Jasper

From: NIGHT OPERATIONS THE SOVIET APPROACH The Katyusha proved to be one of the most effective psychological and casualty producing weapons in the entire Soviet campaign. The initial use of this weapon, which at night appeared to be the simultaneous launching of hundreds of flaming projectiles, routed both German defenders and the Soviet troops in proximity to the launchers

"Again those massive air to ground sorties did not kill many tanks. " That's correct. However even the Germans didn't dispute how crippling air strikes were. How to explain? Well it turns out, and if someone wants me to I'll go find the study, that the principle effects were physiological. Many tank crews would abandon their vehicles during an air stike. Many more abandoned vehicles were found, after the studied air strikes, than those hit by rockets or gunfire, something like 3:1 or higher. So even though the chances were slim, I guess even a small chance of a tank crew being burned alive would be enough motivation for them to clear out! We gamers figure the chances of being hit by something dangerous while outside of the vehicle is less than the chance of the whole crew being brewed up. Imagine the flames BTS would get should they add the 'abandon vehicle due to terror' subroutine.

I'm not trying to knock the CM engine, hey for those that only the messages: CM IS CURRENTLY THE BEST GAME ON THE PLANET. I'm just curious how it works. I've a question of targeting - and how its related to spotting I guess. I tried mixing a couple of 'zook squads in amongst an infantry squad. I figured that it would be harder for the tank to target the AT teams. I got busy and when I went back the AT teams were history, but the infantry squad was still around. Is this an expected result of the CM engine - or was I unlucky? I've been trying to think of some scheme to fit between 'area fire' and 'taget unit' and all I got is a headache. So I was planning on posting "here's a solution", but I ain't got one.

I'll ask again. Please post source material regarding Soviet tank radio's. Who said what and where did they get their information? Might save me some time. Thanks. PS That quote was not from me but the site I attributed.

First sorry for the messy URL. You might have to put the two pieces together to find the page. If you have a problem, post here and I'll try alternate URL's to get you there. Second there is some distance between the next-to-last paragraph and the last paragraph, I was going to put in some periods to show this, but forgot.

What is the source material for the assumption posted here that the Russians didn't put radio's in their T-34's? I would be very interested to find out what it is. My own personal research into this area has not (yet) focused on Russian capabilities, but I have found one source that is contrary to this assumption. http://www.armyradio.com/Default.htm?http&&&www.armyradio.com/publish/Articles/William_Howard_German/German_Radios.htm "Detailed accounts of the 1940 battle of France illustrate time and again how the French army lacked the proper command and control techniques. Despite having a numerically superior tank force, the French were never able to mount a concentrated defence or a major counter attack. Their battle plans were issued verbally before combat and units would have to stop and regroup to receive updated objectives. During battle most commands were relayed via flag signal. These signals were frequently obscured by smoke, darkness or a dispersed battlefield and thus never received The French forces that were radio equipped often fared no better. One report mentions a French unit whose radio batteries ran down just before combat, thus insuring a lack of proper communication. The invasion of Russia in 1941 again pitted the Germans against an opponent with inadequate command and control capacity. In the case of the Soviets, however, it was mostly a lack of proper training that left them paralysed. When the Germans encountered the radio equipped T-34 tank, no Wehrmacht tank could defeat it at normal combat ranges. Heavy artillery, 88rnrn anti-aircraft guns or attacks from the side or rear were needed to knock out a T-34. The Soviets were never able to press this advantage however. Their armoured commanders lacked the ability and freedom to make rapid decisions. While local counter attacks by T-34s were often successful, they were not maintainable without fresh combat orders or co-ordination with other units. By the time further counter-attack was approved and organised, a German defence would usually be prepared. Thus, while most Soviet armour had basic radio equipment, the training and infrastructure necessary to properly utilise this radio equipment was not available."

"All tanks all the time or just the FAC? I thought WW 2 radio technology was not advanced enough for that?" Just the Forward Air Controller. Radio technology had nothing to do with it. Different techniques were tried at different times to communicate with the pilots to let them know which areas or targets to hit. Or more importantly which targets not to hit!

"Cross-Channel Attack" http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-4/7-4_cont.htm I found it interesting that Germany began to expect an invasion and by '44 the quality of the France occupation forces was substantially improved over what it was in '43.

