The_Capt

Honestly this kinda feels like pulling numbers out of thin air.  A Milspec FPV is going to some at a higher price point, of this there is little doubt, but how much is really unknown.  Most commercial drones already have sensors and comms links and can lift.  Milspecing some bloated monster FPV is the natural trend in this sort of thing but I think we may be able to find so etching between 2500$ and $80k.  The other thing missing at economies of scale for a large military drone industry.  This will drive down price points overtime.  We will also likely start seeing fleets of these systems.  Some broad capability motherships or specialized and other treated like ammunition and made as cheap throw away systems.  So not a single price point but a menu.

I am no expert either but EW has been around for decades, so a mature counter is struggling in this war.  As to more fanciful EW (EMP blaster?). I have not seen any of this sort of tech nor does it really address fully autonomous unmanned.  The cheap-many makes the most sense out of this but again if a UAS does not need transmission protocols to target and strike then basically we cutting a link back to an operator that isn’t there.  As to the rest (eg hacking in flight), well if you can do that why not do the same for every other computerized and networked system on the battlefield? (which is basically everything.)

Few points on EW - it has been effective in this war in eroding unmanned systems range and effects, but it likely won’t in the next one.  First off EW is very “loud” as one is basically pumping a bunch of EM into atmo.  These basically look like giant beacons to ISR designed to pick this up.  So in a peer conflict where one side is not being starved of long range precision fires, EW systems are going to be hunted by other systems.
But we know it has not been effective enough.  EW has bought neither side an ability to regain freedom of manoeuvre for mech forces.  So while it can erode UAS it cannot achieve denial or superiority.
And then there is autonomy.  No matter how many videos get posted people still have a block on this one.  UAS in the next war are all likely to have levels of full autonomy.  Whether it is complete or partial, no military is going to leave its unmanned arms vulnerable to falling out of the sky just because someone turns on EW.  Right now the UA has a bunch of civilian UAS they have repurposed to effect but a war in 5-10 years is going to see widespread us of fully autonomous systems…why?  Because everyone is watching this war.  Industry is going to explode in these areas because the advantages are simply too high.
So basically in this war we have a bunch of drones bought online with RPG7 rounds gun taped to them pulling off a 20% success rate (which is damned high) in what is likely one of the most potent EW environments ever.  The fact that some are looking down noses at the fact it takes more than one strike for these systems to kill a multimillion dollar tank shows how upside down we are here.  These systems are not only working, as challenged as they are, they are shaping the battlefield.  No large mech concentrations.  Tanks staying back 10s of kms right next to tac aviation.  When we actually see a tank shooting another tank it is a rarity to be highlighted, which is nuts from what we envisioned modern warfare to look like even 3 years ago.
UAS are not a fad, they are breaking war as we knew it…and frankly we should have seen it coming.

Few points on EW - it has been effective in this war in eroding unmanned systems range and effects, but it likely won’t in the next one.  First off EW is very “loud” as one is basically pumping a bunch of EM into atmo.  These basically look like giant beacons to ISR designed to pick this up.  So in a peer conflict where one side is not being starved of long range precision fires, EW systems are going to be hunted by other systems.
But we know it has not been effective enough.  EW has bought neither side an ability to regain freedom of manoeuvre for mech forces.  So while it can erode UAS it cannot achieve denial or superiority.
And then there is autonomy.  No matter how many videos get posted people still have a block on this one.  UAS in the next war are all likely to have levels of full autonomy.  Whether it is complete or partial, no military is going to leave its unmanned arms vulnerable to falling out of the sky just because someone turns on EW.  Right now the UA has a bunch of civilian UAS they have repurposed to effect but a war in 5-10 years is going to see widespread us of fully autonomous systems…why?  Because everyone is watching this war.  Industry is going to explode in these areas because the advantages are simply too high.
So basically in this war we have a bunch of drones bought online with RPG7 rounds gun taped to them pulling off a 20% success rate (which is damned high) in what is likely one of the most potent EW environments ever.  The fact that some are looking down noses at the fact it takes more than one strike for these systems to kill a multimillion dollar tank shows how upside down we are here.  These systems are not only working, as challenged as they are, they are shaping the battlefield.  No large mech concentrations.  Tanks staying back 10s of kms right next to tac aviation.  When we actually see a tank shooting another tank it is a rarity to be highlighted, which is nuts from what we envisioned modern warfare to look like even 3 years ago.
UAS are not a fad, they are breaking war as we knew it…and frankly we should have seen it coming.

