Jasper

Great thought Jarmo. It would require that CM have 'sympathic' explosions - one explosion setting off a nearby explosive device. Does it? If so all we need is the explosive. Maybe a suicide Flamethrower team! 'Things' burn, but I'm not sure if I've seen a 'thing' explode.

The Germans were so notorious with booby-traps that in N. Africa a common practice was "If it doesn't belong to you don't pick it up". As a test a CO left his fountain pen on the ground for a couple of days. ------------------ Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ for military documents written during WWII

FYI: Rommel used Stuka's to clear a path through the British minefields at Tobruk. Tooks lots of Stuka's to form a 'crater path' through the minefields. Does that justify the ability to add that to CM? No. It happened ONCE. In war lasting years covering thousands of miles, with bazziolons of mines. Sorta like saying that because one sniper - of all the thousands of snipers in the war - never missed then all snipers should never miss.

I've got some period stuff on flame tanks. The Russian article from 1940 is the best. ------------------ Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ for military documents written during WWII

As of now that's everything. I've added some little stuff on the first couple of pages. I put the words *NEW* in front just to make it clear what's new. One of them is *.bmp file - having trouble with Paint Shop or else I'd make it a TIF or JPEG. Hope everyone can see a *.bmp file. From today forward I'll add stuff every now and then, I probably won't make a big splash unless it's really juicy. So you might check back in a little while. I've got some space on the third through fifth pages for little stuff, and when I add them I'll put the words *NEW* in front so you can easily find them. Now to reading. I've skimmed them all, but have yet to read maybe half of the interesting ones. ------------------ Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ for military documents written during WWII

"Interdiction is beyond the scope of the game. " Not is operations it isn't. BTS is tippy toeing towards the edge by their 'Operations' feature. In that case you could / would / should be able to intedict the enemy supplies (reinforments) scheduled to show up in future days.

"The problem might be due to the fact that the AI has an intermittent case of dumb ass." And how's THAT different than the pseudo-reality the CM is mocking ... err ... faking ... err ... aping ... I wonder? ------------------ Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ for military documents written during WWII

"The problem might be due to the fact that the AI has an intermittent case of dumb ass." Yea well the same thing could be said of tank crews as well. Personnally I hope that the AI doesn't treat all situations exactly the same - people arn't that uniform.

Germanboy: All this stuff is going to be translated German if that's what you mean. All: Germanboy's feedback is valid. There are a number of trends in the current batch (not all posted but soon will be). These trends are tank tactics, infantry-tank cooperation, antitank tactics, and infantry tactics. This stuff is not a bottomless pit - just about all the stuff I could find on tank tactics is in this batch. But if others have particular interests let me know (by posting on this thread) and I'll see what I can do to tailor future research into those areas. Example: because it came up on this board I'll soon see what I can find of 'zimmermit' (sp?)

Clearly the "being inside a building as it collapses is hazardous to your health" crowd have never seen the original Blues Brothers movie. 'nuf said

Some of the US period stuff I've read state that after an operation is over that the tanks leave the infantry assembly area to not draw fire to the infantry. Sort of in the same vein - a Combat Lessons document (not yet posted) admonished people to not hang out at Command Posts, because the excessive people and traffic will draw enemy artillery fire! ------------------ Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ for military documents written during WWII

That's not entirely true. There were isolated incidents of German air raids on US positions. As related in "Overlord" by Hastings - the commanders made a Bug Stink and some high ranking officer in the air force brought back recon photos showing the roads behind allied lines jammed with truck and vechicles of all kinds, and photos of the roads behind German lines totally empty. The ground commanders got the message and shut up. Sh*t happens in war.

