Skipper

Grisha: "Internacionale" is not russian anthem Nor is the above link, of course. Tom: Try this http://sovmusic.narod.ru/mp3/nesokr.mp3 and this http://sovmusic.narod.ru/mp3/tnoch.mp3 and this http://www.russaudit.ru/_MP3/den_pobedy.mp3 If it's neither of the three, then you have to give some more meaningful clues. [ April 28, 2002, 06:07 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

This one? Rise the huge country (Vstavay, strana ogromnaya)

"German generals lost the war on the battlefield, but took revenge in memoirs" W.Churchill (quoting from memory)

> The Russians have nothing that compares to the > weapon systems it has. That's a knowledgeable remark. Based on the experience of Desert Storm, no doubt? For starters, M1, M1A1 and M1A2 are completely different things, as far as combat capabilities are concerned. T-72A and T-80UB - as well. And so on... [ April 24, 2002, 07:15 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

Yelnya As you all know (all?), in August 1941 german AG Center assumed defensive stature in the area of Yelnya. Both tank groups were detached from 4th army, and army corps were attached to it instead. Frontline was bulging eastward (see the map). Until the end of August, RKKA was counterattacking in the area, hoping to recapture Smolensk. Yelnya operation was commanded by G.K.Zhukov. Defending the bulge were 6 german infantry divisions (15, 137, 78, 292, 268, 7). Zhukov had 8 divisions, including 5 rifle (107, 100, 19, 120, 303), two mechanized (106, 103) and one tank (102). Yelnya bulge has formed in mid July, as a result of breakthrough by german 2nd armored group south of Smolensk. Yelnya was captured by germans on 19 July. This bulge presented a very good starting for a possible flank attack on Western front, that would help germans to advance on Moscow. Main idea of the Yelnya operation was a decisive operational maneuver - simultaneous strikes from north and south at the base of the bulge, encirclement and elimination of german forces within the bulge. At the same moment, offensive activities from east were supposed to freeze german force, split it and eliminate in parts. Despite the roughly equal ratio of forces in the area (NB: soviet division was smaller than german), the front commander [Zhukov] managed tio gain significant superiority in manpower and firepower in the areas of main effort. STAVKA VGK DIRECTIVE #001253 To the commander of Reserve front On preparations to the operation for elimination of enemy's Yelnya group 25 August 1941 02:35 ... on 30 august left flank 24th and 43rd armies go on offensive with objectives: put an end to enemy;s Yelnya group and afterwards, attacking in the directions of Pochinok and Roslavl', by 8 September 1941 to reach the line of Dolgie Nivy, Hislavichi, Petrovichi. For that purpose: a) 24th Army, consisting of 8 rifle divisions, 1 tank division and 1 mech division - by concentric strikes to destroy enemy's Yelnya group and by 1st September to reach the line of Bol;shaya Nezhoda station, Petrovo, Stroina; afterwards, developing the advance, to deliver a strike in the direction of Pochinok; having captured the latter, by 8 September, to reach the line of Dolgie Nivy, Hislavichi. 43rd Army, leaving 22nd and 53rd divisions on the currently assumed defensive positions, and the main forces of the army on the defense of Spas-Demensk and Kirov positions, by 2 rifle divisions and 2 tank divisions on 30 August to go on offensive in the direction of Roslavl, and having captured Roslavl, by 8 September to reach the line of Hislavichi, Petrovichi... On 30 august, after a brief preparatory artillery strike, troops of 24th army, commanded by K.I.Rakitin started the offensive; in spite of spirited resistance broke through the german fortified defense and by 6th September created a threat of encirclement to german Yelnya group. German high command sent to battle for additional infantry division, but all their counterattacks were defeated, although several quite critical situations have occurred. Fearing the encirclement, german high command started hasty withdrawal of troops from the bulge. Following the withdrawing enemy, our troops advanced for 25 km, liberated Yelnya and defeated a very dangerous enemy group. Only extremely limited availability of armor and combat airplanes prevented our troops from completing the encirclement and eliminating Yalnya group of german-fascist troops. Unlike earlier localized offensive operations of 1941, where passive posture of soviet troops on the nearby parts of the front allowed the enemy to shift forces from other directions and localize our offensive, in Yelnya operation, to assist the 24th Army and ensure operation success, offensive actions were carried out by troops of 16th and 20th armies of the Western front on Smolensk direction and 43rd Army of Reserve front on Roslavl direction. Our losses were 31,853 men, including 10,701 KIA and MIA and 21,152 wounded. Zhukov delivered to Stavka a summarized report on the outcome of the operation. On its basis, Stavka VGK and General HQ issued an order and directives, summarizing the lessions learned from Yelnya operation, for information of the whole Red Army. To raise the offensive spirit in the army, institute of Soviet Guards was established. 100th, 127th, 153rd and 161st rifle divisions have become first guards units. Yelnya operation, despite the fact that the target of encirclement and elimination of german troops was not met, was the first successful offensive operation of front scale in the Great Patriotic War. Translated from: http://www.shortway.to/1941/eln.htm As far as I understand, this text was originally taken from the "Great Patriotic War" encyclopedia.

