[Most overused units in CM?]

The odds with that table are 3% Heavies, 6% Tigers, 33% Panthers, 17% Jadgpanzer or StuG, 33% Panzer IV, 6% Marder or Nashorn, and 3% Wespe or Hummel. Rounded, so you will get a little more than 100 if you add them up.

Tigers or Heavies combined are 1/12, as are the low end thin-armored SP guns. The armored assault guns are 1/6 and the main tank types are 1/3 for each. Your chance of getting Panther or better is 42%, of Jadgpanzer or better 58%. So there is plenty of opportunity for some sort of good armor, close to a coin-toss really.

[Most overused units in CM?]

Here is a proposed system for the Allied armor types, and below it some nits on the stuff already mentioned.

Brits base type roll -

11-12 Churchills

7-10 Shermans

5-6 Cromwells

3-4 Wolverine + Achilles TDs

2 Archer or Sexton

For the Churchills, TD, and SPA/T, the Brit player can pick his forces.

The Brit player can add Stuarts to any force if desired.

For Shermans and Cromwells, the platoons can be of -mixed- type.

For mixed platoons, roll below for -each- tank purchased.

Brit Sherman table -

9-12 Firefly

2-8 75mm Sherman

Brit Cromwell table -

11-12 Challenger

9-10 Comet (once available, Cromwell otherwise)

2-8 Cromwell

The Brit player can pick the make of the tanks (II or V, Cromwell 95 or 75, etc).

The result will be, if the Brits get Shermans they will probably get one Firefly if they buy a few tanks, sometimes two. Late war Cromwell units will have mixed heavier AT types included, but earlier on they will mostly be pure Cromwell.

For the US, the base type table is as follows -

12 Pershing (once available, TD otherwise)

9-11 TDs

4-8 Shermans

3 Cavalry only (Stuart, M-8 Greyhound, M8HMC)

2 SPA only (Priest, M8HMC)

TDs may add M-8 Greyhounds, and Shermans may add Stuarts at will.

TDs roll the type available; if the type is not out yet, they get the next one down.

All TDs are the same type.

10-12 M-36 Jackson

7-9 M-18 Hellcat

2-6 M-10 Wolverine

For Shermans, roll the type for -each- tank, mixed platoons again. If a type is not out yet, move down the table until the vanilla 75mm is reached, not below. The US player can pick the base "make" (M4, A1, A3, etc), and decided for W or not, HVSS or not, once those are available. But 76mm guns, 105mm guns, W+ and Jumbo armor, require the rolled type.

12 Jumbo

10-11 W+ uparmored 75mm

8-9 76mm upgunned

4-7 75mm "vanilla"

2-3 105mm

E.g. a US player starts buying his platoon of Shermans, and rolls 9. The first Sherman is a 76mm. His second roll is 5, a vanilla Sherman. He could stop there if he wanted, but keeps buying and rolls 8, getting a second 76mm. He buys one more, rolls 4, and gets a 2nd 75mm vanilla Sherman.

If a player takes a full platoon, he will generally get 1-2 upgunned Shermans and often 1 uparmored W+ one. Buying just 2-3 tanks, he is more likely to get just vanilla ones, or 1 76 the others vanilla. Naturally, before better types are out the above will default to mostly vanilla, a few 105mm.

So, to illustrate with some examples from the top. An Allied player decides he will take the Brits, and rolls for his base armor type. He rolls 10 and gets Shermans. He chooses the Sherman II make and buys his first, rolling 5. A vanilla Sherman. He buys another and rolls 5 again, another vanilla. He wants one Firefly so he buys again, rolls 11 and gets one. Then he stops, with 1 Firefly and 2 Sherman 75mm.

Another Allied player selects the Americans and rolls his armor type. He rolls 5 and gets Shermans. He will only be able to afford a pair of them, because of his force type and battle size of around 1000 points (meeting). He rolls 4 for the first one, vanilla 75mm, 7 for the second. He gets 2 vanilla Shermans, that is all. He could also add Stuarts if he likes, and if his "armor" budget can afford one.

A German opponent of the Brit above decides to play an infantry force type. Makes that Firefly the Brit player pushed look at bit expensive. The German facing the American above decides on Panzer troops, and rolls for his armor type. He gets a 7. With only 200 points to spend on armor, his realistic choice is 2 StuGs or 1 Jadgpanzer. He takes the pair of StuGs. Of course, he has no idea when he does so, whether the US player has TDs, Sherman 76s, or just plain vanilla Shermans.

A rule on the cheap M8HMC. They should only be bought in pairs or less. That is the realistic number a company-sized element might bring to the field. So in the case of cavalry, while the US player can pick how many Stuarts and M-8 Greyhounds to buy, the choices for M8HMC are 0, 1, and 2.

On your question about StuH, they belong with the StuG, a roll of 7. They were supposed to be issued 3 out of each 10 AFVs in a StuG company, but weren't numerous enough to always be present. In the Panzer troops, they were also more common in the SS units than in the Heer. The SS had a larger AT battalion (45 AFV vs. 31) that grew out of a StuG battalion, before the two roles were integrated.

With German infantry division force types, there would occasionally be armor support, of course. The rule there ought to be, "you can buy anything that costs less than 100 points per item, but no more than 3 AFV and only 1 type from the 'armor' screen". Which means StuG, StuH, Hetzers, Marders, and SPA. Realistically the infantry did not have access to SPA, but they did have small numbers of "Bison" self-propelled SiG, and ad hoc similar versions, which are not represented in CM but closest to the Hummel or Wespe. Notice, all the Hetzers were in the infantry division forces. And not concentrated - you'd rarely see more than a platoon.

I hope this is useful.

[Most overused units in CM?]

Well Redwolf, here is my proposition, for those interesting in both variety and history. When you play Germans, try playing the infantry types. Play lower unit qualities sometimes, and the infantry force type with Heer. Not always, maybe a third of the time. Another third of the time play something fun and different, the FJ without any vehicles and limited artillery support, say - or the VG with only StuG for armor support. Play the mobile troops the other third of the time, with armor, or with a mech force type sometimes.

As for the armor choice when you do play Panzer troops, try rolling a pair of dice to see what you get -

12 - Heavies - K. Tiger, Jdgtiger, or Jdgpanther (your choice, subject to date)

11 - Tiger Is

8-10 - Panthers

7 - Jadgpanzers or StuGs (your choice)

4-6 - Panzer IVs

3 - SPAT only (Nashorn or Marder)

2 - SPA only (Hummel or Wespe)

The 11-12 results mean a schwere Panzer battalion. 3 and 7 mean the divisional anti-tank battalion. 2 means the Panzergrenadiers are only supported by some of the SP artillery that happens to be handy. 2/3rds of the time you will get actual tanks, half the time Panther and the other half Pz IV - the two different battalions of the Panzer regiment.

The first immediate gain will be variety, which is fun. You will also tend to learn about all the different vehicle types over time, how to use them, what they can do.

[Most overused units in CM?]

A note to those who haven't seen too many Panthers. Good for you (and your opponents)! Then you won't mind my comments about them - LOL.

[Most overused units in CM?]

To Olle:

Well, I tried to explain that overall availability should change how often one takes a type, rather than the amount taken. For some reason, whenever overall rariety comes up some assume one is talking about mix in each QB, even if one explicitly says otherwise, as I did in my first post.

But I understand you to object to the change of subject first of all, which is fair enough. Most things are not overpurchased for the number that would be present at one battle, simply because of price - and also because of CM limits on points spent on a particular area.

Generally speaking, vehicles should be bought in pairs at least, and with AFVs one should have one main type, or two that did historically work together sometimes. (E.g. Stuarts and M-8s in the cavalry, say, or different flavors of the same base-model Sherman). Lone vehicles should generally be restricted to "specials", like a flame halftrack or perhaps a scout car. Sometimes one is all the budget and CM purchase limits will allow.

Cheap light guns can be overbought. 2 of a type would be common, and a full battery of 4, or rarely even 6 could happen - e.g. a regimental gun company. Buying 5+ 20mm FLAK is silly. One could still overload the map with light guns, up to the limits of the "support" spending category, by adding several types. But that is still less objectionable, more believeable, then whole flak battalions in company engagements.

Generally, I'd agree with the 1 light mortar FO idea. But 2 of them to represent a greater ammo load, or greater ROF used, is not completely unbelievable.

In answer to your question about mortar numbers, the standard for the Allies was 6 3" or 81mm mortars at the battalion level, in addition to the 3 60mm or 2" at the company level (or assigned to platoons). The Russians used 9 82mm at the battalion level.

The Germans had a TOE of 2 81mm per company plus 6 more at the battalion level in the standard infantry. But in practice they often had more like 8 pieces per battalion, with the "up" companies having their section of 2, and 4 more for a battalion section. (E.g. if you look at the unit returns in Normandy, most divisions had 8 mortars per battalion). The mobile forces, Panzer and Panzergrenadier both Heer and SS, had only 6 per battalion, and those sometimes half-track mounted. There were supposed to be 120mm above those in the SS, but in practice by late war those were rare enough that they stood in for regimental 150mm SiG when available, rather than being pushed down to the battalion level.

The total supporting fire by echelon/level for the standard US infantry was as follows -

3x60mm at company

6x81mm at battalion

6x105mm at regiment

plus 12x105mm per regiment, from division

12x155mm at division.

36x155mm -or- 8" at corps (typical)

The corps level could have 12 4.5" guns paired with 24 155mm howitzers, or 155mm guns and howitzers, or 12 155mm guns and 24 8" howitzers. The guns were more likely to be doing counterbattery or interdiction work farther into the rear; the howitzers were used on front line and nearer targets.