Honestly this kinda feels like pulling numbers out of thin air.  A Milspec FPV is going to some at a higher price point, of this there is little doubt, but how much is really unknown.  Most commercial drones already have sensors and comms links and can lift.  Milspecing some bloated monster FPV is the natural trend in this sort of thing but I think we may be able to find so etching between 2500$ and $80k.  The other thing missing at economies of scale for a large military drone industry.  This will drive down price points overtime.  We will also likely start seeing fleets of these systems.  Some broad capability motherships or specialized and other treated like ammunition and made as cheap throw away systems.  So not a single price point but a menu.

One has to ask out of each artillery shell, or direct fire round for that matter, how many effectively reach a target either?  Warfare is a highly inefficient business.  We waste millions of rounds of ordinance all the time. 20% pk is actually very high compared to say small arms.  Not as high as reports of the Javelins (80-90%) but given the low costs of the systems 1 in 5 is frighteningly effective for something that hasn’t even been designed or produced with milspec.
But the article is very good and on point as to the foundation of a mass precision complex - the new arms race.  Full, or near full autonomy is a must to sidestep EW shielding.  This will mean drones will need to get smarter. Light, cheap processing power is not the problem, algorithms likely will be the competitive space.
The videos of drones with MGs is also interesting.  Someone is going to put a 40mm GL barrel or two in one of those in about 15 secs and now we have HE/HEAT standoff out to 1000+ m.  Now put fins on that 40mm with a laser designator seeker and things could get interesting really quickly.  We have seen all sorts of really expensive counters to FPVs being pushed but it is important to remember that the UAS/UGV side of the equation has barely even gotten warmed up.  Most of the FPVs in Ukraine are civilian make being repurposed.  We have not really seen the results of real investment by military industry in this field.  We are going to, which will drive costs up of course, but capabilities that survive a lot longer and do a lot more are going to happen.  A UAS with a Javelin or Spike missile.  A Wild Weasel UAS with anti-radiation missiles. Fuel air or aluminum powder based explosive drones.
The mass precision complex is coming because mass precision beats everything,

Honestly this kinda feels like pulling numbers out of thin air.  A Milspec FPV is going to some at a higher price point, of this there is little doubt, but how much is really unknown.  Most commercial drones already have sensors and comms links and can lift.  Milspecing some bloated monster FPV is the natural trend in this sort of thing but I think we may be able to find so etching between 2500$ and $80k.  The other thing missing at economies of scale for a large military drone industry.  This will drive down price points overtime.  We will also likely start seeing fleets of these systems.  Some broad capability motherships or specialized and other treated like ammunition and made as cheap throw away systems.  So not a single price point but a menu.

One has to ask out of each artillery shell, or direct fire round for that matter, how many effectively reach a target either?  Warfare is a highly inefficient business.  We waste millions of rounds of ordinance all the time. 20% pk is actually very high compared to say small arms.  Not as high as reports of the Javelins (80-90%) but given the low costs of the systems 1 in 5 is frighteningly effective for something that hasn’t even been designed or produced with milspec.
But the article is very good and on point as to the foundation of a mass precision complex - the new arms race.  Full, or near full autonomy is a must to sidestep EW shielding.  This will mean drones will need to get smarter. Light, cheap processing power is not the problem, algorithms likely will be the competitive space.
The videos of drones with MGs is also interesting.  Someone is going to put a 40mm GL barrel or two in one of those in about 15 secs and now we have HE/HEAT standoff out to 1000+ m.  Now put fins on that 40mm with a laser designator seeker and things could get interesting really quickly.  We have seen all sorts of really expensive counters to FPVs being pushed but it is important to remember that the UAS/UGV side of the equation has barely even gotten warmed up.  Most of the FPVs in Ukraine are civilian make being repurposed.  We have not really seen the results of real investment by military industry in this field.  We are going to, which will drive costs up of course, but capabilities that survive a lot longer and do a lot more are going to happen.  A UAS with a Javelin or Spike missile.  A Wild Weasel UAS with anti-radiation missiles. Fuel air or aluminum powder based explosive drones.
The mass precision complex is coming because mass precision beats everything,

One has to ask out of each artillery shell, or direct fire round for that matter, how many effectively reach a target either?  Warfare is a highly inefficient business.  We waste millions of rounds of ordinance all the time. 20% pk is actually very high compared to say small arms.  Not as high as reports of the Javelins (80-90%) but given the low costs of the systems 1 in 5 is frighteningly effective for something that hasn’t even been designed or produced with milspec.
But the article is very good and on point as to the foundation of a mass precision complex - the new arms race.  Full, or near full autonomy is a must to sidestep EW shielding.  This will mean drones will need to get smarter. Light, cheap processing power is not the problem, algorithms likely will be the competitive space.
The videos of drones with MGs is also interesting.  Someone is going to put a 40mm GL barrel or two in one of those in about 15 secs and now we have HE/HEAT standoff out to 1000+ m.  Now put fins on that 40mm with a laser designator seeker and things could get interesting really quickly.  We have seen all sorts of really expensive counters to FPVs being pushed but it is important to remember that the UAS/UGV side of the equation has barely even gotten warmed up.  Most of the FPVs in Ukraine are civilian make being repurposed.  We have not really seen the results of real investment by military industry in this field.  We are going to, which will drive costs up of course, but capabilities that survive a lot longer and do a lot more are going to happen.  A UAS with a Javelin or Spike missile.  A Wild Weasel UAS with anti-radiation missiles. Fuel air or aluminum powder based explosive drones.
The mass precision complex is coming because mass precision beats everything,

