Holien

Russians started to use new 122 mm HEFRAG shells OF56IM-1P for D30/2S1 howitzers. They have a range on 4 km longer (19....20 km), than Soviet shells (15,2 km). This shells very similar to Chineese 122 mm ammunition with the same parameters, but unknown either this direct Chineese supply with Russian markings or Russian produced.
 

Yeesh.  Well on the bright side, Ukraine is infinitely better than the other major war partners we had over the last 25 years (governments of Iraq and Afghanistan).  But it won't be Western support that kills Ukraine in this war - it can damn well hurt it and create really terrible end-states.  But the mess that is western support at times, pales in comparison to what will happen if Ukrainians lose the will to fight.  As we learned in both Iraq and Afghanistan - we can send people all the money and guns, but if the will to create their own future is not there it will all mean nothing. 
If Ukraine loses the will to fight, we could easily see Kyiv fall.  The West will retreat to Poland and draw some pretty stark lines - because it will have to.  It will create a political "out" for the West, "it wasn't us, it was them...oh well."  Russia will stay boxed up.  Western political parties will frame the outcome as a gross negligent failure for "them" and a resounding endorsement of "us", the blame game will go into overdrive.  And we will deal with the post-war mess.  Meanwhile Ukraine will be in for retributions and dark days out of the middle age as Russia enjoys it new gains and make a show of it...all the while the rot and pressure will build to a breaking point later.
 

Mobilization campaign failed + Russian PsyOps trageted on mobilization is working. Zelenskyi substitued all chiefs of oblast enlistment centers and appointed there mostly wouded officers from frontline. But this was bad decision. Corrupted chiefs didn't forget about opwn pocket, but on other hand mostly performed mobilization plan. They were "bureacrats", which knew all theses 100500 regulation papers. New chiefs not "bereaucrats", they are "warriors". They need a many time to understand all this inner "kitchen" how mobilization process is working. And substitiution didn't change such disgusting happens of abduction of people from the streets by enlistment offices patrols. 
These stories as well as stories from frontline about higher command doesn't carrying on about lives of soldiers, about typical soviet army "dolboyebizm", about enlistment offices, who don't interest that mobilized man would be effective soldier and send for example good specialist in radioelectronic as usual infantryman, protracted war, which contrasted with "stupid Russians" stories on TV, powerful Russian PsyOps cmapaign against government and mobilization - all this gave on fruits. Government really don't know what to do and where to take a people in order to do not cause social explosion. 
Now is upgrading for mobilization law is preparing, but from enough radical and tough project deputies removed many things, which can be dangerous for power stability. 
As a good news and right direction - military units themselves started to attackt motivated people on service via recruiting offers on different work finding boards. Some "new-type" and media-known units already have own recruitment centers ("Azov ", 3rd assault, "Da Vinci Wolves" etc) and wow - people come to them without forcing! And many young people go, which by the law can't be mobilzed (18-26 y.o), except own will. But on other hand we havn't recruitment law. And often enlistment offices and recruitment centers hadn't communication. 
So, now we started a way of enlistment tarnsformation, but now we at the point, when old Soviet type syetem already showed own insolvency in modern conditions, and new system is just appeared and can't maintain 100 % of army need in manpower. 
Other aspect - despite we have 880 000 in Defense Forces (jourmalists "rounded this number to million") - Army, National Guard, Border Guard, Police, SBU, GUR, State Special Transport Service, State Special Communication Service,  many of personnel never have seen frontline. Of corse we don't talk about AD crews or techniclal specialists, or logistic service. But now the audit started in Armed Forces and already spotted 8000 servicemen, which just mobilized "as disposal of General Staff", but in real they don't serve anywhere. And this is only beginning. There are also enough units, which never (!!!) were on frontline or were there for short time and more time sit in the rear or guarding Belarus border, than fighting with Russians in that time when the same 110th brigade spent 1,5 years without rotations in Avdiivka. And this probably was another reason to substitute Zaluzhnyi.   

It will be interesting to see what options that opens for Ukraine.
It could be more Russian planes shot down if they still want to risk flying without an eye in the sky to watch over them.
I am hoping it opens a vulnerability that Ukraine ready to exploit.

