Armdchair

S.L.A. Marshall’s “ratio of fire” theory was challenged vigorously by Harold Leinbaugh, WWII company commander and co-author with John D. Campbell of “The Men of Company K: The Autobiography of a WWII Rifle Company”, NY , Bantam,1987. From John C. McManus’ book “The Deadly Brotherhood: the American Combat Soldier in World War II” Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1998 (pp.99-100): “Drawing on his own combat experiences, Leinbaugh could remember no such reluctance to fire on the part of his men. In talking with other veterans as he wrote his book...Leinbaugh found few, if any, who recalled not shooting their weapons. Leinbaugh took Marshall’s ratio of fire theory as a personal affront to the American combat soldier and he set out to debunk the myth. He met Dr. Roger Spiller, the deputy director of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, and discussed “Men Against Fire” with him. Spiller thoroughly investigated Marshall’s contentions and published his findings in the Royal United Services Institute journal in an article entitled “S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire”[vol. 133, no. 4, December 1988]. An admirer of Marshall, Spiller concluded that the ratio of fire theory could not have been true. He found that Marshall claimed to have interviewed between 400 and 600 infantry companies and claimed that it took three days to interview them. ’By the most generous calculation,’ Spiller wrote,’Marshall would have finished approximately 400 interviews by sometime in October or November 1946.’ Needless to say, that is well after the war was over, which meant that it would have been impossible to conduct on-the-spot after action interviews. Perhaps the most damning fact that Spiller uncovered, though, was from Marshall’s assistant Dr. John Westover, who sat in on the interviews that Marshall did conduct and who worked closely with him. Westover maintained that Marshall never, under any circumstances, asked a soldier if he had fired his weapon in combat. Nor did he ever discuss the matter in their many private conversations. In addition, Spiller found that none of Marshall’s correspondence or field notebooks included any notations about combat troops failing to fire. In fact, one of his notebooks included just the opposite - after action interviews in which almost all the soldiers told of firing their weapons.” [ February 18, 2002, 10:13 PM: Message edited by: Armdchair ]

I think it's much more likely that the Col. Kilgore character was based on Lt. Col. John B. Stockton, 1/9 Cavalry . Here’s a description of him from J.D. Coleman’s “Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam” (p.26):” Balding, rawhide- lean, just under six feet tall, [stockton] had the handlebar mustache of the old time cavalryman. When viewed without his headgear, he looked a lot like a Yul Brynner with facial hair. Years later those who knew him during his days with the 11th and 1st Cavalry swore he must have been the model for the air cavalry commander depicted in the movie Apocalypse Now.” The book goes on to say he ordered up black cavalry hats for all his men and crossed sabers insignia for all his officers. He participated in the 1965 Ia Drang Campaign described in Lt. General (ret.) Harold G. Moore’s book.“We Were Soldiers Once and Young”. No mention of any predilection for either Wagner or surfing. If you listen close during the end of the beach barbecue scene in “Apocalypse Now” you can actually hear someone, possibly Duvall’s Col. Kilgore saying “First of the Ninth! Air Cavalry! Airmobile!” Hackworth served with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne in Vietnam in 1965 and later as a Bn CO of 4/39th Inf. in 1969.