One has to ask out of each artillery shell, or direct fire round for that matter, how many effectively reach a target either?  Warfare is a highly inefficient business.  We waste millions of rounds of ordinance all the time. 20% pk is actually very high compared to say small arms.  Not as high as reports of the Javelins (80-90%) but given the low costs of the systems 1 in 5 is frighteningly effective for something that hasn’t even been designed or produced with milspec.
But the article is very good and on point as to the foundation of a mass precision complex - the new arms race.  Full, or near full autonomy is a must to sidestep EW shielding.  This will mean drones will need to get smarter. Light, cheap processing power is not the problem, algorithms likely will be the competitive space.
The videos of drones with MGs is also interesting.  Someone is going to put a 40mm GL barrel or two in one of those in about 15 secs and now we have HE/HEAT standoff out to 1000+ m.  Now put fins on that 40mm with a laser designator seeker and things could get interesting really quickly.  We have seen all sorts of really expensive counters to FPVs being pushed but it is important to remember that the UAS/UGV side of the equation has barely even gotten warmed up.  Most of the FPVs in Ukraine are civilian make being repurposed.  We have not really seen the results of real investment by military industry in this field.  We are going to, which will drive costs up of course, but capabilities that survive a lot longer and do a lot more are going to happen.  A UAS with a Javelin or Spike missile.  A Wild Weasel UAS with anti-radiation missiles. Fuel air or aluminum powder based explosive drones.
The mass precision complex is coming because mass precision beats everything,

One has to ask out of each artillery shell, or direct fire round for that matter, how many effectively reach a target either?  Warfare is a highly inefficient business.  We waste millions of rounds of ordinance all the time. 20% pk is actually very high compared to say small arms.  Not as high as reports of the Javelins (80-90%) but given the low costs of the systems 1 in 5 is frighteningly effective for something that hasn’t even been designed or produced with milspec.
But the article is very good and on point as to the foundation of a mass precision complex - the new arms race.  Full, or near full autonomy is a must to sidestep EW shielding.  This will mean drones will need to get smarter. Light, cheap processing power is not the problem, algorithms likely will be the competitive space.
The videos of drones with MGs is also interesting.  Someone is going to put a 40mm GL barrel or two in one of those in about 15 secs and now we have HE/HEAT standoff out to 1000+ m.  Now put fins on that 40mm with a laser designator seeker and things could get interesting really quickly.  We have seen all sorts of really expensive counters to FPVs being pushed but it is important to remember that the UAS/UGV side of the equation has barely even gotten warmed up.  Most of the FPVs in Ukraine are civilian make being repurposed.  We have not really seen the results of real investment by military industry in this field.  We are going to, which will drive costs up of course, but capabilities that survive a lot longer and do a lot more are going to happen.  A UAS with a Javelin or Spike missile.  A Wild Weasel UAS with anti-radiation missiles. Fuel air or aluminum powder based explosive drones.
The mass precision complex is coming because mass precision beats everything,

So maybe 5k, not 50k.  Well then this really was more RA leg humping to prove some sort of point.  Based on the rumoured losses it looks more like Russian business as usual as they lose hundreds of people for small gains.  The UA likely picked them up on ISR but either was constrained or did not have the resources at hand.  RA grabbed a few kms and then got stopped.
Dismounted aspect looks more likely either due to shortfalls or simple battlefield realities, as opposed to a shift in tactics. And we are back to another Friday in this war.