Bradley's ERA blocks protected vehicle after ATGMs hit (likely non-tandem). One missile hit the edge of turret without detonation, the second hit side block and activated it. Reportedly Bradley still operational, crew is ok.
 
 

This may be cynically, but Krynky and recently Antonovskyi bridge bridgeheads are just a bites for attrition of Russian troops on left bank, creating of tense here to prevent Russian troops to be moved as reservers in other place. 
We have no enough manpower in brigades (if companies have 50 % of personnel this considers as good result) to establish more crosses simultainously and we havn't enough artillery ammunitions to cover these bridgeheads as we cover Krynky (and tnen, big part of fire support are from various drones attack). So Krynky holds a force in about 2 dispersed companies equivalent, continously rotating personnel. No sence to land there more troops under endless artillery fire and gliding bomb strikes. For Russian generals lost village is a like red rag for a bull. Higher chiefs fu..k them very tough for lost settlements, so they have no choice except to drive soldiers to assault UKR positions and to lose company by company from UKR artillery and FPVs. 
UKR bridgehead slowly growing up but I doubt we will increasing troops number there more that this require this growing. Probably until F-16 appear in the sky or additional long range AD assets to protect bridgehead and probable crossing ways from aircraft and missile attacks.  

Good question.  Light forces and SOF do not appear to be the limiting factor.  I would envision this to be sustained deep raiding, actual force levels would likely be quite modest.  And training and experience of these forces appears to be quite high in the UA.
Logistics is the big one.  One would need numerous logistical nodes on wheels on the home side to push resupply and pull back casualties.  Boats and trained crews are going to be an issue.  There will likely never be enough of them.  Air resupply using heavy drones is one offset option.  We have seen plenty of demonstrations but it is not known if the UA has enough of these to run a larger operation.
Terrain.  The good news is that is we are talking fast assault boats, these are pretty flexible on where they can land, which opens up a lot of options.  Getting heavier with pontoons would reduce those options as these are larger more complex systems.
Fires.  Unknown.  Drones, mortars and AGLs could  be carried with the crossing force.  Long range artillery is likely hamstrung by ammo shortages, much like it is elsewhere.  HIMARs and air might be an option but those are expensive and one would not to risk them too much.  I suspect FPVs might be the offset solution to be honest.  At 10-15 km ranges these could at least push RA guns back.  And once light forces manage to push further south, they would bring those FPVs with them.
Opposing forces.  Best we can see opposing forces are pretty light.  Russia has to mange a very long frontage as well.  It makes sense to go lighter on the far side of a major water obstacle to increase density elsewhere.  I suspect they have hard points at obvious crossing points but in other places are likely very thin.  More importantly, Russian forces in this area very likely lack any depth.  This makes light force infiltration and exploitation easier.  But the RA does have ISR and guns, so I would not propose this will be easy days.
Staff and support.  Once the planning is done, managing the operation will be complex but with less mass.  One thing that has not been brought up is far bank recon and clearances (eg mines), that is a big job pre-crossing and troops that do this are very specialized, likely SOF in Ukraine.  Staff capacity is whatever the UA assigns to the operation.  However, they are balancing a lot of demand right now.
Finally, as to “what can poor light troops do with their quads?”  Or, “what is the payoff?”  Well first thing they can do is bring their radios with them.  This extends high resolution real time intelligence out as far as these troops can see.  Then there are loitering munitions, FPV and ATGMs.  At the beginning of the war we got a pretty good look at just how much damage light forces working in depth could do with some of these new systems.  By extending their reach through infiltration in a weak Russian backfield, it will likely force a response from the RA as their own LOCs are threatened.  Best case the light forces can secure a bridgehead in depth and then other heavier amphib/crossing options open up.  But in reality I think we could expect the RA having to push forces to that sector to try and deal with the problem, which might take pressure off other fronts.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, even if half successful such an operation would shift the strategic narrative.  Ukraine would be demonstrating that it is no longer relegated to its back foot.  Like the strategic strikes we have been witnessing, such an operation would undecide Russian initiative…and this is not small.  We would see videos of a bunch of backfield stuff.  Russia would react, more stuff getting blown up.  In the end, it may not yield major tactical or operational effects, however, strategic effects could be significant.

