[An MG study: Is there a problem here?]

There is a very basic problem in this sort of analysis and the question it implicitly raises as a game design issue, that no one has noticed or mentioned yet. The real simulation problem is that the effective firepower of MGs in real life - or other small arms for that matter - are not constant, and do not add up linearly over time. But the game treats them as such, and therefore its hit rates must be average figures for a variety of situations, only one of which is actually occuring in this test attempt.

What happens in real life is a few shots may be directed at quite exposed men, but soon after those have their effect, small bits of cover, going to ground, and changes of route break up LOS between the few identified firing positions and each surviving member of the attacking infantry. Subsequent periods of firing are therefore not as effective, because they tend to be directed at men exposed only from time to time and briefly. And MG ROF varies over extremes between the two situations. The max ROF of MGs is high enough to burn their entire ammo load quite rapidly, but they cannot be fired that fast for any length of time, or they run out of ammo (or overheat, or both).

But in CM - or any game that attempts to treat firepower in a relatively constant way from shot to shot - each shot by the same firing unit at enemy in the same sort of terrain must result in approximately the same average effect. One cannot then design the proper casualties per small period of complete exposure, use that as the average rate of hits, and base CM firepower off of it. If you did, what you would see is far too much *cumulative* killing by MGs, not in 30 seconds, but in 20-30 minutes.

In fact, CM combat at present is more bloody than the real thing was. Losses of 33% for the winning, and 67% or more for the losing side, are common in short battles of less than half an hour. While in reality, infantry units fought each other for hours on end in close proximity, often taking only 10-20% losses in the process.

This was first and foremost because they did not mash themselves together as aggressively as CM players do in games. And CM players, worried about winning, do not mash their troops together as hard as in this test, either, because loss of half a company to move them 200 yards is not tactically acceptable in most situations.

It is still true, as others have noted, that green and regular troops play more realistically than veterans do. Saying "vets are commonly available" is a reflection on players, and perhaps on the fact that QB settings group "regular" with them rather than with "green", but not on MG firepower.

What the test is implicitly trying to determine is the peak killing power of MGs per unit time. The tester expects that number to be accurate, without making others - like killing power over 30 minutes or 60 times as long - being off. What the test actually showed, however, was each MG bunker accounting for ~20 men per minute. I say this because the detailed explanation said the exposure time was 45 seconds, and the average men hit was in the low 30s. Add 1/3rd again to get the amount per minute, and divide by the number of MG bunkers.

Now, if that rate were sustained as an average over a whole fight, it would put down 600 men per MG bunker. Recall that the total casualties on Omaha beach over more than four hours, by nearly a division's worth of defenders, came to less than 10 times that (around 5000 actually). The number is quite sufficient to make it tactical suicide to leave large bodies of infantry perpetually in the LOS of MG bunkers while in open ground.

Notice that 20 men per bunker per minute, if only *one* bunker were firing at a time, would be enough to generate the Omaha causalty toll in a little over four hours. Not counting the mortars, the artillery, the field guns, the infantry and their LMGs, or allowing for lots more than one firing much of the time. So peak rate and sustained rate are obviously two quite different things.

As a game design matter, what can force them farther apart, and thus increase rush losses without unduly increasing sustained ones, which are on the high side as it is? Lower morale can, by causing units to break after short exposures to fire and avoid it afterward. Ammo limits can, by allowing many hits for relatively brief periods, then low rates of fire thereafter. These are possible now by using regulars and greens, and longer tests.

More variable ROF can, with rapid firing rare but possible, slower firing normal. A problem remains in that case to match up the more rapid fire periods with the proper situations, which incidentally are not obviously linked to range. And the way the way cover works, the "% exposed" numbers, can force the two apart, if occasionally they can be very high for brief periods, but usually are moderate or low.

I have suggested in the past my primary recommendation of this subject. Which is that % exposed numbers be tied to movement states. Thus a running unit would get little benefit from the lighter forms of cover, and have 90s exposure in open ground. While stationary units would not take unrealistic casualties over longer periods, because their exposure numbers would be lower.

I have also suggested that "hot MG", variable ROF behavior, be tied more to target cover state (% exposure), rather than to range. Instead of making MGs more like normal infantry, with the same sort of steeply increasing fp envelope (as rapid fire in close would tend to do), this would leave them longer ranged weapons. But I think it would accurately model their greater pinning power, rather than killing power, at range.

Because, combined with the above exposure-speed connection, it would raise losses against those who moved "recklessly" in MG LOS, while more deliberate movement might be possible (at least for modest time periods - staying too long means more shots, obviously).

At the risk of repeating myself, I return from my CM2 tweak suggestions to my main, basic point. All CM firepowers are averages over most situations the units will face when used realistically. They will give reasonably accurate overall results when infantry spends some time rushing through open, some times out of LOS, and other periods of time in decent cover.

You would not achieve that proper long-time average if you simply increased the amount done in the most exposed short periods, because the higher rate would "multiply through" to a higher overall average, unrealistically. It took more than two MG bunkers to shoot down a division in a few hours. The losses would add linearly, because CM uses discrete shots over and over and resolves each in the same way. If the game conditions are the same, the average results will be. And that already gives results that are on the high side, not the low side.

CM firepower tends to do less in a maximum minute than real combat sometimes can (though its high end is still quite high). It tends to do more in 30 minutes than real combat does. It strikes a design average, and is "off" in my opinion by relatively small proportions at each end (with randomness, incidentally, better able to handle the variation at the short-period end). The reason real life is more "skewed" (higher in 1 minute, lower in 30), is because in real life losses do not add up linearly over number of shots. Because men avoid LOS, retain better cover, do not mash against each other so forcefully - all making the periods of high hit rates, brief and exceptional.

For what it is worth...

[PBEM Numbering: how do you do it?!?!]

I always overwrite, unless an opponent insists otherwise. It is easier and keeps the PBEM folder cleaner, with less potential for wrong file confusion.

The idea that you need a backup to review the game or in case of a transmission error seems to me off the mark. You probably have copies of all the files anyway, in your email in box, as attachments And they are time stamped there, and in the order you got or sent them. If you want to save them for review, you can do so; if you need to resend or back up, likewise. Just don't clean out your inbox (or the inbox you use for PBEMs, if you have a seperate one - which I recommend) every day. Your mail program is already archiving everything you get for you, you don't have to do it twice and clutter up your, and your opponent's, PBEM folder to do so.

[TCP/IP]

What if you have a dynamic IP address, instead of a static one? Does the other fellow need to host then? Will that work? Is there any way to host if you have a dynamic IP address?

[Anti-Aircraft MG42------Where the heck is it??!]

Thousands of planes flew hundreds to low thousands of sorties per day in Nam, for the better part of 8 years, and were on the receiving end of flak thicker than that over Germany in WW II when going up north. The NVA had 100mm, 85mm, 57mm, 40mm, 37mm, 30mm, and 23mm quad radar directed AA guns, SAM-2 missles, as well as flocks of AA MGs and countless small arms. In all of that, certainly a plane or three were knocked down by 30 cal fire. But the chance that one FB would be knocked down by 1 AA MG in 2-3 passes over five minutes or less, then or in WW II, was tiny. Millions of weapons firing at thousands of targets regularly, for years on end, is not one firing at one for 30 seconds.