Sorry to here that. Because this what I just added. There is a little more stuff that I did add that's not on the list. Interested? Check it out. http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ Antitank Artillery / GB / 1946 Notes on Employment of Artillery in Mountainous Terrain / RU / 1946 / 5 Pages/355K Assualt Groups / RU / 1944 General Staff and Command / SP / 1944 German Tactics in Combating Guerrillas / RU / 1942 The Use of Tanks as Heavy Cavalry in Italy / GB / 1944 Tank Destroyer Unit in Meeting Engagement / RU / 1943 Army - Air Integration / GB / 1944 Crossing the Dnieper / RU / 1943 Tank Combat / SP / 1943 Mobile Detachments in Pursuit / RU / 1943 Airfields in War / GB / 1944 Cooperation Between Infantry and Tanks / RU / 1944 Night Photography from the Air / GB / 1944 German-Rumanian Field Fortifications Northwest of Stalingrad / RU / 1943 / 29 pages/2,168K Employment of Smoke in Attack / RU / 1943 RAF Bomber Command / GB / 1945 Antiaircraft Defence of Large Mechanized Units / RU / 1945 The Air Battle / SP / 1945 / 14 pages/2,756K Employment of Tanks with Infantry / US / 1944 Lessons from the Italian Campaign / IN / 1944 /5 pages/388K German Paratroops at the Foot of Aetna / GR / 1943 The Aviation Commander in Combat / RU / 1942 Improving Artillery Observation / GR / 1943 Mobile Columns / IN / 1943 German Tank Tactics in Russia / RU / 1943 Smoke-Trail Mortars / GR / 1943 Air Reconnaissance / RU / 1943 Defense of Inhabited Places / AR / 1943 They Build the Atlantic Wall / GR / 1943 The Navy of the RAF / GB / 1943 A German Estimate of Foreign Tanks / GR / 1943 An Armored Scouting Mission in Russia / GR / 1943 Military Secrecy / RU / 1943 German Engineers in the Attack on Stalingrad / GR / 1943 Initiative in Reconnaissance / PO / 1940? Enemy Blockade Runners / GB / 1943 Antitank Strongpoints / RU / 1943 Increase Fire Preparedness in Defense / GR / 1942 Employment of Armored Trains / RU / 1943 Night Combat / RU / 1943 German Tank Grenadiers in Action / GR / 1943 The Light Antitank Gun / FR? / 1943 Mobile Obstacle-Building Reserves / RU / 1943 Tanks in Attack / RU / 1943 / 32 pages / 3,130K German Tactical Doctrines / US / 1945 Notes on the Leyte Operations / US / 1945 / 6 pages / 1,154K German Tactics in Russia / US / 1942 / 8 pages/748K Japanese Invasion of India / GB / 1945 Assault Groups versus Armored Belts / RU / 1945 Functions of Air Landing Troops / IN / 1945 Battles in Miniature / GB / 1945 / 9 pages / 1,851K Notes on Street Fighting / RU / 1945 Future Warfare and the Atomic Bomb / GB / 1945 Principles of Costal Defense / SP / 1944 Five Years of Airborne Development / GB / 1945 The Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy / BZ / 1945 Naval Aircraft and the Future / GB / 1945 / 18 pages / 3,341K Reconnaissance in Attack / RU / 1943 Mortars in an Inhabited Place / RU / 1943 German and Italian Prisoners of War / GB / 1943 Discipline in Telephone Converstaions / RU / 1943 A Heavy Field Howitzer Battalion Before the Stalin Line, 1941 / GR / 1941 Sure Protection for Boundries Between Units / RU / 1943 Street Fighting / FR? / 1943 Antiaircraft Defense of Battle Positions / RU / 1943 Japanese Principles of Antitank Defense / BZ / 1943 Actions of a Tank Regiment for the Encirclement of the Enemy / RU / 1943 Physical Development Centers / GB / 1943 German Air Tactics in Russia / RU / 1943 The "Hand-Trunk" Breaks Its Way Through / GR / 1943 Artillery Fire: Backbone of Defense / RU / 1943 The Flying Fortress - Reasons for Their Success / GB / 1943 Assuring Manuever of Tanks is the Duty of All Types of Troops / RU / 1943 Self-Propelled Artillery in Armored Combat / GR / 1943 Field Fortifications in Active Defense / RU / 1943 German Motorized Technical Battalions / GR / 1943 Breakthrough of German Defense / RU / 1943 Tactical Training of Tank Crews / RU / 1943 / 32 pages / 3,188K

I'm putting some of the source material that I've found interesting in my 'Fun Facts' web site. Note: Currently it's all from between 1939 - 1948, but I plan on adding later material (studies and the like). The site is: http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ I've got about 1/3 of my current material there. I plan on putting the rest out there, and then see what happens. If no one else but me find this stuff interesting, then I won't go to the trouble to add new documents as I come across them. If you find them interesting then post back here on this thread. Here's a 'dump' of the stuff I've currently got showing title / country / year. Tank Tactics: Nine Primer Lessons / GR? / 1942 German Incendiary Bombs / GB / 1941 The American "Sherman" Tank / GR / 1943 - So what DID the German think of the M4? Tank versus Tank / US / 1946 - aka "In defense of the Sherman" New German Antitank Weapons / RU / 1946 Organization of River-Forcing Operations / RU / 1943 Birish Rocket-Carrying Aircraft / GB / 10 pgs / 819K Observer report North Africa / US / 1946 - Sounds dull but is really interesting. Tank Attack in Wooded Terrain / RU / 1946 Use of Mines in Offensive Operations / RU Desert "Hooks" - Outflanking Movements in Desert Warfare / NZ / 1944 Fighting Enemy Mortars / RU / 1944 Some Thoughts on Combined Operations / IN / 1944 The Atlantic Wall / GR / 1943 An Advanced Observer for a Heavy Howitzer Battery / GR / 1942 - Horses? Tanks in a Forest Battle / RU / 1943 Employment of Heavy Mortars in Defense / GR / 1942 Tactics of Soviet Antitank Riflemen / RU / 1942 German Expirences with Captured Soviet Cannon /GR / 1942 The German "Tiger" Tank (T-VI) / GR - HU - RU / 1942? Timor / AU / 1943 Men of the Supply Train: SOldiers of the Front! / GR / 1943 Armored Artillery in the Soviet Campaign / GR / 1942 Street Fighting in Salingrad / RU / 1942 Bombing: The Worms Eye View / IN / 1942 Attack Across a River / GR / 1942 Communications Installations in Firing Positions / GR / 1942 External Bearing and the Spirit of the Troops / ? / 1942 Mining the Gulf of Finland / GR / 1942 Communications Problems in Tunisia / GB / 1943 Clearing Minefileds at El Alamein / GB / 1943 Pantelleria - The Italian Malta / GR / 1942 The Role of Air Power in the British War Effort / GB / 1943 Employment of Tanks and Infantry in Normandy / US / Flame-Throwing Tanks on Saipan / US / 1944 / 5 pgs / 391K PS - Some of the files are rather large!

