JasonC
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Posts posted by JasonC
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I don't have a problem with an extra 1 sec per waypoint. Only downside I see is it might increase micromanagement, as players tweaked out each unnecessary waypoint to save split seconds, instead of just putting them down wherever they wanted. Tons of waypoints do give more flexibility in use of halts and deletes, though, so that might not be bad.
The main effect of command delay is just to penalize continual changes of plan. If any unit sticks to a plan, the one-off initial cost is tiny compared to the time it spends executing. It is a "flexibility tax". Losing 15 or 20 seconds for a 3 minute plan is nothing, but losing that much every turn is a big hit.
So, I wouldn't want to see the added cost go too high. The total delay from a typical order ought to be some fraction of a 60 second turn. But generally less than half of it. The first 3-5 waypoints should probably be "included" in the present cost, not just the first, if something like this were done. And the added cost per waypoint or action should not be high - 1 sec, not 5.
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"Why there is double delay for fire missions called on TRPs out of sight?"
I assume just for the ease of programming it, since it is that way for every mission. It doesn't much matter with TRPs, because two times zero is still zero.
Yeah, I know it is not exactly zero. But it is still so fast, 2x is a matter of a few seconds, so who cares? It really only has a big impact when the initial time was several minutes.
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I don't think the higher qualities are worth it for most vehicles. But for tank duels, the extra reaction speed, speed on the "draw", first round hit chance, etc, can be worth it. So I like better quality for 1-2 "shooters" or my best tank-dueler vehicles. But for every vehicle? Nah, that is a waste IMO.
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is there a way to set a TRP for the artillery?
No. Unlike BTS's TacOps, in CM you can only get registrations if you are defending, and before the game. They are bought on the "fortifications" menu and cost 10 points each. You can't add TRPs on the fly and come back to them quickly.
You are allowed to adjust existing missions, within a certain radius of the old aim-point (look for a green targeting line), with a minimal adjustment time. And you can adjust to within ~10 meters of a TRP almost instantly. But you can't go back to old fire locations, as you can to TRPs in TacOps.
Incidentally, this also means you general should call for fire when you really want it, and not just to "register" the guns.
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Thanks for bringing it up again.
I can offer some explanation for why I think this sort of effect does have an important impact on game play now. But first a comparison, and a slight practicality issue, about implimenting it.
One of the more distinctive features of CM today is the "command delay" feature. It is a great bit of realism, and has a large effect on the game. Units do not react instantly to orders. While the total delay is tens of seconds, this matters, because the turns are minutes. A unit that changes its orders every turn, winds up using up a high portion of its time in command delay. While a unit that sticks with a plan already settled on, spends all of its time executing the plan. And since suppression effects increase these delays, units lose even more of their flexibility once under fire.
With veterans not under fire, the overall impact is not too high. 8 seconds out of 60 is typical, leaving 87% of the time to execute orders, even with new ones each turn. But regulars and greens, the effect becomes pronounced. A unit that changes its mind every turn only gets done a fraction of what a unit working to a plan gets done.
When I first proposed a relation between % exposed and time in cover, it was exactly this fine system I was thinking of. I think the way to impliment it would be to use the same sort of code and system as the command delay timer. Every unit already has one - a number associated with it, between moves, changing with the clock setting. Just add another "field" to this "array", another number being counted. But start this timer the moment a unit stops moving, instead of the moment it gets a new order.
Then, have a mathematical reduction in the cover benefit proportional to this number. As the number counts down to zero, the cover reduction drops to zero - full cover. The amount of the reduction can be scaled to the past movement type - .8x run, .4x move, etc. Rotations can be handled by treating them as a "crawl" movement type, meaning the total cover reduction possible is very small.
So, say the cover for scattered trees is 75%. But the cover number for "moving" is 0.4x. Then the cover when moving in woods would be 1 - .4 = .6, times 75%, = 45%. A unit moving in scattered trees would have a 55% exposed number, instead of 25%. Then it stops. Perhaps 26 seconds later (regulars, say - supposing one uses twice the standard command delays now) it will have full 75% cover, thus 25% exposed. The % exposed number would fall from 55 toward 25 with each tick of the clock.
This means there will be a large cover difference between a unit that remains stationary, compared to the *average* % exposed number of one regularly moving around. Just as the small command delays are not important when it is a one-time effect of 8 or 13 seconds, the impact of *one* "settling in" period of 26 seconds will not be all that high. A unit might be shot at once or twice with higher % exposed numbers. But, a unit that moves around -repeatedly-, will incur the "cost" -repeatedly-. It will wind up spending half its time, perhaps, in lower cover states. Which will have a much larger effect on the firefights it is engaged in.
In addition, it will create trade off that I think realistic and important. A stationary unit will adopt better positions and keep them - but with its position being known, it is also a better artillery target, easier to maneuver around, etc. While a unit that keeps up and moving regularly, is harder to pin down in those respects. But realistically, is more vunerable to infantry and MG fire.
One of the main reasons I originally recommended such a system, stems from an analysis of the nature of cover advantages on the one hand, and numbers advantages on the other. The first common observation is that attackers with 150% odds often quite easily roll over dug in defenders in CM today.
This is known not to have happened regularly in practice. And this happens not by rushing to point-blank, but by settling down opposite the defenders at relatively close range and blasting them to "cowering", first.
How does this happen in CM systems as there are today? Assume the infantry types are similar, and ignore complications from supporting arms for now. The main difference is the attackers have 50% more guys and the defenders have foxholes. Which matters more?
Well, the effect of foxholes in common types of cover is to reduce the % exposed number in half, or a little less. 10-14% for the dug in, vs. 20-25% for the non-dug in, are typical numbers in woods and pines, varying of course with thickness and LOS, etc. Suppose the defenders have 10% exposed numbers and the attackers 20%. What happens?
You might naively think that with a 2x cover edge, vs. only a 1.5 times numbers edge, the cover would win out. But numbers are a "two-fer". They increase firepower, and they also allow more firepower to be absorbed. 150 shooting into 10% get 15. 100 shooting back into 20 get 20. So the better covered guys, though outnumbered, put out 1/3rd more "net". But 1/3rd more net, will stop 4/3rds odds, but not 3/2 odds.
Thus, the attackers can "dial down" the range, to so close they can barely stand the replies without breaking. Then their own fire will evaporate the less numerous defenders. As some of those get pinned, they will fire less at the attackers, and like a tipping balance the initial edge snowballs into fire ascendency.
The reason for the defender's inability to match the common historical success, of sometimes holding off up to 3:1 odds, is then directly related to the limited size of the -cover differential- that defenders enjoy in CM.
Now, compare my example with the scattered trees, and movement state reducing cover effect, only "growing" to full cover with time. Suppose the attackers are moving around every other minute. Right now, scattered trees they get ~25% exposed numbers, moving or not. Say the defenders have 10% exposure. One can calculate the likely odds the defenders can "match". 25/10 ^ .5 = 1.58x odds, for foxhole in woods vs. moving in scattered trees.
This shows that the attackers in the present system can waltz up through limited cover with little danger. Their own fire plus odds could sustain long periods of such a cover differential. With a little many-on-one, or a little time at the end in more nearly equal cover (ending in forest, or a building e.g.), 3:2 would be enough to match the effect of that cover differential. Which historically speaking, ought to be rather large (stationary defenders in foxholes in woods, vs. moving attackers above ground through thin scattered trees).
Now, have movement reduce the cover 0.4 times as above. Move the attackers every other turn for 45 seconds, and have the cover grow back in ~26 seconds. Then the average cover state of the attackers is - moving 55, growing 40, stationary 25. Times 45, 26, and 49 seconds out of 120. The average cover is thus around 40. Compared to the adversary's 10. 4 times, with odds a two-fer, means it would take 2:1 odds to "break even".
Now, again with running, and a 0.8 multiplier for cover while running. Then the cover states are 85, 55 average, 25. The average exposure is more like 54%.
And the more moving the attackers do, and the faster they do it, the more exposed they are to the defender's fire. The higher the cover differential gets, up to 5-6 times even with some scattered trees used, instead of 2x or less. A much bigger cover differential against "scrambling" attackers should mean a much improved ability of defenders to hold off numbers.
If the attackers don't want the cover reductions, they have all the realistic attacker means of overcoming this wider cover differential. They can use covered approaches that are completely out of LOS. They can pin the defenders by artillery fire, or mask them with smoke, before moving through LOS. They can shoot it out stationary to stationary, with only the old, smaller cover differentials - but at the cost of not getting close, and thus perhaps not having the firepower or ammo to blast out the defenders effectively.
What they can't do, is just pick any body of cover close enough, dial down the range, repeat as often as desired, and let mere numbers and nearly equal cover, do all the heavy lifting "automatically".
Today they can. Because the cover differentials are so limited. Only units moving over open ground face high % exposed numbers at the moment, and since players don't stop in open ground, they face these only for short periods, and usually at longer ranges.
So, the idea is to have larger cover differentials, and to tie these to movement. When both sides have been stationary for a while, they will be no different from now. But scrambling around, and especially doing so repeatedly, turn after turn, will mean significantly higher % exposed numbers and thus much wider cover differentials.
The "feel" of the result will be that movement will seem much more dangerous when done in areas the enemy can hit with his fire. It will not be enough to put a waypoint in any kind of vegetation or building, in order to make movement essentially safe, when under fire. Essential moves will still be worth a cover reduction, which will be temporary. But hopping from here to there to yonder regularly, will face steep risks.
I hope this is interesting, and sorry it is so long.