You'd be better off playing the lottery...

[Armor vs. Arty]

Artillery does infantry in the woods or in the open. Tank HE does infantry in buildings, and enemy armor of all types. Artillery can't hurt tanks seriously, and eventually runs out of shells - those are its major weaknesses. Tanks can't move everywhere, and die if moved too close to intact enemy infantry. Together those make reverse slope deployments of AT teams the major weakness of tanks - they can't get infantry out of such places on their own.

On defense, infantry plus artillery can do the job, but still remain somewhat vunerable to enemy arty. The idea is the infantry blocks enemy tanks with reverse slope positions, and artillery kills any infantry that comes to try to get them out. The only weakness of this combo is artillery can plaster part of your reverse slope and thus let the infantry in. If your own arty doesn't kill them, then tanks can get behind your reverse slope position too, and the whole thing unravels.

On attack, tanks plus arty can do most things, but tanks plus infantry only can't get through the sort of defense described above. Just infantry and arty trying to attack, you can't deal with defending tanks, if there are any. Tanks are pretty much required for a decent attack because of this, unless you know beforehand there won't be any defending tanks.

As for which is "better", stand alone that is easy, the tanks are better. Just put them up against each other and that much is obvious. But they do different things for a combined arms team. A good attacking team has some tanks, some infantry, some artillery - and not just light stuff like 81mm mortars.

A good defending team needs some artillery, but it can be light stuff, because it is often enough to pin and break attackers while the don't have cover. Defense without infantry is basically impossible - there are too many places you can't go, without it.

Tanks are a luxury for defenders, though they can be very useful, especially if an attacker skimps on stuff to counter them. Enough dug in guns, minefields, and TRP-directed arty can take their place in most respects, though, on defense.

This doesn't work for attackers because the guns don't move, the mines and TRPs aren't available - and because infantry AT weapons work from ambush, at short ranges made possible by reverse-slope type positions - but aren't very capable when advancing, where the defender choose the ground for his armor, etc. So defending tanks can only be countered by attacking tanks (or TDs - armor).

Every single force type, on attack or defense, has its counter. Putting all your eggs in one basket will give the enemy easy counters, if he has all the standard tools in his kit bag. His arty will work hard if you took lots of infantry, his tanks will work hard if you took lots of arty. But no one type will do what the mix can do. That is why all the types are in the mix in the first place.

[assault guns verses tanks?]

Use a "keyhole" deployment for the assault gun, instead of a position with a wide field of fire. A wide field of fire also means a wide arc of enemies firing at you, and that doesn't work well without a turret, as you found.

Instead, put the Jagd next to a building, a clump of woods, or the edge of a ridge, just peeking around one end of it. With some other obstacle (though not as close by) off on the other flank.

You sight between two obstacles, in other words, with those slightly ahead of you as well as to the sides. This creates a narrower sighting cone, called a "keyhole", perhaps 30-45 degrees wide - sometimes even narrower for long range stalking.

Point the Jagd down the center-line of this cone. It will not have far to turn to hit something. Another benefit is always presenting the front armor, since the cover blocks shots at your flanks.

Either in that case or in more open deployments, you can also try using an ambush marker to shoot only at a particular area. But if the field of fire is wide, that can be dangerous, because the vehicle typically won't react except to a target right on top of the ambush marker. It works best if you are set up "keyhole" fashion to begin with (as above), then target a particular gap through trees or what-not.

Turretless AFVs are meant to fight from ambush, using a keyhole deployment or targeting a particular gap, getting their kill, and then repositioning and doing it all over again.

Sometimes you need to hold back enemy tanks from some particular spot of ground, and thus have to stay more still to cover the approach, instead of shifting positions after each kill. In that case, it is best to use criss-crossing keyhole sight lines from several assault guns, so that enemies approaching one position from outside its sighting cone have to cross the LOS of a different gun. This also keeps both presenting their front armor, while each protects the flanks of its teammate.

I hope this helps.

[ 08-01-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[The "levelling houses" tactic]

"A problem arises though that once your enemy makes it to the cover of other buildings"

Try this. Defend inside the town with "back, down" deployments, to avoid HE leveling (a few delaying MGs excepted, perhaps). If possible, with SMGs to help win the firefight when he does get to the outer buildings. That is standard.

Then, the real trick is, have a couple infantry guns or other direct HE weapons sighted to hit the outer row of buildings from your beyond the town on your side, looking down roads or between buildings. You can also try TRPs. Blow down the buildings he occupies or HE him in the rubble if he already has.

From the back side of the town, it is usually pretty easy to find spots that can see key points in the town (with a few items to cover several points, a few each), but can't be seen by wide areas on his own side of it. Your men in the middle buildings (1) prevent a fast run through the town, (2) keep his infantry away from your gun positions, and (3) can add their fire, or mop up with a local counterattack, after the guns do their thing.

In silly ASC, a rough sketch of the idea is as follows -

enemy jump-off zone

outer buildings

inner buildings - your infantry

gun positions - sighted down streets or gaps to outer buildings

It is basically the reverse slope idea with the buildings substituted for a ridgeline...

[VG Fusiliers in CM]

Right. "W" means that five platoon positions are layed out in a checkboard formation, 3 up and 2 back in the "slots" behind them - nothing more. The men are not lined up in the "lines" of the W, any more than an "I" formation in football means three linemen holding hands across the front and back, with the other five men front to back between them, turned sideways and holding hands LOL. If it helps, you might also call it the "olympic rings symbol" formation.

You position the platoons on bits of cover in about that 3 up, 2 back formation. Typically one of the two SMG platoons on the front flank positions will curl in on a flank of a target fixed by the other two front platoons, while the overwatch platoons hang back and blast from two different angles at the same target. Always, the movements react to enemy deployments, terrain, your plan, etc.

The general idea of such a deployment is its flexibility and the orientation of its firepower. To see this, consider how it ought to react to various battlefield situations.

Imagine a threat to one of the two flanks, coming in at right angles to the original route of advance - say on the right side. The forward SMG platoon on that side does a right face and blocks the attack directly with close range FP (preferably just behind some obstacle). The rightward overwatch group does a half-right and hits the attackers from 45 left front, while also trying to prevent a deeper move around the flank with its ranged fire (preferably from some sort of hill or two-story building). The center CO position moves to its right front, ahead of the right-front SMG platoon, creating a new right-facing line. The left overwatch group moves right front and turns right, now positioned behind and between these two right-facing SMG platoons. The left front SMG platoon can block the forward direction, continue an advance that way if the counterattack is light, or be held out as a reserve. The formation thus "refuses" its right.

The overall formation has many of the characteristics of three platoons in the standard "V", in the sense of being able to turn either way or hold with one forward "hand" while turning a flank with the other. But it is broader in the center, and more "articulated". And the center "platoon", being led by the company HQ, can pick up additional squads from any of its less-pressed neighbors, or return squads to them, according to the situation.