AAR - Medium Rare Axis: 58 cas. (16 KIA); 2 captured; men OK: 127; score: 41 Allied: 94 cas. (23 KIA); men OK: 100; score: 30 Axis minor victory I knew lateral movement in the open would be trouble once both sides came within range of each other. My plan was to move unseen to the VLs on my side of the street and set up strongpoints on either flank. Once I was in position, I would use flamethrower teams to torch the median areas directly in front of the VLs, preventing any direct enemy attacks, with the added bonus of the smoke obscuring the enemy’s LOS. Using flame, I wanted to create three gaps: defending the left in force; hiding a platoon on the right for my own late turn flag rush; and lure enemy forces into the open center where MG teams with LOS could chop them up. Late in the game, I hoped, I could either drop arty down the middle to destroy an enemy attack, or drop smoke, both to suppress enemy fire, and make him think that was the gap I was rushing through while rushing his VL from the far right. That’s not what happened. I left a couple of squads behind with good LOS as OPs. My 105mm arty spotter also had good LOS right through the center of the map. After about five turns of no contact and sneaking into position, I was surprised by an attack of British engineer platoon ( 2 squads + flamethrower) through a smoke barrage on my left VL. I suffered some light casualties but more or less wiped them out. I was happy to have come out ahead but worried both by the aggressiveness of my opponent and the idea an attack of my own could fail like that. I was soon unpleasantly surprised by the effectiveness of the Vickers MG at long range. I dropped my own smoke to suppress the MG fire and provide cover for flamethrower teams to get in place. This worked and I got busy creating permanent smoke and cover by torching the median tiles on both left and right flanks, covering the VLs. At one point, my opponent( I think, amused at what as he saw as wanton destruction) helped by torching a tile or two of his own. During the next five turns, the VL on the left came under heavy arty fire. My units were alerted but not actually taking casualties yet. A British engineer platoon tried rushing my extreme right where my planned late turn assault force was hiding. I chopped them to pieces and started to feel pretty good about my chances for winning. I could just sit back and wait for another desperate attack my opponent would have to make in order to win. But I didn’t wait. Seeing a cluster of enemy unit icons in the center, I believed the enemy was going to make an all-out rush up the center. I ordered up a 105mm barrage down the center gap, agonizing over the three-minute delay. I wasn’t receiving any fire from the enemy VL on the left and saw little movement and maybe two enemy unit icons. So I told myself it’s weak on that side, I’ll surprise him with an audacious platoon-size attack, seize his VL even as he prepares to rush my center. The only thing that surprised him was the stupidity of the attack. He chopped my guys up although they actually did reach the two nearest buildings on his side...even as another platoon of his was swinging over that way at the same time. Sooo- I made a ruthless decision: the surviving attackers wouldn’t survive retreating back across the street, why not leave them in place to kill as many enemy as they could while I sealed the median behind them with flamethrowers? So I did. It didn’t work out exactly as I planned: two survivors surrendered; but I did delay the enemy long enough to bar my left flank (with the exception of the furthest tile) with flame and smoke. In the center I lost a MG42 team to the concentrated fire of multiple Vickers MG teams and British engineer platoons. I pulled back a squad and Coy HQ unit and torched the building after I left. I was trying to deny the enemy any cover if they rushed the center gap. I wanted to torch another nearby small wooden building but for whatever reason my flamethrower team failed to fire on it (turn after turn...). My arty fell and hit nothing but cobblestones as far as I could tell. I don’t know whether it discouraged a rush up the center gap or not. The last three turns I sat back and waited for an enemy rush that never came. My opponent did move some men out on the other side of the flaming median near my VLs but nothing decisive occurred. Hope this wasn’t too anti-climactic. I told my opponent: I learned that the Vickers MG is an extremely nasty weapon to be on the receiving end of; I think we both learned our mothers were right: never play in the street. [ February 02, 2002, 09:24 PM: Message edited by: Armdchair ]

Something I cut and pasted from an old thread: after placing the reinforcement marker on the map, hit CTRL-W or CTRL-V or CTRL-C and the units will enter in a Wedge, an inVerted wedge or Column (passengers embarked) formation respectively. try it. I don't remember who it was, otherwise I'd give them credit for it. Hope this helps.

I'm interested in playtesting it. Send it on. armdchair@aol.com

That particular piece of dialogue is straight from the book "Dispatches" by Michael Herr. He was quoting a door gunner.

AI cannot use assault boats.

You can find Wild Bill's scenarios at: http://www.militarygamer.net/combatmission/ Another excellent scenario site is Der Kessel: http://www.derkessel.de/ Hope this helps.

Since I'm not a terribly competent player (or designer, for that matter), I'm not sure how relevant my opinion is, but here goes: All scenario design can only be semi-historical at best. It's great if it's based on historical fact because it adds more drama and interest to the game; it asks the question of "What if?". It also helps you understand what happened and why. It makes you appreciate how important the actions and decisions of small units, individual soldiers, and individual commanders were. And while designers like Rune and Franko have well-deserved reputations and acclaim for creating intense, large, and/ or historic battles, my personal preference is towards the smaller battles where every man, every unit counts, every loss means something. I know in my reading of military history that while I feel it's important to understand the Big Picture, the overall scope of things, it is the individuals' stories that stand out in my mind. Playing smaller-size scenarios reinforces that feeling. I just played a scenario where a green, panicked bazooka team cowering under fire along a riverbank, got it together long enough to KO a nearby Panther. It had nothing to do with any command I gave, but it remains the most memorable moment of the entire battle. For myself, I feel that small, intense, semi-historical battles provide the best wargaming experience. Wild Bill, you set the bar: your scenarios usually consist of deceptively simple tactical challenges that quickly turn into nailbiting adventures. You always have thorough historical background briefings that set the stage dramatically. And yes, they're fun; your scenarios have the most replayability of anyone's I know. Now there's jabbering for you.

