The_Capt

It also was no great leap of logic that a machine gun and breech rapid fire artillery will render the horse cavalry as irrelevent but guess what? The shift of mentality required to take that leap is unbelievably enormous and has implications on training, doctrine and even who we choose to lead an armed force. Training of subordinates to exercise Manoeuvre has been an absolute nightmare. To actually teach a junior officer that "disobeying an order" is a good thing in the right circumstances is almost as hard as teaching a senior officer that true sins are ones of "ommission" not "commission" and when a jr officer takes initiative we do not stomp on them even when it goes bad, we instead analyse why they did it and allow them to learn from it. This is leading down a totally different path in what is wrong with the military and how Manoeuvre and military mindset (most that is) do not mix well. The officers who are in fact the best warriors for Manoeuvre are in fact the ones who do not go anywhere and wind up with all the ****ty jobs in peacetime. The when operations start up you are stuck with a senior officer Corps wholly unprepared to deal with rapid fire decsion making....Ok now I am on a Canadian military rant....time to count to ten and remember this is just a game.

I am in. This is a clear chance to practice true Manoeuvre and see if it really works. Axis please.

Looks more like a 3-D Close Combat game than CM.

Steve, I would ask we don't shut this one down as it is tangent to the continuing argument over Manoeuvre and Attrition raging around us. The question is not what they "were" or what they "are". I belive we all coming to terms with these concepts. It is a question of the future and how we will apply them. CM with FOW turned off is actually a desired end state in terms of information available to a field commander. The question is "How are we going to use it". This question is perhaps the most critical since the introduction of Total Warefare. Information Warefare will be more critical to future conflict than any here really understand and CM is a great vehicle to demonstrate this. LCol Leonhart was a guest speaker at staff school and he gave some really deep insights into the future of warfare, which rocked the foundations of what we thought was the "Manoeuvre solution". In a true conflict in which we have "Information Superiority" Attritionist doctrine and methodology is better employed towards achieving Manoeuvrist objectives. We are looking at a hybrid evolution and I believe it stares us in the face every time we boot up and play.

To Steve, the problem with a computer game is that our units do not have a human brain which can actually process a situation within the context of Manoeuvre doctrine. So loss of control actually becomes a "mob rush" which is really all I see in those games. In reality C&C and Age of Empires are far more attritionist than CM in that it really comes down to who has the most. The left and the right is poorly understood in gaming and the real military, boundary lines have caused more grief than could be believed by people who haven't lived it. The cooperative relationship which is vital in Manoeuvre Warfare really need to be developed, we still rely too heavily on report lines and "pieces of terrain" belonging to someone or the other. This is outside of the scope of the battle. What you are talking about is either a battle that does not happen or one that happens instead of another. This is what we call "scope creep" in gaming. Combat Mission is a tactical wargame. It is not supposed to have anything to do with the Big Picture. You find yourself in a confrontation, either of or not of your choosing. It doesn't matter how you wish to think of it, just understand that it happened BEOFRE turn one. In other words, the decisions you are thinking of have already been made. Either by you (in theory) or your superior. I mean, who is to say that the Germans in Last Defense (prior to Turn 1) didn't divert their drive against another bridge, which was more heavily defended, and instead attack the one actually in that scenario? See what I mean? quote: I understand and agree but you must understand that for actual Manoeuvre Warfare to happen we need to allow for this to happen and then the freedom of action must be allowed. This is well beyong the scope of a tactical wargame. I believe the CMHQ "Meta-Campaign" or a large multi-player campaign "pack" released by BTS could be made to provide this "dynamic" environment. The question remains though, would anybody buy it, except us "Army geeks". For Mr. Rock, You are correct in both sets of definitions and in fact both sets support the other. Ths systems as you call them support the philosophies and are each applicable to certain conditions. WWI was not attritionist because the generals were inept or rich-idiot-third-sons. The art of manoeuvre and Manoeuvre were well known and well employed at all levels. WWI was Attritionist because technology had outstripped any freedom of movement, the mentality or system did not work. So instead they kept trying for the break-through using Attritionist control. The system supports the philosophy and the philosophy depends on the system. A better term would be "objectives" and "means". The system provides the "means" and the philosophy provides the "objectives". Although I would say that Attritionist method can still strike at weakness, look for gaps etc, it is more a question of control and who holds it. Lastly for Mr Cawley, I think I now understand the real aim of your discussion. However, the way you are trying to prove it is weak. First of all define "won" and "lost". These two conditions happened a thousand times a day in any given conflict at a myriad of different levels. You have overgeneralized the employment of the two schools of thought to the extreme. You have further "muddied" the waters by dragging in personalities to try and prove your point. Gen So-and-So was an attritionist on the winning side but Gen Whats-his-Name wasn't so attrition is better. This is not logical nor does it provide proof of your original position. One does not supercede the other. They are TOOLS gentlemen, each with inherent strengths and weakness to be employed equally and at the right time is a true sign of mastery. Proof of that is in every historical example given. It was all a question of timing. If you don't believe me take any battle in the last 1000 years and show that the "objectives" of each school did not exist at some level. The "means" and formalization thereof is a different matter and is in fact something we are still coming to grips with.

