and sim time, lack the specialized air combat schools, etc, but they are in the same general league in flight hours and such. Only the Israelis train as intensively. (NATO, U.S., and Israeli pilots as a group fly 10-50 times as much as Chinese, Russian, Syria pilots etc).

One man's opinion on an interesting question.

[MG team recommendation]

"One MMG (or squad) can only target a single other unit (albeit a vehicle, gun, squad, whatever) and then expends the entirety of it's FP against that single unit."

Wrong, that is not the problem. The MGs don't kill the units they *do* shoot at. They drop a man or two and sometimes pin them. In a long attack they will half-squad one unit.

Spreading their fire over more units would reduce their impact on each, or multiply their firepower into uberweapons. They don't deserve the latter, because 1 MMG does not have the firepower of 3 BARs and 30 rifles.

Some simply want MGs and presumably everything else to kill everything they shoot at, and will conclude "this isn't realistic" if they don't. But CM fights are bloodier than the real thing overall, as it is.

The problem is that movement does not make units as vunerable as they really became when moving, and in particular when moving in the open and for long periods.

One fellow did not understand why there should be a delay about "going to ground". The answer is that it is not one man going to ground, but a squad, and they then move around for decent firing positions as they "settle in". Changes in the % exposed number primarily reflect the *portion* of the squad that the enemy can see. It is entirely reasonable that that portion would drop after movement, and not all at once.

The squad does not all reach positions at the same time, instantly go to ground in perfect positions, and have the full benefits of cover that split second. In fact, NCOs spend a lot of their time in combat, repositioning individual men, which is exactly such a "settling in."

One fellow will not be satisfied with anything but the "realism" of fire lanes. How is he going to program the tac AI to pick fire lanes? What shall we do next in the name of realism, have the player aim each M-1 rifle in a "sniper" simulator? How about if we make the player pull on the soldiers' socks, and penalize movement rates if they are allowed to get wet? After all, blisters are realistic.

Game design is not the same thing as making a sim. A sim of Guadalcanal would be somewhere between excruciating torture and mind-numbing boredom. If you aren't interested in the playability of a game, then re-up and go eat snakes.

[T34 Vulnerability]

"given that 26 T34 were knocked out at 1200-1600m range, it seems totally logical to assume that a certain percentage were frontal hits. At and 1200-1600m range the hull front is going to catch at least half"

But they are not talking about every occasion. They are reporting on one, right? And the portion of side hits, and turret hits, can vary all over the place from encounter to encounter. And the engagement range drops to 1200 meters.

So, if they hit a number of them initially from a flank - then the rest went to hull down positions, with only the turret up - and then some of the German moved closer, regaining view of hulls but going from flanks, or at 1200 yards - all of which are perfectly plausible for a single report - then the report is perfectly compatible with the 1200 front hull view. Since it does not say "at 1500 yards, went through the front hull". Nor is it advancing a general claim about all occasions.

"any angle penetrate to 1200m, it suggests that frontal hits at combat angles resulted in penetrations"

It doesn't say it, and it certainly doesn't say that they went through the toughest exposed plate on tank. You limit yourself to "suggests". It is still "averaging up" to me.

Moreover, the two reports are not the same, and you almost sounded like you were making them one by association. The any-angle report does not say every round went in. Which is compatible with the side hull and turret for 30 degree side angle.

"it is suggestive"

Sure. Anything that gives a high range suggests kills at high range, and if for entirely different reasons, you think those kills were possible even through the front glacis, then it seems to confirm it. But if other reports talk of bounces off of too angled armor, along with engagement ranges used in practice, it suggests that every round did not go through the front glacis as logn range.

"where is most of the area?"

That depends on whether I put the tank hull down or not. There is not much area on the turret from the front, certainly. There is somewhat more from the side, and the side hull becomes a significant target from 30 degree side angle, on out, because it is vertical, if not hull down.

The reason turret hits are in general more common is not because the turret is a majority of the area on any model of tank, but because it is higher, and exposed in hull down positions. As you well know. As for the Shermans-in-desert case, deserts are mostly flat, so naturally hull down positions are harder to come by.

