photon

So, I've been reading Ian Toll's Pacific Trilogy, and in "Twilight of the Gods", he writes this: By contrast, according to Wylie, a cumulative operational strategy does not involve territorial offensives and pitched battles, but a "less perceptible minute accumulation of little items piling one on top of the other, until at some unknown point, the mass of calculated actions may be large enough to be critical". It weaponizes the logic of "death by a thousand cuts." In the Pacific, cumulative strategies chipped away at the economic and political foundations of Japan's imperial empire. It struck me that the Russians appear to have adopted what Toll calls a "sequentialist" strategy: "we will march to Kiev 100 yards of dirt at a time", while the Ukranians appear to have adopted a cumulativist strategy: "we will degrade the Russian ability to make war until it collapses". I think that analysis broadly harmonizes with The_Capt's description of warfare as decision space shaping. A sequentialist attack changes the decision space (the US capture of Saipan, for example, or the Japanese capture of Borneo), but cumulativist strategies (building a metric crapton of escort carriers; destroying the Japanese merchant marine) lead to breakthroughs and shorten the overall war by undeciding things and forcing bad decisions on the part of the adversary. In many ways it feels like the Russians are duplicating Japan's WWII playbook while the Ukrainians are duplicating that of the Allies.

One thing I wonder is whether the flow of troops and material into the Kherson area is positive or negative right now? If the Russians are moving more men and equipment across the river, why not wait until they stop the flow to cut off a richer pocket? I suppose you'd have to weigh other political and strategic concerns and time dropping the bridge with other action along the southern front?

One thing that's been eyebrow raising to me is the nadir angle of so many of the drone videos - it looks like at least some of the drones are flying right over the things they're recording at relatively low altitudes. There are certainly some low-angle obliques, which makes sense to me. It looks like the nadir shots are often recon/targeting, and the low-angle shots are BDA? And the people whom the drone sees often don't respond in the way I'd expect (getting out of the way of the likely soon incoming rounds). Which suggests that not only do they not have effective anti-drone weapons, but they don't have a system to detect when they're being observed by drones *flying right over them*. German submarines suffered because our centimetric radar was invisible to German radar-detectors, a problem they never really solved. I wonder what systems to detect drone-based observation would look like? Even if you can't shoot the drones down reliably, knowing when you're being observed would be valuable I'd think?

Alway an interesting read. Out of curiosity, have you read the short book "Introduction to Strategy" by Andre Beaufre? He's a French military theorist who wrote a manual for western strategy in the face of the cold war (the book is 1963, so right after the Cuban Missle Crisis). He conceives of strategy in the broad decision-based framework that you do, and articulates a theory of interior and exterior maneuver to maximize one's freedom of action while minimizing one's adversary's freedom of action, leading to a psychological decision. In his terms, Russia has failed at both interior (i.e. in theater) and exterior (i.e. on the global stage) maneuvers, deeply restricting their freedom of action. Ukraine has engaged in very effective interior maneuvers -- developing a high cohesion hybrid light infantry defense -- and very effective exterior maneuvers -- successfully courting and maintaining broad international support. Similarly, the NATO countries have not (publicly at any rate) engaged in any interior maneuvers, but have engaged in exterior maneuvers to both reduce the freedom of action of Russia and increase the freedom of action of Ukraine.

