JasonC
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Posts posted by JasonC
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Feldgrau gives some decent figures on German losses, though a bit on the low side perhaps, and in some cases the figures are only through November of 1944. The main uncertainty in them concerns the high number of MIA they record. Thus, out of 5.1 million KIA + MIA they give for the whole military over the whole war, 56% of them are MIAs.
Now, a large number of those were really KIA but recorded MIA initially e.g. 100K range MIA figures for the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, who are obviously crews of planes and subs gone missing. Some portion of the MIAs are late war PWs in the west, some are PWs in the east that were captured rather than killed, but never returned to Germany - even if they survived the war. Etc.
But the basic picture presented by the Feldgrau numbers is believable enough. Out of a population of a bit over 80m, Germany had around 25m men between the ages of 15 and 65. 18m of them served in the armed forces at one time or another, up to 9m of them at a time. 5.1m were killed or went missing, of whom probably around a million were released unharmed after the war, and another 5.2m were wounded in action.
Undoubtedly there were additional non-battle casualties above those numbers, still in the military - frostbite cases and disease, etc. Some of the non-battle casualties were invalided home, more were probably returned to duty; the wounded would likewise break into those two categories, but probably in a different proportion. A reasonable overall conclusion would be about 1 man in 4 among those who served died, another 1 in 4 was probably invalided home, another 1 in 4 was probably sick or wounded at some point but fit by the end of the war. Of course at the end everyone gave up at some point.
As for additional sources of labor, (source for some of the following data is Alan S. Milward's "War Economy and Society 1939-1945") the Germans moved only about 600K women into the labor force, net, during the war, far less than any other combatant. But they employed around 7.1m foreign workers in Germany, including large numbers of Polish, French, and Russian PWs, additional civilians from the west and Italy, etc. Up to 1/5th of the labor force were foreigners by the end of the war. That was one source of production, inside Germany - another ~7% of overall German war production came from outside Germany before occupied areas were lost again.
After September 1944, however, domestic production fell in part because of labor shortages. The recovery from the losses of France and western Russian in the summer of '44 were made good by combing out rear areas and relaxing war work exemptions from service. Volksturm duty became mandatory at the same time for men up to age 65 (and in some cases beyond it), and the draft age was dropped, to 15 by the end of the war. These measures produce the manpower to hold at the frontiers of Germany, but GDP was declining because of the diversion of manpower, in consequence.
Before that crisis, foreign workers and productivity improvements kept output high despite the number of men away at the front. Overall, Germany mobilized a higher portion of her men in the military age group than any other combatant, with the possible exception of the USSR (where the figures are much less clear, in part because of territory and population changing hands).
In addition to the military losses, Germany suffered considerable civilian KIA, from two different sources. The strategic bombing campaign, and the entry of Russian forces to eastern Germany and east Prussia toward the end of the war. Figures for German civilian losses are all over the map, from 780K to 3 million. Part of the confusion definitional. Who is a German, and what is a war related loss?
Around 1.2 million "volksdeutch" - German speakers living outside Germany proper - fled back into German territory at the end of the war. They were not German citizens before the war. Large numbers of Czechs and Polish ethnics, and a modest number of Ukrainians, lived in territory of greater Germany - and thus were legally German citizens, though sometimes second class ones or worse - but not in the territory of east or west Germany after the territorial changes wrought by the war. Austria was independent, then part of Germany, then independent again; most but not all of its population were German-speaking. Births and migrations were taking place in all categories, as well as ordinary deaths not caused by the war. So an accurate accounting based on simple before and after numbers, is impossible.
There are other pitfalls in comparisons of German losses to Allied ones. Germany was not alone in the war. KIA and MIAs of Axis minors amounted to 1.7 million, including large numbers of Rumanians and Hungarians, and smaller numbers of Finns, Bulgarians, Italians, and Slovaks lost fighting the Russians. Small numbers of Norwegians, Swedes, Danes, Dutch, Swiss, and French also died in German service, in special SS formations recruited abroad. The US and to a lesser degree the UK, and still less the Russians in the last days, also had casualties against Japan. Italy lost heavily to the UK and later some to the US, before leaving the war.
Less well known, around 500K Russians and Poles died serving the Germans as Hiwis, some practically as slaves and some as eager volunteers. When casualties occurred in German occupied Russia, the usual accounting (and true for the majority, certainly) is as Russian civilian losses to German action. But some were Russian soldiers fighting as partisans, not civilians; some were civilians killed by partisans; some were Hiwis fighting for the Germans and killed by partisans; some died for lack of food without regard to political affiliations, etc.
Russian loss figures are available but uncertain. One site on the web that gives figures on the high side of those reported is www.skalman.nu/soviet/ww2-losses.htm It is noticeable that this set gives higher figures for Russian military losses than most sources, but lower civilian ones. Figures for Russian military KIA vary from as low as 3m to as high as 12m, with most sources giving around 6m. Part of the range width is again definitional - some include military and civilian, some include MIAs as well as KIAs, or those MIAs that died, some include non-battle "irreplaceable losses" as well as battle ones, and that category includes wounded invalided home as well as KIA. Civilian death figures for the Russians vary from 7m at the low end to 20m at the high end, with around 11m typical. Another wrinkle is that nearly 1m Russian MIAs returned to Russia during the war in one manner or another - but that figure probably includes desertions from Hiwi units, stragglers or deserters recovered in Russian territory, partisans operating in areas recaptured, etc. Every sort of category has some people in it to muck up neat distinctions.
Milward gives 6m military deaths (3m direct KIA and 3m PW then died) and 2m additional PWs that didn't die in captivity, plus 11m civilian deaths, 8m of them in occupied Russia and the rest in unoccupied. Krivoshev gives 11.3m irreplaceable military losses but only 7m civilian deaths. An encyclopedia gives 5.2m KIA plus 1.1m invalided out by wounds, plus 3.6m missing that did not return to the army, for a total of 9.8m irreplaceables. I think the most likely real answer is on the order of 10m military losses not recovered. Wounded in action is probably between 10-15m.
All of that is out of a pre-war population of around 150m, or a bit less than double the German population base. But not all of that pop was available during the decisive battles of 1942-3. The Ukraine and White Russia were occupied, and may have included 1/4 of the Russian population. So the "manpower odds" were only around 3:2 in the critical period, even discounting all the Axis minor powers. Including them, the manpower odds would be more like equal. Since they didn't fight very effectively (a few cases and campaigns excepted e.g. Finns, or Rumanians in the first year), somewhere in between is probably the right way to think about it.
What you can be certain of is that the Russians did not have 5 or 10 to 1 manpower odds. And could not afford to lose men in such ratios, and at high rates, and still prevail. Nearly half the Russian losses seem to have occurred in what was to them the defensive period of the war, down to November 1942. That is roughly 1/3rd of the time. The other half were incurred in the remaining 2/3rds, so their loss rate fell about by half as the tide shifted. Many of the excess losses in the initial period were PWs captured in the great pockets of 1941. The German loss rate moved the other way, from low in the first 1/3rd (though they still had taken 1m casualties, including WIA, by the end of the Battle for Moscow in the first winter), to much higher from the rest of the war, but still below the Russian loss rate.
So are the stories of 10:1 Russian odds by late in the war myth? No. But the Russians did not achieve their odds toward the end by mobilization or production, alone. They achieved them by attrition, through the effect subtraction has on ratios. 200 vs. 100 after production is only 2:1 odds. But then trade 100 of the former for 80 of the latter - a higher absolute loss rate but proportionally less than the production ratio - and the ratio of remaining forces move to 100 to 20 or 5:1.
The high local odds the Russians managed by late in the war were the result of such attrition processes working on the German army. Supplimented, especially in the decisive mid-war period, by maneuver effects. As in, 100 vs. 20 in one particular area, then repeated 3 times in succession with the same "100" and a different "20" each time.
The Russians did not reach parity in total forces (after the early 41 debacles) until late in 1942. They took the initiative when the overall total forces were roughly equal. Production increased the ratio into 1943, as the Germans only went to a full war economy footing after losing at Stalingrad. Russian production had basically plateaued by early 1943, while German continued to increase until mid 44. The Russians mobilized both sooner and faster; the overall gain in total armaments output was comparable for each country. As was the industrial potential of each before the war began.
German loss rates for equipment, notably tanks, ramped along with their production, with the result that their fielded force never increased appreciably in size, despite mobilization. Whereas Russian AFVs in operation tripled in 1942, the Germans basically only replaced losses in 1943 and 44. The result was that the numerical superiority in fielded forces the Russians achieve by early 43 was not reversed by German production increases. Meanwhile, losses in the field did work the subtraction effect.
An interesting relationship provides something of a cross check on loss claims, and especially claims about loss ratios. Overall production and manpower available was only on the order of 2x as high for the Russians, before the second front was opened in the west. Periods of lull should therefore see the Russian relative strength building up, but never beyond the 2:1 level from that cause alone. Now, consider the different effects of periods of high losses on this picture, depending on whether the loss rate for that period was above or below 2:1.
