photon

So, I've been thinking and reading, and want to advance a thesis for folks to hammer apart. It's a combination of @The_Capt's language of option spaces with battlefield physics. Maybe this is well known, but it's new to me. Here it goes.
The goal of a weapon system is to deliver kinetic energy (in the physics sense) to a particular place at a particular time. Let's gloss over how you pick that place and time (which is in its own revolution right now). You could think of each weapon system as having an energy-time curve that represents how much energy the killing bits have at a given moment. A couple of exampled:
1. A (ancient, thrown; not modern AT) javelin. The tip has very low energy until thrown. Steep curve (maybe < 1s) to get to maximum energy when just released, gradual decrease in energy as it follows a ballistic trajectory (maybe 5s), then it delivers its energy to the target.
2. A naval artillery shell. The case fragments have low energy while in magazine. Very alarmingly steep curve (< 1s) to get to very large maximum energy when exiting barrel. Gradually losing energy during long ballistic flight (30s+). Loses huge gobs of energy penetrating deck armor (< 1s). Shell explodes imparting large kinetic energy to fragments and gasses delivering energy to target.
3. An air launched cruise missile. The warhead has low energy on runway. Jet engines being to gradually impart both kinetic and gravitational potential energy (minutes to hours). The turbojet motor lights imparting a steady stream of kinetic energy as the missile travels (minutes to hours). The warhead explodes imparting large kinetic energy to fragments and gasses delivering energy to the target.
4. A grenade dropping drone. The drone takes off using the minimal energy necessary. It cruises to the target area using the minimal energy necessary for level flight. Grenade falls, explodes imparting kinetic energy to fragments and gasses delivering energy to the target.
Here's my thesis: the flatter the energy-time curve (i.e. the slower its area integral grows), the larger the option space for the weapon, and consequently the harder it is to defend against the weapon. Additionally, the flatter the energy-time curve, the smaller the signature of the weapon system, and the less it attracts counter fires.
I think we're seeing this dynamic in all theaters and modes of warfare in Ukraine, and the Ukrainians are putting on a master class in developing weapon systems that retain maximal option space for as long as possible. It's just precision that is changing the battlefield dynamic, it's weapons that retain their option spaces much longer than even a decade ago.

So, I've been thinking and reading, and want to advance a thesis for folks to hammer apart. It's a combination of @The_Capt's language of option spaces with battlefield physics. Maybe this is well known, but it's new to me. Here it goes.
The goal of a weapon system is to deliver kinetic energy (in the physics sense) to a particular place at a particular time. Let's gloss over how you pick that place and time (which is in its own revolution right now). You could think of each weapon system as having an energy-time curve that represents how much energy the killing bits have at a given moment. A couple of exampled:
1. A (ancient, thrown; not modern AT) javelin. The tip has very low energy until thrown. Steep curve (maybe < 1s) to get to maximum energy when just released, gradual decrease in energy as it follows a ballistic trajectory (maybe 5s), then it delivers its energy to the target.
2. A naval artillery shell. The case fragments have low energy while in magazine. Very alarmingly steep curve (< 1s) to get to very large maximum energy when exiting barrel. Gradually losing energy during long ballistic flight (30s+). Loses huge gobs of energy penetrating deck armor (< 1s). Shell explodes imparting large kinetic energy to fragments and gasses delivering energy to target.
3. An air launched cruise missile. The warhead has low energy on runway. Jet engines being to gradually impart both kinetic and gravitational potential energy (minutes to hours). The turbojet motor lights imparting a steady stream of kinetic energy as the missile travels (minutes to hours). The warhead explodes imparting large kinetic energy to fragments and gasses delivering energy to the target.
4. A grenade dropping drone. The drone takes off using the minimal energy necessary. It cruises to the target area using the minimal energy necessary for level flight. Grenade falls, explodes imparting kinetic energy to fragments and gasses delivering energy to the target.
Here's my thesis: the flatter the energy-time curve (i.e. the slower its area integral grows), the larger the option space for the weapon, and consequently the harder it is to defend against the weapon. Additionally, the flatter the energy-time curve, the smaller the signature of the weapon system, and the less it attracts counter fires.
I think we're seeing this dynamic in all theaters and modes of warfare in Ukraine, and the Ukrainians are putting on a master class in developing weapon systems that retain maximal option space for as long as possible. It's just precision that is changing the battlefield dynamic, it's weapons that retain their option spaces much longer than even a decade ago.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