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Some additional detail about the air war in Korea, for Trimuvir.
The total NK air force was 40 Yak fighters (mostly Yak-3s it seems), plus another 60 2-seat Yak trainers, 70 Sturmovik light bombers, and 10 recon planes.
The ROKs had 10 each of liason planes, trainers, and P-51s. The last were actually controlled by the US advisor group (KMAG), and there were no ROK pilots trained for them yet. They were turned over to the ROKs anyway, as soon as the war broke out. But essentially, South Korea had no air force whatever.
The far east air force (FEAF), based in Japan, was second only to Europe in overseas US air power. Before the attack it had 1172 aircraft, counting transports and recon, planes under repair, etc. Of major combat types, it had 504 P-80 jet fighters, the main type. It was effective for air-to-air combat, especially against any sort of prop plane, but was a gas-guzzler and so had limited range and payload for strike missions. Plus 42 F-82s, in most respects similar, 47 P-51 prop fighters with better range, 27 B-29 heavy bombers, 73 B-26 medium bombers. So, 600 fighters and 100 bombers basically.
The B-29s were on Guam, and not all of these planes were combat-ready. About 1/3rd of them were on the day of the invasion, but most of them were out of range of Korea. That quickly changed. More planes were taken out of storage, transfered to closer airfield. The first B-29s flew up to Japan on 29 June. And on the 30th, Stratemeyer (FEAF air commander) asked for 500 more aircraft and got approval for them, though with some longer-range P-51s substituted for jets he had requested.
The US flew 163 sorties over Korea on the 3rd day, 27 June, and shot down 7 Yaks that day without loss, the first air combat of the war. 2 days later on the 29th, Mac flew in for his first ground visit, where he saw a DC-3 that had been destroyed by strafing, on the same airstrip he landed on. He brought along an AA MG detachment with 4 quad 50s, which shot down one Yak that attacked the airfield while he was on the ground, but at a conference a ways away. That day Mac issued an order to attack the NK airfields - "Stratemeyer to Partridge: Take out North Korean Airfield immediately. No publicity. MacArthur approves".
Mac got authority for that order from Truman on the 30th, the day after he gave it. After a further recommendation that ground troops were needed, Truman authorized sending two divisions to Korea and establishing a naval blockade of the north on 30th June, the 5th day of the invasion. Incidentally, on the 28th the Brits had put their far east fleet, including one light carrier, at Mac's disposal, and on the 29th the Australians did likewise for two ships they had in the area, and one P-51 squadron they had in Japan. Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands also sent ships.
The first carrier airstrike on the north was launched on 3 July, a week after the invasion. The target was NK airfields around the capital. Ammunition for the ROKs was being airlifted in from Japan as early as the 28th.
TF Smith air-lifted into Korea on 1 July. They soon reported that friendly air was hitting friendlies with some regularity. The front line was very poorly known, and liason between the ROKs and the air force in Japan was almost non-existent. Air strikes were moved farther north to avoid friendly fire incidents. TF Smith's actual engagement with the NKs came on 5 July. It was overcast, which prevented friendly air from helping.
A different unit got CAS and reported tanks destroyed by it on 9 July, the first time US ground forces in Korea used directly called CAS (at Chonui). Later air recon saw 100 burning NK vehicles left by these strikes (see below, passage from the official history). Interdiction strikes had been ongoing since the end of June. By two weeks into the invasion, and days into US ground involvement, tac air was making itself felt in a major way.
"On the afternoon of 10 July, American air power had one of its great moments in the Korean War. Late in the afternoon, a flight of jet F-80 planes dropped down through the overcast at P'yongt'aek, twenty-five air miles north of Chonui, and found a large convoy of tanks and vehicles stopped bumper to bumper on the north side of a destroyed bridge. Upon receiving a report of this discovery, the Fifth Air Force rushed every available plane to the scene- B-26's, F-80's, and F-82's-in a massive air strike. Observers of the strike reported that it destroyed 38 tanks, 7 half-track vehicles, 117 trucks, and a large number of enemy soldiers. This report undoubtedly exaggerated unintentionally the amount of enemy equipment actually destroyed. But this strike, and that of the previous afternoon near Chonui, probably resulted in the greatest destruction of enemy armor of any single action in the war."
The loads typically carried on Korean airstrikes were as follows. P-51s carried 6 rockets and 2 napalm canisters, plus strafing with 6 50-cals. P-80s usually just carried 2 napalm canisters and strafed, also with 6 50-cals. Carriers supported with F4U Corsairs, carrying 8 rockets, 2 napalm canisters, and strafing with 4 20mm cannons. Occasionally HE bombs were carried in place of napalm, while B-26 mediums were regularly used for HE raids. B-29 raids dropped hundreds of tons of HE at a time on strategic targets, though their raids were relatively infrequent.
More on the whole subject from the official history -
"In the first month of the Korean War, close air support of ground troops was a vital factor in preventing the North Koreans from overrunning all Korea, and in gaining for the United States the margin of time necessary to bring in reinforcements and accumulate the supplies needed to organize the Pusan Perimeter. By mid-July the U.N. Air Force had all but stopped movement of enemy troops, armor, and truck convoys during daylight. This imposed the greatest difficulties on North Korea in supporting its front-line troops, and it slowed the North Korean advance.
During the first month, the U.N. air arm comprised U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine planes and some Royal Australian Air Force planes and troops. By the end of July, the U.N. ground forces in Korea were receiving proportionately more air support than had General Bradley's Twelfth Army Group in World War II.
In mid-July, the FEAF Bomber Command began an ever heightening attack on strategic enemy targets far behind the front. The first such target was Wonsan on the east coast. This communications center linked Vladivostok in Russia Siberia with North Korea by rail and sea. From it, rail lines ran to all the North Korean build-up centers. The great bulk of Russian supplies for North Korea in the early part of the war came in at Wonsan, and from the beginning it was considered a major military target. In the first heavy strategic bombing of the war, FEAF hit this busy port city, on 13 July, with 400 tons of demolition bombs. Three days later, thirty B-29 bombers struck the railroad marshaling yards at Seoul.
One of the important bomber missions was to deny the enemy use of the pontoon bridge across the Han River at Seoul, and to destroy the repaired railroad bridge there. Several attempts in July by B-29's to destroy the rail bridge failed, but on the 29th twelve bombers succeeded in hitting the pontoon bridge and reported it destroyed. The next day, forty-seven B-29's bombed the Chosen Nitrogen Plant at Hungnam on the northeast coast.
In the meantime, carrier-based planes from the USS Valley Forge, which was operating in the Yellow Sea, on 22 July destroyed at Haeju in North Korea six locomotives, exploded eighteen cars of a 33-car train, and damaged a combination highway and rail bridge.
By 27 July, the FEAF Bomber Command had a comprehensive rail interdiction plan ready. This plan sought to interdict the flow of enemy troops and materiel from North Korea to the combat area. Two cut points-(1) the P'yong-yang railroad bridge and marshaling yards and (2) the Hamhung bridge and Hamhung and Wonsan marshaling yards -would sever rail communications with North Korea. Destruction of the rail bridges over the Han near Seoul would cut rail communication to the battle area. On 28 July the Far East Air Forces gave to the Bomber Command a list of targets in the rail interdiction program, and two days later a similar plan was ready for interdiction of highways. On the third day of August, FEAF issued to the Fifth Air Force and to the Navy lists of targets for co-ordinated interdiction attacks south of the 38th Parallel. In general, the Han River divided Fifth Air Force and FEAF Bomber Command zones.
By the end of July, the Far East Air Forces had flown as many as 400 sorties in a day. Altogether, it had flown a total of 8,600 sorties-4,300 in close support missions, 2,550 in close interdiction, 57 in two strategic bombing strikes, and 1,600 in reconnaissance and cargo sorties.
As the month neared an end, the first fighter plane reinforcements from the United States reached the Far East. On 23 July, the 27,000-ton Navy carrier, Boxer, setting a Pacific crossing record of eight days and seven hours, arrived in Japan with 145 F-51 Mustangs borrowed from National Guard air squadrons. On 30 July, the Far East Air Forces had 890 fighter planes - 626 F-80's and 264 F-51's - but only 525 of them were in units and available and ready for combat."
The basic overall point is simple enough. The NKs had scores of Yak-3s and IL-2s, and faced hundreds of P-80s, P-51s, and F4Us. They never had air superiority, beyond the first week even. US units had powerful CAS within the first week of being engaged, in some of the very first fights. In the early part of the war, with the front lines fluid and liason poor, ROK and US ground forces probably sustained more losses to friendly fire mistakes from US and UN airpower, than from the NK airforce. And after the first month or so, with almost unlimited US air reinforcements reaching Japan by sea and no replacements for the NKs, it was a thousand plane modern air force against surviving remnants, on harassment raids at best.
For what it is worth.
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"I've never had it happen to a lighter vehicle."
It can happen to trucks and such in the rain, or worse. I've seen a few and heard of many more. Off-road, that is.
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"I'm in a situation where my opponent has an AT pillbox about 800m from me. The terrain is fairly open without alot of hills so he has a great field of fire and getting rid of this is a top priority.
Without me giving away my force composition, I'm looking for the best tactics for destroying this pillbox."
Use tanks, but distract the pillbox with an infantry target first if possible. And use more than one tank, preferably well seperated, so the gun in the box will have to rotate from one to the other if it kills a first one. That will give the second time to shoot into it.
Pillboxes with AT guns are quite dangerous to tanks, but tanks can take them out, with shells fired at their firing slits. You need numbers and it is always a gamble, because you can easily lose 2-3 tanks sent, and losing 1 is "par for the course".