Oh good, you are back.  So I posted links to two estimates of RA force lay down south of Kherson.  From OS we have at least a decent idea that there is roughly a division down there.  I then did a force to space analysis that would show roughly 100 RA troops per km.  That is roughly 1/3 of the average troops density elsewhere and much less than RA offensive concentrations.  But, again, you simply ignore it.
I am not sure what a discussion in Kherson sector has to do with the larger strategic force comparison; however the argument was never that the “RUS are outnumbered and outgunned in Ukraine”, it was: the RA is thin at Kherson and Ukraine has on opportunity to exploit that.
Well at the CFC we also do not assume the enemy is “superior in every way so every option is too hard…so let’s just quit” either.  I have no doubt the RA has hard points along that obstacle but they do not have enough forces to create an effective “wall”, they have likely no depth and they definitely do not have air superiority.  I mean, seriously, how much more do you need?
So first off “difficult” does not automatically translate into “impossible” - that is not a good military rule of thumb.  So how “beleaguered” is that force at Krynky?  How much has it cost the UA to hold that bridgehead.  How hard have been the RA c-attacks.  You basically “have seen pictures of tired Ukrainian Marines” and translate that into “impossible mission”.  So who is demonstrating bias here, in order to fit a foregone conclusion?  Krynky shows that a small light force one the other side of the Dnipro can be sustained and resist RA attempts to push them out.  It demonstrates that the RA do not have decisive force at Krynky and I suspect the bridgehead is acting as a patrolling base.  The fact that they have held on for months reinforces this deduction.
Now the real question is, can the UA do 6-10 Krynkys?  Upscaling is a completely different issue.  It depends on availability of trained troops, water crossing equipment, stores and intelligence.  It is a complete complex operation.  Is it guaranteed?  Absolutely not - war is not a menu with items you can simply return to the kitchen because you don’t like them - this will be a very hard and dangerous operation.  However, it is 1) possible and plausible and  2) likely one of the better operational offensive options on the table.  You appear to write off any offensive operation for your own reasons, however, here is one professional military analysts who is telling you that there is an option space here given the proper resources.  The risks are high, however, the payoff may be high enough to warrant the risk.  Further the other options are all pretty much worse unless the UA has solved for minefields in this war.
(This is your queue to get huffy again and argue with the kitchen btw)
Your state position has been, and is (unless you wish to retract) - “Ukraine is out of options and as such we should be pursuing peace negotiations.”  If you can provide a single post where you do not reinforce this central premise then I think we can re-assess your position.  You have worked incredibly hard to remove the southern light operational option - to the point that Steve also called you out for ignoring evidence being presented in favour of your underlying position.  You have also dismissed any and all other options - again to reinforce your position.  You have side-stepped historical references as “out of date”, you have side-stepped force-space analysis and you have downplayed Ukrainian successes.  
Now, you are correct.  This could all be quite innocent and you do not have a conscious ulterior motive.  But now you might want to take a look at your own biases because you are definitely projecting a sub-conscious motive here.  You can get all huffy and demand to see the manager, but I still smell and suspect you of political motivations that align with other posters who have come through here who employ pretty much the exact same MO on the discussion of future Ukrainian military success - ignore or downplay any analysis or assessment that would give Ukraine any chance of success; over subscribe Russian capabilities and capacity: land back at “Ukraine is done…we must sue for peace”.
No argument on the transformative impact ISR has had on the battlefield.  And no one is saying a water crossing operation is going to be easy.  Like minefields, it will require pre-conditions which include a level of c-ISR.  However, we have a proof of concept that it can be done, which is a helluva lot more than we have with respect to minefields and RA forces elsewhere.  That is one large obstacle to try and cover in detail - 85-100kms.  And the UA has freedom of movement along most of that obstacle (I.e. unlike a minefield they can cross at multiple locations).  So what?  Well if one can keep the logistical demand low, one could sustain light operations through over the water and air resupply (see: heavy drones)…you know, like in other times in history.
A light force water crossing is damned hard and comes with significant risk, no getting past that.  However, compared to other options it may be the best of the bunch.  And it may very well work…and by “work” I mean draw RA forces away from other sectors to deal with it, which may open up other opportunities.
As to “Russian stooge” and “f#cking idiot”…you realize you are the only one to make these statements in this debate?  I still suspect you of ulterior motives but of course that will need proof otherwise.  No, I suspect you are a guy who is entirely enamoured in your own opinion and is always pushing to be the smartest guy in the room.  Now which rooms?  In the end, I really do not care.
Now who is throwing around “you are all f#cking idiots and Pro-Ukrainian bots”?  So if your purpose was to highlight how challenging future offensive operations will be for the UA…well, ok, got it. Contribution noted.  But it really appears you are working very hard to convince everyone that Ukraine has no offensive options left, and its defensive ones are nearly as hopeless…and therefore Ukraine should “sue for peace”.  
This will have been at least the 2nd, possible 3rd time someone has come out of the woodwork after Adiivka to push this perspective.  Your approach of 1) being entirely in love with your own opinion and 2) ignoring any and all evidence or counter analysis, and 3) becoming very offended when called out, matches those previous poster profiles.  Could all be innocent coincidence and you honestly believe this is the situation despite also hoping for a better outcome, but I remain suspicious.
Why?  Because like those other posters, you are not promoting actual discourse.  You are pushing a single position without room for anything else.  I am more than willing to admit a water crossing operation south of Kherson may very well fail, it is no guaranteed success.  I am also very willing to publicly admit that Ukraine is definitely facing some tough decisions this year.  I do not believe we are at the “beg Russia for peace” stage though and see still possible opportunities but windows may be closing.  You on the other hand dismiss any and all ideas that run counter to your position.  You are preaching, not discussing.  Could be just who you are, but you picked a really crappy time to come out and self-actualize.