Incidentally, I never claimed that most hits were on the turret. I simply explained penetrations reported at range that way, along with side shots weak points etc. The statement, "most penetrations at long range were turret hits" is not equivalent to, and need not imply "most hits at long range were turret hits".

As for the JS-2 example, it shows other factors operating certainly. And you can hypothesis the same working in the case of a StuG report in Ukraine. But then you have to see if the hypothesis makes any sense. Tankers tend to do things that work or that they think will work, and especially successful ones tend to use aspects of tank combat in which they have some kind of edge.

In the case of the IS-2, there are several sizeable factors to explain the choice of low range, and I mentioned them - low ROF, limited ammo, and limited AP especially since HE was a large part of the limited load. Plus Russian optics and crews. All of these things would tend to penalize an attempt to engage in duels at long ranges. I take them in turn.

At long range, the hit probability for each shot is lower. The kill chance per unit time is much more dependent on the ROF, since repeated shots, overs and unders to find range, etc, will improve the accuracy of later shots, making the equation for "get a hit" more than linear in "shots fired". Therefore, dueling at long range is a tactic that will tend to be favored by the side with the higher ROF, not the lower.

Limited ammo. The IS-2 carried just 28 rounds. The majority of them were HE. 10-12 shots AP was about all they could expect before resupply. In all tank engagements, some tanks die with rounds in them unused, while others in the formation, alive longer, have to handle more of the enemy. To duel at ranges with hit probabilities below 1/4- 1/3 would therefore be pretty dumb in an IS-2, if one has any choice about the engagement range.

As for Russian optics and crew training (though the last was more nearly equal by late war), everybody knows the Germans had more accurate sights and in general more accurate gunnery. The edge those provide is increased at long range, while shorter engagement ranges render them marginal.

Now, for your hypothesis that the StuGs and such were engaging close for similar reasons, where are those reasons? Did they have lower ROF than the T-34/C? Only the Hetzer. The T-34/C has a 2-man turret, and consequently a lower ROF if the commander has to do anything related to command, and maneuvering the tank.

Did they have ammo loads too small to duel at range? 44-54 rounds for the StuGs. With the F model StuG and counting HE in the mix and if facing superior numbers, it is a plausible factor, though nothing like the IS-2 case. Otherwise, not very. The Pz IV carried 87 rounds; it was not going to get into trouble dueling at range.

Did the Russians have superior optics and crews to hit them more often at long range? No.

These things being the case, why would the Germans pass on a long range duel featuring better ROF and better accuracy? What edge are they after? What weakness are they masking? I can certainly come up with explanations that might fit in some individual circumstance - maybe it was terrain e.g.

[T34 Vulnerability]

Very useful, thanks. So the "C" is only out in '44, when production of 75mm HEAT had already dropped. So the only large numbers of effective HEAT, would be the "B" in 1943. And that was for the L24s? Because there were still Pz IVs with L24s, though not all that many, and also some of the late model Pz IIIs (N and such) with 75L24.

It would be interesting to see if 75mm HEAT was also issued to the towed PAK, which were longer guns. But on the whole, you give a very plausible picture - the HEAT craze was a stop-gap to make the 75L24 somewhat effective, and the drop in production later reflects the abandonment of the L24. The PAK ought to be a good double-check, though. If they were using substantial amounts of HEAT, the picture would be more complicated.

[Counterattack at Carentan]

Here is an example of battle confusion on July 9th in the sector of the 30th Infantry Division. A month later, that is. From the official history - "

When the leading elements of Task Force Y, Company I of the 33d Armored Regiment, finally got to the highway about 1630 after their painful progress across country, they became confused and turned north up the main road, advancing straight toward the 117th's lines and toward the division's supporting guns, both tank destroyers and antiaircraft batteries. With a real and dangerous German armored attack in progress just to the west, there was every reason for the fully-alerted antitank crews to swing into action. A fight instantly developed, the armor coming in with its 75-mm guns and machine guns blazing. The two leading tanks were knocked Out by friendly fire before Company I realized its mistake and turned south on a proper course.