Did those things sticking the top of the Tiger's really work?? I would've thought the Russians could see right through the bunny disguise.

yea I know. tacky replying to your own post. But I realized the URL didn't work, so I corrected it. And in case someone tried to take a look at it and couldn't because of the busted URL I wanted to get the word out.

http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ How does your play compare to this? The text mentions that the tactics come from German manuals. PS Sorry if this muddies the water for the great Vehicle Crew Controversy! (Stupid free website won't allow a direct link to their files. Grrrr) [This message has been edited by Jasper (edited 01-12-2001).]

From "The Illustrated London News" 1, March 1941. Can't put a 'text only' copy. Besides you'd miss all the cool drawings! Updated URL!! This one works! http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ [This message has been edited by Jasper (edited 01-12-2001).]

I cleaned up the text somewhat. Lots of words still misspelled and the like. (I spent enough time on it) When in doubt I left the text as is. I removed the name of the author as I wouldn't want my name used. I chose to work on this document because the perspective of being written during the war I found pretty interesting. We all know how it turns out, but this guy didn't. German Tactics in Russia BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL X. X. XXXX, Instructor, Command and General Staff School German strategy, ever since the time of Moltke, has striven for the destruction of the enemy by means of encirclement, resulting from outflanking action. This was the basis of the Schlieffen plan, which, had it been carried o" ut as originally planned, might well have resulted in the early destruction of the French Army, during the first few weeks of World War I. KEIL UND KESSEL The huge numbers of men, and the tremendous distances involved in the German campaign in Russia, combined with the stout resistance offered by the Russians, has resulted in an interesting variation of the tactic, which the Germans have dubbed Keil und Kessel, and which, for clarity, can perhaps best be translated as wedge and trap. Military leaders in this country are giving attention to the various aspects of this operation, both in order more clearly to understand the tactical methods of an enemy we may shortly meet on the field of battle, and so be preparing a defense against it, and in order to develop any lessons we can learn for our own offensive tactics. Keil und Kestsel is a process of taking huge bites out of the hostile position, destroying the enemy forces in a given sector, and then repeating the process in another sector. THE CONCEPT Its development is somewhat as follows: Aerial reconnaissance, operating up to 200 miles from the front (see Sketch 1), provides information as to the location and movements of enemy forces. This reconnaissance not only precedes the action but is maintained throughout it. A large hostile force is found to have been concentrated in a given area. Weak spots on the flanks are similarly determined. First: overwhelming force is concentrated at the selected point or points usually two or three. At each such point, a breach in the hostile line is accomplished. Strong armored forces, supported by motorized forces, push rapidly forward, deep into the enemy rear. The usual reaction of the enemy is to counterattack, striking. at the rear of the penetrating forces, to cut them off. However, foot troops, making tremendous marches of 30 to 35 miles a day if necessary, follow as closely as possible in the rear of the armored and motorized forces, and in turn cut off and destroy any counterattacking force which may have succeeded in breaking into the rear of the panzer forces.. Such elements of the latter as are necessary reverse their direction, to assist in this phase of the operation, striking the counterattacking force on one flank while the advancing foot troops crush it, on the other flank. The panzer forces and foot troops then continue their original advance to drive a wedge— Keil deep into the bostde position. Usually two such wedges are driven, at a considerable distance from each other. Meanwhile a frontal attack is made against the main enemy position, to hold a maximum number of reserves in that location. While details of the operation will vary in almost every ease, the general nature of the operation is rather definite. Its concept is simple. Its execution, complicated and exaetirig. The operation usually develops as a double pincers movement. (See Sketch 2.) The, more mobile forces, which spearheaded the original wedges, turn to meet at some point deep in the hostile rear. The slower foot troops turn inside the panzer columns to form an inner set of pincers, which, in conjunction with the forces making the holding attack, complete the encirclement of the main enemy forces in that sector. This encirclement constitutes the Kessel, as it .is called. Literally this means kettle. The enemy is in the kettle, or as we would say, in the pot, or, more colloquially, "in the hag." The term derives, however, from a German hunting term, Kessel. irqww, where the game, having first been encircled by a large force of hunters, is driven in to the center of the circle for the kill. So in this case the encircling forces drive inward from all sides, destroying the encircled enemy. Probably, however, for. us, "trap" would most accurately describe the operation. Kiel und Kessel. wl is normally an operation invoking very large forces. Thus, the attack is usually made by a group of armies, on a front of 200 to 500 miles. We will assume a typical operation. Sketch. 