No problem. On the way. Hope you like it.

I have a new scenario that fits the description. Title: After St. Lo Type: Allied Attack (fictional) Date: July 1944 Location: France Weather: Clear Length: 30 turns *****Play as Allied vs. computer (using default setup) or as double-blind two player game Late July 1944- With the American capture of St. Lo, the pressure is on to exploit the breakthrough of Operation Cobra. Combined-arms teams of infantry and tank companies race to seize French villages before German defenders can regroup. Design notes: This scenario is loosely based on George Wilson's account of the battles for St. Gilles and Le Mesnil Herman in his book If You Survive (NY, Ivy Books, 1987). Let me know if you're interested and I'll send it on.

Anyone interested in the battle can check out this site: http://www.lzxray.com/ The definitive book on the battle is outstanding:"We Were Soldiers Once and Young" by Lt.Gen. Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway(NY, Random House, 1992). I tried creating a Vietnam battle using CM a year ago:"Nam Mission". I have a revised version not yet playtested. If anyone's interested, let me know. Here's the general description: Title: Nam Mission Type: Attack (Fictional) Date: 1967 Location: South Vietnam Weather: Heavy Fog Length: 40 turns This is a crude attempt to replicate small unit combat in Vietnam. Crude because so much is missing: no helicopters, no air support, no tunnel or bunker complexes, no confusion of combatant/ non-combatant; elements that more or less defined infantry combat in Vietnam. I have had to make many substitutions and adaptations: pine trees for palm trees; marsh for paddies; small houses for thatched huts. Communist forces are represented by Axis forces: the Volkssturm as local Viet Cong; Volksgrenadiers as Main Force Viet Cong units. I've used paratroopers to represent US infantry. Although the 101st, 173rd, and 82nd Airborne did fight in Vietnam, the use of paratroopers in this scenario is not an effort to portray one of their actual firefights but simply to try to give US infantry maximum firepower (there are no M-16s, no M-60 MGs, no grenade launchers, no AK-47s, etc). A typical small unit action in Vietnam involved US infantry lifted by helicopter to a LZ (Landing Zone) or LZs near a Vietnamese village or suspected enemy position. Enemy forces were generally forewarned of US movements, either from intelligence gathered by Vietnamese sources working in and around US bases, or by the standard MO of US helicopters assaults which were noisy affairs, often preceded by arty and gunship preparatory fires in and around the LZs. VC/NVA forces had a choice of contesting US movements or fading away into the bush. They could if they chose, fight in a number of ways, utilizing small arms fire, booby traps, mines, and mortar fire: attacking US forces at the LZs themselves, ambushing them as they moved, fighting them in the villages using bunkers, spider holes and tunnels from which to fight. More often than not, little or no resistance was offered. US troops would land, endure a backbreaking march through thick jungle terrain looking for an enemy who failed to materialize, or who only materialized in the form of occasional sniping and in the ever-present threat of mines. For American forces, it was a truly frustrating war. In this scenario, Communist forces have chosen to stand and fight American forces landing nearby. This may be played as either one-player or PBEM game. Preferably as Allied playing vs. AI, using default settings, setting computer bonus at +3. If playing as Axis vs. AI allow computer free setup, setting computer bonus at +3. [ 11-17-2001: Message edited by: Armdchair ] [ 11-19-2001: Message edited by: Armdchair ]</p>

I downloaded "B B4- Hell of a Licking" from Tom's Combat Mission site. In the briefing, Franko states this is #4 in a series of Band of Brothers scenarios. Are others available? If so, where? and what are they called? Thanks in advance.