The whole mix-up at the highway was "one of those things" that could happen to any unit, particularly troops that were still inexperienced. Perhaps the best commentary on the affair, and on the attitude of troops that went through it, is the report for 9 July of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion:

'There was lots of small-arms fire, shelling and mortar fire blanketed the area, everybody fired in every direction, rumors flooded the air, and when infantry units withdrew in disorder leaving some gun positions exposed, it became necessary to withdraw to successive positions. The exact movements of each platoon is at present obscured in the confusion of battle...Unit took two prisoners which were its first, suffered its first fatal casualties, was shot up by its own infantry and armored force and in turn shot up our own infantry and armored force, but under all circumstances came through their first critical engagement in fairly good shape...Combat efficiency satisfactory but mad as hell.'"

[Counterattack at Carentan]

"we should distinguish between his facts and the facts that are passed on as truth by the sources of his oral histories. A good historian is careful with facts, sure, but doesn't fiddle with the quotes either"

Basically right. Ambrose does not correct anything he is told by the vets. But partially, this is because he believes what the vets tell him, thinks that is a more trustworthy source than all the known history stuff. And that is short-sighted. The result is that Ambrose does make errors, but they are exactly the errors that the participants made. And the participants make all kinds of errors. He also sometimes adds his own, going by vague impressions or the moral qualities he ascribes to a commander or what not.

On the particular case given, first it is obvious that the gun wasn't an 88, and as everyone has already pointed out, that is just the way most U.S. units talked. Any large caliber, flat trajectory cannon was "an 88"; it was a synonym for "heavy PAK-FLAK".

But it is also entirely possible the zook men shot a Sherman. LOL. I mean, it was pushing through a hedgerow, right? Kinda hard to see the blasted make. And the U.S. tanks were more likely to be pushing through hedgerows (though it is a bit early for all the later devices).

If anyone thinks that is impossible, read the official histories about what happened the first few times U.S. armor formations were assigned some of the same frontage of infantry formations. Whole battalions shot the hell out of each other for hours in some cases. Both U.S. I mean. And in this area, the base of the penisula, in particular.

The other possibility is that is was just a StuG, coming through just a hedge, and the vehicle as a whole was turning, not the turret. Or a stray Pz IV lost and wandering about the battlefield, commandeered by a kampgruppe in its area. Any of the three seems to me perfectly plausible. A Tiger there at that time, does not.

[MG team recommendation]

"I'm not sure if your suggestions address the issue of "non-targeted" units moving through the LOF"

Nope, because I think such complaints aren't really justified and the solutions are more cumbersome than any gain in accuracy they'd involve. I don't want penetrating fire. I am not interested in making MGs uberweapons or making the game more cumbersome to play, or turning it into some single game of "optimise the angles".

I am only interested in making long rushes without cover more dangerous, because they are too easy to get away with in CM as it is now.

Another fellow suggested more rapid fire as the range drops. That is functionally equivalent to just raising the firepower as the range drops. I am dead-set against such changes, as a "blanket" matter, based only on range.

Right now, there is a realistic tactical difference between MGs and small arms, in that the MGs retain more of their firepower at long range, while infantry firepower rises much more steeply, making them more effective at the closest ranges. MGs are long range, especially "pinning" weapons as a result.

But if they fired twice as often at *anything* at 100 yards, then you might as well just double their firepower. Then they aren't especially ranged weapons at all. They are just slow squads with more ammo and fewer men. I don't think there is anything accurate about that.

MGs beat infantry if they can stop them at long range. But in close, infantry should beat MGs, just like they do now. Everybody knows the MG is right over there, because it is loud. There are fewer men and all clustered around it. The guys with the small arms, once in range for those to be deadly, should smoke the MGs, and they do.

The only unrealistic thing, is the ease with which infantry gets through the whole range "envelope" of MGs, even without cover or any care taken in the movement. And that is what my proposal is meant to address.

