cyrano01

I kinda suspect that's at least part of why paras and commandos and rangers got the rep they did - I mean, aside from the deliberate PR campaign to elevate them, the strict selection criteria, and extensive and relevant training. Basically, they were combat n00bs so still full of piss and vinegar, and because they (usually, and by design) only spent short stretches in combat they didn't runs out of either.
There's a story from Market Garden which kind of sums that up. The Irish Guards (armoured battalion from Guards Armd Div) link up with the Paras, somewhere near Oosterbeek. One of the Paras, being pulled out of the line and sent back to England, calls out to a passing tank "Where were you! We've been waiting for four days!" The laconic reply was "Four days? Interesting. We've been fighting for four months. So far. Have fun back in England."

In support of @JonS and @The_Capt 's posts on the subject. The build up of stress over time on troops in combat during WW2 is discussed by John Ellis in his book 'The Sharp End'. He quotes a 1946 paper by Lt. Col' Appel and Cpt' Beebe (US Army) in the Journal of the American Medical Assoc.  as saying that any soldier surviving that long would break down after 200-240 combat days. It seems the British used 400 days but this was reflective of different rotation practises and probably amounted to much the same thing.
Ellis goes on to suggest that, for trained troops peak effectiveness was reached after about three weeks of combat with gradual deterioration setting in after six. Rotation can delay or even restore this process a bit but it takes a long time out of the line. I guess the message is that experienced troops fight better and smarter until they don't any more. There is a rather chilling quote from a British 7th Hussarsa officer dating to 1941 saying that '...the actual business of fighting is easy enough. You go in, you come out, you go in again and you keep doing it until they break you or you are dead.'
Unlike some here I have never had to lead people in anything more hostile than a cricket match or even been shot at, I am pleased to say, so I have no personal experience to draw on. That said, it seems to me that the this sort of thing is more likely to be a problem for the UKA as their individual soldier is likely to have a longer lifespan than the Russians. Maybe the rotation of key formations out of the line give as much benefit in terms of psychiatric recovery as they do re-training on Western equipment.
 

In support of @JonS and @The_Capt 's posts on the subject. The build up of stress over time on troops in combat during WW2 is discussed by John Ellis in his book 'The Sharp End'. He quotes a 1946 paper by Lt. Col' Appel and Cpt' Beebe (US Army) in the Journal of the American Medical Assoc.  as saying that any soldier surviving that long would break down after 200-240 combat days. It seems the British used 400 days but this was reflective of different rotation practises and probably amounted to much the same thing.
Ellis goes on to suggest that, for trained troops peak effectiveness was reached after about three weeks of combat with gradual deterioration setting in after six. Rotation can delay or even restore this process a bit but it takes a long time out of the line. I guess the message is that experienced troops fight better and smarter until they don't any more. There is a rather chilling quote from a British 7th Hussarsa officer dating to 1941 saying that '...the actual business of fighting is easy enough. You go in, you come out, you go in again and you keep doing it until they break you or you are dead.'
Unlike some here I have never had to lead people in anything more hostile than a cricket match or even been shot at, I am pleased to say, so I have no personal experience to draw on. That said, it seems to me that the this sort of thing is more likely to be a problem for the UKA as their individual soldier is likely to have a longer lifespan than the Russians. Maybe the rotation of key formations out of the line give as much benefit in terms of psychiatric recovery as they do re-training on Western equipment.
 

This little master class in scenario design needs to be in the game manual, in full.
Outstanding information as always. Two observations related to the current war. The Russians, with few exceptions seem put a unit forward, and leave there until it is just shattered. This must greatly limit the accumulation corporate knowledge The_Capt is referring to. The Ukrainians on the other hand seem very aware that units needs to rotated before combat exhaustion set in, even if their casualties have only been moderate. The minus side of the Ukrainian approach is that I can site at least two significant instances where a less experienced unit that was just put in to relive another unit had a very bad day that led to a lot of OTHER units having a very bad day. So as the The_Capt says, no approach is perfect. Higher level staff should remain conscious of the down sides of whatever approach the are using.
FWIW I think the Russians are making a big mistake pushing there few remaining pre war elite formations to total failure, instead of pulling virtually all of them back to use as trainers and cadre for new units.