What ticks me off is that he is going to go off and sulk now, muttering about how we are all “high on copium” and “smother alternative views.”  I resent the echo chamber accusation immensely.  Many people have put in a lot of time and effort to keep up with this war.  We are definitely pro-Ukraine but we also try to avoid the blinders as best we can. If they do not want to get beat up, come in with stronger arguments…and maybe some actual facts.
Is Russia still in this thing?  Definitely.  I am not sure exactly how but it is undeniable that they are still holding and even capable of tactical advances.  However as many from this individual’s camp are prone to do, there is a double standard against Ukraine in just about all things. I am willing to bet Russia winds up taking about as much as Ukraine re-took last summer.  To them this is a clear sign “Russia can never be beaten!”  Meanwhile when Ukraine did it last summer, “see they will never push Russia out!”  It really doesn’t matter what happens the conclusions are always the same.
Ukraine is holding on just as well, if not better than Russia.  The UA is undergoing reforms.  The West is slowly getting its act together - this NATO collective mechanism for support is a good idea, if it doesn’t get weighed down in bureaucratic sludge.  Russia is not “getting better” by any stretch.  Advances come at horrendous costs.  Losses continue to stack.  They do appear to have some concerning glimmers of C4ISR daylight but they never really coalesce.  Ukraine continues to demonstrate significant strategic strike acumen.
As to the finish line…who knows?  Could Russia operationally collapse…sure, they have twice before.  Can the full on strategic collapse…definitely.  They did in 1917 and 1991, they can do it again.  Hell Priggy’s wild ride had real potential.  Will they?  Again, we do not know.  The second anyone from either side of this goes “this is how this war will end”, I for one, stop listening.  All we can do is hold on and hold fast.

No, HUR issued a video with a short cadre of ignition inside the ship. It's claimed communication and contrtol system was damaged by fire. More likely diversion, even probably by the hands of crewman, bribed by HUR.  Recently HUR made a statement, that they had own agent from BSF sailors, who set GPS tracker on "Moskva" cruiser and this as if helped to track Russian ship. Maybe just PsyOps to force Russian FSB to see HUR agent in any sailor %)
 

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

Do you have a sense of how they're accomplishing this? It seems like they're doing things that need a big logistical footprint - still firing lots of shells, still using massed armor (?!). But I haven't seen as many videos in the thread of hits on Russian near-front logistical nodes. Just not newsworthy? Or are they more dispersed? How is their supply of trucks and fuel vehicles holding up? Do we have satellite shots of depos like we do for tanks? For a while they were using civilian vehicles for logistics. Has that eased?

Do you have a sense of how they're accomplishing this? It seems like they're doing things that need a big logistical footprint - still firing lots of shells, still using massed armor (?!). But I haven't seen as many videos in the thread of hits on Russian near-front logistical nodes. Just not newsworthy? Or are they more dispersed? How is their supply of trucks and fuel vehicles holding up? Do we have satellite shots of depos like we do for tanks? For a while they were using civilian vehicles for logistics. Has that eased?

@The_Capt did this very thing:
 

Here's my take from reading the thread and a bunch of OSINT:
This is one where I think it's meaningful to separate "Russia winning" from "Putin's regime winning". I'd suggest that on day 1 of the war, those two were in alignment: Russia wins by absorbing a large neighboring state into its sphere of influence with only targeted bloodshed (at the ruling elite). Putin's regime wins by propping up a vision of pan-Russian nationalism and empire building that cements Putin as Czar.
On day today of the war, those visions of victory are no longer in alignment. Russia has lost - they will not absorb Ukraine into their sphere of influence with only targeted bloodshed, and have actively reinforced the global ruleset by pushing Finland and Sweden into NATO and reawakening Europe to the necessity of self-defensive capability. They've also offered the west a huge opportunity to figure out what fighting a 21st century peer war looks like.
For Putin's regime, victory looks like staying in power. And he's been far more successful at that than we collectively predicted. Even Prigozhin's coup-like thing proved a manageable threat (for reasons that are unclear to me). Somehow recon-by-meat-assault isn't provoking civil unrest, &c. &c. So that one's not a loss for Putin yet. Economy still appears to be sort of functioning? Though it's hard to see how he can keep it that way indefinitely?
For Ukraine, the day 1 objective was "remain an independent and free society". That still appears to be their objective, and they're doing a yeoman's job of that. Jury's still out, though, on what the end state looks like.

Here's my take from reading the thread and a bunch of OSINT:
This is one where I think it's meaningful to separate "Russia winning" from "Putin's regime winning". I'd suggest that on day 1 of the war, those two were in alignment: Russia wins by absorbing a large neighboring state into its sphere of influence with only targeted bloodshed (at the ruling elite). Putin's regime wins by propping up a vision of pan-Russian nationalism and empire building that cements Putin as Czar.
On day today of the war, those visions of victory are no longer in alignment. Russia has lost - they will not absorb Ukraine into their sphere of influence with only targeted bloodshed, and have actively reinforced the global ruleset by pushing Finland and Sweden into NATO and reawakening Europe to the necessity of self-defensive capability. They've also offered the west a huge opportunity to figure out what fighting a 21st century peer war looks like.
For Putin's regime, victory looks like staying in power. And he's been far more successful at that than we collectively predicted. Even Prigozhin's coup-like thing proved a manageable threat (for reasons that are unclear to me). Somehow recon-by-meat-assault isn't provoking civil unrest, &c. &c. So that one's not a loss for Putin yet. Economy still appears to be sort of functioning? Though it's hard to see how he can keep it that way indefinitely?
For Ukraine, the day 1 objective was "remain an independent and free society". That still appears to be their objective, and they're doing a yeoman's job of that. Jury's still out, though, on what the end state looks like.