> but there are so many cases of disorganized and > uncoordinated counterattacks during the > frontier battles that I'd say the above case is > just one of the worse examples. Can you give some reference? Who, where, when, the source? It very much looks a fisherman tale. Totally contradicting anything that I know about how the RKKA commanders functioned in 1941 disaster. Basically, a commander who would give such an insane order in "normal" circumstances could expect to end his days in penal batallion. Regarding supply situation, in June-July it was not the problem of general availability (as long as the pre-war stocks lasted), but local logistical situations, that in many areas were totally disorganized by incomplete mobilisation (of trucks from the civil sector), german spearheads, air interdiction etc. Besides, mobilization of trucks and horses was not carried out. E.g., Rokossovsky's 9th mech. corps went to war with (supposedly) motorized infantry having no trucks or horses at all. This (disorganised logistics) is the primary mechanism of how element of surprise worked in germans' favour on the operational scale.

> There are stories of Soviet tanks going into > battle without any ammunition at all and little > fuel, with orders to ram German tanks. I think cases like that could only happen when the tank would be lost anyway. Like, a breakthrough from encirclement. In any other conditions, no sane soviet commander would give such an order.

> Who would have guessed, based on your "name"? Yeah, sounds quite finnish to me. Zukkov...

> I almost threw the book in the garbage when > Tania turned out to be American. Hehe... I had exactly same feeling. It's unbelievable that they cold make a movie even cheesier than that (already ultra-cheesy) paperback.

Nice site, as long as you don't take too seriously its authors as historians... E.g.: QTE At the beginning of war, most of the tanks in the Red Army were obsolete, in addition they were not organized in separate units as in German army, but were rather spread among infantry divisions as a support units. The cavalry were the only mobile troops of the Red Army. UNQTE Hmm... mech.corps, anyone?

Related to this topic is the subject of polish mounted charges in the war of 1939. According to genosse Guderian "Polish pomorskaya cavalry brigade, due to ignorance about characteristics and tactics of our tanks, attacked them with cold weapons and suffered horrible losses". Actual story: in 1939, Polish cavalry carried out 6 mounted charges, only two of them were in presence of german armored cars (1 September, Kroyanty) or tanks (19 September, Vulka Venglova). In both cases, armor was not the objective of the charge. In all cases, this was local initiative, contradicting Polish combat regulations. Particular case mentioned by Guderian (1st September, Kroyanty) was something like this: Raiding group of 18th pomorski ulan regiment, commanded by major Maletski and consisting of 1st, 2nd squadrons and 3,4 platoons of 3rd squadron (~200 men) was carrygin out a raid into the rear of german 76th motorized infantry regiment. At ~1900, leading platoon discovered about batallion of german infantry in bivouak, ~300 m from edge of forest. Trying to use the element of surprise, ulans formed up in 2 echelons, each consisting of 1 squadron, and charged. German batallion was not expecting anything like that and scattered in panic. However, polish leading platoon did not notice several armored cars that were hidden in the forrest. These ACs moved out and opened up with flanking MG fire. Major Maletsky's group immediately withdrew behind the nearest ridge, losing 26 people KIA and about 50 WIA. At 2100 of the same day, german 76th regiment resumed attacks on 18th ulans defensive positions (now occupied by 3rd and 4th squadrons). 4th squadron was cut off and destroyed. 3rd squadron withdrew in organized manner. End result: 18th ulans lost about 60% of men and horses, 7 MGs, 2 AT guns and a radiostation. So... not a brigade, by 2.5 understrength squadrons. Not tanks, but armored cars. Not attacked, but ambushing. Not horrible losses, but 26 KIA and 50 WIA. Guderian is quite a source!