[ 07-31-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[VG Fusiliers in CM]

VG Fusiliers in CM

Most CM players are well aware of the potential of German Volksgrenadier infantry, with their high numbers of SMGs. Less common may be use of the VG Fusiliers (VGF for short), the foot "recon" battalions of the VG infantry divisions. This post is about a sample VGF force and some of its deployment possibilities. The emphasis is on the flexibility of the force and its CM play. It is designed for 1000 point scenarios as regulars, either defending as an "infantry" force type, or in a meeting engagement or attack as a combined arms unit. The core of the force is the same in either case, but a few added weapons are different, and so are the deployments.

First the force in a meeting engagement -

1 VGF Company w/

1 75mm FO

6 Sharpshooter

2 HMG

2 81mm Mortar

+1 VGF Platoon

3 Panzerschreck

1 81mm FO

2 StuG III (late)

In a 700/1050 point attack, you can add another 75mm FO, or upgrade the 81mm to a heavier module to deal with dug in positions better (105mm or 120mm mortar).

In an infantry defense, drop the StuGs and one schreck, and add -

a 3rd HMG team

1 75mm PAK

2 20mm FLAK

3 AT Minefield

3 TRPs

1 AT mine and 1 TRP can be traded for a 3rd schreck, if desired.

The VGF platoons come in two varieties, SMG and rifle. The SMG platoons have two types of squads, two each with pure 9xSMG, and one Fusilier squad with 1 LMG, 5 SMG, and 3 K98 rifles. The rifle platoons have one Fusilier squad and two standard rifle 44 squads. So the whole force listed has 4 SMG squads, 4 Fusilier squads, and 4 rifle 44 squads - equal numbers of each. By organizing these squads properly, the force can coordinate the roles of its different platoons to meet any sort of task. The means of "tasking" is the use of the company HQ, used to command a "fifth platoon".

On the attack, a basic deployment would be a "W" formation, with three SMG-heavy platoons forward and two "overwatch" platoons trailing somewhat, between them. The flank platoons should be full strength VGF-SMG platoons with a schreck added to each. The forward center platoon is the company HQ leading the 2 Fusilier squads from the rifle platoons, plus the 3rd schreck, and 2 sharpshooters to scout ahead. The rifle platoons are in the trailing points of the W, each with an HMG, 2 sharpshooters, and a StuG. The weapons platoon HQ spots for the 2 81mm mortars. FOs can be with the rifle platoons or the mortars.

This deployment puts 63 SMGs in the forward positions. The company HQ can pick up squads from the flanking SMG platoons when needed, to shift the sectors under each platoon's command. Good infantry AT capability is also up front. The overwatch platoons have the range and variety of weapons to suppress at a distance, and the StuGs can help move their slower MGs into good firing positions. There is enough ordinary infantry with the StuGs to deal with AT teams. Naturally, the deployment must conform to terrain, the enemy, and the plan. This tasking is a good point to begin that from.

On the defense, use an "M" formation instead of a "W". The company HQ is still in the center, but back this time instead of up. Each of the three "back" platoons has an HMG and 2 sharpshooters attached for ranged fire. The company HQ "platoon" draws 2 rifle 44 squads this time, one from each of the 2 "back" platoons. This leaves the flank platoons with HMG, 2 LMG, 9 SMG, 10 rifles plus 2 sharpshooters; the company HQ "platoon" has 7 SMGs and 13 rifles instead. The 2 forward parts of the "M" are again full strength SMG platoons with a schreck attached. The company HQ can again draw squads from its neighbors or send those already taken back, to reinforce whatever part of the line needs it.

In addition, the three rear platoons can now act as the close protection for one of the guns, though you should be careful how much you put under a potential barrage footprint. The PAK in the center and the 2 FLAK on the flanks would be typical. TRPs can be located ahead of these, more or less "on line" with the SMG platoons farther forward. Ideally, the SMG platoons would be just behind a slope, with the "overwatch" and weapons back 100-200 meters or so on the front of the next ridge farther back. The idea is to sweep "your" side of the defensive position, hitting anyone crossing the ridge (or treeline, etc) not only with SMGs nearby (front or flank), but with about 2/3rds of your ranged weapons, from farther away.

In all cases, the overwatch formations try to pin a target formation, then mortar fire or light artillery lands on it, deepening the suppression and breaking some of the men. Before they have time to recover, ideally you want to run into them with the nearest SMG formation, to finish them off. The light artillery types in this force mix will not kill decent infantry in decent cover, but can suppress. And the SMGs can kill suppressed formations rapidly, if they can get at them. The SMGs should stay in tactically "hidden" deployments - reverse slope, rear lower floor of buildings, away from a treeline - until needed or until an enemy gets close. The rifle infantry, support weapons, teams, and FOs provide ranged fire before then.

The VGF company force comes with 6 sharpshooters, which may be more than most are used to buying. That comes to a platoon's worth of the critters. In raw firepower, even 6 sharpshooters are not going to equal the firepower of a platoon, but they do have their uses. Some pointers are in order about using so many sharpshooters as part of an infantry defense - what they can and can't do.

Sharpshooters cannot hold ground or stop attackers intent on charging them, regardless of how clear the ground is ahead of them. They are relatively easy to suppress once spotted, and obviously can't take causalties. And they have limited ammo - 10 shots each. But properly used, even regular quality sharpshooters will KO somewhere between their own number and twice their number, and pin or break far more than their number, sometimes for significant periods. And they can do that without all getting killed if played right. In addition, they can provide valuable spotting intel about the enemy force, its movements, etc. They can also provide confusion, because the enemy sees more "infantry?" markers than you have full squads, in a given area.

Avoid the temptation to sacrifice sharpshooters as "expendable" because they are only one guy. After taking any kind of incoming fire, change their position, and come back for another shot a few minutes later. Do not try to force them to accomplish some overall plan for you, or charge them too close to the enemy. Instead, keep them alive, distant and hidden when possible, and take shots when you ID important or vunerable targets. Work them to get their shots and stay alive, not to help the plan. You will get more intel out of them; you are more likely to get off all of their 10 shots, and thus get hits; and you aren't as likely to lose them and thus give the enemy VPs.

Note that crew served weapons moving across open ground are particularly vunerable to sharpshooters. This is because (1) their morale is lowered for inability to fire back while moving, and (2) they can't just go to ground in the open, (3) they are exposed for longer than other units because of their slower speed, and (4), because much of the effect of sharpshooters is the pinning effect of being sniped at - the morale - not men hit directly. Other types vunerable to sharpshooters are teams with high value and few men. FOs are the best target, flamethrower or AT teams aren't bad, and shooting HQs can help considerably if they break. Exposed crew of vehicles are also a useful target. The worst target is an ordinary squad in cover. Those shots are not worth taking, because the reply is much more likely to be effective than your own shot.