Even though Steve gave this line a warning shot, I think we need to try and really put some punctuation points on the idea because it does directly relate to this war.
Beyond these points here, opening up another strategic front in this war, which is essentially widening it into multiple proxy conflicts, comes with extreme risks.
First problem is that it is indeed a major escalation on Russia's doorstep. This would be akin to Russia sparking a proxy war between the US and Mexico...that is how World Wars start.  This may very well cross a nuclear or WMD threshold, and we would be starting it.  In fact if we were going to go down this route it would make more sense to do it on multiple fronts - the Caucuses and the Stans.  Start leveraging the East-West divides.  This of course is setting in motion events which could lead to a hard-fast collapse of Russia - which a few people out there still are not getting as a bad thing.
Second problem is resources.  FFS, we can barely support one proxy war.  How do you think we are going to do trying top keep 2 or more going?  If we somehow talked Georgia into going rogue they may wind up looking at the 1992 Kurds longingly when it comes to western support.
Third is that it will definitely make Putin's job a lot easier...and frankly the Russians would be correct in doing so.  If my nation was suddenly being attacked on multiple fronts by a foreign power, no matter what we may have done to trigger it, survival instinct is going to kick in.  This would no longer be a far fetched conspiracy, the West would be trying to destroy Russia - one cannot have a soft wide-scale proxy assault.
Finally, if we are actually willing to go this direction...why not stop f#cking around and just commit Western forces to Ukraine?  We are courting WW3 anyway, commit and hope we can drive Russia out (if we can) without sparking an Apocalypse. A bunch of proxies are a half-measure when compared to risk.
I keep coming back to this.  None of this is the western strategy here.  We want containment and a slow burnout.  We want a soft long fatal trajectory for Russia with a lot of potential for offramps along the way.  We want to prove that the Western Rules Based Order works, not blow it up.  Ukraine is important, but it is not that important.  "So what is that important Cap'n?"  Well good question and one we really need to have an answer for, before we drag ourselves further into a WW1 situation...but now with nukes.

Even though Steve gave this line a warning shot, I think we need to try and really put some punctuation points on the idea because it does directly relate to this war.
Beyond these points here, opening up another strategic front in this war, which is essentially widening it into multiple proxy conflicts, comes with extreme risks.
First problem is that it is indeed a major escalation on Russia's doorstep. This would be akin to Russia sparking a proxy war between the US and Mexico...that is how World Wars start.  This may very well cross a nuclear or WMD threshold, and we would be starting it.  In fact if we were going to go down this route it would make more sense to do it on multiple fronts - the Caucuses and the Stans.  Start leveraging the East-West divides.  This of course is setting in motion events which could lead to a hard-fast collapse of Russia - which a few people out there still are not getting as a bad thing.
Second problem is resources.  FFS, we can barely support one proxy war.  How do you think we are going to do trying top keep 2 or more going?  If we somehow talked Georgia into going rogue they may wind up looking at the 1992 Kurds longingly when it comes to western support.
Third is that it will definitely make Putin's job a lot easier...and frankly the Russians would be correct in doing so.  If my nation was suddenly being attacked on multiple fronts by a foreign power, no matter what we may have done to trigger it, survival instinct is going to kick in.  This would no longer be a far fetched conspiracy, the West would be trying to destroy Russia - one cannot have a soft wide-scale proxy assault.
Finally, if we are actually willing to go this direction...why not stop f#cking around and just commit Western forces to Ukraine?  We are courting WW3 anyway, commit and hope we can drive Russia out (if we can) without sparking an Apocalypse. A bunch of proxies are a half-measure when compared to risk.
I keep coming back to this.  None of this is the western strategy here.  We want containment and a slow burnout.  We want a soft long fatal trajectory for Russia with a lot of potential for offramps along the way.  We want to prove that the Western Rules Based Order works, not blow it up.  Ukraine is important, but it is not that important.  "So what is that important Cap'n?"  Well good question and one we really need to have an answer for, before we drag ourselves further into a WW1 situation...but now with nukes.

Even though Steve gave this line a warning shot, I think we need to try and really put some punctuation points on the idea because it does directly relate to this war.
Beyond these points here, opening up another strategic front in this war, which is essentially widening it into multiple proxy conflicts, comes with extreme risks.
First problem is that it is indeed a major escalation on Russia's doorstep. This would be akin to Russia sparking a proxy war between the US and Mexico...that is how World Wars start.  This may very well cross a nuclear or WMD threshold, and we would be starting it.  In fact if we were going to go down this route it would make more sense to do it on multiple fronts - the Caucuses and the Stans.  Start leveraging the East-West divides.  This of course is setting in motion events which could lead to a hard-fast collapse of Russia - which a few people out there still are not getting as a bad thing.
Second problem is resources.  FFS, we can barely support one proxy war.  How do you think we are going to do trying top keep 2 or more going?  If we somehow talked Georgia into going rogue they may wind up looking at the 1992 Kurds longingly when it comes to western support.
Third is that it will definitely make Putin's job a lot easier...and frankly the Russians would be correct in doing so.  If my nation was suddenly being attacked on multiple fronts by a foreign power, no matter what we may have done to trigger it, survival instinct is going to kick in.  This would no longer be a far fetched conspiracy, the West would be trying to destroy Russia - one cannot have a soft wide-scale proxy assault.
Finally, if we are actually willing to go this direction...why not stop f#cking around and just commit Western forces to Ukraine?  We are courting WW3 anyway, commit and hope we can drive Russia out (if we can) without sparking an Apocalypse. A bunch of proxies are a half-measure when compared to risk.
I keep coming back to this.  None of this is the western strategy here.  We want containment and a slow burnout.  We want a soft long fatal trajectory for Russia with a lot of potential for offramps along the way.  We want to prove that the Western Rules Based Order works, not blow it up.  Ukraine is important, but it is not that important.  "So what is that important Cap'n?"  Well good question and one we really need to have an answer for, before we drag ourselves further into a WW1 situation...but now with nukes.