If the loss ratio in periods of intense action / high losses was well above 2:1 in favor of the Germans, then this "lull" odds ratio (from production alone) should *decline* in periods of intense fighting, towards unity, where presumably further attacks without more build up time would prove impossible. But if the loss ratio in an intense period was less than 2:1 in favor of the Germans, even if it was in favor of the Germans in absolute terms, then the odds ratio would *increase* during the period of intense combat. And the higher the absolute losses on both sides, the larger this increase in relative odds would be. As the 200-100 / 100-20 example shows, the smaller the remaining force of the smaller side, the higher the relative odds ratio goes, in that case. So qualitatively different predictions are made by differing estimates of overall loss ratios.
To me the fighting from Stalingrad to the end of Bagration in the summer of 44 clearly favors the second of those predictions. From the Kharkov counterattack until Kursk was a lull, and during it the German relative position was stable. But if you look at the Stalingrad period itself, the Kursk fight through to the Dnepr bend battles, and Bagration itself, all saw periods of intense combat and high overall loss rates, with definite and perceptible declines in German relative strength as a result. Attacking with 2:1 from production only, you don't get the relative odds ratio to move your way from intense combat, unless the loss rates (in whatever relevant category - not just men, but formations, tanks, whatever) are below 2:1.
This sort of cross check is needed, because claims of enemy losses are famously inflated in wartime. Often with complete sincerity. E.g. every enemy tank penetrated by a friendly weapon is counted as "KOed". But on the friendly side, every AFV that can be repaired in merely moved to "short term repair"; only "total losses" or overrun wrecks are counted as "KOed" by the enemy.
You can also see this sort of effect in action if you add up claims for ratios over an entire relevant class. E.g. it is often claimed that Panthers and Tigers (and other heavy types) easily accounted for 10 tanks apiece, while even plain jane German AFVs are often claimed to have KOed 3-5 apiece. If the subject is anti-tank guns and heavy Flak, they are typically said to have accounted for multiple AFVs as well. The airforce got some, so did millions of AT mines, and infantry AT weapons got some others.
But the Russians only made 102K AFVs (and imported ~8K more lendlease), and ended the war with more tanks than they started it with. Ergo, they only lost around 100K AFVs of all types. If you subtract out weapons sent to the west in the late war (much shorter) you get something like the following accounting -
5-6K Tigers and Panthers etc @ 10 - 50-60K
25-30K other AFV @ 3-5 - 75K-150K
30-35K Pak&heavy Flak @ 2-3 - 60-70
Infantry AT - 10K
Air and mines - 5-10K
= 200-300K
Or every dead Russian AFV "claimed" three times over.
A more likely reality would be 3-5 for the heavies, and 1 @ for the other AFVs and Pak (a little above that for the Pz IVs and StuG IIIs perhaps, a little below it for 75mm Pak, etc) - implies 85-115K, centered around the number we know the Russians lost, ~100K.
Similarly, every WIA or straggler or frostbite case can look like a "destroyed division" at the time of its occurance, while only half that number are KIA or invalided home. The other half are back to fight another day, and the result is an inflated loss claim about enemy forces.
As for the losses of the western Allies, they were an order of magnitude smaller. The US lost 292K KIA and 672K WIA in the whole war, both theaters and all branches of service. The UK lost about 1/3rd more KIA, though less from Britain proper than the Americans lost; the remainder came from the Dominions and India (90K and 170K KIA and WIA between them). Britain also lost about 100K KIA to German bombing, both in the "Blitz" in 1940, and from the late-war V-1s and V-2s. For comparison, about the same number of Russian civilians died in the seige of Leningrad alone as all US and UK military deaths combined (650K in each case).
Japan lost about 3m military KIA; the number of Japanese civilians lost to bombing is unknown. The Japanese statistics office that tried to keep data on the subject was destroyed in an air raid, if that says anything.
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Um, in operations, reinforcements arrive before a given -battle-. They are then available for ordinary set up in the battle specified. They don't arrive during a battle from off the edge of the map, as in scenarios. You specify in the operation design which -battle- is the first a given set of reinforcments can arrive, along with an arrival chance -per battle-.
So, "turn" 2 and 100% means the force will not be there in the first battle, but will be there in the second. "turn" 4 and 50% means the force will not be there in the first 3 battles, 50% chance it is there for the 4th, 75% there for the 5th, etc - assuming the operation runs that long.
You can also specify that a given reinforcement force is a "reserve" instead of an ordinary, scheduled reinforcement. You have 3 slots available for that - battalion, regiment, and division reserve. Reserves will show up if their side takes heavy losses or otherwise encounters serious trouble in the preceeding fights. The divisional ones are the slowest to arrive, and sometimes will not make it at all. Each will only show up after the previous level of reserves has been committed.
You have no control over committment of reserves, as designer or as player. It is all in the hands of the computer. Scheduled reinforcements, on the other hand, can be "tuned" by the designer as he sees fit - but they will not react to how the operation is going.
Between each battle, the surviving forces on each side are reorganized and receive resupply and some replacements. Some portion of the WIA will return (stragglers, rear area troops coming forward, etc). Abandoned tanks might be restored to service. Ammo will be restored, though not always to full. How strong the old forces are after this resupply will depend in part on the operation's global "supply" settings for each side, set on the parameters screen.
The reinforcements are added to the reconstituted survivor force. That then forms the body of troops available at the start of the next battle, in the set-up phase. Once units have arrived, they are the same as initial forces for all purposes; they never go "back into reserve" or anything like that. They will be resupplied normally after each battle, etc.
The front line moves after each battle, based on how far the lead attackers have advanced, and on the size of no man's land (NML) specified in the "parameters" of the operation. For an ambush and fall back defense, chose a reasonable size for NML. That will push the defender's back gradually even if the attackers only make it to their previous positions, not through them. If you want to show a static defense of each position, then use a thin NML setting, to allow the defenders to hold on to locations until ejected from them. The defenders will still fall back if a location is flanked, though - the farthest advance is the basis for the start line in the next battle.
You have to play through an operation several times to test whether the number of battles, length of battles, NML settings, and map width/length, are reasonable. If you make each battle too long and the map too wide, it will be too easy for the attackers to push through somewhere and race to the rear, sometimes with a small force. The defenders will then give up too much ground per battle, especially if you choose a wide NML setting. Reduce the length of each battle to avoid that problem. You might also narrow the battlefield, and/or lengthen it, to make it harder for attackers to just "go around". Of course, it depends on what sort of fighting you are trying to simulate. There is no substitute for testing it repeatedly.
I hope some of this helps...
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If you want to simulate commando ops, try this. Give the attackers crack qualities, perhaps with a few elite thrown in for particular roles (snipers e.g.). Give the defender's green quality for rear area troops, regular for others. Make the fight take place at night.
Next, fix the set up of most of the defenders, "orange" "padlock" style, with a few areas for set up as desired for a barracks or what-not (small area of 100x100 meters, say, for one or another portion of the defenders). Put landmarks on the map and inform the attacker in the briefing the expected strength and locations of defenders - with whatever level of quality for that intel you desire.
Next, give the attacker set up areas that are all over the map, all through the defended locations, as long as they aren't physically on top of them. Only exclude them from locations that you can see the sentries would cover by sight at night. Maybe there is a compound with free set up for one defended platoon (the above 100x100 area e.g.).
Then the attackers can set up, say, everywhere not within 40 meters of that location, except for exact tiles the orange fixed defenders are on. Notice, the fixed tiles can be made known to the attacker as "holes" in his allowed set up areas, if you like.
The first minute could easily see quite a few instances of "sneaking up", in the sense of defenders finding crack squads of attackers ~20 meters away and moving toward them from the 5th second on, perhaps while they are facing in the wrong direction, etc.
The sneaking is done beforehand and its effects are shown in the set up, in other words. The actual fight begins with the first trigger pull. The scenario could be quite short, 5-10 turns. The attacker should have to plan out the results beforehand, carefully, if he expects to succeed against odds and in the limited time available.
Also, try playing out the resolution from ground level view, as per the "ironman" rules. For short, small scenarios that is a realistic option. The confusion level could get quite realistic for the defender...
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The US paras are better than the gliders, certainly. 50 cals have only about half again the infantry fp of MMGs, and they don't make it up on ammo, with only 40 shots. The 3-man para MGs only have 35 it is true, but there are three of them.
The 1917 HMG has lots of ammo, 125, and if you are on defense they are a better choice than 50 cals. But they are slow (matters attacking, less so otherwise). The standard MMG has a middle 65 ammo but low fp. Used in pairs they can function like German HMG teams, and they maneuver better than the HMGs. But they aren't as good as the German HMGs individually, no question.
What the Allies have for the attack are cheap light armor types with tons of ammo - the M3A1 halftrack and scout car, the Brit MMG carrier. Those often work better than slow HMG teams, or MG teams with inadequate ammo (3 man, 50 cal). They don't go everywhere or use cover so effectively. On the other hand, small arms fire can't stop them (or easily, anyway - they can get 1 crew casualty of course).
