Skipper

> There were no Ferdinand’s in the 4th Panzer > army I know - hence no Jagdpanthers in the hypothetical QB. > Again German Archival materials discussed by > Armchair statisticians are in direct contrast > to your glib statements. Not really. Conclusions that armchair statisticians make are (or rather, your understanding thereof). > And explain away why 1st, 2nd and 5th Guards > Tank armies had to be pulled back Why do I need to explain away something that I am not debating. > and interior military districts. What? What interior districts? > figures of operational Panzer in the east 1943 > 20 July:1471 > 20 Aug:926 Think about it - on 5 July of the same year germans had 3000 operational tanks at the area of Kursk salient alone. Do I need to say more?

> The withdrawal, even after the Soviets opened > their own summer offensive, was orderly and did > not leave irreplaceable equipment lying about Actually, they did - and quite a lot.

> Doesn´t kill ratios tell something about > tactical abilities? Suppose, your tactical abilities are better than mine (I don't really believe it , but nevermind). For argument's sake, we can make a QB: large map, rolling hills, sparsely forrested. I take 2 Tigers, 2 Panthers and 4 Pz-IVs. You take 8 75mm Shermans and 4 Stuarts and try to attack. That's an order from your army CO, you see. Let's see what happens. > And who said that there were only Tigers and > Elefants at Prokhorovka? Oh, I wont bother to quote exactly, but somebody said something silly along the lines "germans lost only 1 Tiger".

> it is my understanding that in August there was > no real resistance in front of Army Group > Centre. Well... Smolensk defensive operation, 10 July - 10 September. 13th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th armies. Barbarossa plan called for decisive defeat of RKKA in border battles. In the sector of AG Center, this meant encirclement and decisive defeat of 3, 4, 10 and 13 armies. By early July this task was complete. After that, there wasn't supposed to be any serious consolidated resistance in that sector, and OKW deemed AG Center capable of continuing advance on Moscow with infantry divisions. Hence the OKW directive 33, which redirected both tank groups to north and south, respectively, and instructed AG Center to: "After improving situation in the area of Smolensk, and on the south flank, AG Center by sufficiently powerful infantry formations of both its armies must defeat the enemy that is still present in the area between Smolensk and Moscow, advance by its left flank as far as possible to the east, and capture Moscow. The fact that RKKA already managed to consolidate another strategic echelon was for germans an unforeseen emergency. Oops. Soviet counteroffensive attempts during Smolensk operation were a costly failure, with notable exception of Yelnya. Yet, AG Center was forced into defensive mode for precious 6 weeks. [ May 06, 2002, 09:05 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

> Red Army: 3'6 Million men (off which around 1 > Mill. Stawka reserves), 5670 tanks NOT COUNTING > THE MATERIAL RESERVES to fill gaps and > losses !!!!!!!!!!!! > German Army (p. 283 ff): > 940'000 men, 2778 Tanks and Assaultguns (OK, 20 > % OFF), NO RESERVES These figures are correct if used for the analysis of whether or not germans could have won. In fact, half the Stepnoy front and almost whole Stavke reserve was not used during Kursk battle itself - these reserves ensured success of the subsequent soviet offensive. According t my understanding, germans did have strategic reserves of about 400,000 people. > And you're right the case of "destroyed" > russian tanks are operational losses, while the > sole tiger and 14 elefants were consolidated > complete losses (as i mentioned correctly), the > operational losses of course were much higher. Yup - total of 1500 for the whole battle (2/3rds of the whole force). In comparison, soviet operational losses were ~6000 tanks and SPGs. Thing is, a lot of german operational losses, especially heavy tanks, have later been destroyed at repair bases, in the face of RKKA advances. > At average a german tankdivision had around 50 > tanks operational. Ditto. Speaking of Prokhorovka, it's not like there were only Tigers and Elefants - 2nd SS tank corps had a lot of medium tanks, too. Still, it was Vasilevsky's operational blunder. NB: not tactical, CM scale, but operational. Front-level decision and army-level execution. Bastables: > Guderian got it wrong as did von Mellentin and > both never mention numbers lost or replaced. But some armchair statistical analyst got it right? Hmm... Read the manual - after Kursk, germans had precious few operational tanks in the sector, while RKKA still had an intact tank army. The fact that RKKA has immediately converted in huge territorial gains.

It was a draw that totally satisfied the soviet side, and spelled the certain doom for germans. On the grand strategy level, arguably, germans lost the war in August 1941 (when AG Nord, unexpectedly for germans, was stopped at Smolensk). Actually, it is not entirely unreasonable to say that they lost before the shooting even started - simply by underestimating soviet mobilization potential over the first 4 weeks by about 50%.