Even though Steve gave this line a warning shot, I think we need to try and really put some punctuation points on the idea because it does directly relate to this war.
Beyond these points here, opening up another strategic front in this war, which is essentially widening it into multiple proxy conflicts, comes with extreme risks.
First problem is that it is indeed a major escalation on Russia's doorstep. This would be akin to Russia sparking a proxy war between the US and Mexico...that is how World Wars start.  This may very well cross a nuclear or WMD threshold, and we would be starting it.  In fact if we were going to go down this route it would make more sense to do it on multiple fronts - the Caucuses and the Stans.  Start leveraging the East-West divides.  This of course is setting in motion events which could lead to a hard-fast collapse of Russia - which a few people out there still are not getting as a bad thing.
Second problem is resources.  FFS, we can barely support one proxy war.  How do you think we are going to do trying top keep 2 or more going?  If we somehow talked Georgia into going rogue they may wind up looking at the 1992 Kurds longingly when it comes to western support.
Third is that it will definitely make Putin's job a lot easier...and frankly the Russians would be correct in doing so.  If my nation was suddenly being attacked on multiple fronts by a foreign power, no matter what we may have done to trigger it, survival instinct is going to kick in.  This would no longer be a far fetched conspiracy, the West would be trying to destroy Russia - one cannot have a soft wide-scale proxy assault.
Finally, if we are actually willing to go this direction...why not stop f#cking around and just commit Western forces to Ukraine?  We are courting WW3 anyway, commit and hope we can drive Russia out (if we can) without sparking an Apocalypse. A bunch of proxies are a half-measure when compared to risk.
I keep coming back to this.  None of this is the western strategy here.  We want containment and a slow burnout.  We want a soft long fatal trajectory for Russia with a lot of potential for offramps along the way.  We want to prove that the Western Rules Based Order works, not blow it up.  Ukraine is important, but it is not that important.  "So what is that important Cap'n?"  Well good question and one we really need to have an answer for, before we drag ourselves further into a WW1 situation...but now with nukes.

Not saying the effort was the waste it was the rapid ramping up.  Worked in government long enough to know a massive spending sinkhole when I see one.  The government needed rapid production of a bunch of stuff so industry had to rapidly increase production lines - that costs an obscene amount of money, which that funding would need to backstop because risks are so high.  Government contracts were not doubt flying.
It is not anyone fault, or at least no one still in the business today. We dialled all that back in the 90s, GWOT did not need it, and we ignored the signals from 2014.  But it means that for some production runs the cost per unit was very high which soaks up the limited funding.  Once we hit steady state we will be awash in artillery shells, let’s hope they do not show up too late.  Russia should be very worried because the clock it ticking against them and they likely know it, hence the push to make hay while the sun shines this year.