The VGF are a fun force type to play. They are not any sort of gamey optimum (they don't have more LMGs than Rambo, yada yada), but they have an assortment of specialized tools to handle each sort of job you may face. For those who know what wrench will work for each battlefield situation, getting them to coordinate well can be quite satisfying. Learning to use them can teach you a lot about the variety of infantry types and tactics in CM.

I hope this is interesting.

[Anti-Aircraft MG42------Where the heck is it??!]

A lone 7.92mm MG is extremely unlikely to harm a fighterbomber seriously. Typhoons and Thunderbolts are quite rugged aircraft, and many of them sustained multiple 20mm hits without going down. Enough mass of ~30 cal fire from small arms might discourage repeat passes, but that is about it - the chance of it bringing down the plane would be very low.

[stopping the infantry "rush"]

In my experience, the best defense against a concentrated infantry rush is an unsuppressable, area-effect counter. Artillery FOs can do it, and AP mines also work provided they are in a continuous belt (6-10 individual tiles long). The key things helping both are (1) they do more damage when more men run through the same area, not less, and (2) the attacking infantry can't suppress them no matter how close they get. Ordinary shooters can be overwhelmed by numbers because they don't have the first ability, and anything not armored can also be suppressed because they don't have the second.

The next best thing is about 100 yards of open ground all within view of 3-5 heavy MGs, field guns, or tanks, preferably firing in from different angles too. These work best if at least some are far from the scene of the attack, firing in from longer ranges - so they don't get taken out by the rush itself. Range won't reduce the effectiveness of your HE much (e.g. from field guns), while it will provide protection to infantry replies. A poor third is about the same amount of open space ahead of a full infantry platoon (or more), all unsuppressed, with ammo, and in command radius of their HQ.

The plain infantry can work particularly well if they are in buildings and the street outside is pavement. But against attacker's odds (3:2 to 2:1), the first and second work considerably better in most situations. Of course, two or more of the above will work better than one of them.

Anything below those things, in my experience, will not do the job. On map mortars don't have enough HE firepower and scatter their shots too widely; single squads or teams are easily suppressed; infantry or MG fire into cover (or only ~50 meters of open, because it lets the attackers shoot at you from cover on their way in) will not do it either, because they will not do enough damage before being suppressed, or engaged in close combat.

[My armor does goofy stuff....]

Case 1, the Hetzer probably advanced back into LOS ahead of your Stuart. When an AFV is facing an enemy that can kill it, that it can't kill from that angle, it will attempt to evade by movement (or pop smoke if it can, or both). That is probably what happened. Such "panic moves" override the orders given; sometimes they will get a tank out of a tight spot, sometimes not. It only looked like it was going after the infantry - it was really trying to get away from the immediate line the Hetzer was pointing along, but failed.

Case 2, your Jadg probably just wasn't "hunting". An AFV with hunt will stop and turn to kill a target, but one moving fast will not. As somebody already pointed out.

Case 4, first off it did kill a target, and second off you say it lost the TC. AFVs that lose the TC are often "shocked" for a few tens of seconds, and unable to fire. That reflects the crew rearranging their tasks, who gives the orders, trying to attend to the guy hit, etc. For a brief period - and sometimes quite some time with low quality crews (not your case obviously) - the AFV will not function "on all cylinders", as it were.

[How do Kill a King Tiger?]

Well, that sounds like you did pretty good considering how far back you were after the first one. Well done.

[Non-historical Anachronistic Operation]

Yes, to do that you'd have the Germans attacking, in an "advance" type operation probably. You can have reinforcements arrive in different battles in the sequence for either side, or put in reserves at various levels (battalion, regiment, division), which will arrive if that side has trouble.

One warning - keep the number of turns per battle relatively low, and expect a moderate number of battles overall. If one side gets the upper hand in an early fight and 86s most of the on-map enemy force, they can easily march so far afterward that they just win. Especially so if they have 30 turns per battle, and get in a battle or two against light opposition, before larger reinforcements arrive. You have to pace out the reinforcements to avoid both (1) too many guys on the map at once and (2) quick wins after one side loses everything in an early fight. There will be a "sweet spot" in the middle, in terms of how fast reinforcements arrive.

Fallschirmjaegers (FJs) were much more common that Gebirgerjaegers (GBs) in the west, and fought on the attack more often. FJs conducted some counterattacks in Normandy but were mostly on the defensive there; likewise at Casino in Italy; some attacked in the Bulge fighting in December.

An FJ attacking force would be mostly infantry. They did not have much armor or vehicles of any kind, really. They were heavy on 81mm mortars, had a mix of support weapons (but those are more heavily used on defense than on the attack), and have limited artillery support (beyond 81mm mortars that is) in size of types and weight of metal.

The support weapons you'd see would be 2-4 HMGs, 2-4 81mm mortars on map (in addition to their standard 1 FO per company), up to 3 75mm PAK, sometimes 2 20mm AA or 88mm FLAK. They'd have just trucks to help the heavy weapons get around (except Skdfz unarmored halftracks for 88mm FLAK if they have those - switch to "Heer" force to get them if needed, then back to FJ). They sometimes had 105mm recoilless rifles too, but those generally fired indirect as artillery (use an FO), not up front as field pieces.

In supporting artillery, they did not have anything over 105mm except occasional rockets, and even the 105mm was less numerous compared to standard infantry. Use at most 1 module of the stuff. They sometimes had 120mm mortars instead, at the regimental level - again one module, and realistically either-or not both.

For a prep bombardment, they might occasionally have rockets. If you want to try that, give them either 1 large rocket FO (210 or 300mm) or 3 of the 150mm ones. You might allow the rockets as a reserve force, to support if they get into trouble - up to you obviously. If they don't show up until/unless a divisional reserve is needed, they could even be twice the amounts stated above (2 big modules of the same type, or 3-6 of the 150mm ones).

They rarely had any armor support at all. But if you want to give them some for game balance purposes, the realistic way to do it is to give them 3 StuG (one platoon), or perhaps for a Bulge scenario give them 2 Hummels (using a "Heer" setting then switching back again). Those would represent not actual Hummels, but 150mm SiG assault guns - a few of those were used in the Bulge to support mostly infantry attacks.

For the bulk of the infantry, use the company sized force of FJs, as many as is appropriate for the size of your fight. Add one or two FJ Pioneer platoons too (they have flamethrowers but are otherwise similar). The FJs had 1 Pioneer company per regiment plus a battalion of 4 more companies at the division level, so around 1 Pioneer platoon per FJ company is OK.

You might have the trucked heavy weapons arrive as reinforcements after you expect the tide to turn, or you could have them in a "reserve". I mean 75mm PAK, light or heavy FLAK etc. That way they ought to have them for the defensive portion of the battle, while not trying to truck them forward under fire during the attacking portion. The HMGs and 81mm mortars can come earlier, if you like, with a few trucks for convenience (they can at least get around on foot to use cover and such, though at "slow" speed).

The quality levels can be a mix of regulars with some vets thrown in. Because they were picked men and tended to fight well, a "green" FJ formation would be rare (there were some, but they did not see heavy action on the attack). Not all "veteran", though. Plenty of these guys were young. If you want the "tough but not particularly experienced" effect, you can try using mostly regulars but then giving them a 25% fanaticism setting.