The only things that might get over-represented in that list, are 60mm mortars and 81mm mortars. With some companies deployed "back", up to 3 extra 60mm besides the ordinary 3 per company are believeable, and I doubt many people overpurchase them beyond that, or even that much. With the 81mms, taking more than 2 FOs is probably unrealistic, as would be using numerous on-map 81s plus an FO. Everything higher will break the CM point bank before you get unrealistic amounts. The Brit 3" would be similar in numbers to the US 81mm, or perhaps a bit more, because they might be easier to mass with their carriers. The US armored infantry used SP 81mm halftracks, 2 per company, and relied on the SP 105mm (Priests) more.

With the Germans, 1 81mm FO, plus 2 on map 81mm per company, would be believeable, or 2 81mm FOs without on maps. For the 75mm, you'd expect either 1 FO, or 2 on-map 75mm infantry guns per company, up to 6 maximum. That is for infantry types.

For the German mobile troops, there would be somewhat less - either an 81mm FO, or 2 81mm per company, halftracked or foot teams. Not both or all three, and a 2nd 81mm FO is stretching it. The mobile troops had fewer infantry guns, often using 2x75mm halftracks per company instead, and using them for direct fire rather than indirect.

Zooks, schrecks, MMGs, and HMGs are generally not overpurchased. There were lots of them and more were easily "drafted". The "support" price area will run out, or the motivation, before one has unbelievably many of them.

The really cheap German LMG teams might be overpurchased, especially when 2 LMG squad infantry types are already being used, or for lower quality "static" infantry divisions that tended to have fewer MGs. The typical numbers you see in the unit returns are 45-60 MGs per battalion, counting squad weapons and HMGs in the weapons platoons.

The most extra MGs you'd see would be around 9-12 in a battalion, more like 3-4 per company - on top of the 2-4 standard HMGs in the heavy weapons company, I mean. So buying 20 of the things would be silly, but say 6 of them is fine, 12 in a large enough battle (battalion scale) not unbelievable.

I hope those comments are more on the subject you wanted...

[Why does artillery not report casualties?]

You don't see the kills because that is only a confirmed number. The shooter has to see the men fall for them to go into that score. Infantry in close combat will generally get "full credit"; MGs at range little, and artillery practically none. Vehicle kills are obviously easier to see and so easier to get credit for. Vehicle shooters are intermediate between MGs and infantry. They do a lot of their shooting at range, but also have sights and such.

As for the effectiveness of artillery, it is quite effective, but it does depend quite a bit on cover. And the lighter types will suppress more than they kill - but that, rather effectively. Also, you should not expect a few rounds to do the job - fire missions are minutes long.

As for light mortars, they will generally put about 1/3rd of their rounds close enough to the target to have any effect. Over their ammo load, you can expect a target in woods cover to lose 1-3 men and be pinned to broken. Or you can get a similar effect in one turn by using several mortars, then switching to a new target.

The tactical role of light mortars is point-suppression, especially against MGs and guns. They will generally not hurt enemies with overhead cover - in buildings that is - but can handle targets in woods easily. With the off-map mortar FOs, which represent a full battery of 6 mortars firing, the suppression will cover a wide area, pinning a platoon, typically.

Notice also that enemy troop quality alters the effectiveness of artillery. Vets will be less suppressed than regulars or greens. Greens without foxhole cover can generally be broken by light mortar fire. Veterans in foxholes will lose a few men and be momentarily suppressed, but up and firing again a few minutes later. Stone buildings are adequate cover against light mortars, too.

But once you get up to the medium artillery, the direct effect is more dramatic. 105mm arty, 4.2" or 120mm mortars, 4.5" guns - will all pin or break troops in cover, and inflict serious (though not annihilating) losses. A platoon left under a full module's worth of such medium artillery is not going to hurt anyone for the rest of the battle, and even half a module's worth of medium artillery ammo will generally thoroughly suppress any infantry target. Only stone buildings, since they protect strongly against near misses, can allow good troops to "ride out" a medium barrage. And not always, even then.

The proper use of medium artillery is to break defenders right before a charge, as in the "rolling barrage" technique. Light mortars can usually do something similar only to attackers, meaning units "above ground", thus with limited cover.

5.5", 150mm, and 155mm artillery - and everything heavier - is a much more serious proposition, and will inflict very high losses on anything near when the shells go off. The number of shells is far less of course, so the average distance to the nearest hit is farther. The rate of fire is also slower. The result is more uneven suppression, but those units close to impacts will be more thoroughly and permanently messed up. When heavy artillery starts landing, the best thing to do is to run clear. The time between impacts is long enough to make it a meaningful distance, and only distance - not cover or hunkering down - will really protect against the heaviest shells.

I hope this is useful.

[Volksturm - Village Defense]

Sorry, I didn't think to take any. Silly of me. I will try to remember such things next time.

[Volksturm - Village Defense]

This is a little examination of an underused German force type, the Volksturm (VS), along with an AAR of a simple outing vs. the AI with them.

The VS are militia, late war home defenders. They should be played with "low" force quality and the "infantry" force type. Realistically they belong in village or urban fights in the last three months of the war, but occasional fights in other terrain, or earlier but on German soil, are possible. They should generally be used in small defense scenarios, with the Germans getting 1000 points or less.

They get no tanks, no vehicles, no towed guns, and no artillery support either (although Jabos are still possible). No bunkers or pillboxes, but the rest of the fortifications are still available. There is only one infantry force type, available in platoon, company, or (giggles) battalion strength. And the only support items available are light and heavy MG teams, schrecks, and sharpshooters. There is a certain elegant simplicity to these poor fellows.

The dominant feature of the VS is their incredible infantry AT weapons load-out. Each platoon comes with 4 schrecks, and each of its 4 squads, in the late months of the war when they are meant to be used, will add 2 faust-100s each. A company has 3 such platoons, and thus 12 dedicated AT teams and 24 fausts.

You generally want to buy them as greens. The conscripts may be more realistic in some respects, but in CM the gap between "conscript" and "green" is extreme. Greens can fight, though a bit brittle. Conscripts tend to miss everything and run. With all the schrecks to pay for included, the VS run 469 for a company as greens. But you'd pay 570 to get VG regulars, with as many schrecks added.

The individual squads are even smaller than the VG - 7 men per. But the weapons load-out is excellent. Each squad gets 1 MG-42, 1 MP44, 3 MP40, and 2 K98. A company with the HQs included thus gets 12 MGs and 57 SMGs. That compares with 5 MGs and 58 operable SMGs for a VG company. Thus, a VS company has as much close-in firepower as a VG company, but spread over more shooting units. And with nearly twice the LMGs, some rifles, and some of the SMGs the MP44 type, it also retains better firepower at medium range.

Organizationally, you can construct a 4th platoon out of the 4th squads of each of the line platoons, putting them under the company HQ. To increase the ranged firepower, it is also a good idea to add some HMG teams, preferably one per platoon, but at least two for a company. Sharpshooters aren't such a good idea with only green quality, though. And you will already have all the schrecks you need. A few cheap LMGs for deception or outpost warning might be sensible, but generally speaking you will be better off with the more robust HMG teams, especially because of their far higher ammo.

When spending the rest on obstacles, remember that your infantry anti-tank ability is already superb. There is not much need for roadblocks or daisy chains, when your fausts and schrecks will stop vehicles anyway. Hidden AT mines are mostly the same story. But AP mines are useful, because they provide an "area fire" effect. Without artillery of any kind, that can be a useful addition.

The main story, then, is that you get lots of schrecks, deadly SMGs and faust-100s, good MGs supplimented with added HMG teams, and the ground under enemy infantry goes boom. It is not easy to run a defense based purely on those aspects of the late-war German force and tactical techniques. But it can be fun to try, and you will hone your infantry fighting and ambush skills.

The short range, high effectiveness of both the SMGs and the AT weapons tends to create an "owned zone" ahead of the VS. Their biggest headaches come from enemy artillery, ranged fire, and vehicles standing off a long way. The reach of the schrecks is effectively extended by their sheer numbers, however. You can afford to take marginal shots with them, since there are 60 rockets in a company and 11 other shooters if a team gets KOed. But far enough a way, they still have little ability to touch things.

How to fight with them nevertheless? First of all, by stealth and fire discipline, and use of platoon HQ infantry ambushes. Lots of hiding until the right moment. Second, by "back" or "down" deployments, that only let the enemy draw into view at close ranges. Third, by occasional sorties, risking a team or a platoon to get off shots, then withdraw. Fourth, by making the most of the HMGs - typically from second stories but also along diagonals from flanks - to cover open areas, and the AP minefields to deny cover or block approaches.

Here is an AAR about a village defended by a company of VS in March 1945, against as it happens a British combined arms force, which foolishly tried to attack at night. Visibility turned out to be around 180 yards. Clear skies and dry ground, but dark.

The 900 point Brits were all regulars, and had 1 Sherman, 1 Stuart, 2 halftracks, a company of infantry plus a few extra 2" mortars and PIATs, 1 Vickers MG, and 4.5" gun artillery support. The 600-point VS had a company, 1 HMG, 2 Sharpshooters (a 2nd HMG would have been much better), and 8 AP minefields.

Notice right off that the VS got infantry parity merely from the economy of not buying anything else. In place of tanks, halftracks, and artillery support, they just had 12 schrecks and 8 AP mines. It proved quite sufficient. Of course, the AI helps - a lot LOL.

The map had a standard village but with a slight twist. A big stone building at the crossroads had only a minor flag, while the major one was on a lateral road south of the crossroads, in the open. The area behind that major flag was almost completely open, with a few scattered light buildings near it, only.

There were three obvious routes "in". Along the left/south edge, patches of woods led up to a pair of low wood buildings south of the large objective. Over on the right, a tall wood inn was masked to the northwest by a patch of dense pines, with a road slanting in toward them and scattered trees on the other side of that road. And in the center, a line of buildings led to the crossroads with occasional gaps, and just south of a pair of them a block of woods with rough ground east of them gave covered access into the first buildings.

