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Pete Wenman

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Posts posted by Pete Wenman

  1. 4 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

    My russian is a tad deficient, Acrashb -- would you summarize what this says?

    After all this time I would have thought you had worked out how to use google translate by now

    Quote

    Dear subscribers and guests of the channel! Yesterday, Russian President Vladimir Putin had a very difficult day, which ended quite dramatically. Wednesday morning began for Putin with a depressing report on the state of the Russian economy and, as a result, a forecast of worsening the situation in the near future. The sanctions imposed on Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine have a heavy impact on the country's economy and the effect of these sanctions is growing and intensifying over time. The main problems in the Russian economy, according to the forecasts of the authors of the report, will come in the period of late spring - early summer of next year, and it is not possible to avoid a negative scenario today. It should be noted that the forecast was made without taking into account the possible announcement of general mobilization in the country and martial law, which Vladimir Putin has in his plans, which undoubtedly only worsens the forecasts.
    In the afternoon, Putin was upset by the news from the front. Promises by the leadership of the military bloc to seize several settlements before the start of winter, including Bakhmut (called Artemovsk in reports to Putin) in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, were not realized. Moreover, yesterday the leadership of the military bloc was not ready to guarantee the president a significant advance on any sector of the front before the New Year. Putin was informed that the cold snap, which is predicted for early December in the Luhansk region, could be used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine for an offensive, and in this case, it would be very problematic to keep territories in the north-west of the region.
    In the evening, Putin had a telephone conversation with President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The conversation touched upon plans for the future and the development of joint projects. No agreements were reached as a result of the conversation, or rather, they agreed to negotiate.
    Truly dramatic events for Putin took place in the evening at his residence. Going down the stairs, Putin stumbled and fell to the fifth point, after which he fell on his side and slid down a couple of steps. The incident took place in front of the president's bodyguards, who quickly reacted and rushed to Putin's aid. Three security officers helped the president to get to the nearest sofa and called the doctors who are on duty at the residence. Medics arrived within a few minutes, but could not immediately examine the president. Putin suffers from oncology of the gastrointestinal tract, as a result of which he already experiences serious problems with digestion, and as a result of the fall, as it turned out, the main blow fell on the coccyx, which probably caused sharp pain, provoking involuntary defecation. If Putin used to wear special waterproof underwear with an absorbent effect, then recently he neglects these precautions, as it turned out in vain. Before the examination, the doctors escorted the president to the bathroom and helped to clean up, and at the same time conducted an initial examination. After a complete examination and examination, a bruise of the coccyx and soft tissues was diagnosed. Nothing critical, the president's health was stable closer to the night, he can move independently, complaints of pain in the coccyx when sitting are the only thing that worries Putin. At night he took painkillers. In the near future, an investigation will be carried out, which provoked the fall of the president. He wears special shoes, even at home with anti-slip surfaces, and the stairs in the residence are considered "safe". As it turns out, all precautions are in vain when nerves go to hell.

     

  2. 11 hours ago, IICptMillerII said:

    One of the better ways to make that context more relevant to the player is to impose restrictions, such as the time limit. Giving the player too much time to slowly recon forward and pick apart the defense can be largely mitigated by having a tight time limit on the battle. 

    You must be new around here 😉 

    P

  3. 2 minutes ago, Huba said:

    I'm leaning towards the missile hypothesis too, but I wonder why would the missile be set to airburst

    I have no knowledge in this field  whatsoever, but what if it was a thermobaric warhead. More blast for size, and a pressure wave to bounce the bridge sections off their mountings?

    Plausable ?

  4. From here

    https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/pfbid023oXx9zwGmAAVb4Cx4wwV3FN21sEqo3eBaahqWVqvv4FWVPk2o8qQhHtsEQSGhzTtl

    Quote

    Russia issued an order for the restoration and modernization of 800 Soviet tanks T-62.
    According to a statement by State Duma Deputy Gurulev, the 103rd tank repair plant has been ordered to restore and modernize 800 old Soviet T-62 tanks within three years.
    It is announced that all tanks will receive thermal imaging targets and additional shed protection. Previously on tanks t-62 m teplovízori didn't install.
    The plant report shows that the tank restoration process will take a long time as components will have to be partially manufactured, carry out a substantial amount of restoration work. You can see the engine that was clearly kept without proper conditions.
    Russia does not have the resources and technology to wage war mainly with high-precision weapons, so it is preparing to restore all available stock of tank hulls for war by mobilization army with old but mass weapons. This is due to high tank losses during aggression, new tanks supply can't cover the losses, to arm the mobilized troops need mass weapons. Russia is unable to increase production of modern technology, so it orders tanks that can be repaired by Soviet-style technologies.
    The amount of Russian iron Ukraine has to oppose exclusively quality. The quality of management and use of high-precision weapons and intelligence equipment, in the first place.