3 shows schematically the development of a wedge and trap. In the assumed situation, three Ftlue armies are in contact with strong hostile forces. In assembly areas, in rear of the two flank armies, are two panzer armies, consisting of armored and motorized forces. Sketch 3 (a). The three armies in position launch an attack. Sketch 3 (. The center army makes a holding attack only. The two attack armies make penetrations, perhaps 200 to 300 miles apart, breaking through weak spots in the hostile line. Only enough pressure is exerted initially on or near the original f rent, by the holding attack, or' by flanking action this operation. Preparation must be made in advance to from the breaches, to hold a maximum number of troops in cope with adverse weather conditions, and with natural or near the battle position. It is desired that the enemy not obstacles that may be encountered. The German "use "o~ initiate a general retreat until the outer pincers have pene horse cavalry at Gomel and Bryansk (to be mentioned hetrated too deeply for them to escape the trap. " The panzer armies pass quickly through the breaches, and deep into the hostile rear, perhaps 150 to 200 miles. Sketch 3 ©. Each panzer army thus forms a deep Keil or wedge, in the hostile position. The flank armies initially follow the panzer armies. containing the forces on the flanks of the breach, and then rolling them up. The two panzer armies turn towards each other. Sketch' 3 (d), and meet at some designated point, frequently some rail or communication center in rear of the force being encircled. The two flank armies turn inside the panzer armies, thus forming an inner set of pincers. The army making the holding attack and those forming the inner set of pincers have encircled a large force of the enemy, Perhaps two armies. The selection of vital objectives is an important aspect of the German operations. For the panzer forces these are frequently important communication centers through which pass the supplies of the encircled force. For the inner pincers, these may be terrain features from which attempts of the encircled force to break out can be frustrated. The two panzer armies, forming the outer set of pincers, cut off all flow of supplies towards the encircled force. They also prevent any attempts of forces outside the pincers to break through and relieve the encircled force. Sketch 3 (d). This is normally accomplished through offensive flanking action. The other three armies proceed with the annihilation of the encircled force. The encircling force presses inwards from all sides, restricting the maneuver area available to the enemy, and seeking out weak spots, and exploiting these to divide the encircled force up into smaller segments. Sketch 3 (e). The encircled force is thus gradually crushed and cut up, and annihilated. As the contraction of the front makes troops available, these are used to relieve the armored force. As rapidly as the latter can be relieved by these or other troops, they take up the pursuit of any hostile forces which may have succeeded in eluding the trap. Sketch 3 (f). The operation as a whole. from its launching to its conclusion may take from one to four weeks. Preliminary planning may take as long or longer. A minority 'of the time in a prolonged operation is taken in achieving the encirclement. The longer time, if facing a resolute foe, is required to complete the liquidation of the encircled forces. The leading elements of an attacking panzer division making a deep thrust into hostile territory frequently operate without flank protection, well ahead of supporting troops. Similarly the leading panzer division may operate well ahead of the rest of the panzer army. However, the' main body, in either case, is normally provided with adequate flank protection either by natural obstacles or by adequate forces assigned to the mission. In the case of the forces making the enter set of pincers, this protection is primarily on its outside flank. The availability of such natural obstacles must be considered in planning "wedge and trap" operations. Weather conditions also play a very important, and sometimes a decisive part in the conduct of low) is an illustration of the former, and their provision of large engineer elements and of ample bridging materials, when required, is an illustration of the latter. We must not think of these wedges as being formed by a long narrow column, very readily cut in the rear, by a slight hostile advance. The pincers are not formed by narrow columns, but by forces operating in great width, as well as in great depth. Thus, the original breach may be made by several divisions in line, their main efforts being indicated schematically in Sketch 4a. Each of these divisions makes a penetration: The flanks of these penetrations are then rolled up. The intervening hostile forces" are thus encircled and liquidated. This creates a wide break, through which the panzer forces Pour. (See Sketches 4b, c, d, and e.) The armored armies, after passing through the breach in the hostile line, fan out" and may comb an area on a front of 50 to 100 miles. Similarly, the foot armies forming the inner pincers may advance on a front of 100 to 200 miles. As the operations progress, a whore series of small encirclements are created. First are the encirclements made at the hostile line, incident to creating the initial breach. And there may be encirclements of counterattacking forces who attempt to cut, off the advancing panzer trOow, =d are .caught between the laf,& r and the following infantry. Then there. are the encirclements of reserve and supply elements caught between the inner and the outer set of pincers, or within the zones of advance of either set of pincers. Then there are the smaller encirclements into which the original large encirclement is gradually broken up. All echelons, therefore, must be prepared to apply the principles of encirclement and annihilation to enemy forces encountered. A trap, of course, is not formed by an uninterrupted chain of riflemen deployed in a complete circle around the enemy. Rather it is a succession of groups of all arms so placed that, by exploiting their superior knowledge of the hostile situation, and superior mobility, they frustrate any effort of the encircled force to break out. It is formed by the combined action of such groups operating both in width and in depth. These drive their wedges into the enemy. either when united or separately, in accordance with the current tactical situation. Hostile elements which are encountered during the advance of the large encircling force are contained and bypassed, so as to cause a minimum of delay of the force as a whole, and are liquidated— as adequate forces for the purpose become available— without hindrance to the main effort. In some instances this liquidation is actually delayed as a counterintelligence measure, in order not to