I put one weak platoon on the left along the edge, blocking the tree route there, and put 3 AP mines dead ahead of them. One low wood building sat opposite this position, but I figured it was close enough that 2 schrecks could, if necessary, make it rather hot. The shrecks in this patch could also look north/right to cover part of the open ground leading to the large objective.

Right/north of that 60-yard minefield, I left a gap perhaps 60 yards long far out in the middle of an open field. Then the mines resumed, covering the exits from the center wood-and-rough "approach block", and "ceding" two houses near that. The mines stretched the rest of the way over to the road, so that an attack up the chain of houses would hit mines, but one hooking a litte farther north and clear of the mines, would be in the middle of the main east-west road.

The main position, built from a full strength platoon and the HMG, was at the crossroads behind the center approach route. One schreck was left forward in the first houses to spot the enemy and give warning, and if possible bag something.

Over on the right, another platoon held the pine woods masking the "inn", with the HQ and a small reserve back in the buildings proper. A schreck outposted the slanting road off to the northwest. Behind the center, the company HQ was deployed with a reserve "platoon" made of 2 squads pulled from the left-hand position, and 1 from the right. They could thus swing either right or left of the main crossroads position, depending on where threats developed. The two sharpshooters each got isolated low wood buildings north and south of the crossroads respectively, crossing their fields of view at the center crossroads.

It is always fun to listen to the night sounds as the ambushes wait, and the clueless AI leads with its light armor - LOL. Sound contacts, sound contacts. One infantry unit spotted by the forward schreck on the main road, but he keeps his head and stays down. A Stuart runs into view, down the main road. The ambush marker is out at 70 yards, and the shot hits at 60 yards, and the dead tank rolls to a stop 45 yards away. Too easy.

The schreck sneaks around and repositions, comes back for another try. The bailed crew briefly considers the house the schreck is hiding in for its own hiding place, then thinks better of it. A Sherman crawls into view, with swarms of infantry around it by now. The schreck team actually hits it, with a loud bang, but the tank seems undamaged. I did not discover until the end that this hit had damaged the gun on the Sherman. The first schreck is soon routed and tears back past the mines to the first held building, drawing fire. Did a heck of a job - even if it was stupid AI tricks, LOL.

Next what looks like about a platoon of infantry approaches by the northern entryway - the pine woods. One squad advances to within 30 yards of my positions before a whole platoon lights it up. One survivor is soon scurrying back for the trees farther west. His mates soon have their fill too - a dead PIAT team is left in the open - and the attack shifts to the center.

There the bulk of the British company pours into the woods-n-rough area, and reaches the first buildings. Any move past them soon draws fire from my center and right. They are pinned back into the cover. The forward building only provides cover for 1 squad to fire forward, and any lone squad there is soon outshot and broken. So instead, the Brits cower behind the first building, in the second, and build up a base of fire in the rough.

Then their two halftracks come foward, poking around the sides of that rough. Meanwhile the Sherman is still operational, though looking "shocked", and begins suppressing the flanking fire from the pine woods with its MGs, staying a respectable distance away. With all the schrecks available, it is not long before shots are lined up, and both 'tracks are KO'ed at ranges of 120-150 yards, fired at from several directions.

Even at low-value targets and with 15% chances to hit, the VS can afford to let fly, and will fire enough to get the job done. Only the Sherman remains alive, as 4 shrecks rounds in succession miss at ~150 yards, and it backs up to 180, while breaking a shreck with its MGs. But with limited night visibility, it effectively takes itself out of the battle - pretty much - by doing so.

The Brits foolishly try to get farther, once their base of fire is built up. Some cross the road toward the pine woods, and some head over the open toward the few buildings around the main objective. The former run into fire from three sides and quickly break. The latter rush into the minefields, halt, and take fire from their front and left flank. The reserve comes up left of the crossroads into those buildings, adding its fire and sending the survivors fleeing back into the rough in considerable disorder.

The fight is basically won by then, with about half of the 25 minute clock gone. But the Brits have one more trick up their sleave. Heavy arty begins to fall on the left, and about a platoon heads for that route. One squad's foxhole is basically clear of the barrage, letting it fire on the enemy in the open. And the secondary minefield there does its work. The left flank platoon eventually loses half its strength to the barrage despite rushing clear of the first blast area and hiding at the bottom of their foxholes. But the attempt to get through on that side is repulsed.

Instead, they keep trying in the center and by slipping north from the center, across the road. But there is no chance there really, after the losses they have sustained and with all of their heavier support neutralized or used elsewhere. A couple of squads make it to the pine forest, and one holds out in a foxhole there (cleared by the Sherman's MGs, and a Vickers team back in the firebase center). But as the whole platoon on that side comes up to 15-20 yards range in pines, the SMGs do their thing and it too evaporates.

Overall, the Germans took 14% losses, nearly half of them from the artillery and some of them from mistaken friendly fire in the dark. The Brits lose over 60% of the attacking force.

The Germans were never in any serious danger, mostly because the AI handled its vehicles poorly, dropped the arty on a target the FO could see instead of the pine woods where it might have done more serious damage. The AI also lost more heavily than it need have by pushing into the open in places it plainly had no business attempting it. But that was after is was effectively stopped.

It got to the terrain I planned to "cede" when I set up the mine wall, but it got no further, as the mines and the open ground around that "allowed" area, made further advance ruinous. Firefighting from 150 yards away at night was not going to dislodge whole platoons from stone buildings. Getting closer meant giving shots to the SMGs while in the open, or running over mines, or both.

I hope this is interesting.

[ 06-01-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Most overused units in CM?]

I think Sajer has understood me very well, and I thank him for his comments.

[Most overused units in CM?]

Since people are being intentionally dim, I will explain the real problem. People take Panthers all the freaking time. Not 1/3rd of the time they take armor, more like 3/4 of the games.

And no to ASL vet, stipulating others take German infantry will not do, since then they and I would each be commanding German infantry. Granted, sometimes that seems like a more sensible fight to engage in. I command German infantry a lot, and I do take the "infantry" force type, not gobs-o-Panther.

Then there is ASL Vet's blithe comment that if Panzer Lehr fights the Big Red One, it will have more tanks. No. Guess again.

But first a grog quibble. He left out the 31 Jadgpanzers in Pz Lehr's AT battalion in June. On the 20th, the SPA also arrived - 12 Wespe and 6 Hummel - a more reasonable omission. The division also have ~70 gun-armed halftracks (split between 75mm inf and 37mm AT, the latter a type not in CMBO) and a number of armored cars.

But he also is over fixated on one date, and that the date of arrival in Normandy, before any action. By 18 June, the operational tank totals of Lehr were down to 26 Panther, 29 Pz IV, and most of the Jgdpanzers, plus another 26 and 19 in short-term repair. By July 1 it was 32 Panther, 36 Pz IV, and 28 Jadgpanzer or StuG operational. After the mid-July fighting (when it staged a counterattack), it was down to ~50 operational AFV. By August 1, a few days into the breakout and around the time of the Mortain attempt, it was 33 AFV operational, 17 in short-term repair. A week later right after Mortain those totals were cut in half again, with only 5 running Panthers left.

Meanwhile, what would the 1st Infantry have? Depends on the date. Because of his citation of the early strength figures, I assume he is interested in the early fighting. Lehr didn't actually face the Americans until 11 July, and then farther west against the US 9th and 30th divisions, not the 1st. But it was deployed along the Allied army boundary around June 10, where the US 1st Infantry brushed alongside the British 7th Armored. In addition, the US 1st was in the breakout fighting, and was sent to Mortain to deal with the counterattack there.

So there are essentially 3 times for such a conflict in Normandy. Hypothetically around 10-13 June in the Caumont area, around the time of the 11 July counterattack near Le Desert with the US defenders hypothetically switched to the 1st Infantry, or around the time of the Mortain counterattack at the begining of August (7th).

At the time of the possible Caumont fighting, the 1st Infantry was not just another US infantry division. It was the left hand of a US corps drive, and heavily reinforced. Each of its 3 regimental combat teams had a full battalion of tanks attached, in addition to the TD battalion. It also had a recon squadron/battalion attached, beyond the ordinary troop/company. It was directly supported by 6 battalions of artillery rather than the usual 4. It had around 250 AFV. Behind it in echelon but not yet engaged was the 2nd armored division, with 350 more.

All the 1st Infantry actually ran into at that time was the recon battalion of 2nd Panzer division, screening the front, and then the Panzergrenadiers of 2nd Panzer arrived (wheeled) and established an actual held front south of Caumont. Because of the affair at Villars-Bocage, the left flank of the Allied advanced was checked, and the 1st Infantry stopped attacking. FJs and 17th SS Pz Gdr also arrived on the right flank and stopped the push toward St Lo. 2nd Panzer completed its deployment in the Caumont area, but did not face heavy fighting. 1st Infantry went over to the defensive for the next month.

In reality, Lehr spent the next week fighting the British, not the US. Its tanks operational or in short term repair dropped by 90 in that week, with around half the remainder in short term repair. If it had never fought the Brits, it would have matched the 1st Infantry in AFV numbers and exceeded it in weight and capabilility. After that week, if had no more running armor than a typical US infantry division, with attachments. What really happened is it took losses defeating 7 AD (UK), following up the Villars-Bocage affair, as well as damage from artillery and air attack. It was then pulled out, repaired tanks and took about 20 replacement tanks, and then sent back into action on the American sector, counterattacking on 11 July.

In early July it had around 100 AFV again, but at the time of the counterattack only managed to throw in 51 AFVs, spread into three prongs. The first had 20 tanks and both battalions of the 902nd Pz Gdr, the middle one had 20 Jadgpanzer and one battalion of the 901st Pz Gdr, and third had 11 tanks and the other battalion of the 901st Pz Gdr. They had support from 1 battalion of 150mm and 3 of 105mm. The infantry battalions were understrength. The division had already lost 5000 men by then, and more than 2000 were still in the British sector pulling out.