    Obviously this is easier said then done, and with a long lead time regardless. However if there is no internal device by which Putin can be deposed, and he has destroyed the norms by which wars are generally ended are we now facing a never ending war where Russia just refuses to accept its beaten. A lot of misery for a lot of people if that becomes the case.

    P

  5. When the Cold War (the original one ) was all the rage autobahn bridges and the like in West Germany were designed and built with chambers within them to assist with their demolition if required - Miesle Shafts.

    These chambers could then be filled with special charges in time of war and allowed good demolition of the otherwise very tough reinforced concrete structures. 

    Is it plausible this bridge might have been constructed with something similar. Locations where charges placed would have greater effect than otherwise. Could this have become known to UKA and they exploited a weakness in some way ?

    P

  6. Loads of speculation here and elsewhere (no surprise)

    But lets try a different angle - what can we gleen from this image - not the CCTV footage but the wider image

    image.thumb.png.7edcf98485f5d2a0826d2fcfb1dab1ed.png 

    We appear to be in a CCTV monitoring room. It's being filmed by a phone or equivalent and has been released into the public domain. Who is this content meant for.

    The camera (looks to be fixed)and  is showing pretty much the exact spot the explosion occurred.

    It seems an odd location for a typical CCTV, and so you assume this is part of the bridge defence network, with the camera not monitoring traffic flow, but the actual bridge structure.

    Above the main screen appears to composite views showing 18 other camera views

    It seems the footage is being watched after the event as there is little emotion in the voices that can be heard

    @Grigb - Can you translate 

    On the video itself 

    The wave seen in the video under the span closest to right screen edge is being suggested as a boat by some, but the explosion and span that collapses is the other side of the nearest bridge support. 

    It could be the wake from a fast moving boat that goes under the next span/rams the next bridge support, or it could just be a wave.

    The explosion itself seems not so much a flash and bang, but rather to be a flash and burn with something on the right being a smoke source for some several seconds - can be seen in the video around the 45 second mark.

    Disclaimer - I have no real idea what I'm talking about, but there are some interesting aspects to this video.

     

    P

  7. Some interesting thoughts from Tom Cooper on the nature of the ground war.

    Full article here https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-4-october-2022-kherson-da84b46d8131

    It's a lengthy read, but well worth the effort given previous conversations here 

    Quote to whet the appetite

    Quote

    UAV-guided artillery.

    ….and then ‘not just some UAV-guided artillery’, but UAV-guided artillery networked with help of automatic tactical management systems (ATMS) — like Kropyva/Urtica (Ukraine) and Sozvezdiye/Constellation (Russia).

    That means not only that both sides are deploying ‘plenty of artillery’: both the Russians and Ukrainians are deploying hundreds of UAVs on a constant search for enemy troops and vehicles. With help of ATMS, these UAVs are in constant contact with field headquarters. As soon as UAVs find something of particular interest: the object in question is subjected to artillery fire.

    Unsurprisingly, UAVs — no aircraft and no helicopters — are the primary target of air defences on both sides, and both are shooting down UAVs in droves, every single day. Whenever they fail to do so, whoever and whatever is found by an UAV within 10–15km from the ‘frontline’, is shelled by artillery in a matter of 1–5 minutes.

    This is getting so far that there are times and sectors of the frontline where Ukrainians — who, arguably, are better equipped with UAVs — are spending 30, 40, 50% of the flight time of their UAVs to run reconnaissance of their own positions, just in order to make sure these couldn’t be found by the Russian UAVs.

    This is why artillery of both sides is hiding most of the times. Yes: it’s frequently hiding even when involved in fire action.

    Sometimes, this is reaching such proportions that Ukrainians are protecting their ‘most precious’ self-propelled artillery pieces 1-for-1 by such rare stuff like German-made Gepard Flakpanzer: whenever the artillery piece in question goes into fire action, the Flakpanzer is responsible to protect it — from enemy UAVs, and thus from enemy artillery.

    In turn, UAVs are foremost searching for enemy artillery. Whenever they find some, this is shelled until either destroyed, or until it runs away outside the range. That’s what they call ‘counter-battery action/fire’.

    Sometimes, enemy artillery is not going to run away when targeted, but — preferably with help of UAVs, but sometimes with support of artillery radars — shoot back at the artillery that’s shooting at it. That’s what they call ‘artillery duels’.

    Second principal target of artillery are fortifications: especially fortifications behind the frontline, like those used to protect headquarters, specific objects and/or vehicles — but also fortifications along the frontline. Fortifications are constructions designed to protect people and equipment: they can be anywhere between ‘relatively primitive’ (like a ‘simple, shallow trench’), and ‘elaborate’ (say, a bunker made of 1m thick concrete, with specially designed openings for fire-arms, which can be shut down with help of armoured covers etc.).

