jtcm

On that view, it's all SOP-- the consequence of which must be th e need for high grade training for tanks and tank riders to know what to do. (HMG opens up, I jump off, tank steams forward, I wait for the tank to finish the job, tank waits, I catch up and mount the tank, we move off, etc). But if things get a bit hairy-- how did infy communicate with a buttoned-up tank ? I seem to remember that the old M-60 had a phone in the back to talk to the crew.

Some further thoughts: -- the roadblock can't be moved-- so armour *has to go off road --infantry has to stick close to the armour-- and take its lumps, too, i assume (mounting and dismounting under fire to get close enough to enemy positions-- no use if it's cowering 300m away from the action. -- what *did real life tank riders / ht riders do once their wheels were shot up ? I'm in a squad of tank riders, i fight with my tank, I screen the tank from THs and my tank big brother shoots up anyone who messes with me-- but what happens when the tank is finally brewed up by an ATG at 500 m ? I raise my head, I see the tank burning, the rest of my h-squad is fine and still tactically coherent, the other tanks are churning away with their tank riders, or alternately the tank riders are lying flat in the dust, too, while their tanks are burning-- who decides what next ?

Will try again, by Jove. The plan: set up the Tigers slightly to the right of the road as a firebase, then basically angle everything to do a right hook.

So in real life terms: drive with armour, aggressively but not without tactics. Why not lead with the Tigers ? If they get bogged, they might as well get bogged while fighting, and while having LOS to the enemy. In game terms, it's not huge, but the demands in term of micro-managing get overwhelming. I wish you could just give broad orders (support plt a, move out) to AI-driven units which could implement tactical SOP competently-- while you concentrated e.g. on fighting the point plt past an ATG crossfire-- instead of having to give precise orders, all of which matter and all of which are necessary, to a myriad of squads. Of course, this relates to CMBB generally not to this very good scenario !

Inspired by this exchange, I went and played the JasonC scenario, "1SSInitial Assault"-- as the Germans on day 1 of Kursk, hitting the Russian line and trying to break clean through. I don't think it's a spoiler to say that it's hard-- true, the Germans have lots of resources (that keep piling on, thus creating pressure to move move move); damp ground and bogging; but they're up against very thoughtfully placed ATGs and THs, roadblocks, arty barrages.There might be mines, but I actually haven't ground far enough to encounter them-- which is just as well, because my pioneers are all dead or cowering in ditches. Maybe all this doesn't matter at the high chess level, and at the end of the day I'll have punched through but it's pretty hard at worm's eye view. Good scenario against AI. I've played it three times and still gave up in the middle with traffic jams, burning hulks, lost infantry. SPOILERS The first time, I tried to move everything right, and dash across open ground. Did I say dash ? The horror of this lumbering traffic jam of a move under arty barrage and long range ATG fire and bogging and reinforcements that kept coming... The second time, I thought i'd dash down the road, cut left before the block of woods and marshes, and move along side the left side of map. Horrible, too

Still musing (and remembering a quip by P J O'ROurke, that Russia is a country where chess is a spectator sport)-- interesting to see how deep strategic thinking can be even under the Stalinist system. Does it carry on into the post-WW II world ? Interesting, too, to combine the results of this thread (good chess playing at high level) with another thread, a few years back, about how at the tactical level, even the "good enough" (Cuirassier) stuff results in v. high casualties (especially on the offensive), more than should be expected, in the tactical mash-ups. Why ? Because (I thnk JasonC argued) of DOCTRINAL choices, the holding back of armour for exploitation, rather than using it to crack open MLRs-- leaving that job to infantry formations, who take terrible casualties. At the higher level, this matters not hugely, as long as the job gets done at the end of the day. Just as in Kursk, the tactical level of fortifs / no fortifs matters less than the results on the big map. But two thoughts: -- there is a point where tactical competence / incompetence must start to tell at the grand level-- as in 1941; in 1942 etc, RUssian performance is just "good enough' for it not to matter *that much whether the breakthrough is effected cleanly or messily, with few casualties or horrendous ones. Is that right -- is the doctrinal choice that results in high tactical casualties not in fact a reflection of intentions at the grand chess level ? I.e. that's the point where they mesh-- intentions and practices and even "military culture" determined from above (rather than filtering upwards from 'grunt level"). is this the right/ the only way to fight, to win, a war ? -- why is there not a tradition of subtle, economical, 'clean' thinking at the tactical level, comparable to the deep chess played at the operational level ? Chuikov's memoirs spend a huge amt of time at the low-level, small unit tactical plane, trying to get the details just right. Just some thoughts, maybe they make no sense at all. Has anyone read Dominic Lieven, Russia against Napoleon ? I haven't; just seen reviews saying that it wasn't general winter that did for Nap, but massive, well-thought out effort by the Tsarist multi-ethnic empire.