The strength of the box is that it is effectively invunerable to artillery and mortar fire, which are the weapons types that can hit it without reply.
When close enough, attacking the box from outside its covered arc - meaning from sides or rear - can also work. The killing weapon in that case can be bazookas (from ~100 yards), or flamethrowers or demo charges (from ~30 yards and ~10 yards respectively). Bazookas are usually the most practical of those. Panzerschrecks the same way, and panzerfausts will also do it if close enough (under half the listed range of the faust type).
But the infantry, close-attack methods require getting very close, and tackling it from the sides. In front, they can still do it in principle, but they have no real cover if they can see its front, and the gun is dangerous to them.
From range, only tanks will do it. As others mentioned, smoke can be used as a temporary measure - from on-map mortars or off-map, typically - to get by the gun into some other area of dead ground. But if there isn't any dead ground, and it or supports are going to shoot up infantry before they can get close, then tanks are the only answer.
When tackling them with tanks, you want to advance from out of LOS to a hull-down position that can see the front of the pillbox, with a target line set to the pillbox at the start of the move.
If possible, you want to do so from a direction the gun is not currently facing, to use the time it takes the gun to rotate, to get in the first shot. Distracting the gun with infantry works best for this. As in, an infantry squad or two runs across its view on the left, ending in cover but drawing fire. Then, tank pops into LOS on the right.
The tank will usually not get the pillbox until several rounds have been fired. It is "zeroing in", on the small target of the firing slit. This is dangerous, because the gun will rotate to reply at the tank while the misses are occurring. Being "hull down" (usually, "hunt" forward from the back side of a hill, and the tank will stop as soon as the target comes into view, with some of the hill masking the hull of the tank. Behind a stone wall also works) minimizes the risk of the first 1-2 shots killing you back.
And because each shot is not very likely to find the slit, more than one tank shooting is usually essential. If you are really clever with the timing, you can also use the distraction trick and combined it with seperated angles from the shooting tanks, so the gun has to rotate back again if it manages to kill one of the shooting tanks. As in, infantry across left, then a paused hunting tank on the right, then a double-paused hunting tank over on the left again.
The usual outcome of it all, the cost you can expect, is one dead tank and one dead pillbox, killed by the 2nd or 3rd shooter. There is a danger of several dead tanks and no dead pillbox. It is a risky thing. The "sure" thing is infantry close from the sides, but at 800m you do not at present have that option.
I hope this helps, and good luck.
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"If stuck under enemy air superiority, US troops could be pretty severly mauled, as they were in the opening stages of the Korean War."
US forces were certainly severely mauled in the opening stages of the Korean war. But not for any lack of air superiority. The USAF entered the fighting before any US ground troops, which first reached the front from Japan well after the NK breakthrough of the ROK positions.
And got air superiority - indeed, supremacy - rather quickly. The entire NK airforce was about 100 planes, about half Russian Yak fighters and half Sturmovik ground attack, light bombers. The US had hundreds of jet fighters and soon equal numbers of naval aircraft as well.
Eventually the Russian air force did intervene in Korea, from bases around Vladivostok, with numerous MiG-15s. Those had rather serious air combat with US fighters, and some with UN allies, and also shot down some US bombers.
But #1, that was long, long after the NK ascendency and after the US air build-up for the war, and #2 they never got air superiority themselves again, nor even seriously took it away from the US and UN forces. They were heavily outnumbered, and only continued to operate because their bases in Russia were politically immune from direct attack, for fear of escalating to general war.
Just some Korean war trivia.
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"shouldn't be any elite russian troops in 1941"
Russia fought Finland in 1940 and Japan in border incidents in the late 1930s. Zhukov was already developing tank doctrine after his experiences in the latter conflict. He did not yet have the authority to make his reforms widespread.
In particular, when the Siberian troops, vets of the Japanese war, entered the battle of Moscow late in 1941, they gave an excellent account of themselves. They stopped Operation Typhoon and took the initiative.
Certainly, the Russian army as a whole was caught by surprise in the invasion, and not in form. Purges had reduced the ranks of the field-grade officers. But pretending there were not capable commanders and experienced veterans on the Russian side even as early as 1941, is simply silly. There definitely were.
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"You are (for the most part) talking about nails"
I am not the one with the hammer, making such convenient conflations of different issues. And I find it slightly amusing that you combined in one post, after detailed examples, (1) the claim that you understand the problem I am talking about and rariety addresses it (2) that you don't understand the problem I am talking about or what I hope for from the changes and suggestions (3) a clear misunderstanding of one of my central points, coupled with the claim that it is just "my opinion" about the value of things, in a case where it is nothing but math, and (4) a dismissal of any further discussion as a waste of your time because you already understand it all.
Incidentally, you also mention the SMG - rifle issue, which I will address below, and say you want non-bandaid solutions, but then fail to mention the single largest and most obvious problem with how SMGs are currently modeled. Which is ammo. More on that below.
"I asked you what the goal of tweaking points was."
Check.
"You had said it wasn't to dissuade purchasing decisions"
Check.
"yet you continue to discuss this in terms of one side being able to purchase X vs Y on the other side."
Check.
"So if you aren't talking about influencing purchasing choices/decisions, what are you talking about?"
How much you can buy. Not influencing the choice of force mix, as in "no I won't buy those I will buy these instead", but influencing the *game balance* that results from those decisions, including not only the items chosen, but how many of them the player can afford. Specifically, when somebody chooses to spend X points on SMG infantry, he gets 4 platoons instead of 5, or 5 instead of 6. Not to dissuade him from buying them. But to better balance the two sides chances when he does.
I said "nobody wins CM games all out of proportion to random chance, by buying lots of Pumas."
You replied with a question - "On the whole?" Answer, yes on the whole. Pumas are rare. They are not particularly effective for the price. Buying more of them that would be historically justified may result in unhistorical battles. A good reason to have a rariety system to fix that. Fine. But buying Pumas does not win CM games, because they are not particularly mispriced. They are rarer, not far more effective for the points. You want to pretend those two things - effectiveness for the points, and rariety - are the same issue or are closely related issues. But they simply aren't.
Some of the most effective items in CM for the price, today, are items that were historically rather common. Certainly nothing like as rare as Pumas. You can buy a force full of rare things and get a crappy force. You can buy a force full of pretty common things and get an excellent force. Rariety and the play-balance fairness of pricing are two different things. Do they overlap in some cases? Sure, like Tiger Is, which are both cheap for their effectiveness and were historically rare. But 20mm AA was not rare, and it is very cheap for its effectiveness.
I understand that you have worked up a wonderful new rariety system for CM2, and I am glad you have. But that hammer will deal with ahistorical fights based on overuse of rare items. That is not the same issue are *play balance* effects based on overuse of underpriced items. The issues are in fact tangential to one another. The overlap between them may create some appearences of similarity. Thus my warning, that not everything is a nail despite the fact that you are the proud possessors of a shiny new hammer.
You say "whether you are talking Pumas or SMG units, you are talking about Rarity"
20mm FLAK, VG pattern infantry, all German infantry types with 2 LMGs per squad, Jadgpanzers, Hetzers, 75mm infantry guns, German HMG teams, British on map 3" mortars, Brit MMG carriers, Brit Sherman Firefly and Achilles TDs, 120mm and 4.2" mortar FOs, M8-HMC and bazooka teams - does that read like a list of the rarest items in the late war? Is it, for instance, anything like this list - Jadgpanthers, Pumas, Churchill AVREs, Sherman Jumbos, Pershings, King Tigers, SS Armored Panzergrenadiers, 88mm PAK, and 8" artillery? The first are combat power bargains in CM today. The second are just rare, and many of them are overpriced or fairly priced.
Next, you missed my point about numbers in the VG vs. US rifle example. You still compare squad to squad, and think the US has a big numbers edge to make up for his deficit in automatic weapons. But you don't get a squad of each, for the same price. When the Germans and the US spend the same points on infantry, the US gets 2 or 3 platoons to the VGs 3 or 4, depending on things like zooks needed for the US.
The match up that is equal *cost* is *not* one platoon with 8 man squads but SMGs, against another with 12 man squads and M-1 rifles. It is 3 of the former against 2 of the latter plus 2 zooks, which is *no difference* in total numbers of men (84 each). At best, it is a marginal extra amount of men with less AT ability (3 platoons vs. 4, 120 vs. 112 men, w/ 10-15 rifle grenades vs. 15-20 fausts).
Why is this point so hard to see? It doesn't matter what you get per squad, because you are not limited in the number of squads you can buy. It matters what you get *per point*, because points are the budget constraint that determine the size of the infantry component of your force.
This is not "my opinion". It is not a statement about lack of importance of numbers. It is a statement about lack of numbers, for the price spent. Plain US infantry does get far fewer automatic weapons than the German infantry types. They do not get larger numbers of men for the same points spent "because they have big squads", because they do not get as many platoons as the VG do.
Then you say "even if the totals for each side come out even, unit for unit the German Squads are inherently more brittle"
It is not an advantage to have fewer targets breaking and getting suppressed more easily. It would be an advantage to have more resilent squads because you had more overall men, e.g. 6 vs. 6 squads and yours bigger. But 6 12 man squads against 9 8 man squads, the former will lose consistently. Why? They get suppressed, and some shooters are left unsuppressed on the other side, and their fire ascendency results in less fire taken by their "mates", and thus less suppression, and the fire ascendency snowballs. The effect is well known to good players.
"US forces have the 8 shot, semi auto Garand. Arguably the best battle rifle of all times."