You can't see units in the editor. You've got to use trial and error. Use what landmarks you can see in the editor - such as adjacent buildings, curve in the road, etc - as reference points to accurately drop building, rubble, etc., over AFV or AT gun. It can be time-comsuming - because once you've successfully dropped building over AFV or AT gun you may still need to adjust either the building tile or the AFV or AT gun so as to retain LOS. If necessary, you could always create temporary landmarks(pavement tile, brush tile,etc) to help orient yourself in the editor to assist placement of building over AFV or AT gun, and then go back and erase or edit out landmark. [ 08-03-2001: Message edited by: Armdchair ]

The only direct reference I could find to Birk, Germany Oct. 12, 1944 was in Charles Whiting's book "Bloody Aachen", pp.115-117, (no sources listed). A three-hour battle that started just after dawn when a lone Sherman stationed at the crossroads in town KO'd one Pz IV, caused another to flee. 5 more Pz IVs emerged from mist. Fresh Shermans from 2d Armored arrived to support lone US tank (no. of tanks not given; I'm guessing a platoon of five). One after another the Pz IVs were KO'd yet panzergrenadiers continued to attack. States German infantry knocked out all of US guns (no mention of what type). US infantry runs into "six-barelled electric mortars" [ nebelwerfers?]. GIs saved by actions of a Capt. Burt of 2d Armored who jumped from his tank to direct his tanks while standing on open ground, exposed to enemy fire. For US Army Combat Unit Histories go to: http://www.grunts.net/army.html For 30th Division OOB go to: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/eto-ob/30id-eto.htm Fact Sheet of the 30th Infantry Division TYPE OF DIVISION: National Guard-Troops from North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Tennessee. NICKNAME: "Old Hickory" SHOULDER PATCH: An oval monogram OH containing the Roman numeral XXX in the center all in blue on a scarlet field. The OH represents the Division's nickname, "Old Hickory" and the Roman numeral XXX, the Division's numerical designation. The "Old Hickory" Division shoulder patch was designed for 30th Division troops of WWI in honor of President Andrew Jackson, Tennessee statesman, who led troops from Tennessee and the Carolinas in the War of 1812. HISTORY: The division was formed from National Guard units from the four states named above in October 1917, at Camp Sevier, NC. After a brief training period in the US, the 30th went overseas for combined training with the British. In Aug 1918, elements took over the canal sector southwest of Ypres, Belgium, holding there until an Allied offensive opened up late that month for the entire Ypres-Lys sector. During the Somme offensive in Sept. and Oct. 1918, the division helped break the Hindenburg Line near Bellicourt and later participated in the battle of LaSelle River. The 30th's Field Artillery units fought separately, taking part in the St Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. The division took 3848 prisoners and suffered 8954 casualties. INDUCTION DATE: 16 September 1940, at Fort Jackson, South Carolina INACTIVATION DATE: 25 November 1945 at Fort Jackson. South Carolina. COMPONENT UNITS: 117th, 119th and 120th Inf. Regt’s; 30 Cav.Rcn. Tp. (Mecz.); 105th Engr Combat Bn; 105th Med Bn.;30th Div. Arty; 118th, 197th and 230th FA .Bns (105 How); and 113th FA Bn (155 How); 30th Div. Sp Tps; 30th QM Co; 30th Sig. Co, 730th Ord. Co. (LM); 30th Div. Hq Co; 30th MP Platoon and the 30th Div. Band. TRAINING UNDER ARMY GROUND FORCES: Began its training at Fort Jackson, SC. and in June 1941, took part in Tennessee maneuvers. During Oct. and Nov. 1941, the Division participated in the Carolina Maneuvers. On 9 Mar 1942, the 30th came under the control of the Army Ground Forces after having changed its station to Camp Blanding, FL in October 1942. In May 1943, the Division transferred to Camp Forrest, TN and in September of the same year, took part in the Second Army maneuvers held in Tennessee. In November 1943, it went to Camp Atterbury, Indiana. DEPARTED U.S. FOR FOREIGN DUTY: 12 February 1944, from Boston, Mass. and arrived Scotland 22 February 1944. OVERSEAS TRAINING: Resumed training immediately after arriving in the United Kingdom, much stress being placed on amphibious operations. DATE ENTERED COMBAT: DIVISION-15 June 1944, FIRST ELEMENTS 10 Jun 1944, the 230th FA. Bn. COMBAT DAYS (DIV): 282. BATTLE CREDITS: (Division) Normandy. Northern France. Rhineland, Ardennes, Central Europe. RETURNED TO US: 21 August 1945 (Hq). SUCCESSIVE COMMANDING GENERALS: Major General Henry D. Russell from 31 Dec.1940 to Apr..1942; Lt Gen (then Major General) William H. Simpson from May to July 1942; Major General Leland S. Hobbs from 9 Sept. 1942 to Sept. 1945;Major General Albert C Cowper from Sept. 1945 to inactivation on 25 