Grognard escalation: When revolutionary changes happen, we look for ways to obscure them. This is, I think, an example. The difference between ships at anchor and ships on the move *seemed significant* to contemporary military theorists in the same way that it's tempting now to say, "well, the Russians are bad at mechanized warfare". That's a factor that *obscures* a revolutionary change in tactics and operations. It turns out that whether capital ships are at anchor or not, they are terribly vulnerable to the combination of dive and torpedo bombers and to hammer and anvil tactics. Everything materially needed for attacks of the sort the Repulse and Prince of Wales suffered was in place in 1940 for every major power. The British had the Beaufort and Swordfish, the Americans the Catalina and Devastator, the Germans the Ju-88 and Ju-87, the Japanese the G3M and Kate and Val. And most of those were products of the mid 1930s, so we can see that navies are contemplating and wargaming the sort of operation that sunk the Repulse and PoW for at least half a decade before it happened. In contrast to what that book argues, *most* major powers (maybe not the Italians and Soviets) could execute an operation like the sinking of the Repulse. The Germans rendered HMS Illustrious combat ineffective with similar aerial tactics about a year *before* the sinking of the Repulse despite the Illustrious having CAP overhead. What the book you cite is pointing to is a difference in quantity, not quality. That is, between late 1940 and early 1942 we moved from *some* land based aerodromes projecting no-go zones for enemy shipping to essentially *all* land based aerodromes projecting that same no-go zone (and the no-go zones growing larger as the tactics and weapons employed by land based bombers caught up to their range). A British or American admiral proposing an operation involving major capital ships without air support in late 1943 would be laughed out of the room. When the Japanese actually undertook such operations, they were (without exception) suicidal. To bring home the comparison to what we're seeing now, we're in that transitional period where it probably is suicidal to engage in mechanized operations without a snow-globe like anti-ISR bubble surrounding your force. No one has *developed* that snow-globe-like anti-ISR bubble yet, so we're in an interim period like the period between, say Coral Sea and Philippine Sea. At least one side in the conflict can project power in this new way (maybe both? we haven't seen Ukraine present mass to be targeted yet). Neither side (I don't think) has developed a plausible defense against the new way of projecting combat power. The USN eventually came up with one; the combination of excellent radar, picket destroyers, CAP, and the CIC. I think some of the discussion here is about what that looks like on land.

It's like the transition from battleship-centric fleets to carrier-centric fleets. Battleships stopped being viable frontline units when the combination of submarines and carrier-based strike aircraft extended the lethal range of fleets (and airbases!) from the 40ish km range of battleships to the 300ish km range of strike aircraft. The logistical weight of battleships didn't help their cause either. We managed to repurpose ours as floating artillery batteries. Tanks might see a similar second life as you suggest. edit: And floating AAA batteries; I wonder if tanks can be repurposed to specialize in anti-UAV missions? it is a collision of systems, one we recognize, the other is something else. I think we're seeing in the Battle of Kiev something like the Battle of Taranto. Everyone should have realized that naval combat was fundamentally different after the British rendered three Italian battleships combat ineffective with cloth covered biplanes. But the British themselves didn't see the dramatic systemic shift and lost the Repulse and Prince of Wales more than a year later.

Thanks - I'll pick those up! Got to hit the library next week to pick up Beaufre's Introduction to Strategy, so will snag those as well. I'm on a second re-read of the Expanse right now; quite good. I also think Neal Stephenson's Anathem (oddly) does a nice job of analyzing strategic and operational art. In particular, it conceives of states of the world as points in a large vector space, and operations as moving through a world-line that's connected to the outcome you desire. That sounds a bit like the decision theory you're exploring. Reading this thread, what's jumped out to me is the analogy to the Pacific Theatre in WWII with the Russians playing the part of the Japanese. Each chose to launch an attack driven by ideological and operational concerns rather than strategic concerns. In the same way that the Japanese plan hinged on the Americans tapping out, the Russian plan appears to have hinged on a collapse of Ukranian resistance. Like the Japanese, they had a closing window when it appeared that strategic success was within reach, driven for the Japanese by the oil embargo and for the Russians by Ukraine's gradual tilt westward. Operationally, the Japanese launched bold offensives that they could not support. They never had control of their lines of communication, especially after the USN figured out how to make torpedoes that actually exploded. The degradation of our submarines on the Japanese merchant navy are similar to the NLAW equipped light infantry wreaking havoc in the Russian LOCs. Like the Japanese, the Russians are penny-packeting troops into operations that have no momentum. Compare the repeated company sized attacks near Kiev with the flow of 500ish troops at a time into Guadalcanal on destroyers. Like the Americans, who carefully husbanded their (temporarily irreplaceable) naval assets until either strategic necessity (Coral Sea) or a huge tactical advantage (Midway) made their collective risk more palatable. Like the Americans, the Ukrainians have denied the Russians the decisive battle the appear to want, rather focusing on small attritional engagement and friction. Time will tell whether Russian operational plans adapt in a way that Japanese operational plans did not. Tactically, non-obvious factors in both Russian and Japanese formations turned out very important -- Japanese ships were light on AAA, had inferior (if any) CICs, and had poor damage control facilities and procedures, all of which turned out to be really important. Russian armored vehicles appear to have insufficient flotation and poor mobility maintenance, which appears to be really important. Beyond that, American information supremacy eventually tilted carrier combat decisively in favor of the Americans, who could deliver CAP formations to just the right place to disrupt Japanese attacks. Similarly, Ukranian information dominance (?) is allowing them to attrit Russian formations and LOCs in ways that appear to seriously disrupt Russian attacks. It's really bewildering to try and make sense of. But thinking in terms of the Pacific has helped me some.