The "rifle" seems to be PPSh SMG. Shooting on the move - if only for the noise effect.

His very own memoir. Rokossovskiy K.K. "Soldier's duty", Voenizdat 1988 He doesn't say that mounted charges were not practiiced at all, just that they didn't work, it was well known since WWI, and therefore mounted charges were not usually practiced. Besides, I've once read a long interview with a cavalry sergeant, who served on horse in 1941-1944. He said something along the same lines - he did several mounted charges during deep raids, but only on weak rear units, caught on the move. If enemy was even hastily dug in, they always dismounted.

I wonder why do the screenshots refer to USSR as Russia (what about Ukraine, Belorusia and other 12 union republics) and to (Great) Britain as England (again, what about Scotland etc)?

K.K.Rokossovsky (one of the best soviet front commanders of WWII who spent 20+ years in cavalry, from squadron to cav.corps CO) says that in WWII cavalry was nothing but erzatz motorized infantry. [ April 18, 2002, 07:32 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

In the same document, organisation of rifle batallion is: Batallion CO and HQ (4 officers, 1 enlisted) Comms platoon (field commutator, 5 radio stations, 3 horsecarts) 3 rifle companies HMG company (3 platoons x 4 HMGs = 12 HMGs) Mortar company (3 platoons x 2 mortars = 6 82mm mortars) 45mm guns platoon (2 45mm guns) Sanitary platoon Logistics (?) platoon - people in charge of food, clothes, ammo, other supplies etc Dorosh: 6 commissioned officers ain the company organisation are company commander, political deputy and 4 platoon commanders. Starshina is equivalent of first sergeant (i.e., top NCO, in chage of discipline, administration etc etc - just like you say). Bamse: > Do you have something simmular for the > Russians, Finns, Rumanians, Hungarians ? RKKA is Russians (Soviets, to be more precise). Source is http://rkka.ru, but it is all in Russian. From the same place, organisational structure of rifle division: Also from there, changes in firepower of standard rifle division, during WWII. ----- artillery salvo weight in kg -.-.- mortar salvo weight in kg _____ shots per minute, small arms (in terms of practical rate of fire)

Here goes: Rifle company, RKKA Organisation 04/400-416, dated 5 April 1941 HQ CO - pistol Political deputy CO - pistol Starshina (master sergeant) - rifle Cart driver - rifle, horse, cart Clerk - rifle Snipers - 2, rifles Messenger - rifle 3x RIFLE PLATOONS CO - pistol XCO - SMG Messenger - rifle 4x RIFLE SQUADS CO - autoloading rifle Machinegunner - LMG Assistant m/gunner - autoloading rifle SMG gunners - 3, SMG Riflemen - 6, rifles 1x MORTAR SQUAD (50mm mortar) CO - pistol team - 3, rifles, rifles 1x MG PLATOON CO - pistol Cart driver - rifle, horse, cart 2x HMG TEAMS CO - pistol team - 4, rifles 1x MEDICAL SQUAD CO - pistol Paramedics - unarmed 6 officers, 22 NCOs, 150 enlisted men [ April 08, 2002, 03:41 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

Since when is it OT on THIS forum???... Although, having taken a look at the list of recent threads...

This is what was going on in the north in August-September. What you see here is that in July soviet troops managed to split Army Group Center from Army Group North (Low Baltics), but in early August german counterstrike from Tukums-Dobele line on the left (northern) flank of AG Center managed to stop soviet advance and create a bulge around Riga. In turn, this counterpush did not reach it's ultimate objective (deblocking AG North), and another strike was made from that bulge in early September. On 16 September germans managed to punch a corridor all the way through to AG North, which Red Army closed on 26th - it was too narrow, and did not exist for long enough time. [ April 02, 2002, 06:09 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

double post [ April 02, 2002, 06:07 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