Indeed. And what are the CM ratings for this weapon? 10-7-3-1 at the different range windows. And what are the CM ratings for an MP40? 36-9-1/2-0. The MP40 is superior out to beyond 100 meters. The M-1 is superior only at ranges so long, that its total firepower is 3-5. At those ranges, all the M-1s in a US squad have about the same firepower as 1 LMG-42. Can squads in CM sit down at 250 yards and blast units out of cover? No. They run out of ammo first.
And here we get to the primary problem, which you didn't mention in your discussion of closing and such, with the way SMGs are currently modeled in CM. Not only do they get superior firepower at 100 yards. But they get just as many shots with 3.6 times the firepower of semi-auto rifles in close. For all the world as though the men were carrying a 20-30 round clip for every 5-8 rounds the US squad carried (that is, ~4 times the ammo load); or alternately, as though SMGs achieved their greater firepower by greater accuracy at close range instead of greater ammo expenditure.
The real edge of the M-1 was that you could afford to plink at 250 yards, because the ammo expenditure involved in slow aimed shots was inconsiderable. The ammo expenditure would increase at shorter ranges, of course. But nothing like the ammo expenditure of an SMG. Since each rounds was delivered more accurately, and similar amounts of ammo could be carried, if two sides each fired off all their ammo and at similar ranges, the M-1s would get more hits. But this effect does not appear in CM. M-1s run out of ammo exactly as fast at MP40s, while putting out less firepower over their whole "ammo-load-life".
When armies avoided the SMG model in later wars, it was because of range to some extent of course, but even more so because of ammo expenditure. The US developed the 3-round burst select fire, instead of full auto, for the same reason. And the lighter 5.56mm cartridge, to enable men to carry larger ammo loads into combat.
The principle advantage of rifles is greater accuracy, which is important compared to just throwing more lead, because it enables a man to put down more enemy before running out of bullets. But in the CM ammo system, this difference is simply not present. Every squad gets 40 shots, and a shot at medium range with 3 firepower from a Garand, uses up as much of its total lifetime firepower as a shot at short range with 36 firepower from an MP40.
The incentive created by this ammo system is to avoid wasting shots at long range and long firepower numbers, in favor of closing and expending the limited available ammo at the close ranges that enable it to do the most damage. In fact, it is well known to experienced CM players - defenders especially, facing odds - that extensive fire at long range is the quickest route to defeat, through lack of ammo.
So, if you want stitches I suggest not merely that other fine hammer, revisions to rules about closing, but also revisions to the abstract squad ammo system. Which is too forgiving to automatic weapons that burn ammo like kindling, and not kind enough to rifles that achieve a more accurate delivery of the available rounds.
As in, rifle armed squads get 60 ammo, SMG squads get 20. Then if all shots were fired, the delivered firepower match-up would look like 36-9-1/2-0 vs. 30-21-9-3. Or in other words, the M-1s could do at 250 yards before running out, what MP40s can do at 100 yards. And at 100 yards they could do more than twice as much as the MP40s, though not do it quite as fast. If the numbers seem too wide, give the SMGs 25 rounds (like LMG teams) and the rifles 50.
"Some people thought like you in the beginning, but a careful and unbiased look showed that the prices were fair. Or at least close enough."
No one buys the vanilla German infantry in competitive play. Some prefer SMGs, and some prefer the 2 LMG infantry types that include about half automatic weapons in the whole squad. This is not a sign of the prices fully reflecting the differences in capabilities. Yet the vanilla German squads have more automatic weapon firepower than the vanilla Allied squads (better LMG, and a second SMG). The reason should be obvious enough after the above. These types effectively carry more ammo, since they get the firepower increases that reflect faster (but less accurate) firing, while still having the same 40 shots as the rifle infantry types.
I said about the overall effect of my proposed price changes "The net effect of a whole change in prices might be, in a typical medium scenario, that the US side gets 1 more tank or 1 more infantry platoon, or the Germans 1 less." Notice, this is about *play balance*. I am not trying to "direct" the player to choose "vanilla infantry", although he can do that if he likes. I am trying to ensure that if he takes this or that type with superior abilities, that he does not also get it so cheaply, and thus get so much of it, that his opponent has no offsetting advantage in return. Whether those offsetting advantages are numbers, or more teams he can afford, or an extra tank - whatever.
I am not trying to make the players' purchasing decisions for them - last thing on my mind. We can get that now by having the computer do the buying. The idea is to allow the players to choose their force, and still get balanced winning chances out of it for both sides. Which requires prices that reflect not historical rariety only, but combat effectiveness to a tolerable degree of accuracy.
When prices do reflect combat ability to a tolerable degree of accuracy, choosing particularly cheap "bargains" in the existing price set does not multiply combat effectiveness, because there are not large effects available from focusing on just the bargains. And incidentally, it also increases the available range of choice a player can make as to his force mix, without sacrificing potential winning-chance advantages.
For most prices this is already true. The problem is that player choice of forces lets them focus on the few important cases where it isn't, and avoid the fairly priced items, at least for a large portion of their total budget. Thus, 120mm mortars are 1 minute faster in response, so they are cheap and a bargain. If someone buys just those, it does not help that the 105 and 150 modules are properly priced. Or he takes only Mot. Pz Gdr or VG infantry. Then it does not matter that the pioneers are expensive or the rifle-44s fairly priced relative to the Allied types. Or he buys Hetzers and Jadgpanzers, and it does not matter than Pz IVs are reasonably priced.
It is not that the items so chosen are particular rare ones. Buying 12 20mm Flak can realistically reflect a whole light AA battalion being present. The issue is that the whole light AA battalion costs only as much as 2 US infantry platoons, whereas the combat effect of so many effective small guns is much greater.
Next, you said that even if you tweak prices for 6 months you would not make a dent in what I am talking about. I think I can show that is not the case. Take the 20mm FLAK. Suppose the price is 30. Now the German gets only 8 of them, or the US gets a 3rd platoon or an extra Sherman to try to deal with them. The balance would be closer. Nobody has to change their purchase habits an iota, in terms of the *types* of units they want. They just face the budget constraint, and they can't have *as many* of such items without giving something up, or fighting in a larger battle where their enemy gets something extra.
"A Rarity system, on the other hand, fixes ALL of the potential abusive situations in a fair and logical way."
Here again the man with a hammer thinks everything is a nail. I do not doubt in the least that it will fix *some*. It will fix gamey use of Tiger Is, along with gamey use of Pumas (though the latter hardly effects play balance much). But it will not fix "all", because there simply is no necessary relation between how *rare* something was, and its effects on play-balance, at current prices.
If US rifle platoons, an incredibly common item, cost 2 points, you would have one monster play balance problem, without it having anything to do with rariety. The extreme example illustrates the general point - the mispricing of an item has play balance effects, whether the mispriced item is common or rare.
They are distinct issues, confused by slight overlap, and by the propensity for folks with shiny new hammers to think everything a nail.
"What evidence do you have to support this?"
Ask anybody. Read the board. People can indeed lose with the Germans, and it is especially easy if they are defending. But same scenario position (attacking, meeting, or defending), it is notorious that it is easier to win with the Germans. I am not making it up. They have better infantry and better armor, cheap, and the prices are not such that the Allies get full compensation by having enough more of either. Ask any experienced player about the use of light guns in large numbers. Or automatic weapon German infantry types, where the only dispute you will find is 2 LMG fans vs. SMG fans.
And incidentally, my standard way of implimenting a use of these factors as the Germans does not rely at all on rare German vehicles. In fact on defense it doesn't rely on German vehicles at all, because I do it with the "infantry" force type. A reinforced company supported by off-board mortars and covered by mines and in a "reverse slope" deployment (to the extend possible), then supported by numerous guns and teams - PAK and FLAK, infantry guns and HMG teams. I can stick quite close to historical force mixes and still buy virtually all bargain items, because there are enough items to choose between to fill needed roles, so the mispriced ones can be picked out.
"RARITY does this inherently. Using Rarity the Allies would largely be limited to 75s"
You don't seem to have understood the purpose of my bidding example. It was *not* to exclude rare things. It is an *interplay* between the two competitors over the play-balance of the game conditions. Everyone knows that Fionn's 75 favors the Allies. Everyone knows that his 76 comparatively favors the Germans. The point of my example is that it showed two people *bargaining* over *play-balance*. The point of which is not merely to favor the Allies or to favor the Germans. It is, instead, to create a more even game. Notice, I didn't say "realistic", I said *even*. Both worthy goals, but not the same one.
The way in which my bidding example tries to improve play-balance is by the principle of "you cut, I choose". Someone will say which conditions are used, with both sides knowing full well that tilting this way favors the Germans, and that way the Allies. They bargain over how far to tilt, which way. The fellow that accepts the other's proposal on that subject, then gets *his* choice of the side he will play. Thus any incentive to tilt toward a side because one expects to play it is eliminated. The proposals will instead reflect the honest assessments the proposer has, about play balance.
In your case, because you'd turn down all of my proposals, I'd get the Germans and would get to show you what I mean - LOL.
The benefit of a bidding system is that it is not in the least based on just my opinions, contrary to your closing comments. Anyone can propose any price revisions he likes - as long as he is willing to let the other fellow choose which side to play, if he accepts them. Anyone's opinions can be heard. They can vary from game to game. Everyone has an incentive to propose fairly. And everyone who proposes a poor price set will have a chance to learn about its flaws by having its holes used against him. Including those who agree with the default price set.