This is really interesting - are there any good books that are primers on this sort of operational thinking? (I've been a lurker for the past 20 years, but this made me post! Huzzah.) (Also, if you've had a hand in CMCW, many thanks. I've found it a really compelling simulation; forced me to learn to think really differently from either CMBS or the WWII games.)

I've kept a G4 450 with OS9 stashed in my closet to occasionally get a fix slogging through Normandy, Russia, and Italy. It's got the public beta, CMBO, CMBB, and CMAK and not a lot else. Really exciting to see CM return to the Mac after such a long exodus! Looking forward to recapturing the excitement of playing Last Defense over and over, or my first PBEM game before smoke rounds were toned down. - Bill

But when every single allied company sized unit comes with organic mortars, all guns are short for this world once they're spotted. The 150 is big enough that it's often spotted after one or two shots, and then if your opponent is patient, it's dead to rights. Are they effective? Of course. Would I rather have a company of riflemen on the defense? Yep. - b.

And which Shermans are you shooting up? If they have a (W) in their name, then they have wet ammo storage and are much less apt to ignite. The Americans realized that having exceedingly flammable tanks was by and large a bad idea and took steps to fix the problem and save the lives of crewmen with wet ammo storage bins and armor reinforcement over the ammo storage areas. If you want to torch things, shoot at either the 105 close support tanks or flamethrower tanks. - b.

I'd add that it's also worth it to check and see if the unit you want looking has binoculars. Most HQ units do, as well as machineguns. They're much better at long distance spotting than regular rifle squads. I usually have my heavy weapons in the rear unhidden with small cover arcs and my front line of troops hidden with small cover arcs. Sharpshooters are a wonderful thing as well. - b.

Are these in the game? I played a game last night with '44 pattern British Airborne and they had no such thing. Do they only appear in '45? Now I'm gonna have to go check... There's something deeply satisfying in the game about taking out enemy heavy armor with only hand held AT and close assaults... - b.

I believe what you're seeing is the effect of terrain elevation. You can't have two buildings in adjacent tiles of different elevations. Frustrating, but possible to work around. - b.

It the cover modifier related to the unit size? In open ground there may not be enough cover for a 12 man squad, but a sharpshooter or a ATR team may find a hunkey dory log to hide behind. I'd like to see something like: C0 = base cover value C(f) = actual cover value C(f) = C0 * sqrt(12 / unit_size) That would allow small units to find good cover in relatively open ground while still keeping good cover the best.