make the large hostile forces realize the seriousness of the threat and start a general retreat until the trap has been sprung. The advancing forces thus comb a large area. Different elements may follow each other at long distances, or pass each other on different routes. Missions for subordinate units may change quickly. A given unit may be a point, and then a flank guard, and then a rear guard, with relatively short intervals, as the direction of movement changes. These march units particularly in the armored and motorized elements— being highly maneuverable and flexible, can" make any required movement. Thus they may suddenly strike to either flank, or if the situation requires it, suddenly reverse direction. They can quickly combine, to overpower any hostile elements encountered, or to drive a wedge in a soft spot in the enemy situation, and then as quickly separate to carry out other missions. Hostile counterattacks may create encirclements of elements of the advancing forces. Forces thus temporarily encircled will maintain themselves to the last man, in anticipation of being relieved by their own higher echelons. " SMOLENSK The battle of Smolensk illustrates the kaleidoscopic character of the Keil und Kessel operation. A writer describes it as follows: "All imaginable types of combat developed. The meeting engagement, the planned attack, overrunning of field positions, assault against permanent fortifications, forcing river crossing were some of the types of combat which were conducted Often the attack was changed suddenly for the defense. Frontal, flanking, and encircling, movements lead invariably to the hemming in on all sides of stronger or weaker enemy forces. The 250 kilometer (about 156 miles) front seemed to have disintegrated into individual engagements independent of one another. There was the~, not a battle hlze, but a battle zone. Thus on 20 July The city of Smolensk itself had been captured by the Germans, and large Russian forces had been encircled both east and west of the city. A dozen other violent battles were raging simultaneously, some of which are indicated roughly on Sketch 5. Doubtless many of these represented encircled forces. We do not, however, have the details to know the exact situation in these localities. Many towns changed hands time and time again, perhaps as many as a dozen times in some instances. It is evident that in such an operation the outcome of the entire action will be the resultant of the outcomes of a '; battles of one cavalry division. Germany had ordered all its cavalry divisions transformed into motorized divisions, but during bad weather, the going was, at times so hard for the motors, that apparently the reorganization of the 1st Cavalry Division was postponed in order to permit its employment at Gomel in August, and at Bryinsk in October. The largest group of armies was the Central Group, which included three foot armies and three panzer armies. At times some of the armies in one group would participate in an operation with another group of armies, as at Kiev and at Vyazma. This was sometimes designed 'to strike at the presumably weak hinge" joining two hostile army groups. Through the battle of Smolensk the main direction of German pressure in the central group of armies had been to the east towards Moscow. Surpr@ e, however, is's main German tenet. These armies on the' northern and eastern, tls. nk OT the salient the Germans had driven, took up the defensive for a period of six weeks, against violent Russian counterattacks which were aimed at the recapture of Smolensk The Germans claim, however, that these counterattacks never gave them any concern, because the Russians spread their effort too wide; instead of concentrating adequate power against any crucial point. The Piripet Marshes had constituted a natural boundary between the central and southern group of armies, while the central group was advancing past Smolensk. The southern group of armies had reached the Dnieper River, and the Russian forces between the two groups were rapidly falling back to the Dnieper. Suddenly von Weichs' Second Army, which had been engaged on the south flank of the central group of armies, attacked south on 12 August, following the fall of Rogac} ev and Zhlobin, on a front of 200 kilometers (about 125 miles), ' from RoslavI to Rogachev, with its main effort on its right. Guderian's Second Panzer Army broke through near Roslavl, the two armies converging on Gomel, and trapping large forces there. (Ses Sketch 6.) GomeI fell on 19 August. Guderian then reversed direction towards .Novgorod Seversky, and the Germans advanced to the Desna River. KIEV The Russians in the southern sector Were now in a large salient formed by the Dnieper and Desna Rivers. (See Sketch 7.) On 31 August, Stulpnagel's Seventeenth Army forced a crossing of the Dnieper below Kremencbug. On 9 September, Guderiax struck south towards Romny, and von Weichs struck towards Lokhvitsk, and the next day vw Kleist's First Panzer army, and Stulpnazel, struck north towards the same points. It will he noted that in this case, the' existence of the salient enabled the two panzer armies to strike directly towards each other, without the necessity of changing direction. They fanned out to a front of over 100 kilometers (about 621 ~ miles), 'as indicated in the sketch. The foot armies al; o were attacking on a very broad front. However. the typical double pincers formation was clearly evident, the more mobile panzer elements forming the enter set of pincers. While this attack was going on, Reichbnau's Sixth Army was making a frontal attack, with his main effwt on his left, and he crossed the DesW at Korosten on 15 SePtdmlwr to join von Weiehs' left flank. The panzer armies had joined below Romny the day b~ fore. h interesting aspect of this operation was that the German main effort came in the rear of a reserve battle position which the Germans then occupied and defended against the attacks of the Ruskjans tvho were trying to break out of the trap. The Germans claim to have annihilated four Russian armies in this operation, and to have capturel G65,000 prisoners. It will be noted that in this action the Second Army and the Second Panzer Army, hotb of ,which belonged to von Bock's Central Army Group. cooperated with von Itnndstedt's