This answers some of your questions:
https://publications.bof.fi/handle/10024/53281
I included one graphic from the report, but there is more data.
TL;DR: a mobik dying in his 30s might earn more by his death than he would during the remainder of his lifetime, including pension.
 
Where do Russia’s mobilized soldiers come from? Evidence from bank deposits
Solanko, Laura (21.02.2024)

 
Forgot: I got this through this paywalled article:
https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/russland-geld-fuer-tote-soldaten-wie-der-krieg-einen-makabren-vermoegensboom-ausloest-a-a35d1548-1e7c-4481-b798-0a5fae6dc3e4

Vehicles of 15th motor-rifle "peacemaking" brigade from Samara. Single Russian brigade on BTRs. They recently had BTR-80, but since 2016 they gradually substituted tehm on BTR-82A. Now you can see incereaced number of BTR-80 losses in reports of Oryx team - 15th brigade due to losses again brougt back BTR-80 in service. 

This has been officially verified as being genuine. And I had no doubt about it. It was like hundreds of project meetings I had had to enjoy.
Of course, our government is not amused and there are lots of critics. But OTOH, the way these guys discuss the matter is very pragmatic and down to earth. They discuss the political and technical ramifications and search for solutions (and find them). Kraft has summarized this very well, although the English subs are quite bad.
The things got hacked because one of the guys was in Singapore and probably didn't use a VPN.
 
 

This is the other major flaw in the thinking within the “sue for peace” crowd…what peace?
All war is negotiation.  However, that negotiation is framed by realities on the ground.  So while this war may very well end in some sort of Korean Peninsula solution on lines yet to be determined.  Like the Korean War both sides had to be forced to the table by military facts.
So the narrative coming out of the MAGA/Macgregor crowd is that 1) Ukraine has no hope.  No military solution exists for Ukraine and they build everything else around that central “fact”.  2) seeing as point #1 is a universal truth (and no room for counter-factuals exists within that universe), the Ukraine must sue for peace.  And of course their own Glorious Leader will somehow make an equitable and enduring peace happen.
This is utter bullsh#t.  Even if one accepts point #1 - and there is a growing pile of evidence the Ukraine is not “done”, as planes keep getting blown out of the sky - this theory completely fails to define just how their version of “peace” will happen.  Russian “peace negotiations” in the past have been self-serving and onion skin thin.  If Ukraine begs for peace right now, it will be from a position of weakness.  If the West begs for peace right now, it will be from a position of weakness.  Does anyone think that Putin is not going to exploit this fact? Russian peace terms will be their terms.  They will be designed to ensure: future Ukrainian vulnerability, a clear demonstration of Western weakness and failure, and promote Russian superiority.  
If Ukraine sued for peace right now I have zero doubts Russia would be asking for war reparations…from a country they invaded.  Russia would also likely demand legitimacy and recognition for the territories it captured.  And would make sure they set conditions for successful future actions - they will call it “Ukrainian neutrality”.
There is no easy tap out in this war.  It is a real war where endstate will emerge directly from military outcomes.  As a minimum Ukraine must freeze this war on its terms, not Russia’s and the West needs to support that.  The “fantasy” in all this is not the prospect of future Ukrainian military success, it is the entire belief that there is another option when dealing with Russia.  I suspect there will be an end line in all this and I am less and less convinced it will be the pre-2014 border; at this point pre-2022 will be a stretch.  But it is definitely not where we are today.  Ignoring the lines on the ground, Russian sacrifice is not high enough to force them towards anything remotely looking like an equitable peace negotiation that we could trust.