I hope this helps.

[How do Kill a King Tiger?]

jwxspoon - that was tungsten ammo, methinks. 76mm tungten will go through the turret front. Standard AP won't, without a rare weak-point penetration anyway.

[How do Kill a King Tiger?]

Your bazookas can kill them, but you need a side or rear shot to do it. It is best if you have a shot straight at the side of the tank, at a right angle. That gives the biggest target to shoot at and the best, flat angles to avoid ricochets. Nothing you have will hurt them from the front.

The way to get a side shot is to have two zooks come at one of them from different sides, or better still if one of them tries to pass more or less between two of your zooks that are hidden. A good range for the zook shots is 80-100 yards, and if possible you'd like to be hiding and use an ambush marker to "aim".

You have to worry about his infantry keeping your zook teams away from the tanks, because they are quite fragile under infantry fire. Ideally, you'd like to have artillery chew up his infantry and hit the buttoned up tanks while everyone else around them is broken. But at the least, you have to use your own infantry to protect your zooks from his infantry, until they can line up shots.

Remember that up front they have their hull MG and they are invunerable to your shots, and straight ahead of the turret you won't last long, nor can you get through the turret front. Every other direction at any given moment, is safe, and the closer to side-on, the better for a zook kill.

Try to keep your last tank and/or halftrack alive and out of sight of all of them. Use it/them as bait - meaning, in order for them to get to a spot that can see your last tank or the 'track, they have to show a side to a zook team on the way. Also use it/them to shoot up their infantry when you can, to give them a reason to come after it.

Good luck - you will need that too, as you doubtless understand...

[ 07-21-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Should MG 42 HMG be able to run?]

The tripod weighed 41 lbs. If they are moving the assembled gun they are thus team-carrying a 60+ lb object. And if you haven't noticed, the fp of the HMG team is 3 times as high as a LMG, plus it has almost four times the ammo in CM shots. They are thus carrying about 12 times the ammo.

LMGs can run, because there is one in every squad and sometimes two. If you want running LMGs buy panzergrenadiers - they get 6 of them per platoon. US MMGs have medium speed, which is not running but is faster than "slow". They also have only 1/2 the fp of an HMG-42 plus only 2/3rds the ammo, so they have only 1/3rds as much cumulative fp. Somehow I doubt that is because each bullet is dumber; I suspect there are fewer of them. Of course, HMG-42 teams are also carrying extra barrels, asbestos gloves to change them while hot, wrenches for when they get stuck, yadda yadda...

[German M.G. 151/15 and 151/20]

Just use a 20mm AA gun, or quad mount to represent the triple. More capable than the 15mm MG, actually, and more common in a ground role as well.

[Availability of units in Quick Battles]

There will be optional rariety systems in CM2, the Russian front version. BTS has said one option will have fixed rariety, where the costs of units will be higher for whatever isn't "vanilla" in that time and place and side. Another rariety setting will be variable, with some units more "available" than others, and thus relative bargains, price-wise. And third one can just turn the rariety off.

[Use of Fortifications in QBs]

I like and use both sorts of hidden mines, as well as TRPs. I don't use bunkers because they are overpriced, and I usually don't use wire, daisy chains, or roadblocks either, because they are too easy to spot and avoid.

AP mines have to be used in quantity to be any good. Just 1-2 isolated fields will not do anything. You want 6 to 10 of the things, in a continuous belt or with only one gap, with a slightly uneven front to make them harder to avoid. Then use them to provide a "shield" for your main line of resistence, maneuvering behind them. When people hit them, they typically lose 1-2 men, but more importantly usually change direction or go to ground, too.

One important feature of AP mines is they are area effect weapons - their power multiples when "rushed". In that, they are like artillery, but they don't run out of ammo or miss, though of course they also don't move. You can use both together, with TRPs e.g., to create shifting patterns of area-denial. That can be very important to stop "power up middle" rushes, because those can work better than you might expect with enough odds.

AT mines are an exercise in prediction of enemy moves. They work best on maps with tight terrain, obviously, since there are fewer chockpoints to guess about. If they KO one tank they more than pay for themselves.

Just don't spend too much on such add ons. The defender is facing 3:2 odds as it is, and if you spend 1/4 of your points rearranging the map that becomes 2:1. It is worth it to have a platoon of infantry's worth of the stuff, because they can do some things just numbers can't.

One man's opinion...

[The German's missed chance in Normandy]

Yes, the Germans would certainly have had trouble even if they achieved a local success with such a counterattack. Pushing back into the range of naval gunfire, as they found at Salerno and Anzio and as another fellow already mentioned, would indeed have made further gains very difficult to achieve.

Limiting the beachhead size would have allowed German artillery a much better target, however - the congested beaches - and limited the material the Allies could bring to bear, for lack of space and danger from crowding up under the German guns. The Anzio beachhead was bottled up rather effectively in that manner, though it was a much smaller area of course.

Those issues are not really what the operation is meant to address, however. It is more an examination of the attempted breakthrough fight, which has similarities to Lehr's attempt in July (not large enough though) and the Mortain attempt in August (steep odds against it soon).

Could the Germans have seized the high ground around Camount, and then driven through the reserves the US could send to stop them near there? That more tactical issue is about all I think CM can handle - it gets pretty big even to show that much. You'd really want a more operational, larger game scale to look at the other issues that might arise later on, if that part succeeded.

[The German's missed chance in Normandy]

I am in the process of making a CM scenario, called "Back to the Sea", about a hypothetical that I think was the best window of opportunity the Germans had to try the "staff solution" of a large scale armored counterattack, in order to defeat the invasion. Whether it might have worked is an open question, and opinions about that are one reason I bring it up here. Personally, I doubt it would have worked even with the best timing, but I think the chances were higher in the window I describe, than at any other time in the campaign. I mentioned this in the Mortain thread; here I present the case for an earlier hypothetical attack.

As with all historical counterfactuals, this is an exercise in assuming things were different, and in this case, more favorable to the Germans. But I have not assumed any large-scale changes, like redeployments before D-Day or quicker releases from the Pas de Calais, etc. Instead I limit myself to a few preventable errors in training, side shows, deployment areas, caution in the use of reserves, etc. Most of the campaign, up to the date of the operation described, is assumed to have unfolded in the exact same manner.

The scenario (actually an operation) is still under construction, and it may be a while before it is out. Of course using CM means the operation would only be a representative piece, not the real deal. The following is text meant for the general briefing of the operation, "Back to the Sea". A small map of Normandy would be useful to follow some of the discussion.

Back to the Sea

This hypothetical operation looks at what, in retrospect, was probably the German's best chance to counterattack in Normandy with armored forces. As many are aware, opinions differed among German commanders about whether to try to stop the invasion on the beaches, as Rommel advised, or by armored counterattacks just inland, as others on the general staff wanted. In the latter camp, some wanted to counterattack in a matter of days, but this was not practical when the armored reserves were so far from the front, as in Normandy. It took time to move the forces to the theater, and the Allies kept attacking to expand the beachhead in the meantime. Nevertheless, the "staff solution" was armored counterattack at the earliest practical moment. Not, incidentally, after the enemy had already attrited the defenders for months and then achieved his own breakout, as with the historical commitment of counterattacking German armor at Mortain. It was simply not practical to counterattack in the first few days, however (21 Panzer tried, with conspicuous lack of success).