Gonna weigh in here, so what we are dancing around here is political warfare/subversive warfare/active measures/stick-a-new-label-on-it-and-claim-it-was-my-idea.
Is it an option space...sure.  There are actions we could take in the backfield to create strategic friction and disruption, we could even engineer paralysis - it has been done to us.  But this is the last thing from an "easy button."
Subversive warfare campaigns take years to setup - mapping, testing and simply keeping up with internal shifts in an opponents human systems would cripple our current intelligence agencies. We had this back during the Cold War - and we all remember how well CIA follies went in places like Cuba. This is extremely tricky work, even with advent that human terrain mapping is technically "easier" in the information age (it really isn't). 
Assuming you can get enough awareness to even start to play this game, the risks are high.  Human systems are non-linear and potentially explosively auto-catalytic. Subversive warfare has more in common with bomb disposal than anything else - a bunch of barely evolved primates armed with the internet is not a cave one walks into lightly.
And then there is the target.  Free democracies are incredibly messy, but we are resilient as hell compared to rigid autocratic societies.  Dictators have single points of failure that when tripped can get out of hand really fast.  We have talked a lot about a coherent theory of Russian failure.  For subversive warfare - like somehow convincing and supporting Georgia with active SOF and CIA - we could see things get out of hand and out of control very quickly.  No politician is going to sign off on - "Well we are not sure but it might result in Russia falling apart. You know...for Ukraine."  Much more likely given our woeful inexperience it will blow up publicly in our faces.  We cannot take a big "sh#t on the floor at the UN", it is the bloody house we built.
Finally, these sorts of actions are more about strategic shaping for negotiation advantage, not really winning a proxy war.  No single harassing ship sinking is going to force Russia to the table - however, it may very well drive support into Putin's arms and allow him to actually mobilize.  Covert and clandestine in the modern age is a lot harder.  Most times Russia "gets away with it" is not because we can't figure it out, it is because we cannot be bothered.  If Putin wants an oligarch to prove the laws of gravity in another country, do we really care?  Diddling our democracy is finally getting eyebrows raised but no one yet thinks it has been much more than an accelerant, not a cause.  No right wing nut jobs stormed the Hill because Russia or China told them to.  Those powers likely made plays to help it along but this is not a evil masterplan...we are doing most of this to ourselves.
So what?  Well I am sure these options are on the whiteboard. And we very likely have some backfield muttering around potentially friendly power elites that we might be able to woo.  We have provided Ukraine with intel and support to make things happen, but it is all in a nicely controlled box.  We simply are not at the point where we are either able to, or want to "set Russia ablaze."  Nor am I sure we want to escalate to that point anytime soon.
    

Mass. The UA had been using small dispersed forces in its tactical bitings last summer. The RA has been using small Cbt teams as short sharp stabs. (and paying for it).  From what we can see this was a large dismounted wave with some mech elements.  Numbers of 50k have been thrown around.  The aim was not infiltration-to-erode, it was to take and hold ground with what looks like unit sized dismounted troops.  That is a different kettle of dead Russians.

Mass. The UA had been using small dispersed forces in its tactical bitings last summer. The RA has been using small Cbt teams as short sharp stabs. (and paying for it).  From what we can see this was a large dismounted wave with some mech elements.  Numbers of 50k have been thrown around.  The aim was not infiltration-to-erode, it was to take and hold ground with what looks like unit sized dismounted troops.  That is a different kettle of dead Russians.

Mass. The UA had been using small dispersed forces in its tactical bitings last summer. The RA has been using small Cbt teams as short sharp stabs. (and paying for it).  From what we can see this was a large dismounted wave with some mech elements.  Numbers of 50k have been thrown around.  The aim was not infiltration-to-erode, it was to take and hold ground with what looks like unit sized dismounted troops.  That is a different kettle of dead Russians.

Well we can agree or at least agree to disagree in some places.  I am still not sure how you can get this new tank platoon down in costs so that it matches what we can do with light wheeled armor.  Tracks to give better cross country mobility but they always come at a significant maint and vulnerability costs of their own.  [Aside the quad tracks are a proven technology but they simply look and feel too fussy and too many points of failure for modern warfare to my eyes].
I did highlight that last para of yours.  I cannot stress how this is not all about drones or a drone basket.  Anymore than your proposal is "all about tanks."  It is about a land warfare tactical and operational systems.  And what we put at the core of that system.  I am arguing that it is tactically - light infantry, indirect fires, PGMs of all shapes and sizes and unmanned systems (surface and above surface). Operationally it is all about C4ISR and Air Denial.  Drones are a main component but cannot be the only component.  This is a new all arms team that has already demonstrated utility in this war.  The question is, can it carry it the rest of the way?
I think the need for armored vehicles is the anomaly, not a sign of a continuing trend.  Infantry need transport and protected transport, this much is true.  And we still see instances of direct fire support.  But looking forward, how fire support is provided is likely to change. PGM means infantry can clear a bunker without a tank gun. They can suppress with combination from the new arms team. 
This is an evolution toward something and we will see c-measures and c-c-measures introduced, but the fundamental truth is that miniaturization, processing power-to-weight, materials and data networking are all reshaping the battlefield. We will not go backwards from here. Large, heavy and expensive are endangered species in this war, they may very well be extinct for the next one - the Age of Needles has already begun.
I honestly think we need to start thinking about ground warfare in terms of naval warfare evolution.  And here is the thing, it looks like naval warfare needs to evolve too.  So maybe it is new naval warfare thinking.  Regardless, we shall just have to wait and see where this all lands in the end.  I have zero doubts that the military industrial complex will try and sell exactly what you are proposing, and western militaries will likely convince governments to pay for it.  But it won't work and eventually we will see the tank take its ranks in the museum - it is just the nature of things in warfare.