What did these 51 AFVs and 4 "battalions" run into in their counterattack? The two forward RCTs of the 9th Infantry division, and soon 2 battalions from its reserve. With some tank and artillery support from CCA 3rd Armored for the 9th. And one RCT of the 30th division, supported by a battalion task-force from CCB 3rd armored.

The whole force in the area attacked was around 11 infantry battalions (vs. 4, depleted), 2 TD battalions which did most of the heavy lifting to stop the attack - the 899th with 9th Infantry and tghe 823rd with 30th infantry - and several tank battalions, only about 1 of which was actually needed. Plus massive artillery fire, 15000 rounds expended on the day.

The actual US armor engaged only came to about 1 battalion of tanks and 1 TD battalion, simply because more was not needed. Company A of the 899 TD KO'ed 1 Pz IV and 6 Panthers for a loss of 2 TDs in 2 seperate engagements. Company C of the 899 TD KO'ed 6 Panther for a loss of 1 TD in 3 seperate engagements It was assisted in one of these - in which it lost 1 and KO'ed 2 - by one company of Shermans from CCA, but the TDs scored the actual kills. In the 30th Division sector, one company of the 823rd TD battalion KO'ed several Pz IVs and a couple of Jadgpanzers with a loss of 1 TD, while the abundant infantry in that area accounted for 5 Pz IVs with bazookas. 2 companies of Shermans from CCB 3rd armored counterattacked the counterattack, but lost 6 Shermans to remaining German Jadgpanzers from the center prong, which hit them from a flank at range. All told the Germans lost 20-25 AFVs and the Americans lost 10, in at least 8 seperate engagements, usually at short range in the hedgerows.

That is the predictable result from ~50 AFVs charging into full strength divisions, with superior infantry, artillery, and air support. And armor. The actual armor engaged on the US side did not outnumber the Germans by very much - perhaps 80 or 90 vs. 50 - just enough to outnumber them in every engagement. The armor available in the area was more like 3 or 3.5 to 1, but not all of it engaged, since the attacks were broken up rapidly enough.

The effect of air (3 groups of jabos flew strike over the counterattack) was that the German infantry had to get out of the halftracks or get clobbered on the roads, and once out of them the effect of the heavy artillery fire (more than 15000 rounds) and large edge in infantry manpower (11 battalions vs. 4) was to strip the tanks of support and spotting. They were then hunted by equal to superior numbers of TDs, occasionally supplimented by Shermans and bazooka teams, and wiped out. Those that pulled back - especially the Jadgpanzers in the center - managed to knock out some of the Allied armor in turn and to maintain the front along the jump-off line. Overall, the attack cut Lehr's armor strength in half and in return bought a delay of one day in US attacks in the area.

This is not the sense of things you'd get from imagining, with ASL Vet, that Lehr vs. 1st Infantry would of course mean Lehr had more armor. And one cannot get any real appreciation of what the men in that counterattack attempt actually did, what they were up against, the realistic potential of counterattacks to destroy the beachhead, the nature of the fighting, etc, from that naive picture of the match-up.

The 3rd chance for a clash between the 2 formations would have been the Mortain counterattack, and US moves to meet it. At that time, the 1st infantry had been pulled out of the line (13 July) to take replacements and prepare for the breakout fight. It went into the breakout fight at the end of July. At that time, it had 1 tank (745th) and 1 TD (635th) battalion attached. When it was sent to deal with Mortain, a 2nd TD battalion (634th) was also attached, giving the division ~100-150 AFV, around half of them M-10s.

Around that time, 1 August, Lehr had 12 Panthers, 15 Pz IVs, and 6 Jadgpanzers operational. The division had only 9 howitzers - 1 battalion had been overrun by the 3rd armored division back in late July. It did, however, have plenty of halftracks, hundreds of them. But it certainly did not outnumber the 1st Infantry division in AFVs.

In the early Normandy fighting the Germans had something close to parity in armor, especially on the British sector of the front and in June, rather than July. In the Ardennes, the Germans had an initial armor numbers edge of 4 to 1, which fell to 2 to 1 in the first week and reached parity by the second week. They still had significant amounts of armor into the first two weeks in January; afterwards they did not (it pulled out to stop the Russians, such as hadn't been KO'ed in the fighting). In the Alsace attacks, they had local armor superiority for a couple of days in each of several successive attacks from different points. The armor around Arnhem, being in the German rear, was obviously not matched. And some limited, local counterattacks were launched in both the Hurtgen fighting (e.g. Schmidt), in the Lorraine campaign (e.g. Arracourt), against the Brits in early 45, and at Remagen.

What is the point of all of this historical minutae? I mean, besides the fact that it is fun? Simply that it is not the case that a German panzer division on the map means TOE and the advantage in armor tactically that seemed to ASL Vet to imply. The occasions on which the Germans actually had local armor advantages in the west are more transient than he thinks. They certainly did not have them whenever a Panzer division, on the map, was opposite an Allied infantry division, on the map.

As for the "today, I am the Panzer Lehr and also, I'm at full strength" notion, this is known as the fantasy role-playing version of CM. It has precious little to do with history. You might make one scenario out of it, about fighting the Brit 7th AD along the Seulles in mid June.

But that is not what people actually pretend in talk on this board, or do in QBs. What they pretend in the talk, is that actually the Germans had gobs o' Panther everywhere, facing the poor pathetic zippos. Some have practically maintained that every Allied tanker died in battle - LOL. And in QBs, they take Panthers (w/ FJs et al), not once in a while for spice, but regularly and thinking it is just plain historical.

Then there isthe argument that because other individual vehicle types are scattered, and thus as numerous as Panthers taken one by one - or less - that therefore taking Panthers all the time is perfectly ordinary and reasonable. Which is poppycock. The top of the line in weight and rariety are the Tigers and other specials. Next are the Panthers. Taking one or the other is pretending that only the top 1/5 to 1/4 of the late war German AFV mix existed. It hardly matters how scattered the types are. The unrealistic thing it continually picking from the top portion of the weight and quality distribution.

Which was, after all, my entire original point, which I am quite sure is well understood, but simply resisted because not liked. It is like the similar argument, that because SMGs were used en-masse, that therefore there is nothing wrong with always taking all SMG infantry - or all 2 LMG infantry for those who prefer better range. (Incidentally, taking VG is fine, but VG is not equal to all SMG - they have rifle squads etc). In both cases, the same thing is being done. The bulk of the German force is simply being ignored, pretending it does not exist, while taking all purchases from the top 1/4 or so of the quality distribution. All veterans is an abuse of exactly the same kind.

Were there vets in the German army? Yes. And automatic weapon infantry? Yes. And Panther tanks? Yes, of course. Is it remotely related to the real war to take nothing but those three categories in every fight one is in, and pretend one is doing just because they are more "fun"? No. That is cherry picking, fantasy role-playing, and done because players prefer winning ugly to a challenge.

It starts getting ridiculous, though, when people on this board grog-preach their "averaging up" notions of history, the Lake Woebegone version, where all German equipment is above the German average. Then they wonder, in their technological-dominance fantasies, why the Germans lost. Not able to see why, they move on to pretending they didn't. I've heard it - e.g. the claim that PWs should be excluded from casualty totals LOL - or the claim that even StuGs and Pz IVs -averaged- ~5 kills per vehicle on the eastern front, etc, ad naseum.

The challenge is to take outnumbered defending German infantry force-type and do a -tenth- of what they actually did with it. That is also history. For varieties sake, of course sometimes one will do other things too, sure.

But the cherry picker fantasy players aren't getting variety, nor do they have any idea what the real German commanders had to work with, faced, and did with what they had. Then they pretend they have all sorts of things to teach modern military pros about German tactics, which under the conditions they magically grant themselves they couldn't discover in a thousand years.

"But what if a city full of German super-heavies dropped out of the sky directly on top of a Canadian infantryman?" You'd get a flat Canadian infantryman. What has it to do with WW II or tactics? Not a darn thing.

[Most overused units in CM?]

"I'm not sure I understand your eggshell theory"

Oh, I expect you understand it well enough. You just probably don't like it. But it is possible I've simply been unclear. A few hundred times. And you along with a few hundred others still haven't gotten it. Or don't want to.

The basic thesis I advanced is that thick armor plates are over-represented in QBs, because players scarf up ungodly amounts of the stuff, because it is useful. Some of that usefulness being historical, some not, and some real historical usefulness is obscured.

Which part is "not", in the sense of game usefulness in CM, far beyond historical usefulness? Flanks anchored by the bottomless pit of tartarus, and small numbers engaged vs. small numbers. Which real historical usefulness, is obscured in CM? Very long range dueling.

Because of those features and the way CM prices things, thick front armor is powerful and a relative bargain, and people buy way more of it than the historical participants actually had.

Now some silly persons on this board pretend (endlessly) that uparmored AFVs were common, or the rule, in the late war, or for the Germans in the late war. This is simply not the case. The common practice by the late war was to upgun vehicle types indeed, but uparmoring remained rare by comparison.

The Germans produced about as many Pz II and Pz38 chassis vehicles in the late war, as Tiger and Panther chassis vehicles. They produced more Pz III and Pz IV chassis vehicles than either, by a large factor in each case. The production of types was normally distributed, with the mean right between the Pz III and the Pz IV chassis. This is regularly obfuscated by leaving out large production runs and whole vehicle types when making comparisons, restricting comparisons to particular vehicle classes, portions of the army, formation types, dates, etc.