Southern Army Group. On 16 September, while still in the climax of the battle of Kiev, Gudwian received orders for his next operation. By 26 Septembw, armies had been regrouped somewhat as shown on Sketch 8. Three armies were deployed on a front of upwards of .500 miles. In back of them, four Panzer armies were in assembly position. Strong Russian forces were grouped in the vicinity of Vyazrna and Bryansk, with relatively light forces between. On 30 Septemb4r, Guderian attacked, his main effort strikin'g southeast, and breaking through a prepared Russian defense between Novgorod Seversky and Glukhov. A gain of some 23 miles was made that day. Some elements of Guderian's Army" headed northwest. The following day, Guderian's main effort headed towards Ore'1, advancing some 60 miles. His other column turned northeast. On 2 October, the main German attack was launched. Von Kluge's Fourth Army broke through the Russian center on a broad front. Hoth's Third Panzer Army and Reinkardt's Fifth Panzer Army advanced to pour through the breach. .Hblding attacks were made by von Weichs, 'in front nf Bryansk, and by Strauss, in front of Vyazma. Guderian continued to advance towards Orel, and Hoepner's Fourth Panzer Army, which USU? llY operated with von Leeb's Aorthern group of armies, beadecf initially northeast. The advance continued. Hoth tuz ned southeaet towards Ore]. Part of von Weichs' Second Army enveloped the southern flank of the Bryansk force, and von. Kluge, splitting his army, en$ eloped the southern flank of Vyazma and the northern flank of Bryansk— his forces in this sector being paced by the secondary column of Guderian's forces. The Fourth and Fifth Panzer Armies were forming the outer set of p} ncers around I/ yazma, and Strauss' Ninth Army was enveloping the northern flank of the Russians in that sector. By 5 October the noose was beini drawn. On 6 October, panzer elements of Guderian's Army suddenly changed direction, and by a surprise attack entered f3ryansk from the rear— from the east. The trap was sprung. The encircled force at Bryzmsk was some 150 kilometers long, amd some 50 kilometers deep ( approximate area of 90 x 30 miles). The one at Vyazma was somewhat smaller in size, but probably contained more men The situation was then approximately as shown on Sk ch 9. ~ Here wa; a battle— a series of battles— raging n an area 800 kilometers (500 miles) long, and half as dee By 18 October, nearly three weeks after the start of the operations, the last remnants of the Russian forces in this sector were wiped out, the final survivors being elements of the Russian Fiftieth Army. The Germans claim to have captured 700,000 men in this operation, besides .tremendous quantities of mat6riel. Granted probable exaggeration for propaganda purposes, it was nevertheless a gigantic struggle, in which some 78 German divisions participated. It is interesting to compare that with the total number of divisions presently in our entire army. German panzer forces, when relieved hy infantry, took up the pursuit of elements which had escaped the trap, and continued till they were stopped by the prepared defenses of MOSCOW, which had been occupied in the meanwhile. These, as indicated on Sketch 10, ran behind the Volga River, about '45 mfies in front of Moscow, in front of Tula, and. then be. hind the Don. Subsequently the Germans attempted another Keil und Kessel operation in the south, in the vicinity of Kharkov, but the Russians had learned their Iesson, and as the two wedges were driven in, they withdrew their forces in the center, and so escaped the trap. RUSSIAN COUNTERMEASURES Russian efforts to combat the German tactics included the digging of tremendous antitank ditches, utilizing the entire civilian population of nearby communities. Also they laid many huge antitank mine fields. Frequently they counterattacked in the rear of the advancing panzer forces, in an effort to cut their supply lines. And they frequently attacked the infantry columns which were following the panzer forces. Such counterthrusts, however, generally had but limited effectiveness, as they were not in sufficient strength for the purpose. Where necessary, German panzer forces reversed their direction in order to assist the following infantry. The Russians made wide use of demolitions' to slow up the German advance, and they made wholesale and ruthless application of the scorched earth policy to destroy not only war materials, but all facilities, including shelter and industrial facilities, which might be of value to the invaders. Forces either large or small— which found themselves entrapped, instead of surrendering wholesale as had the French, fought as long as it was possible to do so. Often resistance continued for from one to three weeks or more. Of. ten units thus cut off broke up into guerrilla bands which took refuge in Russia's huge untrimmed forests or swamp areas, ,and continued for long periods to carry on raids to harass small German groups, disrupt communications, etc. And they and Russian civilians committed continuing sabotage on a large scale. One Russian division thus cut off, broke up into combat teams and for more than a month gradually fought its way east, finally emerging into Russian held territory, with two thirds of its original personnel. In general, the Russians endeavored to provide at least some delaying action at every crossroads, every stream crossing, every town. The cumulative effect of these isolated resistances did greatly retard the German advance. Their ultimate effect was to prevent the Germans from reaching Moscow before the severe Russian winter set in. Meanwhile the Russian defense in very great depth had prevented the Germans from. breaking completely through the Russian armies and destroying them completely, as they had anticipated doing and frequently boasted 'publicly that, they had done. It was not, however , until the Russians learned, as at Kharkov, to withdraw their main forces promptly when the two wedges began to penetrate deeply into their positions that they were able to prevent huge losses of men and of material. ., Details as to the Russian counteroffensive, during the past winter, are as yet not available, and we can only speculate as to what bas actually taken place, and as to the circumstances involved. It