Did the German infantry climb on the rear deck of their tanks AKA "Soviet Style"? If not - was there something about the rear deck that discouraged that - or was it simply "against the rules"? I've look for a picture showing German infantry riding their tanks "Soviet Style" but havn't found one. Thanks.

Yea but didn't the allies only daylight bomb targets in Germany after 1942? They started early 1943? I mean fuel is always in short supply in modern war, but that it didn't become a <U>critical</U> issue until much later (say 1943?) I've found the site: http://vectorsite.tripod.com/indexav.html to be incomplete, but a solid source of good information. For example: I find that the Germans did try and rotate their aces back to training. Oops. That's one against me. It doesn't list the Focke-Wulf 190 but the Bf 109 section seems excellent. I found the discussion of "Wilde Sau" (or "Wild Boar") night fighting tactics very interesting (I'd never heard of it before). <HR> to the rest of your points, you need to go do some more reading.... Actung Panzer says "When in June of 1941, Germany invaded Russia, Panzertruppe encountered KV series and T-34/76 tanks which were far superior (firepower and armor protection) to any Panzer at the time. It was then decided (because of the constant reports from the Eastern Front) to design a new more powerful medium tank, which could be quickly put into production. " http://www.achtungpanzer.com/pz4.htm#panther states . . . and that it took them until 1943 before Panther's actually showed up. That suggests to me that the German tank guys took a military development break between 1939 and 1941, while everyone else was putting the pedal to the metal. What will be interesting is to see what tanks the Russians were introducing in 1943. As a result I wonder if they ended up fielding designs that were dated - so losses mounted - production is increased - development is slowed to allow production to rise - and downward the spiral it goes. It'll be interesting (and harder to find) how long the air craft guys took a break. I suspect the same period, but much more interest in tanks than aircraft, so less material out there.

PS My first attempt to see if the HTML coding works. I apolgize should it fail. "By 1944 the Allies on both fronts had fighter domination so the Stuka was by that time obsolete." My response: It was obsolete a lot sooner than 1944. The Russians came out with their Il-2 ground attack aircraft in 1942. With (pay attention now) RETRACTABLE LANDING GEAR! What a concept! So where was the next German ground attack aircraft? "The principles that served the German Army so well in their early War triumphs held true to the end of the War and indeed to today. They lost effectiveness only when the Allies learned and adopted the same rules albeit with their own national interpretations thrown in." My response: Principles have long legs - from Sun Tzu to "Get there fastest with the mostest". It's the implmentation that I'm curious about. You further my point, the Germans where being beaten at their own game. And by the time they woke up and smelled the coffee it was too late. Issue: The Luftwaffe never sent it's aces to teach 'fighter school'. So then the highly skilled German aces with 100+ kills where themselves killed or captured - they took their knowledge with them. Allied air forces rotated their most expirenced pilots out of combat to teach their skills. Good short term - Bad long term. Along with letting their aircraft get obsolete - didn't the T-34 catch the Germans with their pants down around their ankles? Wasn't the Panther was a response to the T-34?

Thanks guys.

There are a number of facts that make me wonder if the Wehrmacht ever really stayed with the times during WWII. I read that one of the fundemental flaws of the Ardennes Offesive (or Battle of the Bulge) - was that the German high command didn't realize it was 1944. OR another way to look at it: a good plan in '41 was a bad plan in '44. The Luftwaffe didn't seem to realize that the Stuka wasn't the perfect ground-attack aircraft for all time, and seemed to be asleep at the controls. Contrast that to the German 'Storm troopers' of WWI - a fundamental change of warfare using existing technology. I know little about the East Front and was wondering: Were the Wehrmacht operations in say '43 any different than in '41? The personnel and equipment might be different - but was the application the same? Thanks in advance for any input.

I got some information from someone who says words to the effect " ... official USMC history credits ... [name] ... with ...[something or other]" I've looked at the official USMC site, and done a little poking around but can't find zip about it. Is there is an official USMC history database / library / volume ?? If so how can a civialian get access to it ?? Or more to the point - how can I verify that the honorable and helpful person that told me this fact didn't make an honest mistake?

I don't like the 'commander jet pack' ability to fly all over the map - so I don't. If a feature offered by CM strikes you as undesirable - then why not simply ignore it?