I suppose (just musing here) that the point is that the Russians must, at some point (late 1942 ?? out of my hat), reach the point where individual motivation, unit morale, low-level tactical skill, equipment performance, grand tactical implementation, and logistics, are robust enough (even if not, in many categories, high performing enough to reverse completely the lopsided equations in favour of the Germans) to allow high level operational "chess"-- which is what JasonC says mattered, at Kursk. Does that sentence make sense ? Were the Germans out-thought (if not outfought on the ground [?]) at Kursk ?

If JasonC's right-- the fortif belts etc made little difference OPERATIONALLY, and the Russian MLRs might well simply have been in foxholes etc. Is this right ? At what level to the tactical and the operational mesh ?

For those new to the game: JasonC did a Kurk pack a while back. I personally found it pretty difficult to fight my way through the fortified belt, even in the dawn operation (1 SS ?) playing against the AI

Were charges with T34/76s to get angles against Tigers actually used in real life ?

The trick that Walpurgis Nacht / Faustius insisted on is that your FTs should not shoot directly, with LOS, at their targets, but that an area shot, protected by LOS block, works well.

"Irish" temper ? Hmm. The words i used are a bit strong, but I do remember some posts which were entertaining to read as a bystander, but quite inflammatory.

Fionn and JasonC had a big debate / argument / shouting match, about doctrine. It must be archived somewhere ?

Fionn was pretty obnoxious and arrogant-- I do remember something about finally being banned. Had no idea he was a physician, that would explain the crazy hours for play. I think he sometimes appeared on that site, combatmission.com ? His style of play was very aggressive and manoeuverist (one of his AARs, the Sunken Road, is typical). Not sure it still applies in CMBB and CMAK age-- very much the waltzing CMBO style.

AARs please !

Well, I still think there's something dodgy about using the trench+crest defilade as startup position for ATGs-- but the problem is that it is a natural spot to put a gun.

I ran a test with CMBB. Dunno if parameters were well chosen, but here they are: Small map with ridge. 2 German 37 mm in trenches, facing a plt of T-70s. Distance 400-500 m. Gun 1 entrenched on reverse slope, non-kinky LOS to tank. It gets a shot off. The tank destroys the ATG with return of shot. Gun 2 entrenched on reverse slope, kinky LOS to 5 tanks. It plinks away happily (and even takes out a T-70). Return of shot hits the "glacis" of the slope, or sails above. On turn 5, one of the T-70s (firing from a slight angle, but still kinkily) gets a direct hit, and suppresses the gun. Two more hits or shots landing in the trench from a T-70 straight ahead, at 440 m, with kinky LOS to the ATG in its trench: the gun is panicked, and then abandoned. Some remarks 1. Incredibly fun to watch one's gun in "invulnerable defilade" and the shots falling short or sailing long-- one feels (even if JasonC is denouncing a bug and a cheat) very safe and smug and congratulates oneself on one's tactical eye for terrain. 2. But is it invulnerable defilade ? I suppose after about 15 shots from the tank plt, the ATG's run was up. 3. Had it been one on one, ATG against tank, and with a heavy hitting ATG, the ATG would have been at a great advantage from the "semi-invulnerable defilade" bug / feature 4. It's actually possible to get a non-kinky line from one's entrenched ATG, but a kinky line to another part of the map (as dieseltaylor observed, I think). 5. Is the correct tactic massed HE fire against ATGs ? Is that not well simulated in this case ? That's all one had to say

Is it the case that there is no "invulnerable defilade" in CMAK ? Or is it that in the tests, the tanks are defeating the ATG with area fire ??

Joachim: das war als Scherz gemeint.

Do you mean "where is the kinked green line ?" ?

I'm convinced by JasonC and Redwolf: placing ATGs in trenches just behind crestlines in "invulnerable defilade" (whereas it should be in "ATG hull-down") is a no-no, and arguing that the ATG is still destroyable by mortar fire or pinable by MG fire does not change the fact that it cannot get hit by return HE fire from the tanks it fires at. It does make ATG placement a bit trickier.

I dunno, it does seem rather unsporting to site an ATG in a position where it enjoys "invulnerable defilade"

Yes, but can I place my ATG at a point where the LOS tool does not kink, but it still gets *some protection from being behind the crest ? I.e. something similar to hull down for a vehicle.

Can one still get that paper anywhere ? And: are there mentions of typhus-- and disease-- in the narrative or personal sources for 1812 ? It's not the Peloponnesian War, but an amply documented case. Heck, we might even have Larrey's notes.

How was the small calibre mortar meant to be used in combat at plt level, early war ? CMBB players tend to concentrate them into Co. level batteries (I think), but were they in fact meant to be dragged into plt. firing lines, to help squads win the firefight ? E.g. by silencing HMGs ?