Except those that you already know (Glantz etc) - I don't think so. Not the archival stuff, methinks. By the way, another interesting thing is that "the other task" 1st Army received on 2nd August was related to an unexpectedly strong german counterstrike from the north. Several german divisions were redeployed from Romania to Poland (a move soviet army intelligence missed), and for the next 10 days Rokossovsky (1st Bel.Front CO) was thinking about keeping the lines, rather than crossing anything. This is why bridgeheads taken by 1st Army could not be reinforced. In september, 1st Polish army and soviet 47th Army made another attempt. This time around, 47th army spearheaded the advance, and once they reached eastern bank of Visla in Warsaw, they've given the front over to 1st Polish. On 13th September, several batallions of st Polish crossed Visla (all the while, cursing Army Krajova for not witholding the uprising until this very day). This attempt also failed, and no 23 September the operation was cancelled, remnants of landing parties returned to the eastern bank. This did not stop Rokossovsky's attempts to get Warsaw. Another operation was planned on 5th October. On 4th October, however, germans made a counterstrike in the north, and this broke up Rokossovsky's plan. Warsaw was freed by 1st Polish only on 17th January 1945.

What, nobody is interested? NB: 01.08 is also the day when Warsaw uprising has started. It is also 11 days after 1st Belorussian front (including 1st Army of Voisko Polskoe) has entered pre-war Polish border. This is the final push of operation Bagration, during which 1st Army was held out of the fray until this occasion. Note the lack of artillery shells and reserves. Quite fascinating stuff, imho.