    This is why whoever only can is doing his/her best to hide fortifications — to camouflage them, foremost with help of vegetation, or by ‘embedding’ them into terrain and vegetation; and why, in turn, why whoever only can is trying to find such objects, and then shell them, too.

    Now, pay attention: I’ve just spent more than a full DIN A4 page (and that in fonts 10) to explain ‘just the basics’ — and haven’t even come as far as to ‘explain that with infantry and/or tanks’.

    The reason is that these are the ‘fundamentals’ of this war. This is how 80–90% of action is fought — both by the Russians and Ukrainians. Should there be any doubts, invest 5–10 minutes of googling around to find articles quoting 80–90% of casualties on either side being caused by artillery.

    Bottom line: most of the time, and regardless if on the move or standing still, everybody is hiding: hiding from UAVs, and from artillery.

    Now, as a retired Lieutenant-Colonel of the US Marines nicely commented in a private chat, yesterday, this is where Ukrainians are enjoying quite some advantage. Reason? Whether motorised or airborne, the Russian infantry is ‘vehicle tied’. Its troops rarely venture more than 100 metres away from their vehicles. Because these vehicles are easy to detect and track — whether by radars, by infra-red or low-light TV systems — the Russian infantry is quite easy to find, too. On the contrary, Ukrainian infantry is frequently operating ‘miles away’ from its supporting vehicles. I.e. ZSU infantry is much harder to find.

    P

  8. Question not specifically for @Grigb @Haiduk @akd but you guys might have a better feel for it

    When reading 503rd Guard MMR, (or what ever other units referenced) do we have a feel for how many boots on the ground this really is. We know its certainly not at full strength, but what does a Regiment mean in this context, 1, 2 or 3 BTG ? It would be nice to strip away the "looks good on paper" and get to the reality of what shape these units are currently in.

    rybar3009.thumb.jpg.9f568195182711c51ef4dbf5db6cc0a5.jpg

     

    Tom Cooper suggests the following units in the Lyman are

    Russians in Lyman: gauging by reports from the social media, the group of forces encircled there is controlled by the 20th Combined Arms Army. At the first look, one might say, 'ah, VSRF'. That's wrong. The troops there are including:

    - Bars-13
    - Bars-16 (also known as 'Kuban' unit; this unit used to have 1,000 combatants; about 400 are inside Lyman)
    - 208th 'Cossack' Motor Rifle Regiment (LPR)
    - 503rd GMRR/19th MRD seems to be holding the way in/out

    It is possible that the 204th Motor Rifle Regiment is around, too. That said, what's left of the 144th MRD is outside the pocket: this is on the northern side of it, in the Borova area.

    Re. BARS: this is a Russian abbreviation for 'Special Combat Army Reserve' (full designation is actually BARS-2021). This was a program to mobilise 100,000 volunteers from former veterans of the VSRF for a 3-years contract. If the Rosgvardia is 'Putin's Pasdaran', BARS is something like 'Putin's Republican Guards': they're drafted from the Russian Cossack Association, handsomely paid (US$3,500 a month, plus allowances and awards), highly motivated, and well-equipped.

    Other known BARS units are battalion-sized, and, when fully mobilised, about 1,000-strong. Nearly all are meanwhile deployed in Ukraine. The few others I've heard about so far are:
    - Shironin Battalion (from Kirov)
    - Bars-14 (I know this is one of units the ZSU considers 'criminals' and is taking no POWs from)
    - Bars-15 (also known as 'Piatnashka'; receiving same treatment like -14)
    - Bars-18 (ditto)

    For involved ZSU units, the following can be assessed:
    Kupyansk
    - 92nd Mech
    - 3rd Tank
    - Kraken SF (battalion)
    - possibly a battalion of the 80th Motor

    Oskil
    - 1st 'Ivan Bohun' Special Purpose Brigade (est. 4 Mar 22; including troops from 19 countries; has 6 battalions)
    - 25th Airborne
    - 66th Mech (persistently ignored by Ukrainian social media, but reported often by the Russians)
    - 17th Tank
    - 4th NG Brigade
    - Azov SF (battalion)

    Lyman
    - 4th Tank
    - 79th Airborne
    - 81st Airborne

    Siversk
    - 80th Airborne
    - 114 TD
    - 115 TD

    Bakhmut is defended by
    - 58 Motor
    - 72nd Mech
    - 93rd Airborne
    - 28th Artillery
    - at least a brigade (in total) of the TD, but I'm not sure what units are involved.

    Additional units 'detected', but not localised, yet known as involved 'somewhere in northern Donbass' are:
    - 1st Tank

     

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