Daniel, It's funny, but ALL your facts and numbers seem to be skewed towards your point of view. Like, germans had 2700, not 2000 AFVs. RKKA had 5,200 not 6000 AFVs. Ditto for manpower, losses, equipment characteristics etc. Also, you (your sources?) seem to be mixing operational losses with irreversible losses wherever needed. After reading your post, one can't help but wonder, what kind of numerical superiority should RKKA have had to eventually crush the III Reich on the battlefield if it was so crappy in the tactical department??? [ May 05, 2002, 04:35 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

> Skip, unless I'm very much mistaken Beevor got > access to a huge amount of Soviet AARs Well, as I said - it doesn't seem to show through. > Also, Skipper, do you have any suggestions for > a good book on Stalingrad for us "English-as-an- > ONLY-Language" people?? Alas, no.

I wonder how that "average" was calculated? For I can find you a selection of 100 tank vs tank engagements for which the average will be reversed. At Kursk battle soviet side had almost twice as many tanks as german (~5200 vs ~2700). Quality-wise, german force was a bit better. I've quoted Guderian and Mellentin above about how the outcome looked for germans. RKKA still had a tank army to throw around (and throw around they did). 6:1 you say? How comes?

"As a result of the failure of Zitadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. Armored troops, replenished with such difficulties, due toi large losses of equipment were for a long time out of action... Of course, russians hurried to exploit their success. And there were no more calm days on the eastern front. Initiative went fully to the enemy." © Guderian, Inspector General of panzer troops "By the end of 14 July, it has become obvious that german offensive has failed. From the german side, personnel losses were not so great, but LOSSES OF TANKS WERE HORRIBLE. Tanks of Panther type did not justify our hopes, they were easy to set on fire,... crews did not have sufficient skills. Of all Panthers that took part in the battle, on 14 July just a few machines remaind intact. Sitation in SS panzer corps was not any better... russian High Command during Kursk Battle acted with a great skill... by 23 July 4th Panzer Army was thrown back to its initial positions" © von Mellentin, chief of staff 48th Panzer Corps

> the Russian records tend to overestimate > casulties on the German side Usual story. German combat reports were not exemplary in that respect, either. I remember reading in some german memoir that OKW was dividing all divisional kill claims by some factor to estimate more accurately actual conditions of soviet combat formations. > and are impossible to find on the Russian side Impossible? Tell me more about it. There are accurate reports of soviet combat losses for almost all operations, on a daily basis. Since late 80-s they are available to public. German archives were available to public since late 40s. > at Kursk they claimed to have knocked out 145 > Tigers, three times the number deployed to the > battle, the German records state 33 1. See above about overestimating kill claims. 2. Ever seen "Tiger?" on the CM battlefield? 3. There is a difference between knocked out and destroyed/captured. German armor formations had outstanding recovery/repair service.

Yes, but not in 1943, obviously.

From soviet side, this story looked like this: In late December 1942, Stavka decided that in order to ensure successful strategic operaitons in south, Voronezh-Millerovo railroad must be taken under control. This idea was successfully implemented as Ostrogozhsko-Rossoshanskaya operation (13-25 January 1943). As a result of this operation, 2nd hungarian army was encircled and eventually destroyed. This operation suceeded so swiftly and decisively, that it surprised even soviet high command. It also surprised the germans, of course. Southern flank of 2nd german army was hanging loose, and german defensive positions there were hastily constructed and weak. RKKA successfully exploited this opportunity, too. Voronezhsko-Kastornenskaya operation, 24-29 January. The bulk of german second army was also encircled and by mid February - destroyed. As a result of these two operations, in soviet perception, german strategic front in south was significantly weakened. Therefore, a strategic offensive was planned, to exploit this perceived weakness, capture Kursk, Kharkov, Belgorod and Donbass area, and push german army behind Dnepr. The most significant strategic gain here would be actually Donbass, coal mining region. Taking the above said cities wouldn't hurt, either. Offensive started rather successfully, and soviet assessment was that germans are trying to do an organized withdrawal behind Dnepr. As we know now, this perception was far from reality, and in fact objective of german delaying actions was not to withdraw, but to gain time and beneficial positions for a counteroffensive. Blinded by outstanding successes of December and January, soviet high command missed this german intention completely, until it was way too late. So, by the time when german counteroffensive started on 19 February, soviet armies were weakened by several weeks of fighting, in linear strategic formation, 300 km off from supply bases and airfields, and without reserves. Oops. By the way, soviet situation could have been much, much better if german 6th armny would not continue to fight in encirclement as long as it actually did. Eventually, german counteroffensive was stopped not by thaw, but by 21st army and other troops redeployed from Stalingrad area as soon as fighting there was finished.