If you want serious hosing power, take 1-2 of the halftracks and put 2 HMG-1917 in each of them - then pretend they are AA halftracks. The 'track parks behind a bit of cover, and the HMGs move up through it, while the 'track peeks around the side. Keep the range 250-300 meters to protect them from enemy reply by small arms and schrecks. They have enough ammo to fire continuously, to "recon by fire", to use area fire to suppress a target you are about to rush, etc.
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It is simpler than all that. The sniper hit one guy, wounding him but not killing him - and the other is taking him to the aid station...
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A scout section had 2 jeeps and 1 M-8 armored car. One of the jeeps carried a 60mm mortar, the other carried an MG and scouted ahead. Three of those sections constitute a cavalry platoon.
Earlier, M3A1 scout cars were used instead of jeeps. The troops actually preferred the jeep, because it was more nimble and harder to spot, and bugged out of danger faster. Later, some units used M-20s (which are essentially M-8 ACs with the turret removed) instead.
The mortar let the section hit enemies at range without exposing their thin-skinned vehicles, and were popular with the men because of it. At one point there were only 2 per platoon, but that was upped to 3 after North Africa at the men's request.
The MGs on the jeeps were often 30 cals, M1919A4 air cooled. The same as the MMG in CM. But CM only show the 50-cal jeep so you are stuck with it. In real life, a few scouts could also dismount from the vehicles, including MMGs taken off the jeeps to use dismounted.
You can simulate that in CM by taking a few bazooka teams or sharpshooters, an "airborne" 3-man MMG team, or an FO. Ride them on the M-8s, or skip one of the mortars, swap a jeep MG for a regular jeep, or use M3A1 scout cars or M-20s and ride those. If you have enough vehicles, you might take one platoon of infantry instead, and ride them in the vehicles in half-squads.
The cavalry also had M8HMCs - 2 per company on map, or more typically use a 75mm FO to have them fire indirect. Plus support from stuart light tanks, one company for a battalion of the cavalry. Meaning you might see anywhere from 2-5 stuarts supporting cavalry scouts.
Cavalry platoon example, using M3A1 scout cars -
3 M-8 armored cars
6 M3A1 scout cars
3 60mm mortars
2-7 bazooka, sharpshooter, 3-man MMG -or- 1 rifle platoon (with Stuarts)
1 75mm FO
0-2 Stuart light tanks
Using jeeps (typical)
3 M-8s
3 Jeep MG
3 Jeep
3 60mm Mortar
1 75mm FO
0-4 zook, sharpshooter, or 3-man MMG
0-2 Stuart (optional)
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The Germans called them "stukas on wheels". Think of them as a substitute air strike - just as unpredictable, potentially devastating, always loud, sometimes a fizzle.
I don't recommend the largest sizes, because I find the 150mm standard artillery is better at that sort of thing (since you can aim it). But 2-3 of the cheap 150mm FOs can put down a dense enough pattern that the enemy will notice. Target them less than 100 meters apart.
The "beaten zone" of rockets is about 400 yards wide by 200 yards deep, compared to the usual 100 wide by 200 deep for other artillery types. So you need the aim point to be at least 200 yards away, and preferably more like 400 yards away. Trying to use them late, while already in close contact, is not going to work.
The best time is as the enemy approaches, with his leading units ~250 yards out and the rest strung out beyond. Target the salvo on any prominent terrain feature, ~100 yards beyond the nearest *enemy* unit and at least 250 yards from the nearest edge (which on smaller maps means "the middle of the board", typically).
You can spread the targeting points a little front to back for a slightly deeper pattern, but basically put them on top of each other. You need more than 25 rockets landing in a pattern that size to do much to anybody under it.
Whereas regular aimed arty works best against bunched up enemies, rockets will give the best effect against units spread out into decent intervals, to avoid such concentrated fire. Otherwise many of the rockets will fall "wide". But if a large force of the enemy are advancing with decent intervals between them, most will have their random shot at how close the nearest enemy is. And with 50-75 of them, you will get some of them close.
The overall effect of a "spoiling barrage" like that is to discoordinate the attacker's plans. Some units pin, a few aren't available, etc. It will delay, more than stop, the attacker. Most of the morale effects will have passed in 3-5 minutes. Use the time to move reserves or keep attackers under fire with other forces.
Don't rely on rockets exclusively, because they can't do what regular arty does and you need some of that. But in place of one infantry platoon or AFV, a lucky spoiling barrage can make a difference. It is a high "variance" tactic, a roll of the dice, compared to more maneuver units.
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I find the LMGs far too fragile to be of much use, other than potentially confusing the enemy about where you are. They often don't last through their own mere 25 shots. But I've run HMGs down to single digits of ammo remaining in 15 minutes, and getting off 50-70 shots is quite normal.
Basically you get 2-4 times the firepower (depending on how much of the higher ammo load you manage to fire) and greater resilency in return for one target and slow rather than medium speed. The tactical role you need MGs to fufill is long range direct fire, typically 250 meters or so. That requires considerable ammo to produce a decent effect, as the hits accumulate over a long period of fire.
To get the HMGs where they are going, I just ride them on the back of a vehicle for the first 1-2 minutes. You have to pick their locations well to get many shots out of them, but they can relocate short distances to renew a LOS or what-not, on their own. Their range will usually do the rest.
If you want mobile LMG firepower to run closer, the way to get it is to buy Panzergrenadiers, not LMG teams. They have 2 per squad, fast speed not medium, 40 shots not 25, and don't die when you look at them funny. Or Fallschirmjaegers, same story.
[ 08-09-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]
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Yes, that is a useful site for US TOE info. Some added background on the TD battalions.
Each battalion had 3 TD companies, each of 3 platoons, each of 4 guns or TDs. When they had towed 76mm guns, the prime movers were usually halftracks, not trucks. In addition to the 3 "line" TD companies, there were two additional main formations at the battalion level. One cavalry troop to scout, and one assault gun section for indirect fire support.
The assault gun section had 6 M8HMC, used either together as a battery firing indirect (in CM terms, 1 75mm FO), or in 3 2-gun sections assigned to each TD company.
The cavalry troop had 3 platoons each of 3 sections, with each section armed with 1 M-8 armored car, and 2 other scout vehicles, usually jeeps (but sometimes M-20s later on, or M3A1 scout cars earlier). One of the scout vehicles carried a 60mm mortar team, the other was MG armed and scouted ahead. The troop could assign a scout platoon to each company of TDs. Overall, the whole battalion had 51 AFVs (or 36 HT-ATG pairs and 15 AFVs) and 18 scout vehicles, making it as large as a tank battalion, overall.
In CM terms, a TD platoon would have 4 TDs or 4 76mm AT guns plus 4 M3 halftracks to move them. And for every three such, they would have a 75mm FO or 2 HMCs, plus 3 M-8 scout cars, 3 60mm mortars, and 6 other scout vehicles (jeep MG, jeep, M3A1 scout car, or M-20) - sometimes split up among them, sometimes working seperately.
Cavalry battalions had 3 of the scout companies (as above), the same HMC battery, and one company of 17 Stuarts, in 3 platoons of 5 plus 2 in an HQ section. (The permanent cavalry battalions of the 2nd and 3rd armored divisions were exceptions. They each had a 4th company of the standard cav, making 36 M-8 AC all told). The standard ones thus had 50 AFVs (17 Stuart, 6 HMC, 27 M-8) and another 54 scout vehicles.
Around 50 AFVs plus some sort of recon ability added, was thus the norm for all battalion sized armor or mech type units - tank, TD, or cavalry. Armored infantry battalions were somewhat larger in number of armored vehicles, at 20 halftracks per company - plus 57mm ATGs, 81mm mortars, and a recon platoon at the battalion level.
The design philosophy of recon element, line AFV element, fire support element, was repeated throughout. Thus, all battalion level units had some sort of organic fire support - 6 81mm mortars for armored infantry, 6 75mm HMCs for TDs and cavalry, and 6 Sherman 105s for tank battalions. All had some sort of recon (light tanks for armor, M-8s for TDs, etc), or in the case of the "already recon" cavalry, of heavier support (the one light tank company). In addition to the standard three "line", fighting company type (medium tank, TD, or cavalry).
Naturally when the subunits were parcelled out to task forces, and some were reduced below TOE, all of the above could get jumbled and the numbers could vary, etc. But it can help to understand the basic layout. The roles could be fufilled by fewer vehicles or stop-gap substitutes "lent" from whatever force was available, but the design, the layout of the roles and the rough portion between them, was likely to persist.
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From overhead, bocage looks like small ordinary hedges, or the lines between fields. That they would prove such an effective military obstacle was guessed by neither side before the event. The Germans proved adept at devising ways to use it, and found out by experience how effective fausts became in such conditions, etc.
The Germans weren't attacking, and what armor they had available was heavily concentrated on the British part of the front, which was relatively more open, flatter, with larger fields. The Germans did try one large armored counterattack in the US part of the front in mid July, by about 1/2 of one Panzer division. It penetrated the front, but then the tanks quickly got lost, isolated, and knocked out by US TD teams rushed to the area.