Whenever you suggest that folks do this, I sit down and make a list of questions I have that I don't think I've seen answers to:
1. Trains. Are there any operative trains in theater? If so, whose and why? Surely whacking locomotives with Lancets is better than hitting individual tanks or even individual C2 vehicles. We've seen both sides targeting fixed rail infrastructure, but I haven't seen videos of locomotives taking hits. Too fast moving? Both sides keeping them far from lines?
2. What do the Ukrainian fortifications look like behind the front lines? Seen some evidence of fortification in the north, and pictures of various types of pre-fab bunkers being tested out. Are the Ukrainians laying mines in volume? If so, where?
3. In the event of a breakout (which seems really hard to fathom right now), how would you secure GLOC against what would be a pants-crappingly terrifying insurgency/asymmetrical fight?
4. Inasmuch as Russia's been able to advance recently, it's by bombing everything down to the ground along the axis of advance. How, hypothetically, would either side take and hold a large urban area with an unfriendly local population armed with FPV drones? In contrast to even a Javelin, the drones have a very small launch signature and a longer range, so you're dealing with trying to triangulate their radio emissions?

Here's my take from reading the thread and a bunch of OSINT:
This is one where I think it's meaningful to separate "Russia winning" from "Putin's regime winning". I'd suggest that on day 1 of the war, those two were in alignment: Russia wins by absorbing a large neighboring state into its sphere of influence with only targeted bloodshed (at the ruling elite). Putin's regime wins by propping up a vision of pan-Russian nationalism and empire building that cements Putin as Czar.
On day today of the war, those visions of victory are no longer in alignment. Russia has lost - they will not absorb Ukraine into their sphere of influence with only targeted bloodshed, and have actively reinforced the global ruleset by pushing Finland and Sweden into NATO and reawakening Europe to the necessity of self-defensive capability. They've also offered the west a huge opportunity to figure out what fighting a 21st century peer war looks like.
For Putin's regime, victory looks like staying in power. And he's been far more successful at that than we collectively predicted. Even Prigozhin's coup-like thing proved a manageable threat (for reasons that are unclear to me). Somehow recon-by-meat-assault isn't provoking civil unrest, &c. &c. So that one's not a loss for Putin yet. Economy still appears to be sort of functioning? Though it's hard to see how he can keep it that way indefinitely?
For Ukraine, the day 1 objective was "remain an independent and free society". That still appears to be their objective, and they're doing a yeoman's job of that. Jury's still out, though, on what the end state looks like.

Here's my take from reading the thread and a bunch of OSINT:
This is one where I think it's meaningful to separate "Russia winning" from "Putin's regime winning". I'd suggest that on day 1 of the war, those two were in alignment: Russia wins by absorbing a large neighboring state into its sphere of influence with only targeted bloodshed (at the ruling elite). Putin's regime wins by propping up a vision of pan-Russian nationalism and empire building that cements Putin as Czar.
On day today of the war, those visions of victory are no longer in alignment. Russia has lost - they will not absorb Ukraine into their sphere of influence with only targeted bloodshed, and have actively reinforced the global ruleset by pushing Finland and Sweden into NATO and reawakening Europe to the necessity of self-defensive capability. They've also offered the west a huge opportunity to figure out what fighting a 21st century peer war looks like.
For Putin's regime, victory looks like staying in power. And he's been far more successful at that than we collectively predicted. Even Prigozhin's coup-like thing proved a manageable threat (for reasons that are unclear to me). Somehow recon-by-meat-assault isn't provoking civil unrest, &c. &c. So that one's not a loss for Putin yet. Economy still appears to be sort of functioning? Though it's hard to see how he can keep it that way indefinitely?
For Ukraine, the day 1 objective was "remain an independent and free society". That still appears to be their objective, and they're doing a yeoman's job of that. Jury's still out, though, on what the end state looks like.

@The_Capt did this very thing:
 

Whenever you suggest that folks do this, I sit down and make a list of questions I have that I don't think I've seen answers to:
1. Trains. Are there any operative trains in theater? If so, whose and why? Surely whacking locomotives with Lancets is better than hitting individual tanks or even individual C2 vehicles. We've seen both sides targeting fixed rail infrastructure, but I haven't seen videos of locomotives taking hits. Too fast moving? Both sides keeping them far from lines?
2. What do the Ukrainian fortifications look like behind the front lines? Seen some evidence of fortification in the north, and pictures of various types of pre-fab bunkers being tested out. Are the Ukrainians laying mines in volume? If so, where?
3. In the event of a breakout (which seems really hard to fathom right now), how would you secure GLOC against what would be a pants-crappingly terrifying insurgency/asymmetrical fight?
4. Inasmuch as Russia's been able to advance recently, it's by bombing everything down to the ground along the axis of advance. How, hypothetically, would either side take and hold a large urban area with an unfriendly local population armed with FPV drones? In contrast to even a Javelin, the drones have a very small launch signature and a longer range, so you're dealing with trying to triangulate their radio emissions?