There was a noticable period in which the theory might have been tried. Between the first defensive successes by newly arrived forces - at Villers Bocage in the British sector, and in front of St. Lo in the American sector - and the launch of the British "Epsom" offensive on June 28th, there was a period of nearly two weeks of relative stability along the front. The Allies were still attacking in the west on the Caretan penisula, and briefly and unsuccessfully at the begining of this period in front of St. Lo, but most of the length of the line was relatively quiet. U.S. V Corps had passed the order to stand on the defensive about a week after D-Day. Three weeks after D-Day the British launched "Epsom", which drew much of the German armor to their part of the front. In between was the moment of opportunity. And the Germans could realistically have been ready to grasp that chance in the second of those two weeks, starting on June 20th.

New German forces were reaching the front. On the shoulder of the Caretan, the 17th SS Panzergrenadier had a battlegroup in action - about half the division - by the time of the U.S. pause. The 3rd Fallschirmjaeger had arrived in front of St. Lo and stopped the offensive by the right half of U.S. V Corps there. Panzer Lehr was in front of the British, east of Villers Bocage, where advanced elements of the 2nd SS Panzer famously brought Tigers into action. Between these two, opposite the important road junction of Caumont, the 2nd Panzer was arriving to relieve a worn-out infantry division that had been fighting since D-Day.

The lead recon elements of 2nd Panzer were in action as early as June 12th, fighting delaying actions and withdrawing before the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, which was heavily reinforced by three battalions of tanks and one of tank destroyers, making it practically an armored division at that time. The U.S. 1st was also supported by the V Corps reserve, the U.S. 2nd Armored division. Coordinating its attacks with British XXX Corps on its left, the "Big Red One" pushed for Caumont to cut the east-west road from Caen to St. Lo, an important lateral link behind the German front that let them switch forces easily between U.S. and British sectors. This was also the high ground in the area, 750 feet above sea level, and protected Allied positions farther north from artillery observation.

When British XXX Corps was checked at Villers Bocage, however, the 1st Infantry's advance stalled. The weight of V Corps effort shifted west toward St. Lo briefly, was checked by the newly arrived German Fallschirmjaegers, and further attacks were then called off in this part of the front. Meanwhile, the wheeled elements of the 2nd Panzer arrived south of Caumont, then their Pz IVs. Their Panthers were delayed, detraining near Paris and then marching over roads to Normandy, mostly by night, arriving to complete the division force on June 19th. 20 of them went straight to the workshops for minor repairs. The division maintenance officer noted that the rated life of a Panther's tracks was 500 miles. It rained hard on the 19th and the ground was wet thereafter, drying out in time for "Epsom".

Meanwhile, on other parts of the front, strong German reserves were arriving. The 116th Panzer reached the front and was put into reserve behind Caen. It was missing its Panthers, because they were still training near Paris, having received their tanks in early June. This was a definite mix up, as the unit could easily have been supplied enough for platoon and company exercises in rotation before being fully equipped. This division was also short of halftracks, but this again was a correctable mistake, as several other armor divisions in Normandy - notably Panzer Lehr - had far more halftracks than they truly needed. There was no practical reason for the 116th Panzer not being available at full strength, besides these organizational mistakes.

2nd SS Panzer was also arriving, having wasted time committing atrocities against partisans in southern France. It was slated to come into line behind 2nd Panzer. In 2nd Panzer itself, while 20 Panthers needed repair on June 19th, readiness was high enough to commit them a week later during Epsom with good results. Standing on the defensive while awaiting build-up, maintenance, training, and diverting to commit political crimes, were hardly the way to go about achieving the concentrated armored counterattacks many on the general staff had envisioned as the decisive moment in the whole campaign. With a little more focus, and even leaving Panzer Lehr to check the British and the 3rd Fallschirmjaeger and 17th SS Panzergrenadier to check the Americans, it would have been possible to concentrate up to three full Panzer divisions opposite the link between the U.S. and British forces, for a splitting counterattack, to drive them back to the sea.

A focal point of such a counterattack would have been the Caumont area. Situated in the riverless higher ground between the Drome and the Aure rivers - and near the headwaters of the latter, thus allowing attacks down either bank - and with its web of radiating roads, it would have been a key sector in the whole operation. The larger objective for the whole affair would have been Bayeux, between Omaha and Gold beaches. The 2nd Panzer would have been directed toward Caumont, then Ballroy, approaching Bayeux from the southwest. 2nd SS Panzer, as it came into line, would have attacked northward to the east or right of 2nd Panzer, between the Aure and the Seulles rivers. 116th Panzer would have formed the reserve and exploitation element of the Corps-level armored attack.

This hypothetical was probably the best chance the Germans actually had to try the general staff's idea of armored counterattack as the main response to the invasion. The troops needed were not off at Pas De Calais. They had not been destroyed by Allied air. They were not spread over the rest of France, delayed by broken railway links. In the actual event, the first time German armor counterattacked in the American sector did not come until 11 July, five weeks after the invasion rather than two. Only parts of Panzer Lehr were involved in that case, and they withdrew after it became clear that a half-division kampgruppe was charging an army corps of four divisions practically alone. Nevertheless, such was the offensive mindsight, greeness especially on the defense and against tanks, and lax forward deployments in the American sector, that they penetrated five miles before the intruders could be hunted down.

The U.S. 1st Infantry division in the targeted area, was one of the most experienced in the U.S. army, if you go by the fights the formation had been in. It fought in North Africa and Sicily, and landed on Omaha beach on D-Day itself, in the first wave. But the unit was not as veteran as this might suggest, just two weeks after D-Day and after a week of offensive fighting in the hedgerows. The losses it had taken had been severe. The stand-down a week before the projected date of the German counterattack, would have allowed them to take replacements, but the formation would have had a high portion of green troops as a result.

When the 1st was attacking in the week after D-Day, it had as many as four battalions of armor attached to it - one tank battalion and one TD company assigned to each regimental combat team. But once turned to the defensive, this number was cut dramatically. The 2nd Armored would be available to stem breakthroughs, but the front line force had reverted to mostly infantry. As the experience of Panzer Lehr three weeks later showed, the Americans were not really prepared to meet armored counterattacks, at least as far as the initial break-in was concerned - something the Germans could learn from their first probes. Making something of the initial penetration, though, would likely prove a more difficult task - as Panzer Lehr found in July, and the Mortain force found in August. The deployment of the U.S. force had two regiments "up", one "back", with each assigned a frontage of about 2 miles. With battalion reserves at the regimental level too, that left the frontage per front-line infantry company at about half a mile.