Also, the German Panthers had the thick front plates, so blocking the lanes was fine by them - while the US tanks with thinner front armor and guns incapable of getting through the front of a Panther, needed to get off the main roads and out of the sunken secondary lanes, into the fields, much more urgently.
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Put an ambush marker in the middle of the first tile of open ground you expect the Jumbo to enter, or a little farther out. All guns can place their own ambush markers; they don't need an HQ to do it for them. Leave the gun on "hide". When a target moves close to a hidden unit's ambush marker, it will unhide to fire at that particular spot. It also shoots a little better because it is already aiming for the location, effectively. That is what ambush markers are for. There is no sense in trying to keep the gun "busy".
If the targeted area is wide, so that you think you won't be able to predict where the target will appear and thus use an ambush marker effectively, you can try instead giving the gun a targeting order to the Jumbo, if anybody can see it. The target line will be black, but the 88 will still show a preference for that target, at least for the early part of the turn, if it comes into view. If it is going to be a while before the Jumbo comes into view, though, and if other distracting targets are possible for the gun, then staying on "hide" with an ambush marker is safer.
I hope this helps.
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The only time to crawl is when you are behind a wall. Easy to remember, because it rhymes. Walls give 100% protection to anyone flat on the ground behind them, hiding or pinned - or crawling.
Don't use crawl to break LOS while under heavy fire. Use "withdraw-run"; it is much faster and speed is more essential than cover when breaking LOS.
Run in the open and move in woods or buildings, as a rule. Running through non-open terrain is particularly tiring and gains you little. Also, you are more likely to run into enemies in such places, and a unit with "move" spots and shoots better than one running.
Sneak is the command of choice for the last 20 meters of movement in cover. When you are deep in cover and out of LOS, and are ready to move to the forward edge of cover, expecting to get LOS to enemies once you do - sneak. Note that only units capable of fast movement can sneak. You are much more likely to avoid being seen. The speed difference over such a small distance is trivial.
If you add a "hide" after the sneak, the command will become "sneak and hide", and your unit will not give itself away even if a target is visible. This is perfect for setting up ambushes, positioning AT teams without drawing infantry fire, etc.
It is worth learning the technique of "sulking" in a large body of cover with a large body of infantry. This is a tactic for several units rather than one, making use of some of the above. The idea is to originally position the men deep enough in the cover - I'll use woods to illustrate the principle - that they cannot be seen from the outside. Which naturally means they can't see out either - but they can cover the treeline.
Then, sneak one or two units forward to about 10m from the treeline, using sneak&hide. They are your eyes, to spot the enemy coming. Everyone else is still safe. When the scouts see targets, sneak roughly half the men up to the treeline (but not the HQs), and the following turn open up with everybody, stopping all the "hide" orders.
When you draw fire in response, withdraw all the forward guys back into the woods, completely breaking LOS. Sneak the rest of the rearward guys to the woodline in the gaps between the old set coming back. Soon you have a manned treeline again, but the enemy can't see you. He sees a whole cloud of leftover flag markers, but no solid targets. Your new guys open up again, and he sees a few "infantry?" markers in the see of leftovers.
Repeat, and he will never progress to full ID of your units. His direct fire will be much less effective. You can easily keep 1/3rd of your men covering the open ground beyond the treeline, and you will have time to rally men who took a bit of fire in their turn at the edge. Your HQs are untouched, to keep morale high. If he tries to come into your woods themselves, he will suppress only the forward guys, and encountered more men than he bargained for, less suppressed than he thought.
It is a very useful infantry tactic. The counter to it is HE (especially off-board artillery), which doesn't need direct LOS to hurt people - but no one can afford to dump HE everywhere forever. If you get hit by HE, shift positions back in the woods. Obviously this is easier in a larger forest. You can do the same thing in towns by using the back side and lower floors as the "interior", and the front windows and upper floors as the "treeline".
Just remember, when "sulking", you "sneak" forward and "withdraw" back. "Run" in the open and "move" in cover. Only "crawl" behind a wall.
I hope this helps.
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Let the regular squads pick their own targets. MGs, used aimed, not area fire, on the target you want suppressed. The only exception is buys behind a wall - for them, area fire right as close to the target unit as you can get. Mortars, area fire at a location near the unit.
Area fire will be continued even if the target ducks for cover, and even if it can't be seen. This is important with the wall, because aimed fire will break off as soon as they duck, and give them time to recover. But it doesn't "seek" the target, it goes exactly where you tell it to, and effects only a small area, just like aimed shots.
You can also use area fire when you don't have a target but suspect one in there, or to "recon by fire" (shoot to make hiding enemies shoot back and reveal themselves). This is usually only a good idea with vehicle MGs, and ones with a lot of ammo at that. Meaning, 100+ shots, not 40. Some vehicles have 250 MG ammo, and can afford to hose down something every turn whether they see anything or not. Of course, this is loud and will tell everybody where that shooter is. But often you don't care.
Area fire is also useful for gun HE when shooting at buildings. Instead of shooting at the men in the building, target the building itself and use area fire. The shots will be kept up as fast as possible, with little regard to exact aim, until the building collapses. This will do a number on infantry hiding on the back side of the building, ducking back out of LOS deeper inside, etc.
Plain Shermans are particularly good at this, because they have such large HE ammo loads they can afford the shots, even if a few of the buildings they demolish were empty. High caliber guns with large HE loads are also good at it - Sherman 105 and StuH, Priests, etc. High ROF guns of light caliber (20mm, 37mm) are also good at it, but that is something of a bug IMHO and a bit gamey.
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Go to the parameters screen. There are fields to assign ownership of each map edge.
Next, go to the map editor. Choose "zone view". There are color-coded areas on the map - initially one red and one green - that outline the legal set up areas for each starting group. You can have up to three groups on each side of the fight.
Select a color by left clicking on the colored bars on the left side of the screen. In zone mode, scanning over the map with the mouse, while holding down the left mouse button, will change the assignment of each tile to the color currently selected. Holding down shift at the same time will make your "brush" 100 yards wide instead of 20 yards, to fill in large areas quickly. If the map is large, don't forget to scroll it right or left, up or down, to get the parts not displayed at one time.
Then, "preview" the map. You will see the colored zones outlined as you have drawn them. The default is a long, narrow box on the east for the Germans, and one the west for the Allies, but you can change that at will.
Go back to the map editor by hitting "OK", and refine your zones. One side set up inside the map, without any friendly edge, can simulate surrounded units. You can set the zones any way you like, even mixed in with each other for a paratroop drop, or with attackers in cover on all sides and within a defense position to show a surprise raid, etc. The only restriction is that each 20x20 tile have one definite color, not more than one. Use grey for a tile no one may set up in, and to erase mistakes or make changes.
Place the starting units in the zone you want them to set up in. During the set up phase at the start of the actual game, each commander will be able to move around his starting units, but they must stay inside the same color zone they start in. Zones do not have to be continuous - you could have a red zone that has three optional places to set up e.g., and the commander can then divide his forces between them.
Also, if you want a unit to be in a definite spot with the commander not allowed to move it at set up, you can "padlock" it in place from the unit menu, in the map editor preview. Right click on the unit and select "padlock setup". The unit will appear with an orange base, and during the setup phase it may not be moved. Perfect for sentries, fixed gun positions, surprised defenders in raids, etc.
You can do all kinds of things with the tools available. You just have to use them, which takes a little practice to learn, and a little time to do if you do a lot of fancy details.
Oh and one PS. After all your fiddlings, be sure to save the edited scenario. Otherwise you will still have the default settings when you start...
[ 08-08-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]
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Definitely, these are my favorite sort. But the maps can be a bit deeper - up to 440 by 880 meters, with the long axis in the direction the fight is along. You don't need a lot more forces when the map is narrow, and a longer one can allow more choice of terrain and neater tactical problems, ranged weapons, etc, instead of starting right on top of each other. I'd love to see more of them put together, especially for TCP/IP play, where you have to move reasonably fast.
[ 08-07-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]
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Tigers aren't the same as Panthers. With Panthers, the trick is to hit them from the sides with any decent AT weapon. With Tigers, the trick is to hit them with any upgunned shooter - US 76mm on Shermans or tank destroyers, 90mm, Brits Fireflies, Challengers, or Comets.
The Tiger's strength is that even its side armor is still pretty thick, thick enough that straight 75mm guns (or zooks, usually) need to fire from an almost "square", 90 degree angle, and be fairly close in to boot. That way is possible, but risky and uncertain. What often happens is the side angle and the range combine to defeat the shot. But its armor is not so thick, front or sides, that 76mm guns can't get through it at decent combat ranges.
You don't have to razzle dazzle or suicide drive to close ranges. Distract the tank with anything (buttoning it up can also help) then hunt forward with an upgunned shooter from another angle (doesn't have to be wide, but wider means more time) and pop the beastie, and it will go down. It helps to have a full ID of the tank (no "?"), to ensure the right ammo type is used, if that matters.