Ok, I really have read enough of this. You are having serious problems with proper assessment of what polish society is and what is not.
First of all I don’t like farmers, just as Beleg85 said, they are not likable in overall polish society. I guess that it might be something with millions of donations from EU, retirement system where they effectively have it granted for free and a couple of other things. When farmers across EU started their protests by blocking centers of big cities with farming equipment worth in excess of 1 million euros each, it also was not very understandable by people in traffic jams worrying that they will be late to their, oh so well, paid job. But overall this is actually nothing compared to how „likable” are agro-oligarchs in Ukraine. You are now standing in their defense and I would love to see how much of the money they earn is supporting the war. They basically try to abuse unfair competition on EU markets in order to make money, but looking at the financial statements, I don’t see anything like „war tax” in defense of their country, soil that have given them free money, could you please explain me this? How does that compare to billions in direct financial and material support from western countries?
After 2014, when immigration to Poland from Ukraine has increased tenfold, the overall sentiment for Ukrainian people was not perfect in Poland during the start of the war in 2022. Especially among low paid workers, additional competition on job market with low wage expectations were seen as danger. Situation was similar to our US friends, who can elaborate more on overall sentiment toward Mexicans and South American people. Invasion started on 24th of February, my wife spent entire weekend starting 26th on the border, serving hot meals and distributing blankets to the wave of people in need. Week later we went for the local train station, looked around and took home a mother with a child, who have not even spoken a word in Polish/English. She stayed with us for half a year, when she found suitable job and shelter. My then-boss took a family of 8 and even took care of one girl, who was in the middle of chemotherapy, so she could finish it in Poland without problems. This is just a small part of what happened at that time, no one asked questions, no one was whining, because these were people in dire need. Do you think I liked to have a stranger mother with spoiled child in my home? I didn’t, but this is not the point in helping other people to like that. It is to do that effectively and provide whatever is needed despite your feelings or likening. If you will ever work with people like that, you will learn that this is no simple, nor nice task.
Now you are telling me that polish people have showed that they don’t give a **** about Ukraine because they don’t want to give billions of Euro to your corrupted oligarchs, who are most likely closely connected with Russia. Not to mention some of their perfidious actions, which are gaining better coverage in Poland, which directly hit polish stock holders(so effectively all polish people due to retirement system). You must understand that Ukraine has a long way to go before it will be normal country and I am not even saying about the war. Believe me, Poland was on the same track 35 years ago, but it serves as an example that even if things are not perfect, it is doable. At the moment Ukraine is corrupted as were all post Soviet countries, but it is not that important as long as the war goes. This WILL be important, when the war finally ends to continue normal cooperation with the western countries and their business. Hopefully Ukraine will join EU, but it has so much work to do.
And just as a reminder, borders were open to Ukrainian grain, which is not up to EU standards due to blocked export channel through the Black Sea. Now, thanks to marvelous work of Ukrainian drone fleet, this is not an issue anymore, so what exactly are we talking about? No military/humanitarian or other aid was ever blocked, save for some mistakes, nor will be. This is all about bunch of bastards, who want to profit from the blood of your countryman.