Last you ask, "why bother?" Well, right now people are letting the computer pick the forces because that is more fair than exploiting the known gaps in the existing price system. So the first part of "why", is "to restore player choice in force mix". It is true that such choice is available now, if the players agree to pick their own. There, the gain is "greater play balance", the absence of which is currently pushing people toward the previous, computer-choice option. And a third reason is "to allow greater variety in forces chosen, without sacrifice of game chances". Because right now, many players avoid certain force types or stick to certain others, because they enjoy winning and correctly think that certain choices will reduce (e.g. halftracks) or increase (e.g. heavy mortar FOs) their chances in that regard.
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One other pointer - the Sherman can mess up enemy infantry by shooting at them forever from more than 100 yards away. The infantry will not be able to do much of anything back at that distance. If they have a Panzerschreck, 200 yards is better.
You don't need to run the tanks right up to them, is the point. The tank has range, and at logn range the infantry can't hurt it, while it can hurt them. So, stand off and blast. Your own infantry can keep his from getting too close to the tanks, too, by staying between the two.
As another benefit, the infantry ahead of the tanks will tend to spot enemy armor before it can get shots off at your tanks, giving you warning and a chance to move or get the drop on the enemy tanks, yourself.
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300 years? That is easy - Napoleon.
I think the man himself said he would be remembered exclusively because he had participated in around 50 major battles, almost all of which he won. About right.
He lost two big ones badly - Leipzig and Waterloo, both at 3:2 odds against him. A few other big ones were close or minor losses - Aspern-Esseling and Eylau, maybe another I'm forgetting (perhaps Beresina, though not so large). A couple of the victories were expensive but definitely wins - Wagram and Borodino, perhaps a few other similar results in smaller battles. He pretty much ran the table on the rest, scores of them.
Operationally, the 1814 in France, 1806 in Germany, and 1805 in Austria campaigns, are among the most stunning examples of multiplied impact from operational maneuver on record. His logistics were not great (especially in Russia and Spain) and he made three or four big strategic errors, starting with being too inclined to fight everybody - LOL.
He also redesigned and recruited the armies involved, recovering from massive lost campaigns in a matter of months, several times. He invented the army corps, modern combined arms, perfected the role of reserve shock formations, mass artillery in grand tactics, etc.
"Yes, but he was a dangerous criminal madman. You can tell, because he conquered Europe." And we can then all present as certificates of our reasonableness, innocence, and sanity, the fact that each of us has not conquered Europe. Old joke, sorry.
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To LT Shotgun - mostly a reasonably useful review of well known, successful tactics. There is one point I would revise, however. You recommend very spread deployments in open terrain, as much as 100m between squads. I think you will find that such wide formations aren't worth a darn in CM.
A platoon needs to stay considerable tighter - like, maximum width 80-100 meters for the whole platoon - to do much of anything in CM. More scattered units are targets, with low morale, and unable to coordinate their actions fast enough on contact, when pinned, etc. And seperated squads are easily suppressed, which usually leaves them defenseless, or at best (if far from the enemy) useless.
Regardless of what you think of the realism of that, that is the way I think you will find it works in CM. The primary tactical infantry unit in the game is is really the platoon. Its sub-units allow it to take on different formations and use elementary fire and movement. But the minimum level of combat power needed to survive CM firefights, is higher than widely seperated squads can reach.
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Originally posted by Tiger:
[QB]
"Would taking Moscow have won the war for the Germans? I doubt it."
Correct. That is the staple myth of the apostles of mobile warfare, and so much horseradish. The Russians would much rather have had the million men in the Kiev pocket than the city. Closing the pocket was very much the right thing to do, and taking the city - even if it would have been the alternate result, which is by no means obvious with the forces that defended later plus a million more men at large - would not have had anything like the same scale of effect.
The origin of the story is Guderian, who wanted to blame the general staff for the failure of the campaign. And who was forever insisting, as his acolytes do to this day, that running off into the endless expanse of the enemy rear will bring certain victory, while destroying the enemy forces supposedly won't.
It did not work that way in France - the turn was to the channel ports to kill the army in Belgium, not to Paris, and the odds that allowed did the rest. In fact, no one can point to any time when it did work that way. Later breakthroughs that made a point of running for the rear instead of destroying enemy forces in pockets, usually led to tanks out of gas and often their total loss.
And it is doubtful the logistical situation at Smolensk would have allowed all of AG center to participate at the earlier date anyway. It is basically just stuffing got up by Guderian to put the failure on anything but Typhoon.
As for the "anyone else would have capitulated" line, I think it is woefully off target. The French mebe. No one else. The idea that is was because Stalin was a dictator I find laughable; if there were one place the Russians were vunerable in those days it was on the score of their political leadership.
The reason for the dramatic and powerful Russian response had nothing to do with Stalin, who was quaking in his boots and wondering how he could buy Hitler off 3 days after the invasion. It was the Russian people first, and the army second.
And the frightfulness deliberately got up by the Germans at least as much. So far from "ruthlessness" being an *advantage*, it was the primary drawback the Germans had. Nothing recruited people faster. Nothing brought everyone behind the dubious government, which everyone knew had failed to forsee or do anything effective about the attack, faster. In White Russia and the Ukraine tens of thousands were originally ready to join against Stalin - until they got a pleasant look at German "ruthlessness".
Why are so many people so quick to assume that anything disgusting, low, and mean is somehow strong and likely to be successful? It is nowhere the case in other aspects of politics, or life generally.
The Germans came in with explicit orders that no soldier was to be punished for anything he did in Russian, and with flying machinegun squads who shot a million people by the end of the first 6 months. They told the Russians they would be reduced to slavery long enough to build fair cities for their new masters and then would be exterminated. They starved a million prisoners to death by simply leaving them unfeed in barbed wire stockades.
The entirely predictable result is that the Russians jumped through their anatomy, knowing it was victory or death. Meanwhile, the Germans arrogantly disdained to mobilize their economy for another 18 months. There was never a clearer case to prove that pride and cruelty are the worst policy - the first a form of blindness and unilateral disarmament, the second the greatest recruiter and motivator of enemies imaginable.
Then later people try to pretend it was because they didn't hang a left - LOL. Or because the other guys were "more ruthless". Or because the west provided all the money and arms and attrition elsewhere. The German lost because they didn't have enough at first, acted stupidly and underestimated their enemy at the level not of operations but strategy (politics, cruelty, no mobilization, etc), and the Russians fought magnificantly.
The German operations order for Barbarossa was carried out to the letter. The Russian army was destroyed inside European Russia before it could withdraw to the interior, and a forward line was established deep enough in the country to prevent even the idea of air attack on German territory. The Russians just had a new army as big as the old one on the new line.
The operation went as planned, very closely, in the overall results achieved. It still was not decisive. It was not fitted into a strategy adequate to defeat a power such as Russia, which would have started with mobilization and would have avoided recruiting enemies in the occupied territory.
The political ends sought by the invasion were not compatible with the strategy needed to win the war. The political ends beat strategy. Not mobilizing - that was a political end, avoiding disruption of German civilian life. Underestimating the Russians - that was a political doctrine. Acting with cruelty - that was purely political.
Once they made those mistakes, things got worse rather than better. In the first ~16 months, at least the operations were soundly conceived (though not supply or economy or the overall strategy). After that they weren't. Occasionally brilliant, often competent, but blatantly wrong-headed enough times to lose essentially all of army group south, twice in two years.
The Germans had good soldiers, and good field-level officers, and good doctrine when they actually abided by it (which was not often enough once on the defensive), and by the second half of the war they had good equipment too. They lacked strategy, command, logistics, intelligence work, and economic planning. Strange to say they are generally lauded for all but the logistics, when they had rings run around them, overall, in those categories.
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"surprised" should be surprises, obviously. One d instead of an s. They are right next to each other you know. That is called a typo.
Proofread 'em yourself. You are lucky you get 'em at all. Now go sit on your "handle", please - thank you.
Incidentally, I am flattered to be considered a "youth".
LOL.
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"I would send all hunters"
No doubt that includes the lion, a rather intrepid hunter himself. No? LOL.
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"Really really big, really really mad animals I would say"
Well, on the same site there is a hunting story from Africa. 4 man party, armed with 2 high caliber elephant guns (mid 40s caliber, magnums, one a double-barrel the other a magazine rifle), plus 1 7mm magazine rifle for long range, plus a 12 gauge shotgun, the last carried by an inexperienced fellow.
They went for a male lion. The mag elephant gun hit it once, lion disappeared over a rise. They went to look at got within 20 yards, lion lying still on the ground, they thought it was dead. Apparently there is a hunter's adage "it is the dead ones that kill you". Then someone said something, and the lion got up and charged. Having already been hit once, it was in adrenline rush, not dead. A wounded lion is a very dangerous thing indeed.
The double barreled mag elephant gun hit it twice in the chest, and it kept coming and knocked over the man who fired, and went for the original shooter behind him, and knocked him down. The now disarmed double-gun guy was pulling it by the tail trying to get it off the other fellow. The 7mm guy comes up and put 3 rounds in its rib cag from 10 yards. It didn't stop. Then the worst - the shotgun guy missed from a bad angle and killed one of the hunters.
3 elephant gun rounds and 3 regular rifle rounds, most fired under 20 yards, did not stop the critter. Oh, the wounds those shots inflicted were certainly mortal. But "die in the next hour" mortal, not "drop where it is" mortal. And that can be a life and death difference to a big game hunter.
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A very minor point on the discussion of 88 types. It is not completely true that all 88 types are equal for their effectiveness against Allied armor. The shorter 88s (FLAK and Tiger I) will not penetrate the front hull of (W)+ Sherman models, whereas the long 88s (PAK, Tiger II, Jadgpanther) will.