I wish I could say that love of a platform or system is only an amateur wargamers disease.  I have already seen the reflexive signs of the upcoming arguments.  We will dress them up but in reality we have built identities around these platforms/systems.  Asking someone to change a strong identity, one designed to weather war, is a tall order.  We have generations of senior officers who grew up with the tank as the core of the land warfare tactical system.  Hell, we were still counting them as a metric of combat power in the lead up to this thing.  Even now, I think they are still a threat, but more like nukes...if conditions get to the point that they can be employed, this war is already over.  If the UA collapse and we see a ring of steel outside Kharikiv, or if the UA drives tank columns into Crimea, these are not a sign that "tanks work!" They are a symptom of a much larger collapse. A collapse that had little to do with the tank, or even mech itself. 

I think this is the crux of the issue right here.  If you do not believe ISR is so ubiquitous that tanks still have space on the modern battlefield then any revisioning starts to make sense.  To my mind the evidence is too large to ignore that this is not the case.  Beyond RUSI and other academic assessments there is the simple fact that we are seeing essentially a deadlock on a frontage over 800km long.  Both sides are employing force-to-space levels unheard of...and yet nothing is able to move.  We should be seeing moves/c-moves and all sorts of manoeuvre given the levels of breathing room...but we are not.  Why?  Well military conservatives tend to fall back on "well Russian and Ukraine simply do not know how" which gets weaker and weaker everyday.
How?  ISR.  I have no idea how much processing power is required but both sides clearly have it, why else would they be unable to concentrate to manoeuvre? They forgot how? Same goes for airpower.  The RuAF is massively overmatching the UAAF yet cannot do much more than lob glide bombs 50+ kms back.  This is modern AD but it has to be plugged into something.
Finally, even if it isn't on the battlefield in this war...what about the next one?  What possible indication do we have that this trend has culminated and we are going to see less ISR on the battlefield of tomorrow?  It is not the steady stream of social media, it is the fact that neither side can move when according to all modern doctrine they should be able to.  While people are arguing over the tank I see the horrible reality that ground warfare (and air to an extent) is broken.
I am saying you cannot mask military traffic by using civilian shields.  And yes, we might have to clear civilian traffic 100kms back because that is what the enemy can see and hit.
We seem to be agreeing on swarm, but you want to swarm with a multi-million dollar set of platforms.  How long can we sustain a swarm centered on a tank platoon that costs as much as a flight of F35s?  This is basically trying to stuff the tank into a swarming concept because we want tanks, not because we need them.
Again, I am not seeing what these new tanks are adding for the cost. I can get direct and indirect fires via other lighter faster platforms, indirect fires and unmanned already?
So you have a new tank that has "more amor" in different locations and now hybrid electric cold engines pushing a 30ton (how "more armor" and "less weight" works will be interesting).  You have thrown in a statement like "more resistant to indirect fires and drones while maintaining mobility" like it is simply a matter of design.  You are arguing with physics and on the losing end.  A small cheap drone can carry more chemical kinetic power the tank can handle everywhere. But the drone can strike anywhere and apply it to just about any location on the tank, including mines in front of the tank. You are trying to have massive survivability, mobility and low visibility here, and years of tank design have proven one cannot have all these factors maximized at the same time.
Finally, there is firepower.  If I need 105mm worth of HE - that is about 2kgs of HE wrapped in a shell to throw it out 2-3kms (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/105×617mmR) - then why don't I simply stick 2kgs of HE (or shaped HEAT) onto an FPV for a fraction of a fraction of the cost of a quad tracked, transparent hulled, hybrid electric, multi-spectral invisible 30 ton tank with some new amor that can be 50% lighter?  "But a tank gun can throw it at 700 m/s"  Well sure, but for the cost of this next gen F35 tank I can buy and employ a few hundred thousand drones.
Hey man, you said "sanitize".  And the threat from ATGM teams is against heavy vehicles, not other ATGM teams and drone swarms.  The easiest way to avoid getting ones tanks hit and "ruining an attack" is to not have tanks as the core of your tactical system. 
Well you clearly think pretty highly of your own idea if I am reading this right, there is that.  I think you have proven that we still need vehicles to carry C2 and support forward as a bubble pushes out.  Where we disagree is that it need to be this "radical reinvention" of what is going to be 1) extremely expensive, 2) a Rube Goldberg level of complexity to maintain (quad tracks...really?") and is 3) likely to be just as slow and visible as any tanks we have right now.  Why can I not put all of what you are proposing on light armor that is much faster and cheaper?  We already saw this in the Kharkiv break out. It was not tanks, it was infantry/SOF in MRAPs.  I want more of that and enough of them that I can sustain losses over time.