Usually I do it by having lots of reference material handy, and look lots of stuff up. Or you could use a very cool site that is either (a) obscure ( kept a secret by those in the know or © everyone knows about it and I'm dumber than everyone else because it took me a while to find it, then learn how to use it. It's http://leav-err.army.mil/call.html Then click on the CALL icon - CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED OK this is real nerd type stuff. As a student of history I'm a pig in mud, but if history isn't your thing you might not appreciate it. Some of us know of the very cool literature at: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/online/Bookshelves/books3.htm But when reading stuff there they refer to other stuff in the bibial, bibblee, you know the end where people list there sources of information. There was one in particular I was looking for: Cairns, Bogardus S. "The Breakout at Anzio: A Lesson in Tank-Infantry Cooperation." Military Review 28 (January 1949):23-32. Found it - AMAZING! The trick is to use the BOOLEAN MODE. Type in the key words to use and search. You'll find it's slow sometimes. But while looking for the above article I ran across a few others. You'll notice that some of the text is ragged, well that's what you get when you read original documents and convert them to computer text. Like: FAILURE OF GERMAN LOGISTICS DURING THE GERMAN ARDENNES OFFENSIVE OF 1944 FALLEN EAGLES: THE ITALIAN 10TH ARMY IN THE OPENING CAMPAIGN IN THE WESTERN DESERT, JUNE 1940 – DECEMBER 1940 with the chapter: CHAPTER 2 ITALIAN MECHANIZED DOCTRINE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 06 - SEPTEMBER 1945 ARTILLERY WITH AN AMERICAN ARMY IN EUROPE -- SEPTEMBER 1945 Artillery with an American Army in ,Europe' PREPAREDBY BRIGADIERGENERAL CHARLES E. HART Artillery Officer,, First U, S. Army FOREWORD BY COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST U, S. AE~~ The flexibility and power of modern artillery is such that, if properly organized and coordinated, it constitutes a formidable striking power continuously available tm the commander- a power, moreoveI:, that may at any time be applied wide and deep over the battle area at the most decnsive locality. This broad statement applies to all field forces embrrrcing the combined arms, be that force la~ ge or small. This has been demonstrated time and again during the long campaigns of the First U. S. Army in Europe in 1944- 45. For this reason, I commend the following article as being worthy of careffil reading by senior commanders and gfmeral staff officers. Prior to joining this Command in October 1943, the author, the Artillery Officer, First U. S. Army, gerved as Ii Colps Artillery Officer throughout the canrpaigns in Tunisia and Sicily. General Hart's words carry the authority of several years of intensive combat experience. /s/ Courtney H. Hodges General, U. S. A., Commanding, Firsk IJ. S. Army THE SOVIET CONQUEST OF EAST PRUSSIA; SOME MISCONCEPTIONS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT; THE ARMY IN CIVIL DEFENSE; THE EBEN EMAEL OPERAION -- MARCH 1950 document_creation_date: 19500301 The Soviet Conquest of East Prussia Translated and d, gested by tbe MILITARY REVIEW from m article by General A. Niessel im "Revue de D6fensi Nationak,- (17rance) JUIW 1949. THE FIRST WEEK N THE BATTLE OF FRANCE -- OCTOBER 1949 Translated and digested by tbe MILITARY REVIEW from an article by General G. Roton in "Information. Militaires" (Franc.) ' .4uwst 1948. ' And just in case there's anyone else who has and interest in history beyond 1939 - 1949. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY AND HOW THEY SHAPED THE CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY GERMAN OBSERVATIONS AND EVALUATIONS OF THE U. S. CIVIL WAR: A STUDY IN LESSONS NOT LEARNED . . . So the lessons learned that Moltke and his crowd missed watching the US Civil War.

"Russian APBC had unbelievable effectiveness against sloped armor due to flat nose." So how come everyone didn't use it I wonder?