Good detailed post there.  A couple things to add:
I would argue from personal experience that “fighting spirit” and “experience” are inversely proportional.  A lot of times inexperienced troops are all pee and vinegar, ready to win the war single handed.  While the troops who been in it for awhile are basically trying to do their job and survive.  This could be where some of the OP narrative is coming from.
Collective or corporate knowledge is a thing.  Every unit/sub-unit has a body of experience and knowledge that kind of floats overtop of it like a cloud.  People come in and out but that experience and knowledge survives - it normally get labelled as “how we do things here”.  In combat this is no different with the exception of complete wipe-out.  Even if a unit gets 50% attrition, the surviving half will pass the knowledge onto the replacements.  The longer a unit as a collective is in combat the better it learns and gains experience - “we used to do that but it is now a bad idea”.
Leadership both formal and informal gets rolled into this soup, so you can see how it is a pretty complex arena.  In the end units that can keep attrition to manageable rates seem to have a better chance of survival.  This is one of the debates against whole unit rotations as a lot of corporate knowledge is lost.  We hybridize it by doing unit rotations but formation offsets and all sorts of tricks but I don’t think anyone has a perfect solution.

FWIW I made some comments on this a while ago
 

The heartless randomness of the whole thing is absolutely true but these are micro-observations that when upscaled run into other factors.  For example an experienced outfit knows to disperse, dig in and camouflage itself as best as it can.  It has noise and light discipline and sticks to the basics on all around defence and STANO.  When the shells land they stay their holes and stay as safe as they can.
A highly spirited crew with no experience builds a camp fire and sings stirring war songs.  You can see how that will (and has) unfold(ed) and who has the better chance of surviving the night.

UA soldier quote from the WSJ today from article on the brutal fighting:
“I need men. Good men. Spirited men,” he said. “Experience isn’t the most important thing. Here, the most experienced person can live for one day, and the least experienced person for months. It’s roulette.”
Just one observation, but that is really is a major part of attrition warfare. That is, experience does not matter. So why train men and just feed them to the mill?  I think NATO is putting together a force structure that will break that mold. The one thing the UA has over the RA as a constant is the spirit on their soldiers. And that has to be natured and retained very carefully.
 
 

Actually our entire western doctrine is built around the exact opposite of this; however, we are also not really built for attrition warfare.  I am also not sure of the veracity of the statement itself.  In the large world wars the more experienced a solider survived to be, the better their chances of survival is the prevailing wisdom - not sure if that is myth or backed up by serious study.  Further one thing that is backed up by history is that experienced troops fight better and smarter.  In experienced soldiers panic and run, largely because they are more likely to suffer dislocating psychological shock.
The narrative here sounds a lot like "Fighting Spirit and the end of bayonet, for King and Country!"  Which is not a bad thing or untrue, but is more in line with strategic messaging than actual performance on the battlefield.  

OK, so to clear the PL MLRS subject a little bit:
Up to now Polish Army only operates BM21 and RM-70 122mm MLRS. Some RM-70 are modernized to "Langusta" standard with digital automatic FCS, but there are still hand loaded and have a lot of obsolete features. MLRS are grouped in artillery regiments attached to divisions.
War in Ukraine resulted in our MoD embarking on an insane buying spree, which resulted in contract for the K239:
- 218 launchers were purchased, these will be mounted on Polish "Jelcz" trucks and equipped with PL comms and BMS
- 70 more are to be produced in PL under license (perhaps more in the future when manufacturing is all set up)
- contract included also more than 10K 239mm and 600mm missiles (roughly M31 and ATACMS unitary equivalents
This contract is valued at $3.55B. There are no more details available, our MoD absolutely sucks at communications and thinks it wise (or less problematic) to not give up more details on the future artillery force structures, details of what the contract entails regarding ammunition or any future shopping plans. There was talk about setting up production of K239 ammunition locally in PL, but MoD got silent about that recently too.
Now for HIMARS. Of course buying just a single type of a given category of equipment would be just too easy, and we don't like it that way. So on top of the K239 our MoD also want's American MLRS.
We purchased a single HIMARS battalion way before the war started ( 20 launchers and some insignificant amount of ammunition). On top of that our MoD sent a letter of request for more, which got approved yesterday and is the source of all of this commotion. It allows us to purchase:
-18 more HIMARS
- 488 launchers to be mounted on PL "Jelcz" trucks
- 500 pods (3000 rounds) of M30 missile
- 500 pods (3000 rounds) of M31 missile
- 500 pods (3000 rounds) of MLRS-ER missile
- 50 ATACMS Unitary missiles