The fellow who said so did say "more or less", but I thought I would point out an effective game difference between the two gun types. Either type will penetrate the turret front of such Shermans, or side and rear, incidentally.
(W)+ armor was more common than the "jumbo" in the strict sense. It is a more common type one might see as the "point" tank of a platoon, than the historically quite rare, true "jumbos".
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I am sure the new rariety system is a very shiny new hammer. I am confident that it possesses a weighty head, nice heft, and other distinctly hammer-esque qualities. I have no doubt that unhistorical use of Pumas is a very nail-like practice. I do not doubt the ability of the ever so hammer-esque new hammer, to pound on such genuine nails.
But I am talking about a loose screw over here.
A new rariety system is fine, well and good, as I stated. But it does not make everything into a nail, no matter how things first appear to the proud possessor of a fine new hammer.
Do people who think Pumas are cool, take lots of Pumas, more than ever were made? No doubt. Does this bother some grog minded folks? No doubt. Will your rariety system fix that. I have no doubt. But nobody wins CM games all out of proportion to random chance, by buying lots of Pumas.
They may look cool. They are not overly deadly for the cost, enough so to swing the outcomes of many games. The very fact that people are buying them for cool factor reduces the risk that they will accidentally wind up with "win factor" in addition, or instead. By all means, fix the unhistorical aspect of that with a rariety system. But do not assume it is the screw I am talking about.
I will give you a practical example of "win factor" cost problems, and what revised prices can do. You properly ask, what effect are altered prices supposed to have? They are supposed to limit the size of the force bought, or allow the opponent a larger force to meet one with many effective items in it. Here is a case to show how prices make a difference in that regard.
Everyone knows the VG SMG platoons have good close range firepower, a desirable characteristic in infantry. Whenever someone points this out, the first response is that the US squads are much more capable because they are larger, being 12 men to 8. It is true the squads are larger. But it is also true that one does not get equal numbers of squads for the same price.
A US player buys 2 rifle platoons, 1944 pattern. He needs some AT ability, so he adds 2 zooks, 1 per platoon. What is his cost? 268 points. How many men does he get? 84. How many HQs? 2. How many units on the map? 10. What mix of small arms? 6 BAR, 6 SMG, 2 Pistol, 66 M-1 (2 of them carbines, close enough).
A German rival buys 3 VG SMG platoons. He already gets 10-15 faust-60s. How many men does he get? 84, the same. Plus an extra HQ. 12 units on the map. 6 MG42, as many as the US gets BARs., 3 pistols and 3 rifles, and 72 SMGs (66 fired counting the MGs second crewmember). His cost? 279 points, 11 more than the US.
Are MG42s better or worse than BARs? Much better. SMGs better or worse than rifles? For almost all infantry work, and counting ammo limitations, the SMGs. 10-15 faust 60s do not have the range of 2 zooks, but they are on more scattered and survivable "shooters" and have better AT effect when fired. 3 HQs are better than 2, with more likelihood of high values.
Does the US get an advantage in numbers to counteract these advantages? No not really. The low price of the SMG platoons makes up for the low numbers of men in each, allowing enough more to be bought, approximately, that the German player does not face an odds disadvantage for the same points available for infantry. Or, if you go by points, the US gets at most a 4% edge in numbers (multiplying up both force sizes), in return for all of those weaponry advantages.
What is the effect on all of this of my SMG and faust cost proposals? Well, the SMGs are going to increase the cost of the German force above by ~21 points (2/sqd + 1/HQ), while the fausts will cost 9 more. The total German force above then costs 309 (103 per platoon), or 41 points more than the US player spent. That is roughly 1/3rd of a platoon. Depending on how the US player spends it, he might get an edge of 12-15% in numbers of men (12% - 2 MMGs for 36 points; 15% - 1/3rd of a platoon for 40) for the same amounts spent on infantry. With a corresponding narrowing of the firepower gap, in addition.
The point is that the Germans cannot as easily match the US in numbers because of low price, while getting other advantages thrown in "for free". If they want to match the US in numbers, they have to spend more - which means something else in their force must go, or the US side will have more to budget for additional items, to even out the odds.
The next effect of a whole change in prices might be, in a typical medium scenario, that the US side gets 1 more tank or 1 more infantry platoon, or the Germans 1 less. Or, it might be that the odds are the same as now, but the German player takes plain vanilla infantry. The players can pick which ones they think works better for them.
Similarly, revaluing half-tracks downward, and making 20mm FLAK a bit more expensive, might have the effect that a US armored infantry force can fight a German leg infantry defense force, without almost automatically getting their heads handed to them. Because the US infantry will not be reduced in numbers so much to pay for their 'tracks, and the Germans will not be able to afford a battalion of 20mm FLAK along with everything else their defense needs, and may have to settle for a battery or even (horrors!) a more realistic 2-gun section.
The balance problem I am talking about is not rariety. And neither is it any supposed coolness propensity to play Germans. Such a tendency might show up in more people wanting to play them, but not in the lopsided won-loss records actually seen. (Of course, attackers are more likely to win too, regardless of side, because of their point odds edge - but with German attackers and choice of forces it starts getting almost silly).
If it were merely that everyone wanted German toys, then fewer players would play more games as the Allies against many playing Germans, but the won-loss records would remain about the same. What actually happens is most players are perfectly willing to play either side, but most players have a better W-L record with the Germans, and the cumulative W-L for same situation (attacker, meeting, defender) are heavily weighted toward better showings for the guys in grey. When computer-picked forces are used, this tendency declines somewhat.
Why? Because the things that are bargains - thick front armor plates, automatic weapon infantry, the cheapest light guns - are more readily available in more capable and numerous forms for the Germans. By avoiding the overpriced items ('tracks, FTs, trucks, etc) this can be brought out. When the computer picks randomly, the effect is much less pronounced (note - even when it gives rare vehicles), because it is just as likely to pick an overvalued or undervalued item, or one of the majority of items that are priced about right.
How do I suggest this issue be dealt with? In the long run, price revisions would be nice. In the meantime, the present main ways of handling it are - rules like 75-76, bans on AA halftracks, computer choice of forces, alternating sides or randomizing who gets the Germans. Others are considering solutions like handicaps for the Allies, or bidding for the Germans in points-allowed terms. The main problem with the last is it provides the same incentive to cherry pick, and practically requires it, because otherwise the point deficit will not be made up.
My alternative suggested solution in the meantime (prior to any price tweaks, yada yada), is a "you cut - I choose" allowance for suggested price revisions. As follows -
The challenger may present a list of revised prices for some items, on both sides. They should stay within a range 80% to 125% of the present CM values. He may include disqualified items, a la the recon-75-76 rules or AA haltrack/jeep MG bans. Then the challenged as a choice. He can either accept the prices offered, in which case he gets his choice of side. Or he can insist on the CM prices instead (and, optional perhaps, his own preference for the recon-75-76 rule). But in that case, the challenger gets *his* choice of side.
Thus a simple version would be - "Fionn's rule of 76, no AA halftracks, nothing else" and a valid response would be "accepted, I will take the Germans". Or the challenger could say "rule of 75, infantry types pay +2 pure SMG / squad, +1 some SMG, +1 faust 60, +2 faust 100". And the other could reply, "Accepted, I will take the Allies". Or instead the challenged in the last case could say, "no, let's use rule of 76 and normal infantry prices." In that case, though, he forfeits choice of side back to the challenger, who could reply "OK, but in that case I take the Germans."
Obviously, this sort of system is optional beforehand on both parts. But I think it allows the justice of "you cut, I choose", while maintaining flexibility. It does allow anyone to insist on unchanged prices, if he thinks the present ones best. But insisting on a price set would imply granting the opponent choice of side.
One man's opinion.
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Is it true that the Germans emphasized the operations officer over all other elements of the staff? Yes, to a degree. The Germans had the operations officer integrate all elements in his plans. The commander relied on the operations staff for all implimentation details. The operations staff tasked other elements of the staff, which were subordinate to him rather than equal. This is certainly different from the U.S. system, in which G1 through G4 staff officers were equals in rank, advising their commander.
But part of that is because the US system relied on the commander to integrate elements of the plan or decide in disputes among these staff officers. The model there was technical chiefs reporting to a CEO versed in technical details. This simply was not the function of (line) commanders in the German army. It was the function of their chiefs of staff. Compared to the US system, the line commanders on the German system were fifth wheels, politicians and prima donnas, who were responsible for little in the way of planning. They oversaw such based on prior service as staff officers, but it was no longer their function.
The model was not the technocratic one of the US army, but a nobility served by functionaries. Staff officers, including chiefs of staff, were technocrats and had the real responsibilites. They were, however, subordinated to a comparative unbusy leisured "nobility" of line officers. To work and plan is a sign of executive responsibility in US society. To work and plan was a sign of lack of leisure and political power in traditional German society - the old nobility did not have to work. The line officers were "vons", selected for breeding and long traditions of public service in their families, especially in the military, which amounted to a certain kind of political reliability. They were not remotely selected for their brains. Instead, staff officers were, and the ablest commanders were those who moved to line command from long stints as staff officers.
So there is a bit of apples to oranges in the comparison. The operations staff was responsible for integrating plans that US commanders integrated. The chief of staff does not really correspond to the role of a US operations staff head; he corresponds to the role of a US commander. So much for the direct organizational difference.