Late war Pz II chassis were wespes and marder IIs (with a small number of Lynx near the end). Notice - 75mm PAK or 105mm howitzer - upgunned. The original chassis had carried a 20mm cannon. Late war Pz38 chassis were marder IIIs and hezters. Notice - 75mm PAK - upgunned. The original chassis had carried at 37mm cannon. Late war Pz III chassis were StuG and StuH. Notice - 75mm PAK or 105mm howitzer - upgunned. The original had carried a 37mm cannon, with 50mm the later most common type. Pz IV chassis were Pz IVs, Jadgpanzers, StuG-IV, Nashhorns, and Hummels. Notice - 75mm PAK, some even L70, some 88mm, or 150mm howitzer - upgunned. The original had carried a 75L24 short gun. (Not to mention some Brummbars, left out).

Of the above, the Hezters and Jadgpanzers had 60mm angled front plates, and the Pz IVs and StuG/H had 80mm flat front plates. All the rest are thin, and those are relatively thin by late war standards. Nothing like Panther or Tiger armor, or Churchill or Jumbo armor, certainly.

Around 2k Tigers and heavier were made, and around 6k Panthers. The late war production of the IV chassis (all the types) ran around 12k, the III chassis about the same again, the lighter two chassis types 6k and 2k. A nearly perfect bell curve. Everything that could be upgunned to carry a long 75mm PAK or heavier, was upgunned, and remained in production. The heavy types, Panther and up, were heavily outnumbered by the combined lighter types. Not just Pz IVs proper, all the AFV types.

Thus my statement that upgunning was common (more on that, on the Allied side, later) and uparmoring was not (on the scale CM players reach for). I then also said, as you quoted me, "the Panther was the only common uparmored AFV". Which in the sense meant, the list of Tigers and Panthers, Churchills and Jumbos, is true. It is the only one of the late war, heavily front-armored AFV types, that was produced in sufficient numbers to be more than a special role item.

Which does not suffice to make uparmored AFVs common or the rule. It does mean that only the Panther, of the heavy types, was common enough to be an operational reality, rather than an occasional episode. It was not the "average" late war German tank. It was the upper portion of the produced fleet, numerous enough to be palpably present, far enough out on the range of weight and capability to be well above the average German late-war AFV.

I then immediately pointed out how rare the Panther was compared to Sherman 76s and Allied TDs. This draws the comment that "the relationship between allied vehicles and axis vehicles seems irrelevant". Which is an eye-watering, hold your sides screamer. As though how many powerful AT guns there were for each thick armor plate weren't the single most important question about the respective historical usefulness of each.

Of the 6k Panthers produced, only around 2k probably saw action in the west. Not 3k, since they were used in Russia longer and on a longer front. The good tanks faced the Allies mostly in the two waves, Normandy and the winter counteroffensive, Ardennes and Alsace - around 700-800 Panthers on each of those occasions. If they are allowed to stand in for the rarer heavier types, one might round them out to 3k all told, and that would be generous.

They faced 9k US-built TDs and 8k 76mm Shermans (not counting LL to Russia) plus ~5k Fireflies, etc. Upgunned anti-armor Allied AFVs in the west were more common than StuGs and Pz IVs combined, in the whole German fleet on all fronts, over the whole period from 1943 onward. There were at least 7 of the things for every uparmored German tank in the west.

One might also consider 5k each of Sherman 105s and Priests/Sextons and 2k other SPA, as further examples of the "eggshells with hammers" trend toward using the heaviest useful gun a vehicle could carry, without much attention to armor. About 1/3rd of Allied AFVs were in those categories, AT and artillery. There were about as many again of the vanilla 75mm types (Sherman and Cromwell), and the same again of light armor with 37mm or 2-lb (Stuart, M-8, Daimler, etc). As for true uparmoring, late Churchills plus Jumbos were as rare as Tigers and their ilk, with only ~2k all told, most of them Churchills of course.

If one wants a realistic sense of the commonness of uparmored and upgunned AFVs in the west in late war, then, one might approximate it with the following ratios. For the Germans, 1 Panther, 1 Pz IV, 1 StuG or Jadgpanzer (realistically the StuG - in CM the Jadgpanzer), and 1 "other" = Hetzer, Marder, Wespe, Hummel, etc. Facing on the Allied side 3 TDs, 3 Sherman 76 plus 1 Firefly, 1 Sherman 105, 1 Priest and 1 Sexton, 8 Sherman 75, 2 Cromwell, 7 Stuarts, 4 M-8s, and 1 Daimler. Plus one Firefly, Sherman 105, and Cromwell additional, perhaps - in that range.

Ignoring the real match up to focus on each force, this magically becomes 1 Panther, 1 Pz IV, and 1 Jadgpanzer against 1 TD -or- Sherman 76, 1 Sherman 75, and 1 Stuart. Why? Because it sounds better for the Germans, I suppose. Then the Stuart gambles with its life, and the Sherman 75 maybe gets the Pz IV before vice versa but dies to either of the others, and the TD or Sherman 76 might get lucky against the Jadgpanzer, but Panthers rule. Right? Isn't that exactly how it is supposed to be?

Obviously there is all the difference in the world between having 1/3rd of your AFVs carry powerful AT guns while you have only even numbers of them as the enemy has, and having 1/3rd of your AFVs carry powerful AT guns when you outnumber the whole enemy armor force by a large factor, and proportionally, more of your AFVs have powerful AT guns, than of his AFVs have thick armor.

What does it mean for taking forces in CM? Should people stick to abstract ratios? No, of course not. It means #1 the Allies should generally be attacking and #2 they should often have "armor" as the force type, and almost always "combined arms", while #3 the Germans should mostly have the "infantry" force type, only rarely even "combined arms", and only in about 3 battle periods (Normandy, Bulge, Alsace) have "armor" occasionally. And #4 when the Germans do have "combined arms" the armor should generally be of the "other" types (SPA, etc), or StuG/H. And when they have the "armor" type the tanks should be Panzer IVs about half the time, and Panthers the other half of the time. And #5 when the Allies pick their armor types, they should not take Churchills or Jumbos, but anything else they want should be considered fair game.

Only about 1/5 to 1/4 of the late war German AFV fleet was heavily armored, but virtually all of it was upgunned. Between those amounts and 1/3rd of the Allied AFV fleet, depending on how you slice 'em, were upgunned. The reason only 1/3rd of the Allies still proved perfectly adequate, is because that still outnumbered the German thick armor by large amounts. In fact, the Allies probably fielded more upgunned heavy AT AFVs in the west, than the Germans fielded armored anythings in the west, including half-tracks. The other 2/3rds of the Allied AFV fleet were half vanilla 75mm to deal with guns and dug-in infantry, and light armor for exploitation and dealing with isolated infantry on the other.

As for 655 Panthers in the west on a given day, yeah, the Germans sent around 750 Panthers to Normandy. Out of around 2500 AFVs of all types. Notice your totals are "Panzer units". Did it ever occur to you that there were other units in the German army? And incidentally, there were around 500 StuG that fought in Normandy, many of them in the SS mobile divisions, others in several independent StuG brigades, and others parcelled out in divisional AT battalions (along with Marders). Jadgpanzers also filled out the AT battalions of the mobile divisions, when StuGs weren't used to fill in for them instead. But by the first week in August, they had less than 300 operational AFVs in the entire force sent, 10 mobile divisions. Then they didn't have fleets of Panthers anymore, until the Ardennes practically.

"I'm just not seeing the Panther as being all that rare". All what rare? Rare enough to appear in platoon strength in every company meeting engagement from the channel to Berlin? (Like in CM?) You don't see anything rare about tank totals in the mid hundreds at peak force levels, before major battles and after major re-equipage, on a frontage of all of France, facing enemy AFV totals in the mid thousands? Have you worked out how many Panthers it is per mile, at the other times when all the divisions aren't still on the trains, not having seen any action yet? Per Allied division faced at those times? How about, how many could be lost per km of front per -month- without the total disappearing altogether? (Hint - it is not an integer).

The Panther is the only uparmored AFV that is common enough it ought to appear in CM QBs. But nothing like as often as it is actually used. Again, buying upgunned vehicles is realistic, because there were tons of the things, both sides. Buying uparmored things all the time is not, because they were scarce. Panthers occasionally, when the Germans have "armor" at all, which should be "rarely". That is all. They are overused regularly today.

[Defending Against the Assault, a CM Guide]

On tactical counterattacks, I find what I as a defender can actually get together for them is usually -

1 platoon of infantry in the area of the jump-off. Sometimes with its hair a bit mussed already.

1 platoon of reserve infantry, sometimes a company HQ with a wee bit more. Generally in good shape.

A few teams, AT or MG or both.

0-3 AFVs, typically nothing special, 2 StuG or 2 of those and 1 StuH for example, or a couple of Shermans or Allied TDs. At best. Sometimes none, sometimes 1 AFV.

One FO that can dedicate most of its fire to the counterattack, though I'd prefer to save one short fire mission as "final protective fire", for later.

Leading with tanks in such an affair, I'd never try. I doubt it would work. Often the tanks are missing altogether, or only one is available. As always with defending AFVs, the watchword is the clean kill then repositioning, not bludgeoning ahead.

The tanks support, taking out isolated enemy positions and especially hunting for enemy armor, protected by the infantry ahead of them. The artillery breaks some portion of the enemy force, and the infantry kills it while it is still suppressed.

The infantry then typically sets up someplace, able to deliver follow-on fire from an important angle, or just to defend themselves with enough firepower behind some crest or something. Sometimes the whole movement allows an AFV or two, or an MG or two, to set up where they can deliver flanking fire on another portion of the map.

Enemy artillery and playing "tag" with it, in the sense of getting back out if heavy stuff comes down accurately, is often the #1 problem. Sometimes I've misjudged the whole affair and have to call it off rapidly with some loss. Sometimes the enemy presses elsewhere while the reserve is busy with the counterattack.

They are still definitely worth it in my opinion. They keep attackers honest, or punish them for carelessness. Many attackers will act as though they can maneuver with impunity, and leave nothing out of main efforts for security, or don't bother holding anything like a line.