It raises the effectiveness of all infantry weapons against "rushes", by reducing cover for those moving rapidly. This will effect more shots in the case of MGs, because of their superior range. It will not make the MG any more powerful in a short range firefight against a squad in good cover nearby. But it will make it harder to run through the MGs whole, range-extended "envelope" of firepower.

In addition, the effect will be multipled in the case of units with no cover for *extended* periods, in the LOS of the same MG. In a *long* rush, the MGs firepower will be up to double what it is now (a bit less, since the first few shots are not doubled). This bonus will only apply, if the attackers are not in cover or are moving rapidly or both.

It will tend to ensure that at least one attacking unit is badly hit in any long rush over open ground. Which will probably drive that unit to ground or kill it. It will not be much easier than now, for an MG to handle a rush by multiple squads, reflecting the ability of the attackers to spread out. But certainly cases like 4 MGs rushed by a couple of platoons over open ground, will become much more expensive, and will be more likely to be broken up by pins and routs and thus fail altogether.

As for what I am proposing it for, I'd like to see it in CM2. I'd like to see the cover system even in CM, but I realize that is probably not practical, because it is probably too big a programming change. Whether the MG fire bonus vs. long rushes is practical in CM as a sort of patch change, I do not pretend to know.

The key idea of my whole proposal is that the item that is somewhat out of whack now, is how much *exposure* increases the firepower of MG type weapons. Specifically, that the effect of prolonged exposure is greater for MGs - they can play their beaten zone and penetrating fire and lanes games, to good effect, *when* the target is infantry in the open for long periods.

That is the only place I see a serious problem. Specifically, *not* MGs at short range. And *not* any particular need for angle games and the associated complexity. Just, MGs should be more effective at pinning moving troops, and they should especially be more effective against troops long exposed to their fire, without cover.

C'est tout. I am not trying to rewrite CM. Just to tweak 1-2 game systems to correct what I see as a single, readily exploitable, limited area of unreality. (To wit, the over-long open bum-rush).

[T34 Vulnerability]

"5 Panzer Division reports"

But does it even allege that they were front aspect, hull hits? Or with PzGr39?

"Other reports indicate that 75L43 penetrates T34 at 1200m regardless of angle."

But does it say what ammo they mean? No one has yet put together the HEAT part of the story, it seems to me.

Also, even taken literally of PzGr39, "1200 at any angle" does not mean 1200 through front hull at 60 plus a 30 degree side angle.

At 30 side angle, the side of the tank is as much exposed as the front. (More foreshortened, but longer, about the same overall).

And the lower hull plate is vertical. So that would just be 45 @ 60 (all of it side angle), not 45 @ 60 plus 30. So you'd have turret side plus lower side hull, perhaps 33-50% of the target area, more vunerable than the front hull. Penetrable at any angle doesn't necessarily mean, the worst plate on the tank at that angle, still penetrated.

Nor is it in the least clear, that the person reporing "1200 at any angle" meant to include side angles, rather than just "not only through the side, but also through the front". 1200 dead on (0 side angle) on the front hull, is rather believeable to me for the rest of

It seems to me quite a stretch of construction, to assume the speaker meant 30 degree side angle and PzGr39 and through the hull front plate. Why would he? It is not like he was trying to construct an armor penetration table. He was trying to tell tankers what range they could fight at and get hits that counted.

"There are other reports in Jentz' book where hits are reported to bounce off the angled armor"

But, apparently, only the reports of the longest penetrations are true, while the others are false reports caused by nervousness or something? Even though the longer reports, often do not specify the aspect hit, or which plate was hit at that aspect, or what ammo went through it.

I call it "averaging up". One takes the best results or the best ammo reported, and constructs a sort of "could have been this good" picture. Then all deviations from that good, are dropped as "friction".