Next, were the Germans bad at integrating intelligence into operational planning? Often yes, but there was one area where they stood out and performed well. The operational surprised that inflicted serious defeats on the Germans are too numerous to avoid the general judgement of inferior military intelligence. Examples are the flank collapse around Stalingrad, misjudging the strength of the Russian position around Kursk, the flank collapse s in the counterattack after that, most of their defenders in France stationed in the Pas de Calais area, being unprepared for several British offensives in the desert, for the Sicily landings, for the south of France landings, and others. They were of course at an enourmous disadvantage because the Allies had broken their codes and not vice versa, but they also ignored numerous signs in most such cases.
The one area of military intelligence where the Germans did well was signals intelligence and especially signals locating work. Triangulating the position of an artillery battery or an HQ by radio intercepts, for example. The effectiveness of their counterbattery artillery work, in particular, was increased by their successes in this area. It went a long way toward redressing the advantage greater control of the skies gave the Allies later in the war. This was obviously a technological success rather than a military planning one, however. They got information that was useful and made use of it, but it did not have a large impact on other aspects of planning.
Were the Germans bad at personnel work? To some degree yes, for several reasons. One was unreality at the level of the high command. Senior officials and generals ordered around troops on the map that no longer existed, or were only a fraction of the size they thought they were, because rational and truthful accounting of bad news was uniformly discouraged in the upper echelons. This make believe aspect of the higher HQs increased during the war. It tended to marginalize those engaged in it, in real military terms, because little they said or did was relevant. But only in times of clear disaster was this screen pierced completely, allowing retrieval efforts based on realistic assessments to be made.
A second and important reason was the political chaos of the regime. It operated fiefdoms under seperated minor princelings, who set up their own empires over personnel as in other matters. The Luftwaffe had a huge ground army, for instance, simply because of the power of Goering. This channeled large elements of quality manpower away from the army, deprived them of proper training, command, and supporting weapons, and thus dissipated power. Note, I am talking about the Luftwaffe field divisions, as well as huge ground support elements, not about the Fallschirmjaegers (who were, in a sense, the picked elite of that manpower diversion). Organization Todt controlled much of the manpower of the economically mobilized late-war regime. The SS ran its own sprawling empire. Nobody cooperated with anyone else beyond the point that the interest of their own organization dictated.
But a third force worked in the other direction - the flexibility of German forces actually in the field. Consolidation of forces was practiced on an entirely utilitarian basis close enough to the front. Replacement battalions were maintained, and comb-out details used for all sorts of needed tasks. Burnt out shells of units were pulled out of the line to rebuild, often for months at a time. Training was kept up even in times when forces were urgently needed at the front, even if the amount of training time declined over the course of the war. When full scale disaster hit in the summer of 1944, personnel in other services and in rear area troops was rationally reassigned to more urgent army duties. The Germans asked way too much of the average soldier, and way too much of the shoe-string ingenuity and resourcefulness of field officers, to patch something together out of what was at hand. But they got rather a lot back from both overtasked groups.
It is on the subject of supplies, though, where the article writer has the strongest case. The German supply system during the war was abysmal by western standards. It turned more on property rights to equipment, and horse-trading between units, than on any rational system. The black market across occupied Europe was enourmous. Huge portions of the QM corps were engaged in the systematic looting of occupied areas and personally enriching themselves. The army issued several kinds of its own money, and hyper-inflated each kind.
Huge operations were planned and put into execution on such dubious assumptions as supplying entire panzer corps with captured fuel. Some units had many artillery tubes but no ammo for the types they had, others abundant access to ammo for standard types but non-standard tubes. These snafus were expected to get sorted out by not much more than horse-trading between units. Units horded overstocks of equipment to trade for types they were lacking. This sort of chaos, made worse by proliferation of types (one infantry division in Normandy had only 100 trucks, of over 50 different makes), by Allied interdiction, by bombing of oil production and the rail net, could only lead to intermittent catastrophes in the field. And it did, with whole tank battalions abandoned in retreats for lack of fuel, the men escaping on foot; whole divisions sometimes froze without adequate clothing, shelter, or fuel. The army used more horses in its supply network in WW II than it had in WW I. Half of all supplies sent to North Africa were sunk before they arrived, and the rest exhibited many cases of senselessness; DAK often lived hand to mouth from captured stores.
There was little that was rational about it. They relied on a relatively efficient rail system, when not disrupted by bombing, tac air, or partisans; on planned TOEs that were more like ration rights to equipment than actual totals seen in the field (outside of favored units like the SS panzer divisions, and to a lesser degree other mobile troops); on organized grab by QMs. Operations officers undoubtedly failed to properly integrate supply considerations into their plans. But that is because the entire supply situation was a nearly hopeless, tangled mess, patched together with bailing wire and scraps of string; who could count on it?
Do wargames often underrate the very real weaknesses of the German army in WW II because these things are downplayed? Yes, and supply considerations especially. Most operational gamers have no idea how tight vehicle fuel and artillery ammo were for the average German commander, especially in late war, for example. Anywhere but a railhead or before a major offensive, and sometimes even then. The Germans had an elaborate classification of infantry formations from motorised to mobile to semi-mobile to garrison, but few gamers understand what those distinctions mean, or see game systems that bring them home. "Mobile", for instance, meant "possessed enough trucks to move all of its heavy weapons and artillery at once, by road". It was by no means the ordinary classification. Most infantry divisions relied on horse transport for some portion of their artillery, to say nothing of the infantry, which walked as a matter of course. (A lucky few had bicycles).
However, one place where I slightly take issue with an implicit, allowed claim on the part of the article writer, is his notion that the Germans did excel at operations, in the limited sense of which maneuver units were to go where on the map, when. They did in the early war, clearly. They occasionally did in particular operations later one - Kesselring in Italy, some of Rommel's actions in North Africa, the Kharkov counterattack early in 1943, a few others on the eastern front, limited in scale. But frankly, in the second half of the war the Germans were "outplayed" at the operational level, in precisely this sense of the term, as well.
Some of which was because of high command failings and silly orders, signs of desperation or gambling, some was because of intelligence failures or inadequate supplies or manpower. A fair portion of the remainder, though, was just plain poor "play" - failure to keep adequate reserves and a tendency to overcommit the armor to frontages too soon, systematic underestimation of enemy capabilities with expensive consequences, fighting in the wrong places for prestige objectives. The Germans lost heavily in pocket after pocket in the late war, with millions of PWs, not a sign of operational virtuousity on its face. Almost every large-scale counterattack from mid 43 on was an expensive disaster, and you can count on the fingers of the hands (one for each front, east or west) the number of large-scale Allied operations from mid-war on that failed outright, because of successful German defensive operations.
German memoires often point to overwhelming odds in these cases, but map studies do not bear out that as cause until quite late, and the overall odds were not steep until the opening of the front in France. The Germans did face high odds by the late war, but it was because a high portion of their army was destroyed in the field. Subtraction does that to odds ratios. It magnifies any initial odds edge, if the more numerous side does not lose men and equipment in the ratio of his initial strength or more. Thus, start with 200 vs. 100 as a result of production, and let the first lose 100 to the second's 75, and the odds ratio will move from 2:1 to 4:1. Because the loss ratio (4:3 in that example) was less than the initial odds ratio (2:1), the effect of losses is to increase the ratio still further, and more so the higher the overall loss rate.
The Germans lost the majority of Army Group South twice over, of Army Group Center once, of OB West twice (to Falaise, and again post-Bulge), of 1/4 of a million men in the fall of North Africa. These were enourmous defeats, in the west accompanied by huge numbers of PWs. To pretend they were all victories in disguise because of supposed Allied losses is simply poppycock. In the west, the haul of prisoners alone was larger than all western Allied losses. In the east, overall military losses were only 2-3 times for the Russians and most of that disparity came in 1941 alone, in the huge losses of the first 6 months. After 1942 losses in the east were about even, and those even losses combined with a superiority in production down until 1944, led to huge German losses of men and terrain in the field, and thus both odds ratios and a front line moving progressively in favor of the Russians. If that isn't defeat it sure waddles and quacks like one.
My take on the article and the overall subject, for what it is worth.
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"These shooters appear to be amateurs"
Actually, it appears they are quite an experienced bunch, though obviously this gun and cartridge were new to them. With the loads they were using, this round has about 1500 joules of kick. It is an oversized (ridiculously overcharged and oversized, in fact) elephant gun. It probably has the kick of an anti-tank rifle. You'd prolly need a bipod and prone braced position to keep a full hold on it.
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Start with a plain vanilla Sherman M4A3. It costs 122 points, about the same as a Pz IV. Either will penetrate the other. The Sherman has more HE, a 3rd MG, and a faster turret. The Pz IV has a more powerful gun, as powerful as the gun on a Sherman-76.
Now, let's look at improvements. For 24 points, you can get wet stowage (W). This gives you 7 more rounds for the main gun, 12 more from the roof 50 cal, and less likely burn-on-kill. For 24 points, +20% cost. The lower hull has better armor, the upper hull has worse, the turret is the same - all will be penetrated by typical German guns.
Or, you can spend 31 points for a 105mm howitzer, to specialize in infantry killing. This gives more HE obviously, also a slower turret. +25% cost. In contrast, a StuH-105mm costs 11 points *less* than a StuG-75mm, 3/5ths the cost of a Sherman 105, with about 3/5ths the ammo load (and the same ammo load as a StuG).