A secondary attack, meant to probe, or feint and fool the defender, and thus not pressed too hard, can sometimes be butchered in a matter of minutes. Freeing the counterattackers for other work, and imposing a steep VP cost as well.

The basic idea is an attacker expecting just a platoon in some area faces twice that or more, plus artillery support. It is much better to get a decisive punch in somewhere then move the feet, than to hold off such probes with equal forces, and get outnumbered and pushed around elsewhere.

Often you will get pushed around elsewhere, where the attacker has massed most of his force, anyway - indeed, whatever you do, if he goes "heavy" enough on that side. But you better make him pay on his "weak" "wing" for that, or the attrition of it will break you.

For me, that is what counterattacks do. They let the defender also get in his many-on-one "licks", instead of standing still while only the attacker does. And they force the attacker to think in terms of the vunerability of his own forces, not just flowing over the defense.

[Defending Against the Assault, a CM Guide]

I understand taking the plane for the fun of it - sure. I also grok the comment "SMG's are simply too deadly". Defending is tough. Defending with the Allies is tougher. Defending with the Allies against SMG infantry in tight terrain is getting silly.

Guns work much better for the Germans, because they have more types and cheaper ones. A 40mm Bofors costs three times what a 20mm FLAK does, and twice what a 75mm infantry gun does. The US MG teams are more affordable; bazookas are cheap too. A mix works best.

Either way you try to use them behind sighting blocks, when they can see a reasonable distance to a "trigger" obstacle that blocks LOS farther forward, to keep down suppressing fire opportunities. If the terrain doesn't do that, then sure you don't get as much out of them, as when you can find some terrain somewhere that is good for them.

I think you did understand my point about the mines, though. A covered route into your positions is not the end of the world, if you mine at least one such route and give the attackers a bloody nose along it. That direction can act as a "shield", to keep you from being overrun.

You also need TRPs and to call the artillery close. But with or without them, you really can't afford the attitude "I have to fire the arty now or he will be too close and I will have friendly fire losses". That is the one thing I'd forcefully change, even more than the force selection stuff.

While in contact is the right time to call defending arty. But TRPs help in tight terrain, to get it to land close but not too close, and when needed even out of LOS. Then the foxholes have to do some of the work, protecting your guys from the shorter rounds - or a short pull-back to a rear, secondary line.

The close arty has to work with the mines to create area-denial effects. Meaning, a barrage when coming down is a sort of extension of a minefield - both have in common that they do more, the more comes after you at once. And then those areas walk.

You'd still be likely to lose, with Allied defenders against SMG infantry, in an infantry heavy enemy force, with attacker's odds, on a tight terrain map. LOL. But no mines or TRPs, and relatively wasted (and over-abundant) fire support, is obviously going to make it even worse than it would otherwise be.

Which can of course be fun in its own right, to be sure...

[Defending Against the Assault, a CM Guide]

Scout is confused. First he says he disagrees with me. Then he says "I dont play QB's". Then he says "I've never had a problem with the defence." Then he pretends there is anything in his tutorials I don't know.

He also simply ignores, with his "I don't play QBs" comment, that his defense example maps are about 4 times as deep as they are wide, while CM QB maps are about 2 times as wide as deep. When half my point was that they should at least by 2 times as deep as wide, instead of the other way around - while his examples are based on twice that depth again. With all that implies in defender choice of terrain.

Then he says good cover numbers without foxholes work both ways, for the defender too, which is patently silly. Not to mention the fact that defenders cannot "also" use superior numbers, and my whole point is that numbers matter more than cover differentials in CM, and that, considerably more than in real life.

Then he says when defending in terrain, just stay tight enough. But he also spoke of using indirect fire and obstacles as force multipliers, so he is perfectly aware of just how useful the injunction to "stay tight" is, when the attacker throws in 155mm artillery.

Then he admits it is too easy for attackers to cross obstacles, which were supposed to be the one assymmetrical force multiplier. Since obviously artillery is available to both, and the tighter the defender needs to stay, the more vunerable he is to it.

And when talking about staying tight, he traces it to trying to defend too much ground, while ignoring the fact that his defense examples use maps 1/8th as wide as a QB map of the same depth would be. He admits that QB VLs are sometimes impossible. He suggests avoiding QBs entirely. This is supposed to be a ringing endorsement of the balance between defenders and attackers in QBs.

Then he ignores the similarity between his injunction to defend one or two places rather than everything, and my advice to stay loose and keep out of the main path of the attacker, letting as much of his force as possible hit air. Perhaps he thinks defending just one or two places will magically not leave 6-7 others open. No doubt, if you simply make the map 1/8th as wide.

Further, he thinks it is tight enough if the defenders can see each other, and thus support each other. He mentions the importance of this for avoiding many on one attacks against portions, but ignores the reality that in CM, 3:2 or 2:1 odds will run defenders right off their feet if all shoot all. Why? Because of the cover differential limitations, compared to the odds differentials. Which he does not examine or analyze in the slightest.

Here is how to give yourself problems on the defense, scout. Take a map with only as much space as CM actually gives you, front to back. And as much width as CM actually gives along with it, side to side. Take an attacking force that does not spend everything on halftracks, but buys infantry instead, in quantity, plus a few vanilla AFVs and supporting artillery modules, of high caliber.

Put all your obstacles and fire zones anywhere you please. Stay as tight as you please - if you go tight, the arty will get you, if you go loose, the infantry will.

Sacrifice 1/4 to 1/3rd of your maneuever force on a forward screen, which the attack will hit not with a leading element but broad-front with his entire force, AFVs trailing not leading. The attack will annihiliate your screen for little loss. Try to stop the infantry from passing through all covered areas with just arty fire, and see how soon you run out, on a CM defender's budget, not the US army's "rich man's firepower banquet".

And try doing it with US infantry defenders, vanilla. Oh, and no stupid AI tricks either - the opponent commander needn't be any kind of expert, but he must be a human being, thus able to put down artillery intelligently, not lead recklessly with tanks or bunch up in obvious kill zones already revealed, and without you knowing beforehand what his plan is.

You will have problems on the defense soon enough, sir.

[Are snipers good for anything...?]

If you want to know what a realistic true sniper would do in CM, then buy 1, just 1, elite sharpshooter. Put him somewhere on your side of the map with some LOS, preferably of the "keyhole" variety toward a likely approach route, not a wide field of view. And not around your main forces.

Wait until he has a target, then take him off "hide" for 1 turn. He will shoot and probably get something. The following turn, withdraw-run him clear off your side of the map ASAP, through covered areas.

"But what impact will that have on my battle?" Little. And he doesn't care. He just does the above once or twice a week for the whole war, or until an unlucky artillery shell gets him. The result? Cost: one guy with a scoped rifle. Return: ~100 dead enemy. That is what real snipers do.

[Tommy gun question...]

Well, lessee. Winston was a fencing champion in his school days, a champion polo player in India, a decent shot with a Martini-Henry in the Afghan and Boer wars, and rather accomplished as a pistol-shooter from the saddle in action in the Sudan. In WW I, besides suggesting the idea for the first tank ("Winston's folly", as the brass dubbed it), he led infantry battalions and eventually a brigade, but I believe that involved crossing no-man's land armed with stick, to direct his men.

But then, in 1944 he turned 70 years old, and no doubt his eyesight wasn't what it once was. Still, despite going through boxes of cigars and crates of whiskey with some regularity, he lived to be over ninety and buried essentially all of his political opponents. I think he might have mustered the wherewithall to clear a room with a tommy-gun, had he ever needed it. LOL.

[German Halftracks with 75mm guns]

Actually, the M8 Howitzer Motor Carriage is the direct allied equivalent and was quite a common item, used in every TD and cavalry battalion. But in CM, these for some reason are treated as "armor" points rather than "vehicle" points. There is no good reason for that, really, it is just an arbitrary bit of CM design.

Presumably because they wanted 75mm German HTs to be common in mech and combined arms forces, while the M8HMCs were TD and cav (thus mech or armor realistically, but not so common in combined arms).

It would probably be more consistent to have all sorts of light armor in the vehicle page, included armored cars and light tanks, and some SP guns, etc. Leaving tanks and TDs on the armor page. But they just didn't classify things that way.

Incidentally, a couple of 75mm HTs was a very common "heavy weapons" component of German panzergrenadier forces. They used halftrack mounts for items that would be dismounted guns and teams in the ordinary infantry, to give them the mobility to keep up with an armored attack. 20mm AA and 37mm AA (or in the early war 37mm AT), 75mm infantry guns and 81mm mortars, went along with heavy MG teams to provide the ranged fire support of infantry companies and battalions. As towed guns for plain infantry, on halftracks for armored panzergrenadiers.

[Most overused units in CM?]

Light mortars were incredibly common, far and away the most common form of fire support. Yes, it would generally by just one module, but that one module was all over. And one is mainly buying the shells - 150, 180, 200 of them expended per module. The battalion mortars could easily fire off that many in support of every company-level firefight, in physical terms.

In a typical CM QB, the men present on each side will run from 150 to 250 or so. The light mortar rounds fired will typically be 1 per man to 2 per man on the opposing side. Well, in WW II the Germans threw on the order of 100 million mortar rounds at the Allies, who did not number 50-100 million infantrymen, of course.

I do agree that medium artillery was also quite common, perhaps more common than in CM. People buy the mortars for the faster response time. Medium and heavy artillery shells are often more effective in CM for the cost, but they do not respond so quickly. If "gamey" sweet spot is not the light mortars - which are historical in my opinion - but the heavier mortars, 4.2 inch and 120mm. These were relatively rare weapons for all but the Russians, compared to light mortars and medium artillery.

I think the realistic way to address all that is to take only 1 module of light mortars in a QB. And to take medium mortars only ~1/6th of the time or so (roll a die - LOL). Gonzo artillery should also be rare (above 155mm). Most of the time, people should take 25 lber, 105mm, 150mm, 155mm for everything beyond the first light mortar module. (One module of 75mm is also OK for German infantry or US airborne, cav, or TD forces - regimental guns etc).