"Couldn't T34 have caused the same jitters in panzer crews"

It seems to me rather unlikely that the several reports I've seen, of StuG and Pz IV crews blowing away whole tank battalions at 600-800 yards while outnumbered 2-3 to 1, were caused by nervousness. They held fire to 600-800 yards because they wanted every hit to be a kill.

If they could kill the T-34s readily at twice that range - and a fair portion of the replies would bounce off their front hulls at that range - why didn't they? They had better sights, better ROF.

"warfare is more than aim and pull trigger."

I quite agree. But I have to assume even highly successful German tank crews were nitwits to buy the whole 1600m story. It is possible. It seems to me just as possible that someone who said "an angle" meant "any aspect front-side-rear" or "most vunerable exposed plate", not toughest plate at toughest angle. And that particular reports of 1500m kills hit turrets, sides, and weak points - or were HEAT-C perhaps - rather than meaning PzGr39 always went through the front glacis.

"it took an excellent crew to obtain hits at over 1000m...would we consider the 122mm penetration data and reported maximum kill ranges to be baloney if we found that IS-2 tanks would not engage Panthers beyond 1000m?"

No, certainly. They report the reason - too hard to hit. We know about the optics and crew differences. They also had quite limited ammo in an IS-2, a fair portion of it HE, and low ROF. So low % shots at range could be tactically a bad idea despite ability to penetrate. So far as that is your point, I quite agree with it.

If half of the Russian tankers reported bounces off the too-angled armor, would we need to look again at how the round handled 60 degree slope? You bet. But they don't say that.

And if the Germans had lower ROF, limited AP ammo, and worse optics than the T-34/C, then it would make sense for them to hold fire. But they don't, they have the reverse. And with them, firing at range would make sense if the rounds would go in.

In fact, even with relatively few penetrations, a tank company might successfully firefight at ranges were penetrations are marginal (need turret or weak spot e.g.), when they excel in rate of fire and such.

And we know the Germans sometimes did this. They recommended "base of fire" tactics even when they had only 50mm guns, and reported Russians breaking off action when hit repeatedly, even without penetrations. Obviously, such "hail" tactics will work much better if there are even limited areas of the target tanks, that the rounds will go through - or angles they will go through. But you would expect such tactics from the side with better ROF (3 man turrets) and better crews.

I can tell you want you've convince me of, and what you haven't. You've convinced me that the L43 could penetrate the front of the T-34 hull at 1200 meters with a flat-on front shot. You haven't convinced me it could do the same with a 30 degree side angle thrown in, or at 1600 meters when the shot was flat front.

How do I put that together with all the reports? My hypotheses.

1. The reports of the bounces reflect side angle cases especially.

2. The good crews holding fire down to 600-800 are doing it to defeat any plate, counting some side angle.

3. The 1200 any angle report meant front as well as side and rear (most likely), or (less likely) included the turret and side hull cases, i.e. was talking about the weakest exposed plates, not the strongest ones.

4. The reported kills at 1500 were turret hits, side shots, HEAT-C, or weak-point penetrations (driver hatch, turret ring, donno about shot traps) in "hail of fire" tactics that sometimes scared the Russians off, often bagged a few, sometimes wiped units out.

5. The general report on the Russian side, "those kill us at 1 km", was a practical combination of 1200 flat vs. the front, with modest side angle and random effects, based on experience and made a rough rule of thumb.

That is my sense of it. You doubtless have yours.

[MG team recommendation]

Gentlemen:

Here is my proposal for the way MGs and rushes are handled. Comments on whether you think they would help, or not, and why, are all welcome. But please, we already have 10 pages on another thread to rehash the whole issue, and you can start your own topic if you have a completely different idea, or think there isn't any issue yet.

1 - tie the % exposed number to the movement state. When running in the open, the % exposed number would be up in the 90s. It drops on a delay timer when a unit slows or stops, reaching the best the cover can provide if motionless for 15 seconds or so, about the same scale as movement delays now.