Or, you can spend 49 points for a better gun, 76mm. 40% more, for a gun as powerful as the one the Pz IV started with. In return, the HE load is reduced, plus a minor reduction in blast, overall a considerable reduction in anti-infantry firepower - to less than the Pz IV has. What will the gun do? Punch through the front of the turret of a Panther at point-blank range, counting armor quality. Sometimes penetrate a Tiger from the front at very close range. Penetrate the sides of Tigers at range. You also get a random number of T rounds, 0-5, about 1/3-1/2 chance you get enough you will actually fire any of them, if you are lucky. If they hit, often 2nd or 3rd shot, those can kill Tiger Is, and get through Panther turrets only, not the front hull.
Or instead of a gun, you can pick W+ and take armor (late enough in the war). Every 75mm and up gun the Germans use will still go through the turret front, and kill from any other angle. But the hull front actually has tank armor. The Panther will still penetrate the lower hull to moderate ranges (~500m), and the upper hull very close and sometimes. 88mmL56 (FLAK or Tiger I) will mostly bounce from the front hull. Can you kill anything back? Why no, you only spent 49 points you see. You turret and sides are still vunerable, while you will need a 76mm to threaten even the turret of the Panther or Tiger.
So you can buy both the 76mm gun and the W+ armor - for 79 points, +65% to the cost. Now the tank costs more than a Panther. Where does it penetrate the Panther? Sides and rear, or turret only from close ranges. Where does the Panther kill it? Turret at any distance, hull front close (lower especially), sides and rear any range. You will also need another 8 points for easy-eight flotation or you not they will bog in mud, with far higher ground pressure.
Now, let's look over on the German side. As already mentioned, a StuH comes at a discount to the StuG (~11%), instead of costing 25% more. A Jadgpanzer will bounce short 75mm AP from the front for the same cost as a Pz IV, doing the job W+ armor does for the US and more so, since there is no penetrable turret.
A Tiger I costs 59 more points than a Pz IV, and gets in return front and side armor the vanilla Sherman can't penetrate, plus 76s need to be close or use "T" rounds from the front, plus more powerful HE, plus a gun that kills anything below W+ from any angle, and W+ in the turret front from any range, plus the usual sides and rear. For about the cost Shermans pay for *either* a decent (but not as good) gun, or good armor (but not on the turret).
Or, for 78 points, a smaller mark-up than a Sherman 76W+, you can get the Panther. Either can penetrate the other's turret, but the Sherm needs to be close or use T, while the Panther can penetrate the Sherm's hull close, the turret at any distance. Speeds and flotation are comparable if the Sherm spends 8 more for E8.
The prices clearly have the Sherman W+ -or- the Sherman 76(W) as a counterpart to the Tiger I (or the Jadg-L70), and the Sherman W+ 76mm as a counterpart to the Panther. The first of those match ups has the Tiger superior in gun plus armor, with the US picking which one to "match" in effectiveness (= force need of side, rear, or turret shots etc). The second has the Panther superior in tank fighting but at a lower price.
And some of these options only come late anyway (good W+ hull armor, E8 flotation).
Are TDs the answer? They are cheap enough, and they have hammers, more likely to have T ammo and enough of it to use the stuff too. That does make them effective in "stalking". The choices, though, are Jackson - without T ammo, able to kill Tiger Is and take out Panthers with turret hits, not able to get through the glacis or deal with super-heavies except from the side. Or Hellcats, the fastest and with plenty of T ammo. These are the usual choice, but suffer from paper armor than is easily scraped by light support weapons - 20mm FLAK, 75mm IGs, etc. Last the M-10s, slower and slow-turreted, but with T ammo and armor enough to shrug off 20mm rounds. The saving grace of all three types is that they are cheap, the price of vanilla Shermans.
What can the Germans get in the way of guns by skimping on armor? Hetzers for 84 points, Marders for 69-75, StuGs for 94. In other words, turretless AFVs with guns as effective against US armor as US TDs are against German armor, for 2/3rds the cost. Some of them with roofs. They just plain pay less, because the US armor is all paying for extras that are not as critical in face to face tank dueling as gun power and armor thickness.
Is the Firefly a good gun on a good tank? Sure, but you get it for being British not for the price paid. They will kill Tiger Is, Tiger Is will kill them, and they cost the same. The difference is the Tiger I will not die when hit by accompanying vanilla Shermans, while the Firefly will die when hit by accompanying Pz IVs.
Does any of this mean Shermans cannot be used effectively? No. Does it mean W+ is not effective armor? No, unless you are hull down - LOL. Does it mean the US is toast, even with TDs, T rounds, and later Sherman 76s and W+? No, certainly. It does mean the Germans get to buy more armored fighting power for the same price spent.
How does the US fight effectively anyway? By using teamwork. One on one, the prices are such that the Germans can buy a better tank for the same cost. But 5 on 5 or 10 on 10, that matters less, and how the tanks mesh their fighting with one another matters more.
I will give an analogy from the air war in the Pacific. It is not perfect, but it is still a useful analogy. The early US carrier pilots did not have F6F Hellcats specifically designed to kill Zeros. They had comparatively lumbering F4F Wildcats. The Zero was faster, more maneuverable, had a better rate of climb, about equal firepower thanks to its cannons. It wasn't as durable, and did not dive as easily, that was about it. Did this prevent US pilots from every fighting the Zero with F4Fs? No.
They developed group tactics. The most elemental of them was called the "Thatch weave", based on the guy who came up with it. The basic idea was to use the fact that planes are vunerable only from behind (in that era), plus teamwork, to overcome maneuverability. How? By leading a trailing Zero in front of a wingman's guns. Following somebody means turning over to him the decision where one goes. That is power, it can be used.
The similar principle operating in tank combat is that almost every tank type is vunerable from the sides. In the case of the heaviest tanks, vunerable to 76mm Shermans or TDs; for most tanks (including the vaunted Panther), from any decent AP gun. And no single tank can face two directions. Even if multiple tanks are fanned out with their facings in an arc, toward the closest of all enemies arrayed in front of them, if the total arc is long, all of them are subject to side shots. When the terrain prevents that, it usually also prevents one facing from blocking all avenues, and provides opportunities to charge close from a side or rear. When teamwork and its tactics even the penetration odds by making side shot common, then the other frills of the US AFVs come out - faster turrets and gyros, etc.
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No, the issue is not just about rariety. I'm glad you are going to put a rariety system into CM2, go for it, more power to that, but it is not the same issue. People who pick forces for optimal fighting ability for the cost are not getting the combat effects they get by overuse of rare vehicles. Many of the rarer vehicles are priced about right, and players avoid the obviously gamey whether it brings them too much of an edge or not.
Besides rariety, there is also a paper-scissors-rock aspect of choosing forces, which is fun and everyone is aware of, but which in the absence of price anamolies favors sides at random. It produces unbalanced single battles, exactly as it should, as a "reward" for choice of mix in a way that deal well with the enemy choice of mix. That is a head game, but it does not produce large net effects. Some dislike it and restrict it, which is fine; others enjoy it. It is not the issue involved here.
As for the story that it is all so well thought out, that is why people on ladders seriously consider bidding for the Germans, right? People pick the force or side based on the pricing of its items, as much as the items based on the force they picked. Only a consensus about that can give rise to a bid for one side. It is obvious that some bargains are available for the choice of force. Thus Brits get 17-lbers, 3" mortars, and wasps cheap, in return for the side choice. The Germans get better infantry and tanks for the cost, etc. This is obvious, everyone knows it.
What is the best firing position for a tank?
in Combat Mission Archive #4 (2002)
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Usually you want to put your tanks in dead ground, especially at set up. Meaning, spots no one can see from far away. Scout ahead with the infantry. Reveal your tanks only when you have a target for them, then hunt that target and kill it. Once it is dead, get back out of sight. This is called armor "back", and it is the "vanilla" or standard way to use most tank types.
But there are sometimes exceptions to that rule. If you have a tank with exceptionally thick front armor, and you have terrain with logn fields of fire, then sometimes a "forward" or "up" deployment can make sense. The idea in this case is to deny ground to the enemy, to stop him from being able to maneuver.
How thick does the armor need to be? Depends, but generally you are talking - Jagdpanzers (at the minimum end), Tigers, Panthers, or on the Allied side W+ variety (at the minimum end) or Jumbo Shermans, or Churchills. Thick armor, or very well angled armor.
Another critical thing using tanks, especially for the Allies, is to work in pairs. Almost any tank can be KOed from a flank, but many can bounce shots from the front. Well, no tank can point in two directions. So a pair working with one another, somewhat seperated to have different angles to any given point, can do a lot more than one at a time. And a threatened tank can reverse into cover, while its "buddy" hunts forward to hit the threating enemy tank from a different angle.
Last, there is one further distinction, besides "up" and "back". In some ways between them, or a variation on "back". This is called "keyhole sighting". The idea is to have a particular spot of ground in the enemy area that a tank targets. It positions itself to get a clear, long view to that spot, but stays masked against all other parts of enemy territory. You can get this effect by peaking around a house, between two clumps of trees, around a hill, etc.
The reason that can help, is when you can see every spot on the map, every spot on the map can see you. It is easy for the enemy to spot you, get "many on one" odds, and side angles, when you can see everything. In contrast, with a "keyhole", you don't get spotted until you see a target, and then usually just one, and in a direction you are facing. You can add "ambush" markers, too.
Also remember that sitting still once spotted is usually not a good idea, for long. The enemy will send things that can kill you, or avoid the spots you can see. Moving around, you change what those spots are, and you also change where you can be threatened from. So, don't just park the tank. Spend 2-3 minutes doing something, then change the deployment, unless you are in the middle of a firefight. Sometimes even then, if you've been stationary for too long - 5 minutes say.