The most overused is probably automatic weapon "uber" infantry, as opposed to "vanilla" infantry. Also veterans generally, rather than a fair portion of greens and a majority of regulars.

As for AFVs, Churchills, jumbos, Tigers and Panthers are also overused, as people grab for invunerable front armors. Historically, "eggshells with hammers" - upgunned but not particularly uparmored AFVs - were much more common.

There were as many 76mm Shermans as Panthers, Tigers, and other German heavies combined - on both fronts - and the same number again of Allied TDs. But Jumbos and Pershings and late-model Churchills were as rare as German uber-tanks, and rarer by far than Panthers. Upgunned things were a dime a dozen, uparmored things were quite rare. The Panther was the only common uparmored AFV, and on the -western- front was much more rare than Sherman 76s and Allied TDs. Like, by a factor of ten (since most Panthers made overall, were used on the larger eastern front).

[Defending Against the Assault, a CM Guide]

Portion of infantry in reserve - 1/3rd or less, often 1 platoon, occasionally 2 platoons or one platoon plus a command group built around a company HQ.

On the fellow with the wooded map, trying to defend with 1 tank, 1 fly-boy, 2 infantry companies and artillery: I doubt it would work regardless of the terrain you "drew". Players don't seem to appreciate the full effects of taking large amounts of fire-support as defenders. It drastically increases the ground combat odds faced. I will explain.

The thing that is different about off-map artillery, on-map mortars with limited ammo (all but the Brit 3" essentially), and fighter-bombers, is that they take themselves out of the battle by expending their ammunition. They "exchange off" against enemy forces hit, at -best-. And one is always facing the "headwind" of the odds ratio.

Suppose a US player takes a 215 point module of 105mm artillery. Well, the enemy force has 322 points worth of stuff to counter that size investment. That is up to an entire company of infantry, or 2-4 AFVs (Hetzer to Panther), or 2 platoons of improved infantry types or improved quality, plus supporting teams. The 100 shells of 105mm have to neutralize -more- combat power than that, to pay for themselves. As they are expended, they will automatically take themselves out of the battle. The question is how much they take out with them.

Or, another way to look at it. Suppose that the fight in 1000 points for the defender. If the defender spends 250 points on artillery types, and the attacker only spends the same amount, 250 points, on such types, then the odds ratio in maneuver forces becomes 1250 to 750, 5:3 instead of 3:2.

When attackers avoid taking too much fire support, and avoid overpriced items of little value like halftracks and flamethrowers, and keep their purchases of vets and mongo armor within bounds, then they leave as much as possible for raw numbers of the critical maneuver elements - infantry platoons and AFVs. This possibility places the severest constraints on defender force selection. If you blow 1/3rd of your points on fire support, fortifications, and annoyance extras, then you can easily face 2:1 odds in maneuver elements.

There are very few items like that defenders can afford. A single platoon's worth of minefields and TRPs can help. One module of medium artillery can give tactical options that will repay the cost. Lighter forms of fire support - especially light mortars, but also the cheapest 75mm modules and such - can also work. -Some- of the budget must be spent on these things, to get area-effect weapons that can protect defenders from concentration by attackers. But too much spent on them will break the bank.

What defenders need above all is items that -have the potential to destroy more than their own cost before being neutralized. And not just marginally more, but several times their cost. That is the only thing that will even out the odds ratio. A tank that kills 3 tanks can even out the odds ratio - or 2 PAK/AT guns that kill 3 tanks between them. Infantry that breaks an attacking platoon without being badly hurt itself, then is repositioned - can even out the odds ratio. AT teams that cost 1/5th what AFVs do but can sometimes kill one - or guns that cost what squads do but can sometimes neutralized an entire platoon - those are the sorts of "trades" a defender must rely on.

Defenders must fight like poor men. That means doing things not with the best weapon for the role, but with the cheapest that will accomplish the task. They have to ask far more of their units than attackers do. A defender's platoon needs to cover two avenues at once; a defending AFV must kill cleanly and live to do it again.

Now, artillery modules in themselves cannot do this. Because they expend themselves and thus take themselves out of the battle, with a strictly limited amount of damage that can be expected of them. The way artillery can pay for itself is by setting up infantry counterattacks on broken enemies, that kill far more than the artillery alone could.

Firing blind into zones attackers are moving through, trying to "attrite" them before contact - will not work. Modern doctrine otherwise is based on a rich-man's attitude toward fighting, that defenders in CM cannot afford. Artillery must be bought sparingly on the defense, and must be used economically.

It should fall on units in contact, or just before contact, or in the worst case to break or prevent contact to enable a maneuver element to get away from superior enemy forces. Fire missions should be 1 1/2 to 2 minutes, only lasting another minute in rare cases, to keep attacker's guessing. Whenever possible, enemies broken by fire should be finished off before they recover, by ground counterattack.

It is by multiplying suppression into total destruction, that artillery can be made to

"pay", and can reduce overall odds ratios against you. Just fired "independently" to "soak" attackers, it will barely pay for itself. And even then, only if fired on known targets, not empty patches of woods half the time.

Defenders cannot afford to spend high portions of their limited point budgets on artillery and fortifications combined. They must avoid high-priced items of dubious lasting combat value - like more than 1-2 snipers, like flamethrowers and halftracks, like the most expensive uber-tanks or top unit qualities throughout the force. Some mines, TRPs, light FOs, and one medium FO, is the most they can afford to divert from maneuver element, combat-power "buys".

On board guns are the defender's best friend. They are not useful on the attack, for lack of mobility and cover. Foxholes and a planned deployment and ambush are the defender's advantages, and guns multiple their usefulness, while those advantages mask the weaknesses of guns. Cheap teams, like AT teams in particular, but also MGs with high ammo allotments and good firepower, have a similar usefulness. With AFVs, defenders should focus on the gun more than anything and its anti-armor abilities. Take only a few AFVs, and take types that can kill enemy armor efficiently. Use ambush to protect the hunters; get a kill and then move. PAK/AT are a budget alternative.

Often the defender can even out the infantry odds by strict economy in fire and armor support. If cheap guns, ambushing AT teams, and a few AT-capable AFVs can neutralize enemy armor, and if friendly cover and hidden locations, moving targets, TRPs, and minefields can equalize the effects of fire support despite less spent there, then defenders can win. Because enough can be left for infantry purchases to avoid being steamrolled by numbers.

But anyone outnumbered 2:1 in infantry, and especially if facing better quality or higher per-squad firepower at short range to boot, is going to lose eventually, unless his opponent makes numerous "unforced" errors. You cannot count on shooting down attackers that enjoy serious odds, at range with rifles and light MGs, even on relatively open maps. It is not going to happen.

Arguable, CM needs tweaks in some important respects, in favor of defenders. The two chief changes needed in my opinion are #1, more room for defenders to set up in, and #2 greater cover differentials from some sort of linkage between movement state and reductions in terrain cover.

The first is easy to understand. The more room the defender has, the more he can pick his terrain, and the less he is forced to defend right on objectives (easily located and artillery bait), or behind them (giving them up then counterattacking after a barrage e.g.), or to give them up. I think 50% of the map should be available to defenders in -probes-. In attacks it should be more like 2/3 to 3/4, in assaults more like 4/5ths, with only a thin strip of no-man's land between the attacker's jump-off line and the begining of the defended zone. And the maps should be 2:1 or 3:2 longer than wide, instead of twice as wide as deep.

Realistic defender's tactics all count on use of space and choice of terrain. Ambush and fall back, chosing terrain to get reverse slope effects, defenses in depth, time to gauge a main effort and meet it with reserves - these are the standard tools of real-world defenders. In CM, there simply isn't the space to use half of them.

The second is a larger change, and I have explained in repeatedly before. The basic point is that right now, attackers achieve %exposed numbers not much worse than defenders can get, the instant they reach any decent form of cover. Since players choose where they fire-fight from, time spent in worse cover is limited. The overall cover differential attacker's face is thus limited.

And odds are a "two-fer" compared to a better cover state. To match a defender with % exposed numbers twice as good, an attacker only needs 42% more numbers (square root of two). Because he both puts out greater firepower, and can absorb greater firepower, while cover affects only one-half of the "equation".

In real life, defenders often held off 3 times their numbers. For that to happen in CM, % exposed numbers would have to sometimes vary by factors up to 9 times. In practice they only vary by factors of 2 or 3, at best and counting approach time, and in urban settings less than that.

I won't bore everyone with my previous particular proposals on the movement-cover question; they have been explained to the CM folks well enough for them to consider them for CM2.

In the meantime, defenders have to be very wary of facing anything like 2:1 odds in infantry match-ups, anywhere on the map. Because the 2-fer nature of odds, and the "snowballing" or "knife-edge" nature of fire-ascendency and suppression, means such odds ratios will typically lead to lopsided success for the attacker, when cover differentials are only ~2 times or so.

Defenders need to focus on the survival of their men, first and foremost. Sometimes to the point of evading the attacker rather than trying to block his movements. The defense of the objectives are secondary, and will tend to follow in a manner at least somewhat satisfactory, if the defenders live. While nothing done in the meantime will hold them, if the defenders die.

To see this, notice the effects of "exchange" attrition when starting off outnumbered. If you have 4 platoons and the enemy 6, then a loss of 2 platoons each will move the odds to 2:1 - high enough that you will not be able to stand any longer if all forces on both sides can engage. A loss of 3 platoons each will leave the odds 3:1, a walkover. As with a side down material in chess, you cannot afford even exchanges and should avoid anything that just drives up the loss rate on both sides equally.