Maximum price for all of this is $10B. Now this is are just maximum numbers that were approved and now negotiations for specific purchases will commence.

My comment on that is that this whole plan is insanely stupid and buying anything from this list (except maybe ammunition) absolutely doesn't make sense, for several reasons:
- absorbing the K239 will already be an enormous task is itself - manning, training, building facilities etc will be a huge undertaking
- the amount of ammunition in this LoR is absurdly low compared to number of launchers, it's just 3 reloads, what is the point of that?
- K239 can also reportedly fire US MLRS ammunition, so there's that...
- Korean ammo offers the same performance for much much smaller price (except the GMLRS-ER, Koreans just use 400mm missiles with similar range)

It doesn't help that our MoD is not disclosing any detail about the planned force structure, there are only some leaks. As far as one can tell, the division level artillery regiments are to be enlarged to brigades, probably with 2 MLRS battalions each. There are to be some corps/ commander in chief level missile brigades too, let's say 4 battalions each. This adds up to 20 battalions, typically with 18 launcher per, giving a required total number of 360 launchers. Which means that there won't be any huge HIMARS purchase as this is almost all covered by already purchased  290 K239. 
This is all speculation though, and our MoD might very well be just crazy and plans to buy it all for some reason, perhaps bloating the forces to even more insane levels. It's hard to tell, cause the ex-Soviet culture of extreme secrecy is still present in MoD/ Army...

Edit:
There might be one way for this insanity to make sense. At the moment the older RM-70 are to be pushed down to brigades and used as DPICM dispensers. If these were to be replaced by HIMARS there ( around 20 more battalions) and we were to buy up the whole remaining US M26 stock/ start production of similar rockets locally, this perhaps would (very arguably) make some sense. 

 

Just had a flashback to the  All-Russian Executive Committee of the Union of Railwaymen and their absolutely crucial role in the events of 1917. An incredibly risky move.

Two separate thoughts.
Won't these private companies compete with the MOD for what passes for able bodied men in Russia, and therefore make the problems worse?
Or is this a place to stash the children of the rich and/or  privileged where they can claim to be legally unavailable for service at say, the Bakmuht front?

Given that five (~20%) of the suspicious deaths of Russian businessmen over the past year have involved people associated with Gazprom, it begs the question of who is protecting who from who - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022-2023_Russian_businessmen_suspicious_deaths

Fellow resident here and that's all spot on.
And that's just a taste of how many police departments exist in the city: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_law_enforcement_agencies_in_the_District_of_Columbia

On tanks, first really coherent explanation I have heard.  Western armor is about longer-term strategic sustainment that allows Ukraine to take operational risks now.  I must be dead. 