The only case to worry about with an upgunned shooter (besides him shooting you first, obviously!), is the following. If you have only a US style 76mm gun (not 17 lber in other words), and you are facing the front armor plus a slanting angle, or the range is long (over 1000 yards), then you need tungsten. Otherwise T ammo is unnecessary, and usually it is easy enough to avoid that special case (just increase the angle and shoot from the side, or decrease it and shoot from the front, or wait for him to get closer if too far away).
This is different from the Panther. The Panther's front is harder to get through than the Tiger's, but its sides are weak enough for vanilla 75mm to tackle, even at range or with side angle included. So going for the flanks is the way to kill the Panthers, including the split up - two shooter approach others have described.
The traps or pitfalls of the two tanks differ. The way to get killed by a Panther is to try to tackle it from the front. The way to get killed by a Tiger is to try to tackle it without an improved AT gun, with just vanilla 75mms (regardless of the angle).
So, for the problem you presented, the key is to use the Fireflies carefully, stalking particular, spotted targets from behind cover, then repositioning/hiding again after a kill. They should do the killing, but they will need help from your other stuff to live long enough to do the job. In the form of bait, distractions, threats to the flanks from 75mms, smoke rounds, whatever it takes.
Expect to lose some of those "helpers". You will succeed anyway if you keep the Fireflies alive and working. If you lose a Firefly every time you go for a shot, you will probably run out of them before the other guy runs out of Tigers, and lose. If the Fireflies are get killed, you can try using your remaining vehicles as bait to draw the Tigers past PIATs or something, but don't try to tackle them directly.
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While I agree with Andrew about green troops for realism, I don't agree that the issue is spreading MG firepower thinner, among a greater number of targets.
One, MGs will change targets if the AI picks them, instead of having one designated by the player. They usually don't switch until the target goes to ground, but they do prefer men up or firing, as well as close ones.
Two, the issue is definitely that little is done to the units fired at. It is not like every shot badly hurts the target but the MG then "overkills" it, letting others go. The ones shot at are often fine. Spreading the already low effect over more units will not do the trick.
Part of the issue is rush behavior, in the form of set reactions to being fired at in any ground that is open. The initial response of a moving unit to such fire is to accelerate to a run. If the morale state is green, that is all that will happen. If the morale state is pushed up to yellow, then the unit will often change its destination to the nearest non-open ground tile and run for the (lower unit qualities especially). If the morale state gets to red, then the unit voids its orders and runs, but often in the wrong direction, trying to avoid fire but usually badly.
One annoying minor thing, not related to the MG firepower problem, is that units in an open ground tile will often react that way, even if stationary or if they do have some form of cover. Walls aren't used properly. Going to a crawl might mean no exposure at all, but units will still run as though naked. Hedges likewise, and craters/foxholes in open ground are abandoned far too easily. Similarly, a unit in open ground behind a ridge often has great cover available by backing up slightly, but with shot in open ground the unit will often run for scattered trees that are more, not less, exposed.
This undoubtedly all has to do with the "seek cover" routine not knowing LOS considerations from baked beans. Admittedly, this a hard programming problem to solve perfectly. But it would be nice if the routine could ask "if I go to heads-down/crawling right here, how exposed will I be to that shooter?" - and if it treated foxholes and craters as adequate cover, regardless of the tile type.
I think a more realistic rush behavior would be to go to ground if the morale state hits yellow. Meaning, reduce the movement rate, instead of increasing it. The path should be cleared and the destination changed to the nearest cover too.
Right now, higher quality troops will run to their listed waypoint - or even divert to charge directly at their shooter - even while "shaken", which I think is far more aggressive than realistic combat behavior. Regardless of what training tries to teach about ambushes, the overwhelmingly dominant reaction to heavy fire (which a yellow morale state should track) is to go to ground.
The "accelerate to run" or "charge the shooter" behaviors might be restricted to green morale results, like "alerted". BTS has already said they will be revising such rush behavior issues for CM2, of course.
There still is an issue about not enough men being hit during hazardous movement, especially at range. I don't mean Somme massacres; I am not calling for 1 MG to kill 3-5 men per shot. More like, running in open, multiply exposed % by 1.5, moving in open, multiply it by 1.25.
Then just going to a crawl (which incidentally ought to be faster, closer to the speed of "sneak", to represent a high crawl rather than a low crawl) would provide some protection. The current level of firepower per unit time would be quite believable for troops high-crawling in moderate-length grass.
Personally, I'd like to see a more systematic tie between % exposed and movement state, but a few ad hoc changes could tweak the current system without much revision.
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The allies need it, because a tank with weak armor and a gun only as powerful as the standard 75 on all the German beasties (the 76mm) costs 150+ points, while the Germans get thick front armor and the same gun for 100 pts, plus or minus 20 (Jadgpanzer or Hezter). Also, just as a bit of trivia related to one of the side comments, the Germans didn't have much armor left in the west by August '44.
If you want a realistic German panzer division force, built around full, turreted tanks, take the "armor" force type. That's what the thing is for. And use the same for a US or British armored division force. The combined arms force type is meant to show AFV supported infantry forces, which for the Allies means a few medium tanks or TDs, and for the Germans meant a few assault guns or self-propelled guns of one type or another.
Tigers and Panthers and Panzer IVs were with the Panzer divisions and used in quantity, as many tank platoons as infantry platoons, or not more than twice as many infantry ones. That is not what a combined arms force type is.
On the Allied side, each infantry division often had a battalion of tanks or TDs, or both, supporting the infantry, and that is what the combined arms force type is meant for. But armor division forces would have mostly armored vehicles, roughly 1/3rd Shermans, 1/3 halftracks carrying armored infantry, and 1/3rd everything else - light tanks, armored cars, TDs, assault guns, etc. In CM terms that means most of the force spent on "armor", a fair amount on "vehicles", and modest amounts on "infantry" and "artillery". Which is the armor force type.
Also, there is no reason to restrict fights to symmetrical forces. An armor attacker can hit an infantry defense, or a mechanized recon force have a meeting engagement with a combined arms force, etc. If you are worried about play balance, just play the same settings twice (not map or forces, let those change for variety), and switch sides the second time.
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Numerous issues here. First, Capt. seems to doubt whether I understand what he is trying to focus on, and because of it, the relevance of overall loss data. I am well aware that he is trying to get a handle on "mad minute", worst case MG firepower, but that does not suffice to make the overall loss data irrelevant. Their relevance is that they -constrain- possible solutions to peak MG firepower changes. Simply put, making changes to fix the "mad minute" (upward) have to be done carefully, or they will push the already sky-high overall loss rate through the ceiling. Linear, across the board increases in MG firepower will not work.
I quite agree with Capt that highest losses to MG fire would regularly be above the loss rates seen in CM. In case anybody forgot, I suggested several changes to address that issue, quite some time ago and again in this thread. My preferred solution is higher exposure numbers / lower cover for moving units, especially rapidly moving units. I have also suggested "rush" behavior changes, like going to ground rather than accelerating when under fire, "hot MG" ROF increases tied to target exposure, etc. What I do not support is across the board increases in MG firepower, because they will break the other end of the loss relationship, total losses in 30 minutes.
Then there is the issue that Capt says what he is trying to model is the first minute of the Somme. There are numerous problems with this, which I will address here at length. To start with it ought to go without saying, but apparently doesn't, that the first minute of the Somme is not the usual case of MGs firing at infantry in the open. To me it is yet another example of the ever present disease I have encountered among knowledgeable grognards on this board, the phenomenon of "averaging up". The peak performance of any weapon or match up is thought of as the norm, and modeling is demanded based on this notion.
The battle of the Somme did not last 45 seconds and involved rather more than two MG bunkers. It lasted 140 days, and 6/7 British casualties in the battle occurred after the first day. 27 British divisions were involved in the attack. During the 139 days after the first, the loss per division per day averaged around 100 men, a figure lower than those already presented here for US divisions attacking toward St. Lo in Normandy in July '44, though still heavy fighting obviously.
During the first day, of course British losses were much higher. In fact they were about the highest in recorded history (though a few early gunpowder era battles, like Leipzig, might be higher). The average losses in the attacking British divisions were as high as the losses on Omaha beach in WW II, and the worst hit division at the Somme lost as much as both divisions on Omaha combined. It was as bad, on a much larger scale and with a higher ratio of force to space. But this did not happen in 45 seconds, either, and was not caused by two MG bunkers.
The German forces holding the sector attacked amounted to 16 divisions, each with a frontage of about 2 kilometers. The frontage of attacking divisions was more like 1 kilometer. A CM map that we fight company or sometimes battalion actions on, was packed with an entire division. No man's land was not 100 yards wide, but between 250 and 600 yards. In some cases following waves of the British attack forces had to walk 3 km to reach the forward German trench. The Germans had three main lines of trenches in addition to various traverses and pillboxes, anchored on fortified ruined villages and hilltop redoubts; the whole defended zone was up to 5 km deep.