Anyone wants a Polish scenario? I came across the following document (translation is mine, and I was mainly trying to keep to the original). If you want the original text, ask me. --------------------------------------------- Political report by head of Political Directorate 1st Army, Voisko Polskoe on crossing Visla river To Gen-Lt TELEGIN, 1st Belorussian Front War Council member (Front's top political officer) During the night of 31.07-1.08 and in following days units of 1 st and 2nd DP (infantry divisions) received the task to ford Visla river. 1st DP had to send across the river 2nd bat. of 2nd PP (infantry regiment), a penal company and a company of 3rd PP, to create and strengthen bridgeheads on Visla's left bank, and give opportunity to deploy further forces. Same task had to be carried out by 2nd DP - 2 batallions of 4th PP, 1 compny of 6th PP and one company of 5th PP. Suceeded in crossing: 2nd bat. 2nd PP, penal company, 1st and 2nd bat. of 4th PP, 1st company 6th PP. This operation has a serious meaning for our units, despite its failure. Despite the fact that crossing parties could not hold on the left bank. Visla was crossed by yong soldier, who in most cases was first time in combat, had no experience under fire, did not know what is a river crossing. During tis operation or soldier got used to enemy shooting, learned to entrench, met germans in a direct fight. Reasons of the failure are as follows: Means of crossing were of poor quality, and in insufficient quantity. Divisional engineers failed to perform their task. Boats and rafts built by them were not suitable for crossing Visla, which has very very strong current in this place. Boats and rafts were too heavy and not maneuverable enough (in 3rd PP water carried rafts upto 2 km down the river), poles were too short and heavy. Means of crossing were prepared 1-1.5 km from the river, and time to carry them to the bank was not allowed for, as a result of this 1st and 2nd divisions were late for the beginning of crossing. Divisional and regimantal recon units did not carry out reconnaissance, so there were no information about the enemy and units were rushed into attack blindly. Our artillery could not destroy enemy fire points (tr: I dont know the right term - any position with an MG or other heavy weapon), although it was shooting accurately. On the opposite bank, troops were landing in small groups, officers did not know operative plan, soldiers did not know their personal task. In 2nd PP these separated groups had no unified command, this led to germans having a simpler task: they easily broke up isolated groups and eliminated them one by one. During operation, there was no adequate commanding of crossing parties from senior officers. Lack of communications. Wirelines were constantly destroyed by the enemy. Radio communications were underutilized, and flashgun signalization was completely forgotten, although units were saturated with the latter. Artillery supporting 2nd DP did not have enough ammo to create a firewall in front of 4th PP trenshes. This considerably complicated the situation and caused significant losses. Enemy artillery was very active, companies of 2nd PP were completely eiminated (by it). Units of 2nd DP were ordered to disengage due to large losses, no possibility to send in reinforcements, besides, the army received a new task. Mood. (Tr: this is POLITICAL report, so here goes the main part from author's POV). Soldiers and officers were morally prepared to fight, and wanted it. Organisational mistakes undermined (their) belief in victory. Lack of artillery and aviation, much discussed before the battle, created among soldiers and officers an impression that they are going to certain death. Some were saying "I will not spare my life, but I want to lose it for Motherland's benefit", "I will go, but I know that I am going to a certain death". Depression and apathy could be felt in 3rd PP, where rafts were completely unsuitable, 2 out of 5 sank, 2 were carried downstream. These depressive moods were strengthened by th fact that many platoon commanders and some senior commanders - political deputy commander 2nd bat 2nd PP hor.Goss - went hiding and did not hurry to the crossing. IOne could hear questions like "Where are ou commanders?". Being late ffor crossing and disorganisation undermined confidence in command. Soldier were saying "with such officers we shall lose". At the same time, 2nd PP commander polk. Sepnitsky and his political deputy commander hor. Stampor were all the time at the crossing, bringing up hiding and slow moving soldiers, as well as some officers. Lector of 2nd PP, communist ppor. Yakubovsky inspired troops with personla courage, despite extremely strong enemy fire from all kinds of small arms, mortars and artillery. The first group landed successfully, suppressed with grenades a german workers batallion deployed on the other side and moved forward. News about this helped to brighen the mood of following groups, where soldiers were taking places in boats with enthusiam, saying "Quick, we'll help them" Let's crush the germans". During the 2nd day, mood was better. Batallions of 4th PP came to the crossing calm and disciplined. In 2nd bat 6th PP in the first day of crossing there was a panic, due to cowardice of batallion's political deputy commander hor. Avitovitsk and deputy company commander Galpern, and in 5th PP senior officers shot 12 soldiers for cowardice and panic. When news were received about failure of 1st DP operation, a gossip about big losses spread in the army and mood darkened. However, 4th PP soldiers returning from the left bank told about their fughting deeds; and (propaganda) work of political organs liquidated these moods. They returned full of determination to fight, and were telling that artillery was shooting accurately, that many germans were killed, that enemy has heavy losses. Besides, it should be said that first misfortunes of the operation contributed to spreding an opinion that we are not capable of independent (without Red Army) actions and successfulcombat operations. Many were saying "We need to learn a lot from Red Army, it is very difficult to fight without them". In combat, our (not used to fighting) soldier behaved with great courage. There were many cases of heroism. Soldier held position to the last moment, until withdrawal order was received. Cases of cowardice took place, but were few. Many line officers displayed great organisational abilities, fortitude and readiness to sacrifice their life. Capt. Yatskovsky was all the time in command of the 4th PP landing party, and maintained contact with regiment. Deputy commander of 5t batallion behaved heroically and died in combat. Politicall apparat as a whole in combat was up to the task. There are many examples of heroism and fortitude: ppor. Yakubovsky, ppor. Shubich, hor. Tsukerman and others. Authority of our officer has risen. Most serious drwaback in political work was not getting orders of the high command to the soldiers. Due to lack of combat experience, political apparat did not properly control building of the crossing means. At present, thanks to special politico-educational work, moods of depression and apathy were liquidated. Soldier is again ready to carry out combat tasks. Crossing Visla was fr him the first big, difficult, practical combat lesson Saying of capt Sheptitsky of 2nd DP is characteristical in this regard for most of the soldiers: "We did not know how to fight, and were scared; now we are not scared anymore, learned a lot and managd to use it". This is evidenced by fighting of our tankers, artillerists and infantrymen on the left bank of Visla, on a bridgehead that we have given over to Red Army, which will be duly reported to you, General, in my next report. Head of Political Directorate 1st Army Voisko Polskoe ppol. Zambrovsky TsAMO RF, F.233, Op.2380, D.14 L. 85-90 Original

Two panthers racking up such scores on defensive is not only realistic, it's pretty much expectable. Not to mention the fact that you played against AI. At war, very weird things sometimes happened. Lowly T-60 knocking out two Tigers. One well placed Stug breaking an attack of dozen T-34s. Etc etc. > On the eastern front a single tank at times > hedl up entire battalions and brigades. Please take these accounts with a pinch of salt. Especialy the "wiping out" part. I am not saying it didn't happen at all - just that authors of books like Panzer Ace are not terriby critical about their sources.

Just let them target the bunker from very close range and wait. Not in front of the bunker, and not on the sides, but behind it. Normal rifle infantry may spend 2-3 turns on it. Engineers are a lot better.