> Antony Beevors book is more overview, and he > seems to have taken his records from the > Russans, who were not known to keep as accurate > records. Apparently, Beevor used anecdotes from both sides, and never looked at real documents - daily combat reports or anything like that. Maybe he did, but it doesn't show in the book. In the battle of Stalingrad the whole german 6th Army was encircled and eliminated. Army HQ was captured. I doubt that german records of that particular event are somehow more accurate. Saying that soviet records are not as accurate (which is probably true, but it doesn't mean they are unusable) is, IMHO, mostly used as an excuse for not getting access to them. Since about 1989 this is a lame excuse, by the way. Central Archive of MoD is accessible to the public.

> Has that maybe been translated into German at > some time for the benefit of the socialist > brethren in the home of the workers and > peasants aka the German Democratic Republic? Hardly. It was not in sync with the party line at the time. For the benefit of socialist brethren there were different books. Like, Winzеr Вrunо. Soldat In Drei Armeen. — Berlin, Verlag Der Nation, 1969.

Oh, yeah. Here it's practically Saturday though. One day I may become angrier than I am lazy, and post something like "Report on combat actions of 10th tank division on the front of struggle with german faschism, during the period of 22.6 till 1.8.41, map 200 000" here. Or "Dispatch of 12 mech corps HQ on corps' combat actions during the period of 22 June - 1 August 1941".

By the way, what's TGIF?

Man, I feel like crying on somebody's chest! Played a ladder game today - non-fatal penetration from 76mm gun, then a 75 mm round bouncing off frontal plate of Stug III (mind you, it was supposed to penetrate at least 10% more at that distance). Needless to say, "his" shots don't bounce. Still made it a draw... And then look what we have here.

Aaaaargh... > I remember seeing something about the > production of Panthers vs T-34s around the > battle of Kursk. Why not King Tigers vs SU-76? > The Germans were getting something like 50 > tanks a month vs the Soviets 1000. Which makes it what, 600 tanks per year? Surely, they only built Panthers. Especially around Kursk. > Parity? Hard to say. This game will have a hard > time modeling the lack of coordination and > Stalins stupidity in the first weeks of the > war. NB: this is a tactical game. > In all reality it will be hard for a Soviet > player to mimick the ineffectiveness of the > Soviet droves until later in the war when the > Germans were lacking in every single part of > the battle. Mainly due to frost and mud, no doubt? > And the human wave technique worked. Yup, tell me more about it.

> The research Beevor did was simply amazing. Compared to what was before him - probably. On top of usual sources (Guderian, Rudel etc) the guy read some russian high school textbook, few pages from the Great Patriotic War encyclopaedia and perhaps even some divisional "Combat Page" issues. > he is a very uncoventional historian, IRRC he > doen't have any A levels > he's a jolly affable bloke to boot! Oh, I'd imagine this is probably true. Doesn;t make him a pro though. Look, as long as the book sticks to widely known facts, it's OK. But somehow when I was readng it, on every second page or so there was something to chuckle about. So, nevermind, the book is better than nothing, but plse don't take it for what it is not.

Oh, yeah, as far as english-speaking community is concerned, it's Glantz, Glantz and Glantz.

> Well, this particular Stalingrad book (being > the only one I've read) is pretty good. > (Despite what Skipper says.) I am not saying it's bad. Like I said in another thread few days ago, as medieval legend it's quite enjoyable reading. As long as you take whatever yarns the author spins with a huge grain of salt (like, divide everything by the factor of pi squared). The question, however, can it be a definitive book on the battle. The answer is a big no - like The Ballad of Roland cannot be a definitive book about crusades. I'd say, the best "human perspective" book I've read about Stalingrad was "In Stalingrad Dugouts" by V.Nekrasov. Written just a few years after the battle, and the author didn't care much about political correctness, and he was there from July till December, as sapper platoon commander. Finally, he was a damn good writer. Don't think it was ever translated into English though. http://militera.lib.ru/prose/russian/nekrasov1/index.html

Not worth. It's a mix of horror stories and fisherman's tales.

Pavlov's House was not fully encircled, in fact. Together with that mill, it was a very important forward position in the defense of Rodimtsev's division. There was re-supply and reinforcements, too. 28 people took part in this episode, but at any moment there were not more than 15. "This small group, defending a single house, has eliminated more german soldiers than hitlerites lost while capturing Paris" © V.I. Chuikov, "Battle of the Century" [ May 02, 2002, 07:22 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

"Normally" - on defense a rifle company would have a reserve platoon, and on offense batallion would have a reserve company. But this is a rather vague generalization.