Last game I smoked a Jumbo76 that was trying to flank my JpzIV with a 50mm AT gun. My opponent was unamused. -Photon

It would probably be best if they fought against a human opponent too, someone who will test their defenses more than the AI attacking. - Photon

While certainly not antithetical, they can be mutually exclusive. Consider that there are a fixed number of hours that a company can allocate to a given project. Work within this project then becomes a zero sum game. If BTS spends 100 hours improving the graphics that is necessarily 100 hours they will not spend improving gameplay. Now, a balance must be struck between the two areas of concentration, but no one on this board is even remotely capable of dictating what this balance should be. Only BTS can do that. It's ok to question BTS about anything you want. But when they answer (several times, definitively) you should stop arguing. It wastes their (very precious) time and yours as well. We should remember that every hour we spend bugging BTS about something they've answered already is one hour later CM2 will arrive on our doorsteps. - Photon

I guess the whole he dosen't know where you are was the bold stuff I had going on. If you aren't where the attacker thinks you are he's in a boatload of trouble. You should know not only where the attacker is, but where the attacker thinks you are (and don't be there!) If he attacks in force into empty space and you appear on both of his flanks as arty starts to rain down, well, that's a beautiful thing to watch. I think we're saying the same thing. You used forward manouvre to flank the attacker, I (generally) use rearward. The important thing is that the defender can steal the initiative from the attacker by being somewhere he shouldn't and counterattacking (or putting up stubborn resistance) - Photon

One of the things i've used a couple of times is to defend behind the VLs - when the attacker reaches them all he finds is a couple of TRPs - then the 105mm lovin' starts. - Photon

A lot of the thinking in the Preview thread is way over my tactical pea-brain. This is a summation of my little thinking on defense. The key to defending well is to exploit the advantages of the defender to overcome the numerical superiority of the attacker. The advantages of the defender are: 1. He should get to shoot first 2. Foxholes 3. TRPs 4. TRPs Number One is pretty self explanatory - you get off the first shot in the majority of situations unless the attacker is firing blind. If he is that suits me fine. When he runs out of bullets for the infighting he will see the error of his ways. Of course, firing blind will be effective if your men are in obvious places. So the first rule: Be somewhere he thinks you won't be. Now, this rule has variations. If you can waste the attacker's effort by being somewhere he thinks you won't be, you can do that twice or three times! Move, fall back! Break contact and force the attacker to make it again. The defense that dosen't move is a poor defense indeed. Number two again is pretty self explanatory. Each infantry unit gets a foxhole (or two) which can dramatically increase their life expectancy. How best to use these is more complicated. If you start your men at your main line of resistance when they fall back you lose the advantage of the foxholes you have dug. Dig two rows. One as a secondary line of resistance, and another as an intermediate line. We're going to get some Triplex Acies Action Going. The Roman Triplex Acies was a formation of three lines. The first was engaged in active fighting, the second was a reserve for the first, and the third was a reserve for the second. When the men of the first line grew tired (stabbing barbarians gets old after a couple of hours) they would withdraw and a man from the second line would fill their place. When he got tired (or killed for that matter) the man who was in the third line moved up to take his place. The original fighter is now the second line. They rotated soldiers to keep fresh men in the fight. You too can do this! Fall back your first line (no foxholes) to the third line and let the second line fight. Then when the second line begins to waver fall it back into the third line and advance the third line in counterattack! The thing to avoid is sitting there and slugging it out with the attacker. Rotate and move troops to both confuse him as to your strength and keep fresh men in the fight. Another thing from the ancient world that you can use is the tactics of Hannibal at Cannae. The Romans pressed hard the middle of his men, only to have them rout and retreat. The Romans, heartened by this pressed their attack, filling the void between the flanks of Hannibal's army. When his center stopped it's ordered retreat and turned to fight the enveloped Romans were destroyed. If you fall back a part of your line that is pressed you can flank the attacker without moving any men! It's also very helpful to have a reserve to fill the gap between your line that retreats and the line that holds. This makes much more sense with pictures... - Photon