November 1945 at Ft. Jackson, SC. DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATIONS: 1st Bn. 117th Inf. for 7 Aug. 1944 action at St Barthelmy, France; 1st Bn, 120th lnf. for 8-12 Oct. 1944 action in Germany; Co E. 117th Inf. 16 Oct. 1944 for action in Germany; 1st Bn (reinf) 119th Inf . for 19-21 Dec .1944 action in Belgium; Co K, 120th Inf. for 6-12 Aug.1944 action in Normandy; 1st & 2nd Platoon AT Co., 120th Inf. for 6-12 Aug 1944 action in Normandy and 2nd Bn 120th Inf. for 6-12 Aug 1944 action in Normandy; 3rd Platoon, Co. B, 105th Engr. Bn. for action in the Vire River crossing; 743rd Tk. Bn., for action on Omaha Beach, 6 June 1944. CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR Recipients: 1st Lt Raymond O. Beaudoin, Co. F, 119th Infantry Regiment for 6 Apr. 1945 action near Hamelin, Germany; S/Sgt Paul L. Bolden, for 23 Dec. 1944 action at Petit-Coo, Belgium; Sgt Francis S. Currey, Company K, 120th Infantry, for 21 Dec 1941 action near Malmedy, Belgium; S/Sgt Freeman V. Horner, Co. K, 119th Infantry, for 16 Nov. 1944 action at Wurselen, Germany; Pvt. Harold G. Kiner, Co. F, 117th Infantry Regiment, for 2 Oct. 1944 action near Palenberg, Germany; S/Sgt. Jack J. Pendleton, Co. I, 120th Infantry Regiment, for 12 Oct. 1944 action near Bardenbcrg, Germany. FOREIGN AWARDS: Awarded the Belgian Fourragere for 4-10 Sept. 1944 action in Toumai, Louvain, Waterloo and the Tongres areas, and for the 17-25 January 1945 action at Malmedy, Belgium, per Belgian decree #1393, dated 20 Nov 1945. COMBAT HIGHLIGHTS: The 30th came ashore in Normandy on 10-15 June 1944, spearheaded the St Lo breakthrough and kept in the forefront all the way into Belgium, Holland and into Germany. It was the first unit of the Allied troops to enter Belgium and Holland. Its first mission on landing in France was to secure the high ground north of the Vire et Taute Canal. The small community of La Ray soon fell before the rolling 30th and the mission of clearing the north bank of the canal was completed by 17 June. On 7 July the Division moved forward again, crossing the Vire River and penetrating as far as St Jean-de-Day. Beginning 25 July the 30th took part in one of the war's most memorable actions, the St Lo breakthrough. Advances were slow in July, but by 6 August the 30th relieved the 1st Infantry Division near Mortain. Suddenly the Division was attacked by five armored divisions of the enemy, the German's purpose being to drive to the sea at Avranches and split the American First and Third Armies. The 2nd Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Bn. of the 117th Infantry Regiment, bore the brunt of the assault and were so hard-pressed, that all available personnel of the 30th Division were thrown into action. The Battalions held fast. In a week the Nazi spearhead was broken and the enemy thrown back. In August 1944. the town of Reuilly fell to the 30th and the Seine River was soon crossed. In September 1944, an offensive was started near Tournai and Brussels. In mid-September after the Albert Canal and the Meuse River were crossed, the 30th took objectives near Horbach, Germany and completed plans for the assault on the Siegfried Line. This attack opened on 2 October 1944 and a breach was made the following day. Contact with the 1st Infantry Division was made 16 October 1944, and encirclement of Aachen was completed. The 30th then continued on their offensive into Germany. When Von Rundstedt attempted his breakthrough in December, 1944, the 30th was rushed to the Malmedy-Stavelot-Stoumont area. Here the 30th gave such a mauling to some of Hitler's best troops, that the Germans called the Division "Roosevelt's SS Troops." After helping to stem the German winter drive, the Division moved to the Vielsalm.-Sart-Lierneux areas. Back in Germany, the Roer River was crossed in February and the unit headed for the heart of Germany. In March 1945, when the Rhine River was crossed, the 30th was one of the first divisions to break out from the bridgehead and it led the dash encircling the Ruhr and trapping thousands of Germans. At war's end the Division was stationed at Magdeburg, Germany. Arriving in the US late in August, the Division trained at Ft Jackson SC under V Corps until inactivated on 25 November 1945. These Army Ground Forces Fact Sheets were prepared at the end of the war (1 March 1947) by The Information Section. Analyst: Branch, Headquarters Army Ground Forces on each division. They maybe found in Record Group 407, Unit Records. for each division, under the file number 3 ,(Division #) - 0 at the National Archives and R ecords Administration. 8601 Adelphi Rd. College Park MD. Research by Mr. John D. Bowen (31st Infantry Division - 1953), professional National Archives researcher. http://www.indianamilitary.org/30thinfdiv/FactSheet.htm [ 07-31-2001: Message edited by: Armdchair ] [ 07-31-2001: Message edited by: Armdchair ]