The "challenge" as Mr Cawley put it is an usless exercise. Trying to provide an exmple of a "war" in which Manouvre or Attrition decided the day is an endless loop. I will give Mr Cawley the benifit of the doubt and take it as a trick question. Wars are won by a combination of the two and how well one uses them will determine a victor. Do not get too hung up on the past gentlemen. Yes those who fail to learn from it are doomed to repeat it, just as those that fail to recognize that, "that was then this is now and victory is tomorrow". D-Day was a brilliant Strategic manoeuvre to open up a second Western Front. Hitting Germany on the weak side with clear intent to driving for it's heart. It was also an operation carried out in a classical Attritionist doctrine, bomb, shell, land and secure BLUE line by 1900hrs. In reality it had to be. The Gulf was the reverse, our intent is to destroy the Republican Guard (a more Attritionist intent you could not have) but we will allow our forces to execute it via a Manoeuverist mentality (exploit, exploit, exploit) You see, brilliant Manoeuvre at one level can be brutally Attritionist at another so you challenge is impossible to truly answer because the second we try and grab the smoke it blows away.

To respond to Steve: I have just started a thread on CM and Manoeuvre which is headed in that direction. I will give you the scenario briefings as an exmple of Manoeuvre (I actually forgot about those) in that one is given intent, resources and the ability to execute as we see fit. From our POV down however, we can exercise the goals of Manoeuvre (tempo=dislocation, disruption, recce pull etc) but it really doesn"t happen. If we "lost" control of our units and the AI was about ten years older we may be able to duplicate this experience. When a commander, in the context of "aufstragtactik" (gotta use at least one German buzzword) or mission command gives his orders and intent he is allowing is subordinates "free reign" within the guilines of his intent to carry out the mission. True Manoeuvrists trust their subordinates to the point of complete hands off, with the exception of the Reserve. That is reality but probably would be a very frustrating game. CM also excludes the left and right, which is a poorly understood, critical, relationship. There would be a Battalion Commander left and right of you, guys you've trained, drank and whored with. The coordination of these men to cooperate under a commanders intent is a key Manoeuvre experience which is missing. Manoeuvre is not a Grand Scale device and can be applied to a Platoon attack. It simply stresses allowing subordinates to know more and therefore do more when the opportunity arises. I guess an idea for CM Manouvre could be played out in an operation where the ability to exploit (or not) between maps could be allowed. One must see Manouevre in context with the picture around them. In Last Defence if the enemy hasn't shown up by turn X (and my commanders intent is to counter attack to regain initiative) I have no option to carry out that c-move with my troops till we run out of gas, nor is there a commander with a Reserve to push thru me once I do. Last point, I am not saying Manoeuvre is "the next Grail", in fact I do not believe it is even going to be relevant in the near future. Attrition and Manoeuvre are two sides of the same coin and a truly masterful commander can switch betwen the two with perfect timing and not miss a beat.