Update: It seems the French didn't put radios in all their tanks. The Germans did. So did everyone else. It seems only the USA had a 'walkie talkie' type radio. Others has small battery powered radios - but they needed headsets and microphones. The UK used something called a Wireless Set No. 18 MkII. http://home.wxs.nl/~meuls003/wireless/ws38mkII.jpg The Germans (in 1944!) the Kleinfunksprecher d (KlFuSpr.d) "Dorette". I think it's pretty safe to assume the USA had the best radios. Period. But I don't think that radio contact was how infantry communicated with tanks. - - - - - - - - - - - - - I'm still trying in find out about those cool SPR type hand signals. Was is just a movie thing? Were special forces trained in their use? I don't know. - - - - - - - - - - - - - However what I now know as an 'infantry phone' does have some leads. Years ago I was looking into the M4 Sherman (the how's and why's it was so ill suited to engage German armor) - I recall reading something to the effect " . . . and another mistake they made on the M4 Sherman is the lack of an infantry phone . . ." Actually I didn't know the name of the thing. Revisionist history. First I found this: "Visibility from inside WW II tanks was appalling, so drivers and TCs in particular often rode with their heads exposed, even in combat, to spot threats and maneuver over rough ground. It was a matter of survival. One platoon sergeant I interviewed, describing the circumstances that led to the death of his platoon leader, said - quite eloquently, in my opinion - that "A man has a tendency when he gets in a position like that to fight for sight like a smothering man would for air." I have a photo of this same man, who later became a platoon leader himself, leading his tank into combat on foot and relaying targets to the gunner through the infantry phone on the rear plate. (He was later wounded by machine gun fire in another campaign). He simply could not see targets from inside the tank. The practice of fighting with the head exposed sometimes led to high casualties among TCs, but was considered a necessary part of the job. Grant Timmerman, one of two TCs who won the Medal of Honor on Saipan, was killed while fighting his tank from an open hatch, as was Robert McCard, the other TC MOH winner on Saipan. TC casualties on Peleliu were particularly severe, about 70%. The comments are based on material in the book 'Marine Tank Battles In The Pacific', due out this month from Combined Publishing. " then From "The operational history of the 3rd NZ Division Tank Squadron" http://www.kithobbyist.com/AMPSNewZealand/KiwisInArmour/tshist.htm "When the lst NZ Army Tank Brigade was broken up in December 1942, 2 Tanks Battalion Group was reorganised along the lines of an Armoured Regiment with two squadrons of Stuart Hybrids and one of Valentine Mk II and IIIs. It was designated to provide armoured support for the 3rd Division then moving back to the Pacific, however, in June 1943 the requirement for armoured support for 3rd NZ Division was reduced to a squadron sized unit and so 2 Tanks was broken up the bulk going to provide reinforcements for 2nd NZ Division while the rest were formed into the 3rd NZ Division Special Army Tank Squadron Group. The Tank Squadron was despatched to the Pacific two echelons. The first, including the Recce troop, left from Auckland for New Caledonia. The balance of the Squadron was sent to Guadalcanal where they were to train with elements of the 8th NZ Brigade. Once in Guadalcanal the Valentine III CS tanks were painted with a type of heat resistant paint and infantry-tank telephones were installed on the rear. They were also issued with a special track grouser. These were supposedly to help improve traction as the Valentines supplied to New Zealand had tracks suitable for sand only, but these grousers were never satisfactory and were not used operationally. The five troop leader's tanks along with the rest of the tanks in the Squadron's sabre troops, were fitted with an infantry tank telephone box. The jack, headphone and microphone were all contained in a box that was originally fitted to the right rear mudguard in place of the tail smoke discharger. This box was later moved to a position alongside the petrol can rack. The jack was wired through the driver's junction box and the wire carried through a conduit on the right side and out through the tail lead light opening. The close support tanks had 100 yard leads for the microphone/headphone, while the other tanks had 15 foot leads. " When WILL the UK learn how to spell. Not enough "Z"'s and too many "U"'s. ļ Swiss Hetzer? http://users.forthnet.gr/ath/dimi_labada/G-13@.html Seems in 1946 Swiss Army decided to equip itself Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzer's. They were equiped with an infantry phone. While not in WWII it's the only picture of the thing I could find. http://users.forthnet.gr/ath/dimi_labada/G-13phon.jpg Alas - while there are some places on-line that might bear fruit, I fear I must now take my search off-line and into books for the kind of thing I'm looking for.