Maybe Macron was inspired by watching Ridley Scott's Napoleon? 🙂
But seriously, I really like this new Macron.
I have to once again agree with Estonia's beautiful Prime Minster.  Even if NATO does not put any troops on the ground, that does not mean we should tell the Russians that it cannot happen in the future.
 

What interesting times are coming... Caution Germany became a locomotive of military aid, France, who wanted "to allow Putin to save his face" now allowed own SOF and other units to cross Ukrainian border. Interesting also that current commander of French Foreign Legion is ethnical Ukrainain (at least by surname) Cyrille Yushchenko.
 

Impressive video.

Ok, so let's throw out military history then, and I am only half joking - you do have a point on this war being off the conceptual map so historical example have limited traction.
In this war we have seen one sustained river crossing, so there is that.  Otherwise we only have opinion and informed assessment to go by.  What we are seeing on the battlefield:
- Light dispersed forces are doing better than large heavy concentrations of mass.
- Light dispersed forces have had disproportionate effects on the battlefield from previous war.  This is likely due to C4ISR and weapons developments.
- Light dispersed forces have a much lower logistical footprint than heavy ones.
- Russian forces are very thin in places on these fronts based on simple math.  They have offset this through mine warfare and other forms of force multiplication.
- We have no reports of massive fortresses or mine belts south of Kherson.
All of that adds up to an option space down south for a sustained light force effort that may yield operational effects.  You keep skipping past the fact that the UA has already demonstrated a proof of concept on this at Kryky.
As to disagreements.  I have no problem with well thought out, evidence based disagreement.  It is when certain folks arrive on this forum with "wot I think" as if it has come from the right hand of the Almighty Himself while missing key observations and phenomenon, that I will point that out and call "BS".  You are not the first person to Dunning-Kruger on this board, nor will you likely be the last.  What you "do not know" based on your position is significant...and this is in a war where we can only see shadows.
Normally, I can live with someone who embraces their own ignorance. However, when one arrives with an ulterior agenda that is when alarm bells go off.  By your own admission, you do not want a southern light option to be workable - it counters your central theme - "this war has gone on too long and should be ended".  This is perverse logic.  Any military solution for Ukraine is unacceptable by taking this stance.  There are no options for Ukraine, is what you are proposing, the issue of water crossings is secondary.
I again disagree and openly say that you have no idea what you are talking about. You have presented no evidence or even analysis...only assessment based on "what you think".  As I tell my students: "Rule # 4 - no one cares what you think.  They care what you can prove."  If you admire my posts, then you will note that I always try to ground my assessments on facts and evidence.  I tried again here and you have dismissed them.  I tried outlining force density on the ground..."whatever".  I tried to outline what light forces could do..."uh uh".  In short you are pitching a problem that does not want a solution.  Then go all alligator tears and huffy with indignity when you are called out.
You want respect for your analysis, well go do some research and come back with something that holds water.  Do an UA options analysis that stands up to scrutiny and we have a start point for discussion.  I have tried to present counter-factuals to your position but none are good enough because none will ever be good enough for someone whose position is pretty obviously unassailable.
So like the others who have come through on the same train you are on: why are you here?  To convince us all is lost and we should call out political leadership to sue for any peace we can get?  I mean the UA has no hope down at Kherson.  No hope at Zaporizhzhia. No hope in the Donbas. So what is the point of even doing military analysis and assessment, the outcome is clearly already decided?  What are you here to learn?
My bet is that you already answered the question in both our minds - "f#cking idiot" and "very stable genius", which in the end are the same thing.    

You can recall dozens Russian planes and choppers, which were "shot down" in first several months. Indeed these were either "morale boosting", or mistaken reports (target just dissapeared from radars for many reasons, but crew reported about downing), or it could be E95M aerial target jet drone, which Russia actively used during first months as false targets and our radar crews could think they lock on real aircraft or cruise missile and then to report about downing, or it could by cruise missiles. So, from there is derived "340 destroyed planes", but in real in five times less.  

Thanks for keeping us grounded.
It will be interesting to see if can get confirmation of accurate numbers.
I guess without pilots ejecting we can't rely on COSPAS and if they go into the sea no satellite proof possible.
Just maybe in months time obituaries of the pilots if they pop up on social media.