OK, I will first direct everyone to my tirad on Attrition and Manoeuvre in the ATTRITION thread. First let me say that I will refer to the two above concepts in terms of modern military doctrine (as taught at the Canadian Staff College, we have american instructors and students too so both nations have roughly the same ideas). The two concepts are in fact philosophies and doctrine on "how to do business". The goals of Manoeuvre; dislocation, disruption and whatever the hell the last one was, are all aims of Manouvre doctrine but not the doctrine itself. One can be executing Manoeuvre doctrine by doing nothing or digging in to take the brunt of the enemies force "face on face" so long as it fully supports your commanders (and his commanders) intent, regardless of the mission. Now let's discuss something really wild. Manoeuvre was developed to empower subordinates with the capability to exploit opportunity, within the guidance of just what in the hell the entire team is trying to do. This was done because warfare evolved around ones ability to "think faster/plan faster and move faster" and therefore be able to strike weakness and bring about decisive victory quickly. And troops on the ground have a much better view, and therefore, are in a better position to see opportunity when it comes. Now CM is attritionist by nature, we direct almost every movement that happens, our troops do not carry out any major initiatives. If they did I have no doubt the "bug" posts would be endless. The point is, should they? Our Point of View (POV) is godlike in comparison to the real world we know much more than out troops do about the "big picture" we get instant feedback from out troops and even with FOW we get an instant picture of the battlefield. The entire reason why Manoeuvre doctrine is being adopted was because troops in the front have a better view of the battlefield than a commander hearing reports on the radio, we then empower them to act. Not so in CM we, the commanders, see and know everything faster and more completly than our troops, should not the power for decision rest with us. All interesting stuff but answer me this; isn't modern combat beginning to look more and more like CM. The E-Battlefield is a reality right around the corner and it may render the philosophy of Manoeuvre as obsolete. The idea of striking weakness and flanking are not new gentlemen, it how one goes about doing it in which lies the future...your thoughts please.

Soapbox?! Ok if that is what you want to call modern military doctrine. This is not definition by concensus. I have been doing this full time for the last 13 years and spent last year in staff college, I don't really care what the rest of the community thinks, I am only giving the definition and concept "chapter and verse" from current teaching. I am not here to argue. Most people on this forum have made the beginner mistake of thinking Manouevre Warfare has something to of with sneaky moves and flankings. It is an amateurs view but in most professional military circles what I have offered is in line with current teaching. Mr. Cawley, thank you for the history lesson and yes history shows us wonderful examples of each types of warfare (although the modern concept of Manouvre doctrine is relativly new). Yes Verdun was open attrition but it was not Attritionist doctrine. D-Day, the March to Caen, Gettysburg were all wonderful examples of Attrition Doctrine by which a very controlled and centralized deployment of units towards a well-defined terrain objective. Try if you can to re-think the concepts as methodologies rather than a set of tactics/strategies historical or otherwise. Manoeuvre is a "way" of carrying out warfare not a set of rules or tricks. As for historical examples, the Gulf is your best bet not perfect by any stretch but the only real historical use in the formal sense. You are quite right though in it having been practiced by many great commanders, it was instinct and a personal gift. We are now trying to train leaders towards the idea rather than hope it develops Mr Abbott, what you have is a very good case of deception and initiative but not Manoeuvre (with the capital M). In order to execute the scenario you describe you will still plot each units move and position in order to execute your brillant plan. True Manoeuvre would be your troops executing the gap exploitation against what you told them to do because if best supported your intent and in real combat you cannot see what they can nor get instant feedback. That is Manoeuvre. What you have are a neat bag of tricks which do emulate some of the tools used in Manoeuvre (or goals of this methodology) but Attritionist still.