Mike Gonzalez did an operation based on it: "Foret de St. Sever". You can find it at Manx's Combat Missions site: http://www.combat-missions.net/operations.htm

Mr. Dorosh, I'm not really sure what I've done to warrant your sarcasm. Maybe I'm not one of the elite scenario designers around here but I've authored a couple of scenarios that were well-received and helped contribute to several others that were also well-received.

Ok, Dunnee, I get where you're coming from. I wasn't trying to flame you. I was reacting to a phenomenon that you're obviously familiar with: where one side's abilities are exaggerated or derided ("supermen" or "dumb bastards"). When Allied troops in the Pacific realized the Japanese were not natural jungle fighters and that they could not only match them but excel against them in jungle warfare, the tide really began to turn. Vietnam, of course, was different. The Vietnamese had been practicing guerrilla warfare a good 20, 30 years before US troops entered the conflict. Longer than that if you count their historical tradition of guerilla warfare against invaders from other Asian nations. US military advisor John Paul Vann said (referring to the system of 13-month tours for GIs in Vietnam):" We didn't fight in Vietnam for 9 years. We fought for a year 9 times." Ultimately, the problem of trying to portray small-unit infantry combat in Vietnam comes down to whole political dimension of the conflict. The VC/NVA were obviously more motivated to fight in their own country than American forces overseas fighting a hotly-debated and hazily-defined conflict. Imagine a Nam scenario where two VC snipers hold off a US infantry company by utilizing a system of tunnels and spiderholes in and around a small village. The scenario ends when US troops disengage and call in an airstrike. The scenario is so lopsided and unbalanced due to the political nature of the war: where US forces were trying to keep their casualties down and VC forces were trying to inflict maximum casualties on US forces (even at the cost of their own lives). You're right - CM doesn't model the resourcefulness of guerilla fighters; but neither does it model the initiative of German lieutenants, NCOs and privates that German infantry was famous for in WWII;or for that matter, the doggedness, courage, leadership, etc. of Allied troops. AI is often unimaginative, which is why so many CM players prefer human opponents. Ideally, "Nam Mission" would be played in head-to-head competition so that the player representing the Communist forces could set ambushes, etc.

If anyone's interested, I've done a revised version of "Nam Mission" that I promised to send Spike but haven't had playtested yet. As far as using Volksturm for Viet Cong, it works just fine. The Viet Cong were, by and large, not crack troops; some Main Force guerrilla units might possibly qualify as well as some NVA regular troops. Most Viet Cong units were made up of local farmers and kids utilizing mines, booby traps and sniper fire to harass US infantry, not some kind of elite force of jungle warriors. In "Nam Mission", I used both Volksturm and Volksgrenadiers to portray Communist guerrilla forces. The two types of Axis forces are meant to duplicate the two types of Viet Cong forces: local VC units that operated close to their homes and hamlets, and the better-trained, better equipped Main Force VC units that operated provincially and regionally (although actually in the briefing for "Nam Mission" I described the distinction as being between Viet Cong guerrillas and North Vietnamese Army regulars). The main drawbacks in trying to portray infantry combat in Vietnam using CM are as I stated in the general briefing: "This is a crude attempt to replicate small unit combat in Vietnam. Crude because so much is missing: no helicopters, no air support, no tunnel or bunker complexes, no confusion of combatant/non-combatant; elements that more or less defined infantry combat in Vietnam." [ 06-20-2001: Message edited by: Armdchair ]

How about calling it "Last Man Standing"? Just a suggestion.