Some British formations were already out of their trenches in no man's land. Most of the others that went over the top in the first wave were well into NML before the first MG fire hit them, because the German MG teams had to climb out of their deep dugouts after the end of the barrage, "racing to the parapet" as it was later called. The quite accurate memories of battalions being hit by MG fire the instant they went "up", were about follow on waves sent in in spots the first wave had accomplished nothing, with the defenses already manned - or delayed jump offs in a few cases.
The attackers advanced 400 to 1000 yards in places, despite the losses, but failed catastrophically wherever they encountered uncut wire, which they did in many places. The hardest hit division penetrated 900 yards to the second line of German defenses, was there isolated by barrage fire behind them, hit by flanking MG fire for hours because of the failure of the units on their flanks, and was then reduced by counterattacks up the traverse trenches. Remnants pulled back that night. That division lost 5500 men, but all day, not in 45 seconds.
The French, attacking on the right at the same time, were already using the open "skirmish" tactics of small groups using all available cover, which they had learned at Verdun. These became standard in all armies in the course of WW I - long before the late war German "strosstruppen" inflitration tactics, which were additional refinements beyond the basic one of advancing in squad packets, rather than company waves. The French took nothing like the losses the Brits did, and advanced 2-4 km on the first day.
Overall, British losses were 7 times those of the Germans. The Germans were not defending the 34 km frontage with scattered MG teams alone. Their defending divisions lost an average of 500 men each that day, high by the standards of WW II, or indeed by the standards of the rest of the campaign.
At the front, the manpower odds may have been 4 or 5 to 1 for the early stages, as the Germans were deployed in depth - but it was not 12 MG gunners against a 730 man battalion. The Germans had 2 MGs per platoon, less than in WW II, but heavier tripod mounted and water-cooled pieces. Many of them fired 20,000 rounds apiece beating back the morning attacks.
The Brits attacked in waves. The force to space was much higher than anything you are used to from CM. A Brit battalion of that era had 730 men at TOE, and Brit division ("square" rather than "triangular" in layout) put up to 10 battalions apiece into the attack. The "teeth to tail" ratio was much higher than in WW II - meaning, far more of the men in the division were in the infantry as front line riflemen.
If you want to see what such an attack looks like in CM, then you'd simulate a battalion with a CM Brit battalion, 2 added companies, an additional engineer platoon, and a couple Vickers MGs and 3" mortars. All the troops should be "green" - this was the first offensive use of "Kitchener's army", the new draftee force. Delete the PIATs and reduce the 2" mortars to 1 per company, traveling with the company HQ.
Put two companies abreast plus an engineer platoon on a frontage of about 440 yards, then put another two companies and engineer platoon behind them as the second wave, and another two companies behind them with the MGs and 3" mortars and battalion HQ. Then group move, not run, the whole way toward the German position in one straight line. As units take fire they will speed up or drop out; rally them with the company HQs.
The opposing German force should be about company strength, plus added HMG teams and MG log bunkers, and plenty of uncut wire. They should be regular quality, and if you want to simulate what the MG teams really did, use a 25% fanaticism setting as well. In overall men, the Brits should have 4-5 to 1. In CM points, they should have about 3:1 for fighting units alone, but only 2:1 when fortification points are included (wire and log bunkers).
Turn every building on the map into rubble and every wood or tall pine tile into scattered trees, to show the effects of the bombardment. Simulate trench lines by using stone walls, with one the vertical length of the board 100 yards from the west edge for the Brits to start behind, and two or three full lines of them, each around 400 yards apart and the first 400 yards from the British one, for the Germans to hide behind. (By hiding you can get full cover behind them, at the cost of not shooting).
The Germans should have all the hills, most of the rubble, and their choice of trench lines to conform with what scattered trees there are. Use farmland, light woods, small hills for the terrain type. Give the Brits 30 minutes, and the Germans at least enough wire to cover half the frontage.
If you want a smaller simulation, use a strip only 240 yards wide by 880 yards deep, and give the Brits green two companies with 2 2" mortars and no PIATs, 1 Vickers MG, and give the Germans one platoon plus 2 HMG teams and a sharpshooter. Give the Brits only about 15 minutes. This will simulate a single wave.
I have run several such simulations. In the one wave case, I let the AI command the Brits to simulate how uncoordinated and straight-ahead the attacks actually were. The result I got with 95 Brits down to 9 Germans, after 15 minutes, and a total German victory. 2 panicked Brits from a platoon HQ were still alive past the wire; no one had reached or crossed the first trench line.
Some others had made it past the wire but broke afterward, some ran off the map edges. 24 Brits were in "OK" morale state, and every one of them was rattled (!). The two German HMGs had lost 5 (immobile) and 2 men respectively and had 6 ammo left between them. All the squads were "low", with only two men hit in one of them. The platoon HQ had 7 shots left and the sharpshooter was out. With how clumped the Brits were under AI direction (to avoid open fire zones), one barrage would have ended it.
In another fight, I gave the Germans only 6 HMG teams and 2 HQs, and no much wire, while the Brits had two companies plus 2 Vickers MGs. I let the Brits keep all 6 2" mortars in this one. I commanded the Brits this time, after setting up the Germans in a two tiered defense (fields of fire of second tier reach to just ahead of the first positions), without "trench" walls to help. Most of them were in rubble, a couple in foxholes in scattered trees on a hill near one edge of the map. In this case, the map was large - a mile deep by 440 yards wide. The idea was to simulate just a few determined MG teams among the rubble.
After 15 minutes in that one, the Brits had 2 platoons shot to pieces, with only a few men down in the other four but around 1/3rd of the remainder rattled. Overall, losses were 33%, broken units another 17%, leaving half effective. Those had varying levels of ammo remaining, some 3/4, some 1/3rd; all the mortars were dry though. The German hill position had beaten off all attacks but run out of ammo in the process, and one of its MGs was down to 2 men who were panicked. The other gun had all 6 men but only 8 shots remaining; the HQ there was fine. The other MG in the forward position was wiped out. The three in the "2nd tier" were untouched, having expended around 30 shots between them.
Realistically, the Brits would have stopped to reorganize at that point. With 4 platoons left and most of the men in them functioning, they could have pressed on the next half-mile to the second tier of the defense. But the Germans would not have been idle, and all that hill that held out needed was an ammo run, maybe a few extra defenders, to remain a thorn in the Brit's side. They hadn't really made it through the whole of the 1st line, and they took 1/3rd losses.
Green troops and 15 minutes are not veteran troops and 45 seconds. It is certainly true that realistic HMGs would have hit more men in 1 minute than I saw them hit. But it is also true that 139/140 days of fighting at the Somme saw still green British troops lose only 100 men per division per day - when mad minute modeling (3M) might make that the inevitable casualty toll for moving into the open at all, for one company.
I realize why Capt wants 3M. He wants unhistorical tactics to not be used for historically accurate reasons. He realizes that Somme style losses are exceptional, and does not want to see them in CM games, where indeed they would be quite out of place and unrealistic for the tactics later used. But he thinks the reason such losses did not occur after the 1st of July 1916 is because nobody ever again group-moved swarms of infantry into LOS of unsuppressed MG teams - except perhaps at Normandy (and similar cases) where the nature of the operation and terrain gave no choice in the matter.
Personally, I consider that doubtful. I think there have probably been plenty of cases since the 1st day of the Somme where infantry walked into MG fire zones - without taking Somme-like losses. Why the difference? First and foremost, because the force to space wasn't so high, and second and multiplying the effect of the first, because the men fired on went to ground rapidly and worked forward much more carefully.
My thesis about what was truly exceptional about 1 July 1916 is that such a group of men never did the like again. I don't mean just any men attacking MGs; I think that -has- happened, but not with such results. The men of the Kitchener army before it had been blooded went forward with a recklessness that has not been equaled since.
You have to be that green to go in so dumb, and you have to be that trusting of the plan and the officers around you (or that brave) to keep walking upright and forward under such fire. The combination of that green and that brave (or docile to leadership for that matter) was rare, and exceptional. Because experience teaches caution on the one hand, and the some degree of experience is usually needed to avoid panic. Vets wouldn't be so stupid. Raw recruits wouldn't be so brave.
Leaving aside the interesting historical issues of the Somme proper, I reiterate the main point I am driving at with my suggestions on the one hand and the information on average losses vs. CM losses on the other. I can see valid reasons to increase the firepower of MGs in short periods of fire against exposed, moving troops, in the open. But increases in the effectiveness of MGs against that specific kind of target have to be carefully done, and narrowly tailored to that case, to avoid excessively high casualties over the long run, including all other cases.
As a design matter, that means solutions have to focus not on across the board firepower or shot resolution changes, but on the distinctive marker of the case Capt is concerned about. Which is "hazardous movement", moving too rapidly to use small bits of cover, through ground open enough for MGs to play fire lanes across it, for moderately long periods (not snapshots of a few seconds, etc).