Compared to Mortain, the Germans would have 3 panzer divisions instead of the equivalent of slightly less than 2. The attack would take place 2 weeks after the invasion, not two months. Total German armor available in the region was four times as high, counting divisions still arriving. Allied forces ashore were considerably smaller, as was the logistical buildup of vehicles and artillery ammo to support them. The storm on the 19th was the one that wrecked one of the two Allied "Mulberry" artificial harbors, and no port had yet been cleared, so the Allies were near their weakest logistically. The British had already suffered the check of Villers Bocage and the Americans had been halted in front of St. Lo; the Brits were preparing for Epsom but a week shy of their planned jump-off date. A week of attacks inland through hedgerow country had certainly taken a toll on the front line U.S. forces, while the arriving German panzer units were still fresh.

[SMG thread annex]

No Slap, you see I don't need your concurrence. Your indifference is quite sufficient. No matter how many times or ways you say it, your indifference does not amount to opposition. If your opponent wants sugar pills, you won't object because they are just sugar pills, and that is quite honestly all I request.

You see, I deliberately left room for differences of opinion on balance issues. I don't require people to agree with me about balance issues, and I am not on any campaign for them to do so. Under "you cut, I choose", differences of opinion about balance are not banned but expected, and indifference is simply one way of reacting to the choices that offers. You would presumably pick side or rule-set based on your convienence or your other whims, like which side you'd like ot play in a given game. Which is just fine. It isn't any skin off your nose.

And that is what I am aiming at. Not universal agreement on balance issues, but a scheme for balancing sides and choices that does not skin any honest person's nose, whatever his balance opinions happen to be. You assure me, on examination, that the ammo tweaks would not skin your nose, and I take you at your word, and count it lemonade.

[SMG thread annex]

I thank wwb for his comments. He advised me about tone, thus "the problem was with the tone of your reply, which read to me as "Well, you don't agree with me, so your reply does not matter". I can understand that reading, but what I actually said was "you agree with me enough for my purposes", and "pocketed" it as friendly, in practice. I took Slap to be saying, in effect, "I looked and it doesn't seem to matter either way", and the intent of my reply was "fine by me".

Perhaps Slap did not expect indifference to be welcome. Perhaps he was thinking of the sorts of things BTS has to change, where absence of a strong compelling reason for a change means don't touch it. Perhaps he didn't notice that indifference on his part will mean in practice his opponent deciding whether to use this setting or that, rather than settling the matter. Perhaps he flattered himself that his enthusiastic desire for a setting is a moral requirement for others using it.

That is as may be. The fact of the matter is, whether he was trying to disagree with my proposals or not, he did not manage to. "Whatever you like" is not an argument against a particular player-set choice.

So I welcomed his conclusion. In fact, I take it as evidence I haven't gone overboard in my suggested tweaks - he didn't see an impact so large as to be imbalancing the other way.

Of course I do think the difference between 30-35 and 45-50 shots matters, or I wouldn't have proposed it. But I certainly don't want a change so large that rifles clearly rule. I will go over the ground again, to give some idea of the mass of "objections" already presented, and how little has come of them.

The whole subject began with the observation that SMGs are more effective than rifles but cost the same (both in CM, obviously). This was disputed by some for a while, and a valid case was made that automatic infantry in general (including 2 LMG types with many autos) can sometimes be better still - but basically the superiority of automatics was admitted. So I suggested raising their CM price.

BTS stated that the reason the two cost the same was that both were supposed to be about equally useful, just at different things, and cited the fact that armies made plentiful use of rifles. Price tweaks were not as welcome. BTS stated that they prefer to correct any underlying modeling issues, rather than repricing things, and that is a sensible position. The prices are the same, and BTS says that is because they expected their effectiveness to be similar, though good at different things. So the question became, how can rifles and SMGs be more balanced in game effects and realistically so?

Which led to my ammo and firepower analysis, discussion of loads carried, relative accuracies, implied accuracies in existing fp numbers and (even) ammo allowances, fp per unit time (related to suppression also) vs. fp over ammo load, etc. The basic idea is that SMGs dish out more firepower per unit time, but rifles dish out more firepower per bullet fired.

SMGs will do more per shot at any reasonable range for them (~100 yards, like now). If the range is low enough for the accuracy difference to be small, the SMG will do more over the whole of its ammo load too, because of the larger ammo loads carried. But once the rifle's accuracy is higher by more than the size of the ammo load difference, the rifle - while still behind in fp per unit time - will catch up in fp over the whole ammo load.

The ammo tweak proposals were meant to accomplish that. They will tend to leave SMGs better at suppression even at 100 yards, but at that range the total damage an SMG can do before running low on ammo would be less than a rifle could do. At closer range - 40-70 yards - the SMG would remain better in all respects, of course.

In addition, the added ammo for rifles should make it more feasible for them to use their superior range, with shots in the 100-250 yard window. Which can be rather dicey with things as they are now, with 40 shots for all squad types, because it means less ammo for the rifle squads in close. The shots used up at such distances get 3-7 fp per rifle, while SMGs are saving their shots for 9-45 fp numbers at closer range. With ~10-15 extra shots per squad, rifle-heavy squads should be able to afford such long range fire. My testing seemed to bear this out.

Now, it is worth while to record all the various positions along the way, of which Slapdragon's latest is just one example, that have alleged there isn't really any problem, but nevertheless have failed to make a case against the proposal in practice.

First some said SMGs suck because they never get in range, and rifles are better. One fellow said so under the mistaken impression that M-1 rifles had higher fp numbers than SMGs at 100 yards. Some compared 12 man squads with 8 man squads instead of equal points spent on each type. Many argued that 2 LMG squads are better than pure SMG, without pretending that 1 LMG rifle-armed squads are as good as either, for the same amount spent.

Some said that SMGs were cheap and easy to make, overlooking the fact that CM prices reflect combat effectiveness, not economic cost. Some said that larger squads are more effective for the same firepower because of their robustness, when in fact more shooters means some unsuppressed. Some claimed that support weapon differences made up for it all, overlooking the fact that German support weapons are as available and at least as effective for the price.

Some suggested that SMGs were only good at close assault, and that paras and engineers were the doctrinal counter - but paras and engineers lose to SMGs in close, and SMGs are useful defensively and offensively, out to 100 yards, using reverse slopes, etc. While at longer ranges support weapons provide much of the fp, not squads, and squads face problems from ammo and from artillery zeroing in on them, if trying to fire at long ranges for long enough to do anything. 2 LMG automatic infantry (especially on attack), or a mix of SMG-heavy squads and HMGs for long ranged fire (especially on defense), are superior to rifle-armed squads for the same points spent.

Some then argued that the superior performance of automatic weapon infantry was justified - but failed to notice that in that case, the point costs were not, since those are supposed to reflect only combat effectiveness and are the same for a rifleman or an SMGer. Some regarded the superiority of automatics as obvious, and thought the Germans had more of them. When in fact the Allies made far more and were often above TOE in automatics, while German units were often below it - something documented here for Brits with Stens and Fallschirmjaegers with LMGs, as examples.