I doubt this is real number. 
Now we have next: 
 - two confirmed Su-35 and A-50U from Russian side
- the video of falling down unknown combat aircraft near Dyakove (presumably Su-34, this is mathes with COSPAS information about eject signal from this area - Su-35 was shot down significantly west from this place)
- COSPAS ejection marks on the map allegedly from three Su-34 (including the one, mentioning above)
- bad quality of something falling down on the screen of some SAM (StarStreak?) claimed as Su-34
- just a claims of shot down jets. 
So, we have 3 100 % confirmed, 2 with high probability confirmed, 2 allegedly confirmed by COSPAS marks and rest 4 just unverified claims
 

Russian milbloggers write two UKR HIMARS hit the ceremony of awarding of 155th naval infantry brigade personnel in Olenivka (near Volnovakha). 
Reportedly 19 KIA, 12 WIA. Among killed three high-ranked officers, including deputy commander of brigade. The commander of brigade was wounded.

Interesting thread from UKR serviceman from engineer-position building unit of engineer brigade (these units subordinated to Support Troops Command, not to Ground Forces Command) about why unlike Russians UKR forces have so poor fortifications (if they were built after the big war started), which often dig hastily with shovels and limided engineer means of brigades instead to be prepared beforehand by engineer troops of Support Command.
1. Why we have so small number of useful fortifications. According to General Staff directive of Marh 11 2016 the infantry unit, seizing area of defense is a disposer of defense lines, and the performer of works of building and equipping of this defense line is Support Forces, which have to do it according to requests of infantry brigades engineer service chiefs.
2. Many of chiefs of infantry brigade engineer services do not know how to plan ahead and send requests to Support Command untimely. When I arrive on the place, I have neither a map nor enginner justification of positions. As a rule I hear some sort: "Dig here from the stump to tree-plant". But this is not work in this way. The defense must be continous. Ше must have a depth and the enemy hadn't to bypass it. But infantry engineers in stupid way don't know how to plan this and we have to do it themselves or even to shut up and to gig there, where they to tell, because your business is to shut up and execute.
3. Why is thete no concrete? According to the order of Engineer Troops Chief and a resolution of Chief-in -Command of July 4 2017, the character of defensive positions determinates by Operative Tactical Groupment Commands - OTU (wood cladding) and Operative Strategical Troops Groupment Commands - OSUV (pouring with a concrete) after appropriate request of the infantry unit, seizing defense area.  Wood is provided by Engineer seervice of OTU, and concrete and technic are provided by OSUV. The second defense line have to be cladded with a wood and the thired defense line with a concrete. Why there is no this, because, again, brigade's engineer services have no will to denand this and OTU have no money, because deals (author used a word more corresponding to "frauds") with a wood is a separate theme. 
4.Concerning a concrete - I report. There is no one engineer unit doesn't supply with corrwsponding technic (like and NATO too). These works performs civilian technic, but this is contracts with business. Moscovites just rob technic for works, but we can't do in such way. And again - where is third defense line should be? No one infantry brigade on East didn't provide a project.
5. Where are the tractors? According to numerous directives, orders, normative documents to maintain the defense line have to a units of Support Forces with a supply of infantry units. Alas, an excavator doesn't work on the water - it needs a diesel, and soldier, who works in it have to rest somewhere and to eat something, 
6. As result - with all my respects to engineer services of 110th, 47th, 53rd brigades, you guys are guilty themselves, that your troops hadn't proper trenches. And to all other collegues in Twitetr I recommend to study documents and contact the proper address.    
7. Concering to our work. We work from 6:00 to 17:00 and build continuosly, having more poor funding and more vulnerable technic. Pay attantion, there are many fundrising requestes, but no one engineer unit doesn't ask about a tractor or excavator. Because we undcerstand - the needs of infantry is more important. But instead the infantry for some reasons considers us as useless appendage 
    

Hmmm
Any scale of operation?
Would you like to take a crack at explaining how Ukraine has managed to maintain such a bridgehead which has been in existence for months?
 

Hmmm
Any scale of operation?
Would you like to take a crack at explaining how Ukraine has managed to maintain such a bridgehead which has been in existence for months?
 

