Skipper

That's one heck of a reference... Here is a bit more accurate account. To start with, none of the Red Army field regulations mentions this as a normal combat practice. Which means, it wasn't. Special purpose blocking squads were established in summer 1942 and existed till some time in 1943. Organisationally, a blocking squad was an independent HMG platoon, manned by NKVD servicemen. Mainly they worked as squad-sized block-posts on roads directly behind front lines. There are accounts when they were used like the thread originator said, behind assaulting penal batallions. A report on blocking squads activities in the area of German summer '42 offensive says (again, from the top of my head) that something like 200+ thousand retreating soldiers were stopped and sent to the nearest assembly areas, about 10,000 were imprisoned, and something like 2,000 executed. This was very tough - the toughest blocking squads have ever been. Also worth mentioning on the subject, RKKA officers from platoon commander and up had legal right to shoot their subordinate who refuses to execute a combat order. Using this right was not uncommon. I believe, it was same way in Wehrmacht.

Err... I would be counting, too, if anyone can remind me when is the D-Day? Last time I heard was fall 2001...

Speaking of prep fires in CM... In the last three games I've played against human opponents (all MEs), I've been treated with three Nebelwehrfer barrages. For the total loss count of 10 infantrymen, I wasn't too impressed. The thought of one of these rounds actually hitting something was scary though...

Should say straight away that I am not an expert on the subject. This is wartime winter uniform of "real" naval infantry. As you can see, it's black. On the other hand, there were pretty many naval infantry units actually formed from sailors. Those, iirc, had navy blue (i.e. very dark blue) uniforms. This is from a rather recent time - the guy in the middle is naval infantry. Also black. However, their modern field uniform is camo, just like anybody else. Like here. In Stalingrad at least (probably elsewhere, I don't know) naval infantry was ordered to wear normal infantry uniform. The only naval thing they were allowed to keep was the striped shirt, called "telnyashka". You can see it on the second photo above. [ 01-03-2002: Message edited by: Skipper ]</p>

Yup. And you can tell the azymuth from the impact pattern. Alas, counter-battery fires don't pay in CM.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Scott B: All of it pre-planned and to a fixed time table.<hr></blockquote> Disagree. All pre-planned (except mortars), but each phase of the plan is implemented on a signal (codeword on field phone, radio, rocket lights etc).

In fact, as I remember from two or three artillery memoirs I've read, in "mobile" situations wirelines would go from FOs to a fire control post of regimental or even battery level. From that post they would have a line to division's artillery chief. The regiment (battery) would be assigned to an infantry unit, and would have a certain number of shells "budgeted" for targets of opportunity. In such case they wouldn't need anyone's approval for firing on anything worthy of attention. By the way, there is another aspect here. At least until 1943, Germans definition of "worthy of attention" was much wider. Well, such was the soviet perception, anyway. I.e., germans much more often spent arty shells on insignificant targets. When assaulting fortified positions, regimental or even divisional CO would be at observation post with as much LoS as possible, up to the second line of enemy trenches, and call all the shots personally. But this kind of engagement is not what CM models, anyway. Also worthy of notice, soviet FOs always tried to put wirelines even when a radio was available, for the fear of counter-battery fire directed by radio azymuth finders (sp?). If I were BTS, I would probably have two kinds of artillery for the same caliber. Something like available for direct support (faster response time, more expensive for purchase), and the arty that you beg from a higher HQ (slow and uncertain response time, but cheap). And then leave it up to scenario designers. As far as yours truly is concerned, just give me plenty of mortars, including 120 mm, and a good choice of tubes for direct fire - that's all I care.

The right answer: Pz-IV, Tiger, KT, IS-2, T-34. Scales, by the way, are all correct. Somehow i never occurred to me that IS-2 was not bigger than Pz-IV, and much smaller than KT.

For my money - StuG for germans and M4A3 for allies. M4A3 + whatever you can buy for 100 pts (81 mm FO, or Priest) beats Tiger any day, as long as you know what you are doing and there is enough cover.

Soviet combat regulations at the time said 150 m per platoon in attack and (iirc) up to 400 m per platoon on defence. And then there were miracles, such as 3 people defending a 300 m wide bridgehead across a river for two nights and one day and bouncing off 2 or 3 platoon-sized attacks, until reinforcements came in. Or companies defending a single house. Only those were, say, 6 men companies (Stalingrad, November 1942). By the way, Soviet Army in 1941 found the 2 men foxholes totally inadequate. Wherever there was at least a few hours before the fight, foxholes would be connected by shallow crawling ditches, and in 1-2 days full profile trenches would be dug out.

Indeed, it was a commonplace field modifications on soviet tanks in 1944-45. A fashion, almost.