There are already CM markers for that case, it seems to me. % exposed, and movement rate. To increase the loss rate from fire in those cases only, without doing so in other cases, is thus the design problem. There are obvious ways to do so, that have already been suggested numerous times (go to ground on a "pin" result instead of accelerate to run; increase MG ROF against high % exposed targets; link % exposed to movement state; etc). In my opinion, it can be done without the micro-management workload of "fire lanes". In my opinion, it should not be addressed by any across the board fire effectiveness increase.
In the meantime, I also continue to recommend use of green-regular rather than regular-veteran as the accepted or default level of unit quality. Green troops give reactions to fire, especially taken in the mass, that seem to me far more realistic than that displayed by veterans. The excellent CM command delay system is also masked by use of vet troops, who typically render the delays so trivial they do not make a difference in plans. A middling morale result is not trivial for green troops, as it can push the reaction time for new orders to 2 minutes.
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The light mortars (other than the British 3", which is more like a stationary gun position) all have one serious problem - not enough ammo. If you take a US airborne additional 60mm you get a larger ammo load for a few more points - which is worth it. Otherwise, you get about 3 minutes of fire. With regulars, only about 1/3rd of the rounds will land close enough to a point target to hurt it, though a deeper grouped target (front to back along the line of fire) can make 1/2 to 2/3rds of the shells fired useful. You can get another round of smoke out of them.
Because of their limited "wind", the light mortars are best at one task - suppressing higher value, relatively fragile shooters. Field guns and HMG teams are the most common cases. Targeting AT team or FOs also works, but since they move around more you are less likely to get the shots.
Against targets in buildings they will generally prove ineffective, however. Tree cover is the right thing to shoot at. Avoid targeting regular squads unless there is a lot at stake tactically, or you doubt you will get a better target. Being larger, they are more resilient in morale terms after losing 1-3 men, which is all you can expect a light mortar to do. A small team can be panicked or broken by such losses, but squads generally only pin, and recover quickly.
Enemy light mortars are only worth firing at if you catch them moving in the open. In that case, unable to fire back, they will often abandon the mortar to run. If set up in cover, though, they are probably already firing, and will take themselves out of the battle on their own in a couple of minutes, without any firepower needed on your part - because their ammo will be gone. You are better off trying to suppress or break something that will be a threat longer.
One light mortar will generally have to fire off its whole ammo load to suppress one point target. 81mm versions are a bit better in this regard, with their larger shells. They will sometimes break a target in one turn. As soon as you see the target cowering on the ground, find another target(unless tactically, this is the only priority, etc) - you aren't likely to do more than that with the additional rounds.
An alternative to firing one mortar for its whole ammo load is to fire 2-3 of them for 1-2 turns. This is faster and more certain to get the result, but can wind up spending more ammo to get that first "head down" result. Note that closer range does improve mortar accuracy, so shots from 125 yards are more likely to land close than ones at 400 yards. But the gains in accuracy once already under ~250 yards are minimal. If you want greater accuracy, take higher unit quality rather than trying to work them much closer.
Organizationally, the Brit 2" mortar can travel with the platoons, since it has fast speed and even more important, no minimum range. It is also not worth using up the company HQ (the Brit's only "free" HQ, typically) to do nothing but babysit weak mortars that have only a few minutes of fire. One other Brit trick is to target a single nearby defended building with "area fire" from all available 2" mortars and PIATs, to destroy the building or ignite it (especially if already "*" damaged from heavier weapons). This assumes you can burn the ammo, but it can be effective.
60mm and 81mm are slower and need to be 100m from the target, making them overwatch weapons. You can use them either with an overwatching infantry platoon (more on that below), or with a weapons or company HQ "fire support element" (FSE for short). In either case their tactical role is the same - to suppress enemy gun crews and HMG teams.
The 81mm is slow enough on foot that you should either set it up where it is going to fire, or move it to its firing position by vehicle. Note that an 81mm mortar cannot ride on the back of a tank - the transport class of a tank is too low.
60mm mortars have medium speed, the same as US MMGs. That is fast enough to lag a minute behind an infantry platoon but basically maneuver with it. Since US infantry has good ranged firepower as it is, and often wants to avoid ranges under 100 meters to avoid SMGs anyway, regular infantry, MMGs, and 60mm mortars "go together" reasonably well.
I like to use an "overwatch" platoon (sometimes two) with an American company force. Use both MMGs together, as alone they do not have enough firepower. Use an HQ with your best combat rating, and if possible a command bonus as well (to handle so many teams). Then they stand off at 150-250 meters and blast. Keep a sharp eye out for enemy barrages, though, and bug out or shift positions if you see spotting rounds.
An overwatch infantry platoon can have 0-2 mortars, depending on the use you have for it, how much maneuvering it will have to do, available early fields of view, etc. Another trick here is to send the weapons HQ along, to command the MMGs and mortars when the regular infantry moves out. The teams pass from the infantry to the weapons HQ and back again as the need arises.
The alternative use is an FSE, based either around the weapons HQ or the company HQ. Give it 2 mortars, sometimes the 50 cal (also slow and limited ammo, and with enough range you don't need to close), and FOs or sharpshooters if you like. You can also split these with company HQ+50cal+1 60mm as one FSE, and weapons HQ+2 mortars as another.
Many German company types have 4 HMGs and 2 81mm mortars, and a weapons HQ. All the weapons teams are slow speed, but pack a good punch at range. A useful "tasking" of these support elements is to divide them into two mini FSEs, one under the weapons platoon HQ, the other under the company HQ. Each with 2 HMG and 1 81mm mortar. They will fit on 2 vehicles, though one can't be a tank (to hold the mortar).
Set up the HMGs spread to the limits of command range, with the HQ in the middle spotting for the mortar behind it, and staying hidden whenever possible. The HMGs can engage enemy infantry, and the mortar can suppress any enemy MGs that try to duel with them. Another division of labor between them is the HMGs do open ground (and brush, and scattered trees), while the mortar can handle woods. When needed, it can also smoke an enemy tank or what not, to give an HMG time to relocate to a safer spot.
[ 08-05-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]
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Ariel's data fit very well with the figures already presented. Losses in 217 actions, with advances of around 600 yards per hour (plus or minus 200) against "heavy" opposition rather than light, averaged 17 per company in 1 hour fights and 24 per company in 3 hour fights. The highest figures out of 217 were 32 per company in 1 hour and 57 per company in 3 hours. Some involved single company advances, some full battalions. Figures for slight opposition have one digit.
One would therefore expect heavy opposition to generate losses on the order of 60 per battalion facing it, light opposition around 10-20. 150 to 250 for an attacking division in a day fits, with 2-4 out of 4-6 up battalions hitting heavy oppposition, 0-4 hitting light. Checks with the division level figures for heavy action. The overall war-long average then includes some static periods, lots of light opposition, and a moderate amount of heavy opposition (say about half the front, half the time, etc).
CM battalion level fights of one hour do not typically involve only 50 casualties on a side, but by the data given that was fairly typical for advances against serious opposition.
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"this is all averaged out over a variety of types of combat."
The fight forward to St Lo was slogging frontal attacks through thick hedgerow country against determined defenders. The divisions involved attacked every day for two weeks with 4-6 battalions "up", sometimes more, as I have said. The attacked daily and measured their gains in hundreds of yards. The attackers had an important edge in weight of artillery support. The result was division wide losses between 135 and 265 per day, for both attackers and defenders. It is mathematically impossible to reconcile those facts with the idea that a *typical* battalion attack involved 50% losses in half an hour.
"The numbers are interesting but essentially meaningless"
They are not meaningless, and they are also not even outliers, unlike the anecdotal evidence you prefer to cite. With dozens of battalions fighting for hundreds of days, you take the worst you can find and pretend it was typical. That is the shoddiest type of statistical ignorance. The averages are much lower, and some occasions - such as less intense fighting - have to be well lower than the average for that to be the case. The average is not 250 either - that is a high figure for heavy offensive fighting. The average for all kinds of warfare - your patrolling and static included, etc - is only 50 per division per day. Including plenty of days "25 and under" to balance the heavier 150-250 range losses for heavy fighting.
"suffered 325 casualties among their rifle companies at Verrieres Ridge - the worst day for the Canadian Army since Dieppe and admittedly atypical"
So, it is so extremely relevant because? Because it is an outlier, the worst you can think of out of dozens of battalions over hundreds of days. You might as well call US 29th Infantry's losses on Omaha beach typical. Which would be silly, not to mention insulting. The reason historians cite the outliers is to give a sense of the worst things sometimes got, to impress upon readers what the participants faced.
But there were participants. For numerous battles in a row. The war was not over in 5 weeks with almost everyone involved a casualty. All you have to do to see how impossible the idea that such losses were typical is, is to assume that really is what usually happened in a day's attack, and deduce the consequences. No one would be left, or attacks could not occur daily, but only once in a blue moon.
"many battalion level battles inflicted casualties on this order"
"Many" is a wonderful word. It means more than three. In that sense, the statement is certainly accurate. But the average or typical battalion level fight did not inflict losses of that order. On the whole front, there were hundreds of battalions engaged for hundreds of days, and spent a significant portion of them attacking or defending, actively, sometimes for more than 30 minutes, too. "More than three" out of thousands or tens of thousands, does not rise to "typical".