2 - allow an "acquisition" bonus for crew served weapons putting out infantry firepower, for fire at the same target several times in succession, *if the % expose number is high enough*. E.g. multiplier for firepower is 1+(exposed - (say) 75%, 0 if negative)^number of shots already taken. The maximum benefit is 2 times effectiveness. The acquisition is lost if the target's % expose number falls to (say) 75 or below, or if another target is engaged.

This makes *covered* rushes possible. It makes *multiple* rushes possible, with several attackers all spread out. It makes *short* rushes relatively easy to accomplish. It does not excessively penalize troops in cover, troops not moving, or short "snapshots" at squads crossing narrow areas of open ground.

But if e.g. an MG is firing 4 times in succession at a charging squad with 95% exposure, then the first shot would be .95. The second would be 20% more effective (95-75). The third 44% more effective. The 4th 73% more effective. The range is also dropping, increasing the fp.

The reduced effects of cover for moving troops would apply to all weapons types. But the acquisition effects would be specific to crew served MG type weapons. They would be far more powerful (up to a maximum of twice) against *long* rushes across *open* ground.

Moreover, the effect is a believable one. It depends on the exposure of the enemy troops, and the length of time the gunner can "spray" them. Flanking becomes important, teamwork to tackle an MG from two directions becomes important, use of cover becomes more important.

That is my suggestion. Comments welcome.

[T34 Vulnerability]

Is it possible all those "turret ring" hits weren't exactly on the turret ring, but instead involved defeating the angle of the hull armor by a shot-trap effect?

That is, imagine the shell hits the turret, but barely above the hull. Can it deflect down? And if so, might it face 45mm armor only, without much in the way of slope, at the actual impact angle?

Why do I suggest this? Because, as the previous fellow stated, the actual turret ring is an awfully small target to hit repeatedly with a relatively low velocity gun. But if you expanded the "vunerable area" via a shot-trap effect, then it wouldn't be so magical.

[T34 Vulnerability]

"just because they don't fit with your view of the world"

Not at all. I was happy to be corrected about the difference between late Pz IVs and the earlier ones, c. 1942, in terms of what ranges the T-34/76 could penetrate them. It is not my view of the world I am trying to match, is the the German documents issued by their head of panzer forces staff, as well as the reported tactics of the German crews.

When the German staff says, the T-34s stay out at this range, knowing their advantage, then I sincerely doubt they were making it up. When the German crews go for this range, and consider a kill at that range unusual enough to report as an accomplishment, I sincerely doubt their standard tactics involved KOing everybody at twice those distances.

Rexford's correction about the invunerability of the front hull of the late-model Pz IVs was a useful correction, not because it contradicts those things - it couldn't be right if it did - but because it needn't contradict those things, but does help locate in time, a change in doctrine we all know happened at some point. To wit, at some point the Russians stopped standing off, and tried to close instead.

We know from the German documents that the Russians were standing off in 1941 and early 1942. We know that after the Panther (mid 43 and after), they were closing - and against late model Pz IVs, they would have been dumb not to, as rexford pointed out.

We know there has to be a change over between the two. But not exactly when or why. That is what remains to be lined up with the tech issues under discussion.

I can put the principle this way. If you specify all the penetration and range envelopes, and then I take the Germans to your Russians, if I do not have to adopt the historical German tactics of that period of the war to blow you away, then the numbers you specified are wrong, slanted in favor of the Germans. And conversely, if you specify a different set of numbers and I take the Russians, and can blow you away without having to do the sorts of things we know the Russians did at that point of the war, then we know the numbers are slanted toward the Russians.

If the penetration ranges make the actual tactics senseless, then they can't be right. Equally, if obvious penetration facts (not a nuance , and e.g. exactly the sort of thing rexford pointed out in the late Pz IV case) don't fit a supposition about how long a given tactical doctrine was used, then that supposition about tactical doctrine can't be right. So I happily changed my supposition about how soon, and why, the Russians went to a tactic of "close".

The true tactics and the true penetration facts have to match up. Either can correct guesses or difficult estimates about the other. Neither can contradict clear facts about the other. It is not a question of one order of facts or another being "more important", but of a simpler thing - truths don't contradict each other.