Panzer Leader (and anyone else interested in the PTO) - other books you might read on the Pacific are William Manchester's "Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War" (NY, Dell, 1980), E.B. Sledge's personal account "With the Old Breed: At Pelelieu and Okinawa" (NY, Oxford Univ. Press, 1990) and of course, PTO vet James Jones' novel "The Thin Red Line" (NY, Dell, 1998) - I'm recommending the book, not the movie (which differed considerably from the novel). For an overview there is Edwin P. Hoyt's "Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict 1853 to 1952" (NY, McGraw Hill, 1986) and Ronald H. Spector's "Eagle Against the Sun:The American War with Japan" (NY, Vintage, 1985).

Looking for playtesters, esp. two players to test in double-blind head-to-head matchup. Description follows: Title: Free For All Type: Allied Attack (semi-historical) Date: April 1945 Location: Germany Weather: Clear Length: 25 turns ******may be played as either side or as a double-blind PBEM/TCIP game. If playing AI, use the default settings, preferably playing as Allied. American troops must seize both a vital crossroads and a castle that overlooks it. The castle is rumored to be a POW camp for a large group of Allied officers. Design notes: This scenario was inspired by the liberation of Colditz Castle in April 1945. "Colditz Castle was possibly the most famous of all Prisoner of War camps during the Second World War. During this period, its high grey granite walls, barredwindows, steep roofs, ancient towers, archways and moat set the scene for the greatest chapter in escape history. The castle is situated high up on a cliff top in the small town of Colditz, Saxony. The castle originally took on the role of a transit camp for Poles after the fall of Poland. This small group were relocated in the early summer of 1940, and were later replaced by 140 Polish prisoners. In November 1940 a handful of British RAF officers arrived, soon to be followed by 6 British Army officers, and later by some French. So, the castle became an international camp. More British, French, Belgians and Dutch soon added to the prisoner contingent which would reside in Colditz castle until its liberation on 16th April 1945. Early on it was decided that Colditz Castle should become a ‘Sonderlager’ (a maximum security prison), only accepting prisoners who had escaped at least once from other camps throughout the Reich, or who were pronounced ‘Deutschfeindlich’. Consequently, the German High Command had kindly assembled an international array of talent that boasted an expert in almost every field from mechanical engineering to lock-picking and the manufacture of home made explosives. The castle was visited by Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering early on in the war, and was declared to be "Escape Proof" - a prediction which, with hindsight, was rubbish. Throughout the five and a half years of war, over 300 escape attempts were made. This resulted in 120 ‘gone aways’ (escapers which got out of the castle but were later recaptured). At the fall of Colditz to the Americans in April 1945, 31 prisoners had successfully reached home - a figure unequalled by any prisoner of war camp during the Second World War. " (excerpted from website for Colditz Castle Oflag IVC) http://www.geocities.com/colditzcastle/

Ok, Istari, it's on the way. If for whatever reason, you still don't get it, look for it at Manx's site: http://www.combat-missions.net/

Istari, I just e-mailed you a copy of "knockemalldown". It was created by Michael"GonzoAttacker" Gonzalez and myself. It should be posted fairly soon, probably at Manx's site. Thanks for the interest.

While I agree it's a fascinating book with important things to say, S.L.A. Marshall's claims (and methodology) have been severely questioned in recent years, by both scholars and WWII combat vets. While there is numerous anecdotal evidence recounting soldiers being reluctant to kill each other on occasions(see John Keegan's "The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt,Waterloo,and the Somme" NY, Penguin, 1976 among others), I'd be reluctant to make any sweeping generalization about men's innate humane instincts towards each other. One of the reasons for WWII GIs' reluctance to shoot (not cited by Marshall) was the fact that they had been trained to shoot at stationary, highly visible targets (a rare occurence in combat), rather than in putting out rifle fire towards suspected enemy positions.The change in US Army training and the equipping of riflemen with fully automatic rifles (emphasizing firepower over aimed fire) during the Vietnam War era was a direct response to this. All that being said, I agree with you it's a worthwhile read. I'd also recommend Gerald F.Lindermann's" The World Within War: America’s Combat Experiences in World War II" Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univ. Press, 1997 and John C. McManus's "The Deadly Brotherhood:The American Combat Soldier in WWII", Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1998. BTW, nice job on your Boot Camp articles at Manx's site. [ 04-28-2001: Message edited by: Armdchair ]