Just having completed a year long staff course, the topic of manoeuvre and attrition was forefront throughout. Manoeuvre is NOT the rapid deployment of forces towards an enemy weakness, all Blitzkriegy and sneaky. Attrition is NOT the opening of the Somme and 6000 dead in about 25 minutes. The labels "Attritionist and Manoeuvrist" are in fact terrible as they conjure up the above images. Manoeuvre is a methodology. A way of doing business. It is actually quite simple but amazingly complex to apply. Manoeuvre doctrine at it's absolute essentials stresses the Commanders "intent" over that of the actual mission, to the point, (everybody pay attention here) that it becomes more important to the actual mission statement itself. Manouvre "empowers" a subordinate to exercise maximum initiative in contributing to the overall success of the plan. This mentality yields a very fast tempo pace of warefare which relies on armour (because it can move quicky) to exploit and "show max initiative", normally aimed at enemy weakness. The applications and implications of that statement are legion so I will move on. Attritionist doctrine, stresses the actual letter of the law rather than the spirit. It focuses on immediate objectives with little or no room for change. "Take the Flag", not why or what if the enemy does "blah", just "TAKE THE FLAG" until I say otherwise. Attritionist doctrine stresses maximum control over your troops towards a central (normally terrain based objective..Vimy Ridge for example). To answer what seems to be a snide post by Mr Cawley (no doubt born out of frustration)...No War has been one by single use of either of these two principals. They are in fact two sides of the same coin and have direct application to any conflict. D-Day was an attrition battle. The sole design of which was to allow "break-in" into Germany where some commanders (Patton most notably and Monty most "not"-notably) employed a manoeuvrist method to the battle across France. Attrition stresses control and maximum planning and is normally used in the break-in battle when "fancy-footwork" will only get you killed. Manoeuvre is used when an attrition battle has been successful and exploitation can be accomplished. Both of these methods may be employed numerous times in any given conflict. As to CM, it is attritionist, period. Sub-commanders are actually strings of code and cannot execute initiative beyond a very narrow scope. Also the entire emphasis is on Flags or terrain objective which may or may not have any real value in term of what the enemy is doing. We may have battles which may have been part of a "manoeuvrist" operation but each battle is an execise in attrition, no matter how fancy someone is with their tanks and Halftracks. Anybody who preaches otherwise has no real understanding of the concept but have jumped on the "buzz-word" band wagon anyway.

Having read the above exchanges may I offer a simple suggestion. Give the player the ability to have more control of targeting. If TacAI can't do something it is in the best interest of gameplay to allow the player to take on that function. Target "Lock": Shoot at that Churchill until it out of LOS, then keep orientated to that direction until I say otherwise. Target Priority: Churchill till out of LOS then target someone else. Could also be incorporated into an SOP style of "priority of engagement". Target "Free": Shoot at whatever your little silicon brain figures it should, based on experience and threat profile. Such a system may go a long way to allowing more control as to what gets fired upon. I think we have to remember that the "computer tank commander" is just that and cannot be expected to react like a person. CM is very good but could use a little tweaking. I also think that the "powers that be" know this and are going to make CM2 all things to all people. In fact I am thinking of starting the "Church of CM2" with the faith that CM2 is in fact the second coming and will bring 1000 yrs of bliss to humanity. It shall cast "Lucifer" aka Bill Gates into the fiery pit of hell were he will roast and be tortured by guys who can actually do more than one push up and be forced to work on his own OS for 1000 yrs....or words to that effect.

Bang on comments by "tss" and "Dorosh". I could go on at great length as to the employment principals of obstacles and the "general" vs "close support" concepts. Regardless, tss has an excellent learning point in that all obstacle must be covered by direct or indirect fire. Another clear example is the Gulf War. If the Iraqis had actually offered resistance along their defensive obstacles the US casualties would have been much higher. The AT ditch embedded in a minefield is my worst nightmare. With modern armoured assets (ploughs, rollers, dozer tanks and Armoured bridges) it still takes around 5 mins to breach an AT ditch in the middle of a minefield. And as everybody here knows 5 min is one hell of a long time under fire. As to CM engineers, yup, what we are seeing are actually Pioneers or trained infantry, semi-permanently attached to a battalion. These guys did the dirty work of blowing wire and holes in bunkers. "Engineers" were centrally controlled and would execute Brigade level obstacle plans. This is changing with the concept of manoeuvre warfare and empowerment of subordinates. Engineers are now cut to Battalions in sufficient numbers to do a hell of a lot more in a shorter planning cycle. Last note on the subject: CM is probably one of the better games in the use of engineer and engineer works. Steel Panthers III also does a pretty good job of modeling the effect of obstacles. I hope CM 2 will improve this by adding the complete spectrum of engineer capability available in the time period.