This was unconfirmed rumors. Since weekend Russians multiplied own efforts to cut off Bakhmut from main supply routes Sloviansk - Bakhmut on the north and Kostintynivka - Bakhmut on the south. Except Wagners convicts, they also attacked with Wagner "core" and with VDV troops, so they could advance significanly along canal from Klishchiivka to Ivanivske and now are heavyly assault approaches to the Kostainntynivka - Bakhmut road. 
Today's twitters are reporting about endless heavy arty and MLRS barraages from both sides in that area. Unlike in previous days, reportedly UKR arty is working continuosly and hard. Either ammunition was delivered in time, or now they use "emergency strore" due to lack of ammo. Mass usage of bomblet-copters in Bakhmut is not of good life - but because of critical lack of artillery. One guy wrote in twitter - their battery has a long queue from units, which requested Excalibur strike or even "several shots at mother...ckers".
93rd mech.brigade was returned to Bakhmut week ago or some more - their time of R&R was shortened, because situation became worse. Their drone recon unit "Seneca" returned there so far through a 7-10 days, after the brigade was moved out - troops critically needed eyes in the sky. Many eyes. Despite on Bakhmut direction there are many drone teams are operating (except drones inside frontline units), their number anyway insufficient to cover all enemy movements on so wide front.   

There's been discussion last few days about RU getting chips & maybe RU defense industries are actually overcoming sanctions, etc.  But if this is true, where are the missiles?  RU did a large number of missile attacks on UKR infrastructure (and civilian centers) for a month or so.  Now those attacks are getting less intense and less frequent to the point that we nearly forget about them.  If Putler's defense industries are so good, where are the missiles?  For Putler this would be priority #1 I would think since he thinks it can break UKR will, yet we see nothing.  
Of course, there will be probably be a missile attacks starting tomorrow for a full week to prove me wrong.  🙄
Meanwhile, we have the ongoing question:  is UKR quiet because they are weak or because they are waiting?  I think they are building up and training and stockpiling for when they can really hit hard.  They basically have to pull off an 'invasion' of a well defended small country.  Bakhmut does seem to be done w an economy of forces by UKR, presumably to save resources for something else -- option B is that UKR is actually too weak to stop these attacks.
For RU, I still think Putler is castigating at his generals to break UKR army in Donbas, burning up men & material that will be sorely missed when the ground solidifies.  Like Stalin in summer of 41 continuously forcing counterattacks immediately w/o coordination or enough force, allowing germans to defeat them piecemeal.  If those attacks in 1941 hadn't been micro-mismanaged by Stalin the German schwerpunkts might've really been in trouble.

Not wanting to disagree, but there is one factor in favor of the Russians here. Russian businessmen expect less stable supply lines (even in peace time) than their western counterparts. So they usually have a much greater stock of stuff than in western just-in-time networks.
Russian companies will last longer in supply chain disruptions than western ones. This may be a factor why we don't see a breakdown, yet.