It is quite possible the Germans made far more front line use of them than the Allies, despite having fewer overall, of course. But that supposition fits with BTS's statement that rifles and SMGs had comparable effectiveness at different tasks, not with the idea that SMGs were dramatically more effective. Because, in the latter case, the more numerous Allied SMGs ought to have migrated to the front. Otherwise we are left to suppose that thousands of military professionals with their lives at stake, failed to notice what every green CMer manages to figure out by the end of his second or third outing in "A Chance Encounter".

Then some got into the nitty gritty of the numbers and alleged that the exactly equal shots per squad were justified by the differences in ammo weights, and thus in rounds carried per man. But no one alleged SMGers carried more than 2.5 times as many bullets per man, and SMGs get well more than 2.5 times the fp at close range. The fp of each bullet (not burst, and not rate of fire) out of an SMG is therefore higher than one out of a rifle, which is silly.

Some thought it might not be silly because part of the effect of fire is suppression, not hits. But in CM, suppression is greater for the same fp already, when that fp is delivered faster, because morale recovery from shots is time dependent. So there is no need to over-inflate fp over whole ammo load to model suppression. Higher fp per unit time already models better suppression, leaving fp over whole ammo load to reflect actual accuracy, and thus casualties.

Some alleged that the problem was not SMGs, but rush behavior. There are issues with rush behavior and BTS is improving it, certainly. But the SMG edge is there on defense, and when attacking slowly by fire and movement through covered areas, not just in rushes, so it is a different phenomenon. Then some suggested the issue was SMG infantry scarcity and their overuse. It may well be that a scarcity system will alievate or mitigate the problem, but there isn't one for CMBO now.

Many have advanced all of the above arguments without trying the proposals. A few to their credit have, and have expressed favor and indifference, respectively.

Some suggested ad hoc "solutions" like banning SMG hordes, limiting the number of SMG platoons to 3 per battle (without reference to battle size), not playing people who use them, requiring purchases by company. These either remove an interesting infantry type from the game or fail to address the problem, and they are subject to all sorts of misunderstandings. How various infantry types are categorized is not made clear - e.g. is a GB squad an "SMG squad" (2 rifles)? What about an FJ one (3 rifles)?

Through it all, many have maintained loudly that no issue exists. This can have two meanings - that the proposed solutions are unwarranted and would be unbalancing, or that the proposed solutions are irrelevant without making any unbalancing difference. These two, which may seem similar to their proponents, in fact have very different conclusions for practice.

If there is no issue but the changes also make no difference, then there is no principled reason to oppose the wishes of an opponent who happens to think there is an issue. Whether you think the latter is right or wrong. If there is an issue but the proposed changes make no difference, the result is the same - no reason not to use them when an opponent wants them. If there is an issue and the proposed changes help, then there is positive reason to use them.

The only cases in which the tweaks would be truly unwarranted, are (1) if there is indeed an issue but the proposals are too big a swing in the other direction, making SMGs debilitated and rifles omnipotent. No one, as of yet, has even alleged this. And I have deliberately kept the changes moderate - 30-50 range for ammo, not 20-60 e.g. - to avoid this possible pitfall. And (2), if there is at present no issue, and the proposed changes make a serious balance difference, naturally one in favor of rifles. No one has yet alleged this either, directly and as a whole, though some have tried to leave it as an implicit conclusion to be drawn.

There are two problems faced by those who would argue either (1) or (2) above. First off, the scale of effects that must supposedly matter, have to be larger than the obvious and well-known effects of SMGs (or automatic infantry generally) today. In the first case, the ammo changes have to outweigh whatever edge autos now provide and move the result about as far off "balanced" in the other direction. But the proposed ammo changes are only +/- 25% to the default number.

No argument that changes on that scale do *not* matter, will suffice. Nor will any argument work that allows some moderate effect to SMG vs. rifle differences, but regards these as not large enough to matter for game balance. One would have to argue both that changes on the scale of the ammo tweaks *do* matter, and that effects on that scale do not already exist in favor of automatics. This is a rather narrow rope to walk. One practically has to allege that SMGs are undermodeled in CM effectiveness and too expensive as it is, at equal prices to rifles.

The second problem with either (1) or (2) is that a real disagreement about balance issues of the character required, will in practice be met by the "you cut, I choose" nature of the implimentation. If someone honestly thinks that rifles with 45 shots cannot possibly lose to automatics with 35, then all he has to do is pick his side and take rifles. If someone honestly thinks that the balance is perfect at 40 shots for all squads, all he has to do is give his opponent choice of side, and with it choice of squad type.

Any honest belief about balance issues will fit into the proposal. Different opinions on the subject will, indeed, lead to different choices - of side, of infantry type, and whether to use the tweaks or not. But no honest belief on the subject of balance is harmed by the option or the scheme of choices.

The only "position" that is "harmed" by the proposal is one talking up the effectiveness of what someone does not intend to take, and talking down the effectiveness of what one does intend to take. If someone wants high automatics with 40 shots per squad, and wants his opponent to have rifles with 40 shots per squad, *because* he thinks it will give him an edge, then indeed the scheme may seem inconvenient.

That option will be available only if one's opponent agrees that is a balanced fight. If he does, it is still available. To desire it even if one's opponent does not regard it as balanced, is consciously to seek an advantage both sides understand is an advantage, rather than balanced. Some may be in this position, of course, but it is not publically defensible. It simply leads to bids for side, or to vetos of the "no SMG hordes" variety, to ban what both understand is an edge.

I think I have listened to every single objection registered to my SMG proposals, over months now. Which have changed and I think have improved as a result of the feedback, from unsubtle proposed "centralized" price changes initially, to the present voluntary ammo tweak scheme with its "you cut, I choose" implimentation. I don't think a single significant objection has gone unaddressed. And at present, I do not hear anyone saying the proposal, upon testing, seems ruinous. Nor do I hear any argument how anyone honestly objecting to the balance struck will be harmed by a "you cut, I choose" implimentation of it. He simply exercises his choices under that scheme one way rather than another.

If anyone has anything new in any of the above, or sees an injured party somewhere I've overlooked, or any other reason the scheme of offers and choices must be avoided like a pestilence, fire away. Expect me to defend my proposals - I don't require your endorsement to think them sound, you know, nor to use them - but I will certainly listen. I frankly doubt the opposition has anything reasonable left, and I make no secret of that. But if you think that isn't so, take your shot.

[ 07-19-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[SMG thread annex]

I am afraid I don't understand Slap's last much at all. He still seems to think his indifference one way or another on the suggested proposals, as a result of his tests, is somehow unwelcome to me. If the most anyone has against my proposals is indifference one way or another, that's great as far as I am concerned. Then I've got an "I like it", and an "I don't care" as tester feedback.

Just why Slapdragon thinks his personal indifference on a subject is of more general interest than that, remains something of a mystery. Surely he doesn't think that if he doesn't care about a setting one way or another, that implies none may? Or does he think his mere indifference should outweigh an opponent's stated preferences? On any proposal, e.g. Fionn's 75, or no SMG hordes, rather than mine, if he likes. If one player says "I don't care", isn't that the same in practice as "up to you"?