I guess there are two differnt mindsets among CM players these days. I would see a battle result of what you describe as good tactics by your opponent. He identified your primary anti-tank asset before exposing his armor and removed it. Then he employed his armor in a decisive way from a protected situation. That isn't luck - it's skill. Now, it he hit your AT gun with a random barrage without spotting it, well, that is luck and you just have to deal with it and fight on! (at least IMO) It seems to me that even if you only have Shermans and Panzer IVs (A Panzer IV is pretty much as hard to kill as a KT with infantry and schrecks) running around unopposed they will wail on you. The solution isn't to restrict what tanks are available, the solution is to learn how to maul tanks without a heavy hitter. I once took out both Stugs and the Tiger in Last Defense with *only* riflemen. It can be done, and the challenge is what makes the game fun. If you want to play a game where you get all the heavy armor you want and I get only infantry I'd love it. I'll even give you a +50% modifier. It's all about challenge and learning from others tactics! - Photon

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> My point is, it seems as though you have changed the armor points becouse of X complaints, but you refuse to look at the Y compliants and just say that it aint gonna happen unless somebody comes up with a better idea. I dont get this. It is you game so naturally you can do hat ever you want with it, but it sees pretty clear that you are looking at it from one side. After all, I can only speculate that the changes made came from with in BTS. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The key difference you overlook here is that the points for a particular vehicle are determined not by what Steve and Charles think they should be, but by the results of a mathematical formula they have chosen. The point distribution is simply arbitrary (as far as I know - it would be very difficult to sample good data by which you might arrange a formula to predict those) In the one case a new formula must be proposed which will appropriately price more than a hundred vehicles. In the other a new allocation must be proposed which will set a total of 5 numbers. Of the two tasks the former is the more difficult by far and therefore demands more rigor and thoughtfulness from one who would propose changes. I would wager that if someone presents a comprehensive formula set with justification that produces results that are believable for the whole range of vehicles then BTS would consider it. - Photon

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Churchill VII-VIII These things have 150mm armor and can only be taken out by the long 75 and long 88 mm guns beyond 100m. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> You neglect the following german units that can kill the Chruchill VII and VIII: Heer: Rifle 44 Squad Rifle 45 Squad Volksgrenadier SMG Squad Volksgrenadier Rifle Squad Pioneer Squad (!) Sicherung Squad Sturmgruppe Squad Panzergrenadier Squad Motorized Squad Panzergrenadier Pioneer Squad Motorized Pioneer Squad Escort Squad Platoon Headquarters Company Headquarters Battallion Headquarters Panzerschreck Team Flamethrower Team 150mm Infantry Gun 88mm Pak AT Gun 88mm Flak AT Gun Antitank Mines This is an abbreviated list of course. There are many many more units that can kill the Churchill. Not to mention that the short 75 it packs can almost penetrate a bag of doritos. Almost. The point of that is that pretty much any unit can kill just about any other unit (especially infantry). That dosen't mean it's easy to do, but that's where skill and luck weigh in. Combat Mission isn't about facing off one tank against another, it's about fighting a good effective combined arms battle! - Photon

My tactics on defense stem ultimately from how Hannibal defended at the battle of Cannae a couple thousand years ago. I call my particular way of defending a ridged defense. With a ridged defense there are only two places an attacker can concentrate his manouvre elements. He can either hit a ridge or a valley. A ridge is a manouvre element placed some forward of the mean position of the main line of resistance. A valley is a manouvre element placed some distance behind that line. The first situation looks something like this: The big arrow is the attackers main thrust, the little arrows are skirmish forces - the bumpy things are my MLR, and the squares are reserves. The defender here has several options. First, he can reinforce that ridge that has been attacked and blunt the attacker's momentum, forcing him to either stall or commit reserves. Assuming that the attacker's main force hits with a 3/1 advantage, doubling the strength of your ridge will make it 3/2 and probably stall the attack. His other option is to (under the cover of smoke or by squads) fall his ridge back to behind the line of his valleys. The attacer, if he exploits this and pushes into the gap the defender has created will find himself not only facing the reinforced ridge to his front, but not less than one valley firing into his flank. This is getting longish so I'm going to talk about attacks into a vally later - maybe tomorrow. - Photon Doh! mistyped the image URL [This message has been edited by photon (edited 01-20-2001).]