Ok, so this is pretty much the crux of your entire argument as far as I can tell?  I mean if there is more please feel free to post it, again a few references or fact could be helpful.  Like for instance how big is Russian military industrial capacity?  How does that translate into military production?  How does that stack up with Ukraine's?  How does it stack up to western industrial production?  What is happening to Russian industrial production?  Hint, it does not look good:
https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/industrial-production#:~:text=Industrial Production in Russia averaged,percent in January of 2009.
Ok, back into my wheelhouse, the military situation.
"Victories of yore"...? we are talking last Nov.  So in 3 months of what has really been leg dry humping in the Donbas, the entire UA war machine, one that was able to conduct two simultaneous operational offensives over 500 kms apart while being hit by Russian operational strikes...is on the verge of being wiped out.  Or is in an untenable situation?  The UA has lost the initiative and can never get it back?
So here is where I won't be snide or take personal shots.  Instead I will say up front and simply: you have no idea what you are talking about.  Now if you are really interested in exploring and widening you knowledge base, stick around by all means.  If you here to promote unfounded points of view and insult everyone...well nature will take its course.  
I am not sure who you have been reading or listening to but my best advice is to stop because they don't know what they are talking about either.  Here is what Russia is not going to do because there is not pocket dimension that they can drive their military into and reform/rebuild it over 10 years - but only a few days in our time - and then drive it back out and actually change the course of this war: 
- They are not going to solve for the C4ISR asymmetry, which is absolutely killing them (literally).  In order to gain a level of parity they need to either expand the conflict dramatically and directly attack US ISR assets, or spend billions, compress time and space and invent a competitive ISR architecture in comparison to the US.  That is a tall order China cannot meet but that is what Russia will need to do in this war to turn it around.
- They are not going to solve for air superiority.  Closely linked to C4ISR, the inability for the Russian Air Force to get in this game and fight the war they need it to is nearly insurmountable.  The air denial being exerted in this war is pretty definitive.  Add to that the Russians never really had a CAS doctrine to speak of, so there is that.
- They are not going to solve for operational pre-conditions.  The Russian military has demonstrated again and again a failure to effectively dominate the: information/communications infrastructure of Ukraine (and now it is been hardened and integrated with the west), transportation infrastructure to effectively cut off western support and sustainment, and disrupt the linkages between military strategic and political decision making - i.e. shock.  They also have not demonstrated an ability to establish effective levels of force protection - we see that nearly daily.
- They are not going to solve for logistics.  This has been the major problem for the RA and the UA/Western actions have made it nothing but worse.  At this point Russian logistics is functioning but has severely been eroded.  They have had to disperse logistical nodes and their losses on logistical equipment is approaching horrendous.  More facts: https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html...and these are simply insane numbers btw.
This is the operational stuff and it does not even begin to address the effects of UA corrosive warfare and precision asymmetry at tactical levels.
At the strategic level, as we have gone on at length about, Russia has a lot of larger problems.  Force Generation is likely the biggest one.  Russia can produce all the hardware it can but it is useless unless they can turn it, and people into functioning fighting units and formations.  We have seen indications that Russian FG is occurring, likely in better order than we had hoped, but it is no where near what the west is providing the UA with.  We know the RA cannibalized its training schools last spring-summer, which can damage force generation for years.  They have been able to turn out massed dismounted infantry but this is 2023, we have gone on at length at the challenges of training mechanized forces, let alone the number of specialist required to fix those four big operational points above.  Force Generation-wise the RA will need to demonstrate that it can create divisions that are enabled comparative to the UA, and we have seen no evidence of this. 
And then we get into the political level, and have gone on at length at Putin's constraints and restraints.  I just posted an ISW analysis of his risk calculus which outlines some of this.
So against that you have..."well Russia is really big and bad".   The first step to getting out of the Dunning-Kruger hole is to recognize that your are in it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning–Kruger_effect

With reference to Russian industrial capacity....
In my experience, it takes 6-12 months before major supply chain disruptions really start affecting the economy.  My customers, (I work with large industrial supply, repair parts, etc. wholesalers) were able to leverage pipeline inventory, source inventory from one domestic location or another, cannibalize parts from assembly and/or production sources for about 6-12 months depending on the industry during Covid and the recent supply chain disruptions. Then it got ugly.
Russia may be getting to the end of that window before industrial production really starts taking hits.
That's basically a long winded way of saying, just because some Russian manufacturing sectors have been running for the past 12 months doesn't mean they will keep running at the same capacity.  Or at all.  And when one sector fails, every other sector dependent upon those products suffer as well.
 

All war is communication and negotiation.  Yes, what happens this years is going to shape the end state, possibly dramatically.  There is a version of the future where this conflict essentially freezes in location.  If for example, the UA completely fails in a drive for Mariupol.  That might just trigger a lot of sidebar conversations at the political level where tying this whole thing off starts to make more sense.  
All sides are communicating through violence right now.  Violence is a fundamental form of communication in itself.  How that communication translates into reality on the ground - a pliable concept, is going to likely shape the outcome of this war.  Kursk was an enormous exchange of violent information that shaped both sides afterwards.  It shaped them physically, psychologically and socially/politically.  It shaped the negotiated end-state dramatically - if Germany had won, the Soviets may have been down a road to a negotiated end-state.  And it was all wrapped up in sacrifice - how righteous the cost was in the face of the certainty of what the desired end state was.
And we are right in the middle of the same situation, right now.  Different scale, but extremely high stakes.  I have been a tactical commander on the ground in two wars, studied war and warfare my entire adult life, and teach it now to the next generation.  And this war, unfolding on these 2000 pages has likely taught me more in a year than the 3+ decades before.