Ok, well let’s start there then.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington's_crossing_of_the_Delaware_River
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Plunder
And of course the big one: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Overlord
And let’s pull some doctrine in: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90-12/fm3-90-12.pdf
So adding this all up, essentially it has and can be done but there are a lot of caveats.  Ultimately it is a question of weight.  How much weight is being projected across the river as combat power?  How much weight is needed under combat conditions to sustain the weight of the combat power on the other side?  There are multiple ways to get that weight across a river other than a fixed bridge.  Fixed ferry, unfixed ferry, tac aviation and now, UAS.  Forward foraging and cannibalization etc.  
Now doctrine agrees with you, the best is solid fixed LOC bridging but any crossing operations, even conventional ones come in phases.  The opening phase is very often lighter more mobile resupply methods until the bridgehead force can push the enemy back far enough that it is safe to build a series of fixed bridges.  Essentially almost every opposed military river crossing in history began with what we are describing south of Kherson - light forces establishing a bridgehead, sustained and then heavy force link up once conditions are established.  D Day being an exception as were other amphib operations which all had to be sustained by air and sea.
So “sustaining a scale of operation” without a bridge is not only possible, it is really the only way to get many water crossing started in the first place.  Now as to “how long and how far?”  Well that depends on a lot of factors.  If the UA stays light it keeps the logistics bill low.  They might not need a fixed pontoon bridge if they can advance - as you say - “10-30kms”.  Pontoon ferry’s might be able to sustain them as they did for the RA for quite some time before the RA withdrew.
So basically as an engineering and logistics problem what we are looking at south of Kherson is not new or novel.  In the current environment it is going to be challenging and dangerous but it is not the thing being invented from zero in all this. 
 
Ok, so this one opens up the question of how well prepared are the RA forces on the other side?  Light forces have proven pretty important in this war.  They were critical in the first month pretty much everywhere and at Kharkiv constituted the breakout force.  If the RA has built a heavy line of defence as you seem to indicate then you may be correct.  But have they?  We really do not know, but the fact that a small bridgehead at Krynky for months - no massive RA armoured c-attack, and a few maps of force lay down estimates may help:
https://features.csis.org/ukraine-war-map/
https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/
These seem to suggest that the RA have accepted risk in this sector exactly because there is a river there.  So how dense are those RA fortifications?  That map appears to show roughly a single Division covering off 100 kms of frontage.  That is - and let’s be really generous and say that RA division is at full strength - approx 10,000 troops, or 100 troops per km..which is extremely thin.  Estimates of the rest of the RA line are around 300 troops per km.  100 RA troops per km means that there are massive holes in that defensive line.  Light troops can not only cross, they can infiltrate between forces and get into rear areas, which will force the RA to react.  So we are not talking the Atlantic Wall here, we likely have RA hard points on obvious crossing sights, small c-moves forces and a bunch of RA ISR.
So indications are that RA force density is quite low, which makes the light dispersed option a good fit.  Now the UA has much better intel and will have to plan according to that but based on what we can see, the employment of light forces over that river in strength is not only possible, it is viable.
An and now we get to the crux…but you kinda answer your own question here.  “What can these light forces actually do?”  Well at Kyiv they stopped the RA cold.  Elsewhere they have been instrumental in causing the RA to collapse - please find me one major tank battle in this war?  Hell it is hard enough to find a decent mech battle.  This is a war dominated by fires, not manoeuvres.
So the answer to your question is right in your post:
”RUS regroup, reassign reserves to the zone, pile on the drone/artillery/aviation support”.  
That is exactly the objective of a bunch of light forces running rampant in the backfield.  Why?  Because the RA will have to pull these (shrinking) assets from somewhere else.  This is the minimum objective by the way.  If the RA cannot or does not have “reserves” then an opportunity to redraw the lines south of Kherson presents itself.  If those light forces can actually establish a bridge head then options open up for heavier forces and other crossing options.  By that point the entire left end of the RA line is in trouble. But let’s leave that all as a branch plan and stretch goal.
So the real question is not in your response or reasoning.  They are not “can it be done” or “will it do anything?”  The real question is: does the UA have the forces and capabilities to do it at scale?  This we do not know and will have to simply wait and see.