would appear, however, that the Russians were better prepared for, operations under the conditions existing than were the Germans. It would further appear that through the effective utilization of large cavalry forces, and of forces of all arms on skis and sleds, they obtained, through the severe winter months, greater mobility than the Germans, and, with shorter supply lines, have been able to drive repeated wedges into the German lines. Apparently, however, conditions— up to the time of writing— have not, in general, permitted the ready closing of the huge traps which characterized so many of the German operations. Whatever the facts on this point, however, the operations in Russia since last June have certainly demonstrated that, given suitable conditions, the Keil und Kessel is a very effective tactic. But it is a highly complicated and very costly one, and conditions are not always suitable for its use. Some of the considerations in a Keil und Kessel operation are: The enemies' capabilities must be very accurately determined. This requires not only intimate knowledge of his initial strength and dispositions, but accurate computation of all the time and space factors involved. Very complete knowledge of the hostile situation, both initially and progressively, is, therefore, essential. Reconnaissance, both by air and by other means, must be aggressive, thorough, and continuous. Signal communication must be rapid and sure. Radio is the chief appropriate medium. There must, therefore, be an elaborate system of radio nets. Proper timing is of crucial importance. This requires rapid movement of both armored and foot forces, and the timing not only of the initial attack, but of the attainment of all objectives. Surprise must be achieved by (a) Deception, ( Secrecy of assembly, © Speed of movement, and (d) Denying to the enemy of observation. Control of the air throughout the operation is necessary in order to: (a) Permit free operation of our observation aviation ( Deny the enemy aerial reconnaissance facilities © Continue to neutralize enemy combat aviation (d) Give close support to the ground forces. Creation of the necessary combat intelligence, estimating the enemy's capabilities, determining the composition, organization and disposition of the task force required, assembling the necessary means, planning the details of the operation, maintaining contact with and control of the numerous widely separated and indelwndently engaged units and planning for and maintaining the essential supply of all such unts, involves an amount of detailed staff work that is enormous. Staffs and commanders of all echelons, therefore, must be highly trained and exceedingly .proficient. Parachute and air landing troops may also be used on occasion to seize critical terrain, and hold it until the arrival of other elements. There have been numerous reports of such use of airborne troops on this front, both by the Germans and by the Russians. . The size of the penetrating forces, the terrain and hostile defensive strength, and the weather all influence the depth of the wedge thrust and the size of the trap. Under the conditions existing in the Russian campaign, an. almost inconceivable numbers of men and huge distances are involved. It might appear that a mere division would hot be concerned with such matters as Keil und Kessel However, as has been pointed out many Keil und Keesels may be involved within the large Kessel} and a division may well accomplish a Kessel of its own several times. Moreover, the situation is a very rapidly moving one. Orders may often have to be mission type ones. Individual units may find themselves cut off and be "on their own: for several days at a time. It is therefore essential that commanders and staffs of all echelons understand the general nature of the operation as a whole, and plane of the higher command, so that they can at any time act in accordance with the general plan, even in absence of specific orders, The concept of encirclement and annihilation is foremost in the minds of commanders of all echelons in the German Army. Thus, in the account of the battle of Kiev, we read where one division was advancing with combat teams abreast. One such team found a Russian regiment defending a town. The German commander immediately reacted that "only an encirclement will capture the town." Accordingly, he kept only light forces in front, as a holding force, and spent the night working around both flanks with the remainder of his regiment, and successfully attacked in the morning, driving the defenders into a woods in the rear of the village, where they were mopped up by the troops of another division which was occupying the woods. With groups small enough to hear the firing in their rear, it is extremely disconcerting to be thus encircled. And resistance is apt to be greatly reduced, accordingly. One final thought. The Germans, in the west front. found the French so thoroughly disorganized and paralyzed that their armored forces ere free to run through them almost at will, and it was not necessary to eliminate them a bite at a time. The Russians are stubborn fighters. Thus, in one small Kessel, it is reported that only 300 were captured, after 2,000 had been killed. The panzer forces could not take the liberties they did in France. So Keil und Kessel was developed. With other changes in the theater, foe, armament or morale of either aide, we can expect corresponding "change of pace" to Yit the existing situation. We cannot take it for granted that a stereotyped pattern of Keil und Kessel will be the German tactic against us. We must look for the unexpected. We can, however, expect that he will attempt our annihilation— not merely our defeat. The general must know how to get the men their rations and every other kind of stores needed for war. He must have imagination to originate plans, practical sense and energy to carry them through. He must be observant, untiring, shrewd; kindly and cruel, simple and crafty; a watchman and a robber; lavish and miserly; generous and stingy; rash and conservative. All these and many other qualities, natural and acquired, he must have. He should also, as a matter of course, know his tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building materials is a house. Socrates.