My wife calls me a 'Renaissance Man' (she's being kind). What I think I have is a short attention span. So now I'm off on another fascinating tangent in life. It starts with the question: "How did people outside of a tank communicate to people inside of a tank?". A: I still don't know. BUT what I did find was some really cool stuff about WWII radio's. Who would've thought THAT would be interesting? And I thought Jeff D was a little over the top with his tank periscope / range finding stuff I'll share the results that I've found so far. The focus is on US equipment, and I'll indicate 'keywords' to other countries (should anyone else on the planet be interested in this crap). http://www.gordon.army.mil/museum/amc/talk.htm To quote from the above: "Company commanders would have the SCR-508 (with a transmitter and 2 receivers); battalion and platoon commanders, the SCR-528s (a transmitter and one receiver); all the rest would have SCR-538." Q: Why battalion and platoon commanders issued the same radio? A: I don't know - I'll rejoin the hunt after I post this. "Real Life Use" http://www2.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/sua/PdH.htm http://www.gohotline.com/medalofhonor/recipients/audie.html "Rebuttal" http://home.att.net/~firstdiv/info.htm Search for the number 536 to jump to the "walkie talkie" stuff. For other nations 'patrol radios' look for information around the following. British: Wireless Set No. 18 and/or Type 38 Soviets: PPC Japan: Type 94-6 German: Feld Fu (really not sure about this one) more likely "Dorette". PS - If there's anyone else on the planet interested in this stuff, simply post a reply. I'll be willing to post more information as I find it. The search, up to now, has been hard and so that much more rewarding. If you're not interested then just don't read this thread anymore.

For those that are interested. http://www.armyradio.com/publish/Articles/William_Howard_German/German_Radios.htm

In closing: The term Blah Blah spotting is not really the issue. The issue is, of course, C3. Command Control & Communications (?) Take a 'relative' spotting scheme and give it a 100% C3 system and you can't tell the difference between that and the 'absolute' system. All units still know everything - One for All and All for One. This is the way most wargames run. The 'relative' spotting idea is to make it C3 - C1 = C2 - Still have 100% control and 100% command, but the inner-unit communications is gone entirely No shouting, no radio contract - zip. Personally I think this will cause problems of micro-management and I suspect when the TacIA jumps in and switches a unit away from 'Area Fire' it will become very unpopular indeed. So be it. End of my posting on this issue.

Doug Beman: I'm confused. Do you agree that units communicate with each other? Or not? Question: Will a unit hammer away with an 'Area Fire' order until it runs out of ammunition - or will the unit commander start thinking once juicy target(s) come into view?

"A tank and some infantry are moving down a road. A machine gun opens fire, and the tank closes its hatches and starts firing at the machine gun. Then the infantry see an anti tank gun; the tank COULD POSSIBLY see it but does NOT. Under the current code, during your next orders phase you can tell that tank "target that AT gun" and the tank immediately turns its turret and opens fire, WITHOUT checking to see if the tank SEES that AT gun." How much time to you propose it take for the infantry to let the tank crew know about the AT gun? Didn't all German tanks of the period have phones on them? If they did then Jeff D could probably give model number and production plant! I think that initially M4's did not have phones on them, but eventually that they too had phones. Failing that - they could use those cool SPR type hand signals. Remember the sniper in to tower communicating with Tom Hanks? Bang on the tanks hull to get the crews attention maybe? In a pinch they could pass notes through the drivers view slit!

"The more we can do to make CM realistic, the better the game will be." I think it's great the BTS is still actively supporting it's product. With many traditional software companies by the time a product reaches market the developers are busy on the next title. It's a welcome change. "The difference is that Relative spotting would force each unit to go through this process for each enemy unit before being able to shoot at it." I acknowledge to all that I'm only a causal student of military history, but surly it's not going to be that simple minded is it? I mean the beef now is the middle management tier is 100% effective in zero time. Sounds like you're going to strip away the middle management tier entirely? I know you guys know this stuff, but just in case other readers are confused. Given an infantry squad is pinned down by an MG on a hill. They could communicate via radio or runner to their platoon commander "Pinned down by MG on hill.", if he didn't see this fact himself. It would then passed up the infantry command chain until it crosses over somewhere (I'm only a causal student remember?) to armor support. Which then communicates back down "Anyone able to take out that MG on the hill?" Currently that scheme takes zero time and is 100% effective. It sounds like you're going to remove that layer entirely so it's zero percent effective and takes 100% time. That's troubling.

A not too subtle attempt to turn CM into a FPS (First Person Shooter) or RPG (Role Playing Game)