Minefields.  Yes, they will be a problem for Year 1, day 1 of the next war.  If Ukraine had several hundred thousand drones that could carry and drop mines on 22 Feb, do you honestly think they would not have used them?  In fact mines are likely to make a major comeback because when plugged into a C4ISR architecture and supported by....everyone say it together...indirect fires, PGMS, infantry and unmanned systems, they work so well that modern breaching doctrine fails and doctrinal force multiplication stops making any sense at all.
You asked for critiques and hole poking, you are getting it.  Your proposed system is really has the appearance of a hammer looking for a nail.  The core assumption that we even need a tank is already been established within your proposal, yet what you are proposing does not address the fundamental issues with that assumption that we are seeing everyday on the battlefield in Ukraine, and every indication we have points to accelerating trends in these directions (ISR, precision, lethality and reach). 
To summarize, your proposal, my critiques are:
- Does not demonstrably show how these new tanks/tank platoon will perform any better than what we already have.  You are far too vague on how mobility-survivability-visibility will be optimized for the future battlefield. It appears you are advocating a "free lunch" concept.  I am not seeing net competitive advantage here against an opponent that can deny terrain with todays technology let alone tomorrows.
- I see some very significant engineering challenges in: armor, engine/power pack and drive trains.  You also are proposing some very complex and advanced ISR and targeting equipment, but I think these are well developed elsewhere so porting them over is likely a lesser concern.
- Tactically, this system does not solve for the Denial Asymmetry we are seeing.  It is waiting for another system to solve that problem so it can then do what it is designed for. Problem is that whatever system can solve for Denial Asymmetry will also likely be able to do what these tanks can, so there is real risk of redundancy.
- It is a very expensive redundancy risk.  An F35 comes in at roughly $83 million per platform.  A modern M1A2 Sep 3 comes in at around $24 million.  What you are proposing will likely be in this league of costs.  And for this we get a 105mm HE gun, a 40mm gun, a drone platform and C-UAS platform that needs a significant C-ISR and C-UAS enterprise to survive, let alone thrive.  To my mind if we can build that C-ISR/C-UAS enterprise we can put this firepower and mobility on much cheaper extant platforms.
- Operational costs will also be very significant.  Maintenance of complex systems such as these will drive a much higher logistics load, at best it will likely be the same as the one we currently have, which we know is too heavy.  Your hybrid electric idea is actually being fielded (https://www.army.mil/article/254124/army_advancing_first_hybrid_electric_bradley) and on a 30 ton chassis.  This will reduce fuel requirements (by 20%) but these are still combustion engines with the heat and sound vulnerabilities.   I would shoot to get logistical burden down to that of an MRAP, at which point this tank platoon becomes competitive. Again though, I am not sure why I need a tank here when this engine on a high mobility light armor vehicle is already in reach.
- Offsets/Risk. An opponent could neutralize this entire system with existing cheap and readily available systems.  ATGMs, indirect fires, UAS/UGV and mines, carrying loads of stand-off EFP and/or smart submunitions are likely going to counter this proposed system at a small fraction of comparative costs. Given the low density of production of this new tank platoon, driven by costs, means an opponent can be wrong many times but our forces can only be wrong a few times, perhaps once. This system would likely be niche and used rarely, much like low density specialized engineering vehicles.  We could find ourselves in a scenario where they are on a critical path but this would not be the norm, nor should it be.
More bluntly put - too expensive, too visible, not enough benefit compared to other systems.  And too reliant on another system (C-ISR/C-UAS complex) to be able to do its job, to the point that the enabling system can likely do its job for it.
Finally, there is one wildcard out there, cyber.  Cyber has been tepid in this war, we know it is happening but neither side has been able to weaponize the domain to the point where enemy ISR is shut down, for example.  If cyber were able to re-set a battlefield by eliminating or highly degrading an opponents C4ISR then traditional manoeuvre could be back on the table.   Of course if we have complete C4ISR superiority, I still do not see why we cannot simply push our own bubbles with impunity but fast manoeuvre with a level of armor could make a re-emergence.  But we would have to see cyber actually perform as advertised - an operational/tactical tool as opposed to strategic shaping tool within conventional warfare.      

I gotta be honest, I am far more concerned at the indications that then western mil industry complex has become a sponge for military aid.  It makes sense that we had to go through them as Ukraine really had no MID of their own and we have been buying few-expensive for the last 30 years.  Now we are asking industry to do many, so there are going to be losses.  But I have a sinking feeling that a whole lot has been wasted getting our own factories up to speed while the UA goes dry.  I am not sure that even if we got western troops involved (which we won’t) that we ammo stocks to supply them either. This trend of highly inefficient contributions has to stop.  But perhaps we are in a “darkest before dawn” moment.