The original article says that he hit the barrel during a long burst. And there was sort of a small explosion inside the turret. Anyhow, these are all technical subtleties. What amazes me is the kind of mindset one should have to do it, while (a) being a cook, ( being alone, i.e. not participating in the fight and © having no AT weapons better than an axe. Wow!

Hero of Soviet Union I.P. Sereda I've heard the story today. It goes something like this. August 1941, Leningrad front, near Daugavpils, Lithuania. Sereda served as a cook. His unit was fighting off a german attack. While he was cutting firewood for his field kitchen (or whatever it is in English), a german tank (I guess, Pz-I or maybe some AC) maneuvered to his unit's rear and opened fire from nearby Sereda's kitchen. Meantime german infantry was slowly advancing on the front. The only anti-tank weapon Sereda had was a large axe. So, he climbed the tank and hit MG barrel with the axe. Tank ceased firing and didn't move anymore. When the fight was over, the tank was captured and its crew taken POW.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by pt: The Luftwaffe pilots interviewed in the programme, were far from confident.<hr></blockquote> Hindsight 20/20. I am sure that their commanders (and probably themselves, too) thought differently at the time.

Just between us, if you don't use hi-res mods, it'll fly on a much simpler PC than yours.

My take on it is that it was a real thing initially, but at some stage has become a cover story for Barbarossa preparations. A cover story that worked wonderfully well, I would add.

Here's one prototype for you:

Hehe... 40 posts out of thin air As I said somewhere near the beginning of this, we know straight from the horse's mouth that it was a countermeasure against russian infantry AT weapons (read, AT rifles). H. Guderian. Erinnerungen eines Soldaten. Heidelberg, 1951; quoting from russian translation Voenizdat, 1954 - Chapter VIII, Development of armored troops from January 1942 till February 1943): "For Pz-IVs, Pantheras and assault guns, special detachable screens were introduced in order to protect them from AT weapons of russian infantry." Anybody still wants to argue to the contrary? [ 10-28-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]</p>

Shurtzen were a protective measure against AT rifles, says Heinz Guderian in "Soldier's Memories". General-inspector of armor in Wehrmacht. If that's not authoritative enough, I don't know what is...

> This I've heard a lot and only buy up to a > point. Communism is just not good at a) > innovation, and b)quality stuff. Communism is a nice theory. Reallife USSR launched the Earth's first artificial satellite and the first manned space flight, among many other scientific and technological breakthroughs. I'd say, soviet contrbution to the technological progress in 30 years after WWII was second to none. Before the war, Russia made the way from illiterate peasant country torn by civil war to the top european industrial power within 15 years. Which involved a lot of innovation, too. I am saying that soviet optics could not possibly be better thamn Germans because German optics were state of art. Soviet war industry aimed for different criteria - mass quantity at sufficient quality. [ 10-27-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]</p>

AFAIK, LOMO was not the first, or the best quality, or the biggest volume optics plant in the country. But I do agree that, all factors in mind, soviet optics could not possibly be better than german. Just as obviously, they were not drastically worse, and on the outcome of the whole story - good enough. > in the soviet union the climate is very harsh, pray, tell me. BUt while uyou ae enlightening me, plse keep in mind that I lived there for the better part of my life, most of the time - in really harsh climate, but for almost 10 years in Moscow, too. > winter sets in much earlier then in this > country, In 1941, October was mild (iirc, never colder than -10), and even November was not that harsh. December and January were rather cold (hitting -35 on a few occasions). > hang around outside with a light shirt and > jeans in say 30 degree weather all day and > night and tell me how you feel. Oh, come on! German uniform was not "light short and jeans", of course. In fact, anything upto -15C should be quite livable in that uniform. > the germans could ahve acheived a fast vicotry > as planned if the operation was not stalled a > couple months for the reason of germany bailing > out mussolini in the balkans and greece. They couldn't. Starting in May would help, but hardly help enough. That's the whole point of argument. When they were stopped, they were not anywhere as close to the victory as they thought they were. Soviets had an ace up their sleeve (reserves) and even loss of Moscow would not be fatal, IMHO. > the fact that the germans faired so well > considering the awful decision imposed upon > them by hitler himself i think is a testement > to how effective a fighting force the germans > were in that era On that we can agree

Harsh winter was the last thing responsible for the failure of Barbarossa. By the late October Barbarossa was already a certainly doomed enterprise. The only reason somebody could have thought otherwise was fog of war. Because the same reserves that were used to mount a counteroffensive at the battle for Moscow could have been committed within and around Moscow. Besides, really low temperatures (lower than -20C) were happening in December. That's when the german offensive was already stalled as it was.

I think, I'd take three Pz-IVs instead of two Panthers any day (except flat desert terrain). But then, I mostly play Allies, and mostly use vanilla armor, anyway.