Ok time for me to wade in. I have spent 12 yrs as a full-time Combat Engineering officer and though I may have limited knowledge of WWII employment of the "sapper" I think I can shed some light on the ensuing argument. For the purposes of CM engineers are employed in to distinct roles. Defensive: Defensive works are completed prior to engagement with the enemy. WWII did not have SCAT Mines of FASCAM which could actually influence the defensive battle so wire, minefields, bridges etc would be prep prior to the actual contact with the enemy. CM has been rather gamey (my only criticism of the game by the way) on the actual effectiveness of these works. Minefields were/are normally 400m in depth and can be several kms long, with AP rows mixed in. The AT ditch, which is a real "show stopper", is not even modeled. These effects were no doubt "toned down" to enhance game play but they are unrealistic. In the defensive battle one could see bridge demolition but in the scope of CM it would probably, be an entire battle on it's own, not a tactical device. Next the offence. Engineers are critical in the offensive role. They remove enemy obstacles by breaching. Breaching can be by hand (very slow and costly) or by explosive means (bangalore, line charges, satchel etc). The breaching of buildings or "mouse-hole breaching" is the act of engineers placing a satchel charge on a safe wall and blowing a hole for the infantry to enter and clear. The charge not only provides an opening but also tends to neutralize anybody inside the building in the vicinity, much the same for pillboxes. Breaching of barbwire and roadblocks is very "do-able" and is in fact part of the "mobility support". Second-to-last and not really included in CM is general support. Fortifications are an example. Hull-down positions and extensive trenches/CP hardening are not in the game but should be, for a price. Last, we can see small pieces of it but Armoured Engineering has also been left out. Breaching Tanks, flails, rollers (WWII?) which provide a high-speed and protected method to deal with these problems would also add to the game.

12 yrs as a Canadian Combat Engineering Officer Reg Force, One yr in the Reserves. Many adventures and flying steel. CHIMO!

Combat Mission - $45 US Shipping and Handeling - $10 US Total Price - $83.00 Cnd 3D Tactical Wargaming done right after a 16 yr wait - PRICELESS!!!

Combat Mission 2: "Nazis can't jump!"

I know that in current doctrine (NATO) that HMG fire can be sited, particularly in the defence. The posn and angle of the gun are marked and fire is coord by higher. Maybe an infantry wizard can enlighten us as to whether or not this is/was actually employed and whether it would work in CM. I would like to see it as it would greatly increase the effectivness of the HMGs by allowing fire outside of the LOS. The question of effective range still remains though...

Searched and couldn't find a discussion on the subject. I know it is current infantry doctrine that the .50 cal and other MG can be sited to fire indirectly in to beaten zone. Any thoughts on the employment in CM (ie HMG TRPs) The ranges would just fit on a large map, I believe. Any thoughts?

Flank Security, thus endeth the lesson.

A real Meeting Engagement involves an "normally" unexpected unit/formation colliding with an en going in the opposite direction. These battle are fast and furious in which the fastest "draw" usually wins. I believe CM is mistaken in placing objective flags in the middle of the two forces as it tend to draw focus on terrain rather than en units locations which in a real ME is ultimately more important. The error is compounded by the fact that the objective flags do not represent terrain which is really important to the battle (ie random) I think MEs should be based on unit strengths remaining and not positions on the ground. Please note that I have absolutely no idea what this would involve from a programming point of view, only what is correct from a military doctrine POV.

Even though it turns my stomach to discuss anything Navy in nature, I will venture my 10 cents worth. The resposibility of command is what empowers a commander to tell other people what to do. It is not because he/she is smarter or better at the job but because he/she has stepped up to be trained and accept responsibility. That being said, at what point should a commander be held responsible? When things "go bad" in combat, it is a very dangerous thing to automatically crucify the guy in charge. It breeds undo caution in his/her peers causing paralysis in decision for fear of making the wrong one. A very US military mindset right now, hence CNN polls etc. Perhaps the best advice I ever received was from an old Armd Maj who said " I will always forgive a sin of commission, it is the sins of ommission I cannot abide". Which is to say never hit someone for doing something (within reason of course) as long as they were using best judgement and keeping within the intent of their superiors direction (a little manoeuvre doctrine for you guys). Failure to act is a far more serious crime. That all being said, I don't think anybody here has enough of the facts to even wager a guess, let alone an opinion on the actions of a senior naval officer.

I don't have to take off any clothing do I?

I just lost my Junior cherry!!! I love you guys...sniff. Drinks on me, ring the bell!!

I had a similar problem running CM on a laptop with a ATI card. Try changing your bit color pallet. I was on 16 bit then switched to 32 and the mouse pointer came back. I would switch your card as I had nothing but trouble with that ATI, lock-ups etc

Tell your wife, gently, that she's puttin on weight and that the exercise of pushin the grocery cart will do her some good. Then play away. Or tell her that you've received death threats from your opponent so you are really playing for her and the family.