Yea! That's what the French said to. No fair sneaking around behind us!

Good job Germlin. I've printed it out and added it to my files.

Jeff Heidman: No not Jason. Guess again. Give you a hint: starts with an S. My non-de-plume is Jasper. On another board someone started a thread to have people explain their handles. To answer the question: I just thought it sounded cool. I too was big into TOAW (the original not II) for awhile. Like CM ground breaking in it's way. I loved the 'event editor'.

Bimmer: The link is: http://leav-err.army.mil/call.html The click on the Call Database icon. It's a little tricky to figure out so I'll just send it to you as a word file.

From: BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION BY THE LUFTWAFFE AT THE BATTLE OF KURSK-1943 This is what the battle was like: "The tanks were moving across the steppe in small packs, under cover of patches of woodland and hedges. The bursts of gunfire merged into one continuous, mighty roar. The Soviet tanks thrust into the German advanced formations at full speed and penetrated the German tank screen. The T-34's were knocking out Tigers at extremely close range... The tanks of both sides were in closest possible contact ... At such range there was no protection in armor and the length of the gun barrels was no longer decisive. Frequently, when a tank was hit, its ammunition and fuel blew up, and torn-off turrets were flung through the air over dozens of yards. At the same time over the battlefield furious aerial combats developed. Soviet as well as German airmen tried to help their ground forces to win the battle. The bombers, ground-support aircraft, and fighters seemed to be permanently suspended in the sky over Prokhorovka. One aerial combat followed another. Soon the whole sky 2@as shrouded by the thick smoke of the burning wrecks..." Ugly. And How did Patton win it for the Soviets? Read on. Meanwhile, Hitler met with the two commanders of Army Group Center and Army Group South and informed them that the Allies had landed on Sicily on 10 July-and that he was convinced there was, therefore, a danger of losing Central Europe. When Hitler also told them he was considering calling off the Battle of Kursk, von Manstein (Amy Group South) was shocked. Von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center, agreed since he was already in the process of moving the Ninth Army north to support the Second Panzer Army around Orel. Army Group South was allowed to continue its offensive. How- ever, on 17 July Hitler effectively ended the Battle of Kursk and the last great German offensive of World War II by ordering the SS Panzer 27 Corps to Italy.

Mark Twain. From: IMPACT OF THE HUMAN DIMENSION ON A THREE-MAN-CREW TANK The Soviets arguably produced one of the best tanks available before and during World War 11, the 5-man-crew T-34. Subsequent improved Soviet tank models were evolved from @ basic design. Their analysis tbLat 90% of the hits made on a tank occurred above a meter from the ground resulted in a prime design imperative to lower the frontal profile of the tank. (Garbage characters intentionally uncorrected.) I wouldn't call this a 'fact' but it makes a fun story: the space inside the initial T-34's was so cramped that the Soviets gave preference to smaller people to crew the tanks.