Don't let him pin you to the ropes, in other words. Don't jump in front of the steamroller trying to stop it. You have to stay loose and spring one-sided "jabs" (ambushs, TRP barrages followed by counterattacks, sniping work against enemy tanks, etc) until you have evened out the odds. You want the main attacking forces hitting air, or chewing minefields, or pinned by barrages. -Not- smashing into your defenders, who obligingly come running to stand right in front of him. Don't forget that your number one asset is that he doesn't know where you are.

[Is pause-able real-time the eventual goal?]

No.

Short and simple.

Strategy games have turns so that the decisions made by the rival commanders, and the interaction between them, will determine the outcome of the game.

Strategy game design is not sim design. It is harder, and an art not an engineering problem.

Making a sim is easy, making a good strategy game is hard. Chess and Go are good strategy games, but simulate nothing. First person shooters are "sims" at least in a fantasy, action movie sense, but are lousy strategy games. So are RT"S" games, which have less depth of game-play than checkers. I am not kidding. Try beating an expert checker player your first time out.

Continual revision of decisions equals practically no consequence to intellectual mistakes in orders. Or, it can only produce consequences if the player loses control of his forces generally, which is boring and reduces to a movie.

Some increment of action must depend on past decisions of the players, without being able to take them back. For example, in chess, if you touch a piece you must move it. A chess game in which each player took back his moves after seeing the opponent's response would be a lousy game. "Oh, someone shot at me. Hit pause. Now let's tweak every order for a hour, then allow another 5 ticks off the clock". That is not strategy.

"Real time" "strategy" is a contradiction in terms. And there is, incidentally, nothing "real" about it either. A player is not 25 seperate officers and sergeants making decisions in parallel, and is never going to be.

Everyone who knows nothing about game design is forever trying to turn strategy games into sims. To choreograph the moves of units. To reduce player control to the nullity that any single man's decisions actually are in the middle of an enourmous battle. To substitute programming and eye candy for game design skill and depth of play. This is why most of the computer wargames ever made have fallen far short of the old board game genre in game play.

They have generally had greater playability, there only saving point. But the number of real successes can be counted on the fingers. More successful wargame designs appeared in a typical year in board form in the heyday of the late 70s through late 80s, than successful computer wargames ever.

BTS figured this out a long time ago, with TacOps among others. The simul-plotted move system was proven from board wargames, especially for tactical combat (air, ships, and individual man ground combat).

Essentially every successful computer wargame has used systems previously proven in game-design terms. The machine allows bookkeeping functions of various kinds to the handled more easily and vastly improves playability and "immersive" feel. But it is not a substitute for good game-system design and never will be.

[Infantry cover]

"Jason, do you feel that the type of movement that the attacker is using should influence the attacker's cover state. Sneaking infantry should have better cover than Moving infantry, and Moving should have better than Running?"

Yes, definitely. That is something I suggested months ago, and the "timer" for cover adjusting back up to full after a halt, was a refinement of that suggestion.

In my example, I showed one way this could be done. A coefficient for the movement type, that modifies the benefit from cover, or otherwise stated the size of the penalty for moving. Thus my "0.8x for running". That would mean only 20% of the cover benefit was available to running units. "0.4x for moving", would mean 60% was available to those units.

That is, right now % exposed = 100 minus cover. The "cover" portion of that would be reduce for moving troops, by an amount that changed with the rate. So a Crawl would keep almost all the benefit of cover - the reason it was actually used, of course. Sneak would keep almost as much, Move a bit less, Assault-move (new for CM2) not very much, and Run almost nothing.

Perhaps 0.1, 0.25, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 respectively. The "move" and "assault move" settings would be most common when really trying to get somewhere, and on average those would reduce the effect of cover by half. Sneak and crawl would keep most of the benefits of cover, at the expense of being slower and more tiring. Run would get you there fast, but you if you get shot at you might as well be in open ground, almost.

Then, when the movement rate changes, you don't pick up the full cover benefit or the slower movement right away. Otherwise people would be micromanaging their waypoint speeds too much for cover reasons. The cover benefit keeps improving as time passes, until it is as good as it can get with the new movement state, including stationary. That is the idea.

So, someone assault-moves through scattered trees until he reaches some tall pines. Then he drops to "sneak". Say the cover of the scattered trees is 70%, and the tall pines is 85%. On assault-move he gets only 1-.6 x 70 = 28% benefit, so his exposure is 72%. When he gets to the pines and slows to "sneak", his -max- cover benefit becomes 1-.25 x 85 = 64% benefit, which would be 36% exposed. The % exposed starts still up at 72%, and falls to 36% over perhaps 15 or 30 seconds, perhaps depending on vet or regular, etc. When the unit halts completely, the max benefit is now 85 same as today, and the % exposed drops - after he stops - from 36 to 15.

If later, he started another assault-move out of the pines, his % exposed would jump up to 1-.6x85 = 34 benefit means 66% exposed. So charging would negate most of the cover of the pines.

If the effects seem too large, just tweak the numbers - 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.35, 0.5 say, for crawl-sneak-move-assault-run. Then the cover still depends more on the terrain you are in than the movement state. The point is, you can tune it to whatever, until it "feels" right and gives the right sort of balance between importance of "hitting the deck" vs. having something to hit or hide behind.

[Infantry cover]

"I'd love to hear your thoughts on that."

I replied to that thread. In general I don't see a problem with over-packing, because I think overpacking did really happen at times. Maybe full cover shouldn't be available with too much "stacking", or maybe the area that is effected by small arms fire should be a bit bigger. But in general, I think CM is ok on that score.

Packing is physically possible, but artillery makes it dangerous. That is true on both counts, and CM has it on both counts. Big effects from HE as the main reason units to try to spread out, and sometimes they bunch up quite a bit. And pay for it.

[Infantry cover]

"they're hardly a one page document"

LOL. Well, thanks. But 2 1/2 is more like it for that one. You might easily get it on two with smaller fonts or something.

[Packing Multiple Squads Into A Single Terrain "Square"]

I don't think this is a problem in CM. Others have pointed out the danger from arty, and area fire from MGs can be added to that too. The buildings are a bit tougher to take, but 2 floors can explain that.

On the actual densities of tactical deployments, though, they can go way up there. Much higher than you might think. I can give an example from Nam, the fighting at LZ X-ray in the Ia Drang in 1965. It is certainly an extreme, but not anything out of the age of Napoleon. Here is a description of the feature, from the US colonel who lead the force there.

"The clearing was about 100 yards long, east to west, and kind of funnel-shaped, with the ninety-yard mouth of the funnel on the western end near that dry creek. The bottom of the funnel was on the forty-five yard span of the clearing's eastern edge. In the center of the clearing was a copse of scraggly trees, about half the size of a tennis court. All told, the space at X-ray amounted to no more clear ground than a football field."

Now, some terrain alternations occurred during the battle. A small area on one side of the clearing was cleared of trees with explosives to make room for 2 choppers to land - a tile, maybe two, in CM terms. And on one long side of the field, some of the men cleared fields of fire out about 50 yards later in the fight. Overall, then, 100 yards on a side is about as big as it ever got. The troops were deployed on it, and just beyond into the trees, 20-40 yards off.

The initial length of the perimeter, then, would have been around 17 CM tiles, and at the maximum later on, perhaps 28 CM tiles. How many men fought in that space?

Before it was over, 2 battalions US. Somewhat understrength, but around 120 men per company in the field, 900 or so overall. That is around 80 units in CM terms. In the early part of the fighting, perhaps 40 units. 3 units per tile, then, but with some spread front to back thinning them out (but not much; they weren't in any great depth).

And that is not the densest. Those were the defenders. They were attacked by 4 battalions, an entire NVA regiment plus a VC battalion. In the densest attacks, an entire battalion hit just one side of the perimeter. That is around 5 CM tiles long, maybe spread out a bit more farther out, and converging as they approached. This wasn't some (-) regiment in name only, either. Full strength at the start.

The attacks were in waves, certainly. But there is no question the NVA put 2 full companies at a time - 300-400 men - into attacks on a frontage of 100 yards. "But how, that is 1 foot per man?" Yes. Some crawled, some hunched behind them, some stood behind them in the elephant grass, some got up on the ant-hills (the size of cars), some climbed up in the trees. They were stretched out some front-to-back. They slid down behind men hit and used their bodies for cover.

They did this under the fire of 24 105mm howitzers, several 81mm mortars, helicopter gunships, and 50-100 fighter-bombers bombing, strafing, and dropping napalm. Into a score of M-60s and hundreds of M-16s. They made it to point-blank range and overran some of the US positions, destroying 2 platoons essentially to a man and mauling 2-4 others, before the firepower cut off reinforcement and the attack faltered. Sometimes half-a-dozen US soldiers were down in a single foxhole. When it was over the NVA fallen were literally stacked on top of each other. One machinegunner (who got a silver star) had 100 dead NVA within 40 yards of his foxhole.

The sense that battlefields are empty comes more from inability to see anything when everyone hits the dirt, than from actually being empty. Often, battlefields are anything but. That is one reason artillery does so much of the damage; at times it can be hard to miss.

[Taking out AT Pillboxes]

"You say there are lots of hills"

No, he said the terrain is fairly open -without- a lot of hills.

As for smoking them, several have mentioned that, but it is really a temporary measure. To neutralize the box for 1-3 minutes, so you can rush by some spot it can see into dead ground, that can work. But with long, 800 meter, open fields of fire, there is no way smoke is going to last long enough to do the job. A whole module of artillery will only smoke it for a few minutes, and using it up for that is like giving the enemy 1-2 platoons of infantry.

The fellow also said it looked hard with the forces he had. Well, if arty and infantry are it, then you are going to get shot up some. Use dead ground, temporary smoke from on-map mortars, and arty on its flank supports and infantry protection. But expect it to be a tough nut. And keep your zooks/schrecks as safe as you can and don't waste their ammo on infantry, because you will need them when you get close.