"If a 10,000 man division loses 250 men in a day, that may not seem like much"
That is because you haven't paid much attention to the math I already presented. It sure does "seem like much", and in fact it is on the high end of results for divisions attacking, in heavy, sustained combat. It is five times the average for US infantry divisions for the whole war. Between that, and half of that, was common for heavy fighting periods, rather than "patroling, static warfare, unopposed advances", etc. And as I already showed, losses at that rate will reduce a division quite rapidly, over a period of a month or two, unless it receives a large stream of replacements continually. 250 times 30 is 7500, which is high losses indeed, for one division in one month. In fact, it would turn over the men in the front line companies more than once. Recall that infantry divisions only turned over their entire personnel twice in the entire campaign in the west.
"if all 250 men come from a single engaged battalion"
But they don't. They come from the division, not one battalion. Which has 4-6 battalions fighting in the front line, in addition to lighter losses scattered through its rear area units from artillery fire, modest losses to other arms besides the infantry, etc. If every battalion in the front line were taking those losses in every attack, the divisional total would be five times as high. But it flat isn't.
The losses in the real deal were lower than they typically are in CM because the real participants did not mash into one another as recklessly as players push their cyber warriors together, first and foremost. One can also deduce from this, however, that it is not the case that CM firepowers are ridiculously low by historical standards. As the entire thread has dicussed, there may be extremes of exposure that CM depicts as less bloody than they would be, but over whole fights CM combat is certainly not less bloody than the real deal.
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Well spook, if you will go back and look, I think you will find that subject was the exact matter discussed in my prior post. The game design issue is that what an MG would generally do in 30 minutes was not 30 times what it might do in 1 minute. It was much less.
But that means you need two things in combination - one, some averaging or trade-off balance between getting the fp per shot right, and getting the fp over a whole game right. And two, some factors that drive apart the amount that a "best minute" can do, compared to an average minute, thus less good minutes of fire.
I gave examples of the second sort of factor, some already available, some possibilities for CM2 tweaks. Changes in % exposed numbers, relating those to movement state, varying ROF by % exposed number, lower morale so units break and avoid LOS sooner, etc.
But if people recognize the general issue, they can also be realistic in their expectations, and see that some of the first - averaging - is going to be involved too. In general, if the game conditions are about the same, 10 MG shots are going to do around 10 times what one shot does. Just from game mechanics.
To keep that from being too high on the many-shot end, and thus from causing excessive losses in other, less ideal situations for MG shots, that is going to mean something a bit low on the one-shot end, if you are thinking of best case, most effective shots and running men in the open, close by.
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Average losses were obviously lower than the anecdotal worst case of a particular formation in a particularly expensive attack. Units did not regularly take 50% losses in a single day's action (let alone 30 minutes), for the obvious reason that they would not exist after doing that a few times - they'd be gone inside a week.
Detailed statistics are available for some longer time scales, that give an idea of overall loss rates. The average losses per day in combat for a US infantry division in the ETO was around 50 men. There are a few outliers - a handful of divisions that didn't reach the front until 45 have averages lower than 25, and one, the 106th, was badly smashed in the Ardennes offensive shortly after going into the line, and has a higher average, 130 per day. Most are between 25 and 70. Some of that may reflect spells out of the line, and of course two up, on back formations were also standard, within the divisions, so that may reflect the losses of four battalions, 3/4ths of the time. Around 15 men per up battalion per day.
That reflects plenty of quiet periods and exploitation moves, however. In heavy action, the same figure is a typical average for a unit one step lower on the organizational scale, and in the heaviest fighting it might be twice that. That is, 15-30 men per front line company per day.
If you want examples, the 30th Division in the St Lo fighting lost 3934 battle losses in 15 days, or 262 per day. Over that period it cycled its regiments and companies, obviously, and also took replacements regularly. It was fighting with 4-6 battalions up regularly, sometimes 8 with reserves committed, for brief periods. That is 44-66 men per front battalion per day, or 15-22 per company. That would be 11% at TOE, but they were regularly somewhat below it for the second half of the period, but above 50% (they rotated out for replacements, etc). The 35th division in the same period averaged 162 per day, somewhat lower.
If you look at the German defenders, you find similar results in men per day. After losing 1200 men on D-Day, the 352nd division averaged about 250 per day for the next 2 1/2 weeks, and 150 per day for the 2 1/2 weeks after that, already down to about half strength. Rear area troops were being cycled forward to replace infantry losses by then. The 3rd FJ averaged 135 men lost per day in its first month in combat, with lighter fighting in the first half of that (after a few heavy days), heavy fighting in the second half of it.
You see anecdotal reports of higher loss rates for particular smaller formations, used by staff to illustrate losses by their "outliers". Thus, the U.S. staff history of the 2 week push to St. Lo records two seperate occasions on which a unit took 2/3rds losses in one affair, in both cases by being hit with mortars. These are described as "disasters". But both were platoons. Or you read about a German battalion that took 50% losses in 3 days - which is 20% per day - mentioned as an outlier, the worst off unit in the division. This is on a sector of the front where the US was expending 20,000 rounds of arty per day, on a corps wide front.
Of course, these average losses are made up of some days of light action, some days in which particular sub-units get mauled while others are relatively unscathed, some days without any serious opposition, others with multiple combats longer than 30 minutes, or under sustained shelling outside the scale of CM battles. But it gives an idea of the resiliency of WW II infantry units, and of their gradual reduction by attrition if not receiving regular replacements in quantity, if in heavy action.
Even 5% losses repeated every day for a month, if no replacements are received, will reduce a unit to 1/5th its original strength. The same will happen if a unit takes 15% losses in more intense fights twice a week for five weeks, with local inaction, or other units rotated forward to bear the brunt at other times. If the loss rate per day for the whole formation (rear area troops included) gets much above 2.5%, the unit cannot sustain the pace for more than about one month, without regular infusions of new men. The front line units are taking more than there share of that kind of average, but they will be well above that even moderately sustainable rate if they average more than 20% losses in every local fight.
Of course, that did happen to some units. They were reinforced, relieved, or destroyed if they could not get either sort of help. But you do not find 3 US infantry divisions running into 2 German ones (one understrength, say, to give more than 2:1 odds), and wiping all of them out 3 days - let alone in three 30 minute actions, as you might easily imagine from CM-scale fights.
[ 08-04-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]
In the search for facts and numbers
in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Posted
Lewis's site with all the different sources, showing the range, is vey interesting. It would be fun to investigate the definitions used for all the different numbers - battle / non battle, yada yada. The range is impressive in some cases, and probably would remain nearly as wide for some countries even if the definitions behind the categories could be sorted out.
On Lewis' disbelief about 100K+ US losses from non-battle causes, that is perfectly believeable to me. The US had up to 10m men mobilized at the peak, and several years a bit below that. So that non-battle loss rate is a fraction of 1% per year.
What causes are included in that total? Lewis guessed traffic accidents, and training. But it also includes disease, including malaria and yellow fever from the south Pacific to the Philipines. I know anecdotally that only about 1/3rd of the personnel that served on Quadalcanal escaped incapacitation by disease over the ~6 months of that battle, and far more fell there through disease than through Japanese military action. The figure probably also include deaths of US PWs held by the Japanese, up to 2/3rds of whom died (vs. only about 1% in German captivity).
Then there are ships lost at sea in storms, or in collisions (there were a few), or men overboard; plane crashes among hundreds of thousands of planes flying daily for years; disease and exposure in European winter in the open, complications of frostbite and trenchfoot like gangrene; Lewis' training accidents, certainly his traffic, ammo handling incidents, etc. In addition, some portion of the men in service, even after selection for fitness, undoubtedly died from natural causes while in service - heart disease, cancer, etc. Also some suicides and murders.
I decided to get a little perspective on the rates of such things, so I looked up the following stat at the CDC, which keeps numbers on leading causes of death in the US. I asked for data for a 4 year period, using 1981-1984 because it was the start of their detailed series, for men age 18 to 45. The 10 leading causes accounted for 460K deaths in that period - but of course, that is out of the whole US male population that age. The causes were accidents 137K, heart disease 53K, murder 48K, suicide 48K, cancer 42K, then smaller numbers for liver disease, stroke, flu and pneumonia, diabetes and birth defects. The big 5 were 9/10ths of the total.
Now, the US population was around 230m in those years, vs. 135m in WWII. In those years you'd expect about 57.5m males in the age group describe (about 1/4 of the population). 460K out of 57m is 0.8%, over four years, or 1/500 chance per person per year.
If you apply the same rate to peak US military personnel you'd expect 80K deaths. Mobilized manpower wasn't always at the peak, though. Overall, the death rate from non-battle causes might have been twice the later peace-time level. A smaller portion would have come from murder, and some causes would have been filtered out by medical screening. But tropical diseases and captivity would account for some, and then the accident rate would have to be higher for men flying planes, sailing ships, and driving vehicles all over creation continually.
I'll address the other fellow's questions in another post.