Solid points.  I think we knew this was going to be a long war about a month in and that has not changed.  My guess, and it is a guess:
We will see some sort of Russian offensive this winter/spring.  Too many things point to Russia making a hard push for March.  Brace yourselves because it may even include a Ukrainian setback, they do happen.  The problem the RA will have is exploitation.  If the UA has truly been badly attritted we will know then.  Because a local or even operational collapse will happen if it has.  The UA will most likely re-establish the front line.  Russia will then “declare Victory”, hold a parade and then blame everything that happens after as defensive against NATO aggression (see we told you so, they want our Borscht).  Russia will make weak attempts at renormalization and splitting western unity.
UA will then wait until late spring or early summer and bring out the hammer.  They will likely try the one-two punch starting on a flank, pulling RA in that direction because the RA does not have enough troop density along the line and will have to relocate.  And then they will punch down the middle and split the strategic land bridge, likely at Mariupol.  If they can make the coast then the Crimean Bridge is in GLSDB range and we have a new ballgame.  At this point things get dicey as Russia is approaching a “put up or shut up” point with its own people.  I am betting this takes up through the summer as this long jockeying to end game drags on.
Recall that the Allies knew the war was over by about 1943.  We all loved Saving Private Ryan but by 43 after Stalingrad the German Army was never coming back, Allied bombing was settling in, North Africa was done and the West was really just staking out its win with Normandy etc.  It took two years for everyone to fully see what winning losing looked like.
In the PTO some point to Midway, others Guadalcanal, but by mid 44 - definitely after Kohima, Japan was out of gas and going to lose.  How much and what end state took another year to figure out.
So to my mind, Fall 22 was a critical turning point in this war, and now we are just waiting for the finish.  But wars are uncertain affairs.  I accept that I am very likely wrong.  As I have said repeatedly - it is hard enough trying to understand what is happening right now.  Let alone make accurate predictions.

So Russias economy is airtight and bulletproof, and Putin as glorious leader/dictator for life can demand his people die in the millions for him?
I mean that is where this line of thinking is carrying.  We as weak western democracies cannot possibly impose enough pressure, nor will our willpower survive as long as a dictatorship because our system is inherently weaker.
I am sorry but I am not buying any of these points and nor does history bear them out.  Sure Russia has put in fallbacks and economic bastions, but how long can they last?  Every dictator you mention had a very different economic system to sustain their society.  Russia will need to re-wire theirs (already have) in order to make this work in the long term.  We have posted a plethora of charts and graphs on how the Russian economy has taken sever hits and has had to prop up its currency and system in many dangerous ways.  Now the IMF makes a two year prediction in the middle of a shooting war and we leap to “negotiate!”…?
Economic systems take time to shift - in 2014 it wasn’t like the sanctions were felt over a weekend.  In fact it took 2 years to see full effects on GDP, maxed out in 2016.
https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp
And then recovered but never back to 2014 levels.
Yes, let’s look at the long game for a minute.  If Russia gets away with this stunt and we blink, then we are back to anarchy of states.  China, Russia or whoever is aligned with them are going to be able to fall back on Rule of the Gun.  If we didn’t stick it out in Ukraine then why should we in Taiwan?
We built the system.  If we want to keep it, we have to be willing to fight for it.  Russia is not a bunch of extremist yahoos, it is a global power that went “ya, whacha gonna do about it?”  So we either push it back in line or the whole drug deal starts to unravel. This is not about national identity, it is about a global order (warts and all) that put us all on top.  We defend it or lose it.
This war is a test of western will and resolve as much as it is for Ukraine or Russia.  Dictatorships are notoriously fragile, normally collapsing with the death of the dictator.  A few have bucked the trend - North Korea, but that freaky state is a whole thing on its own.  Russia is a modern and developed nation, with a capitalistic economy.  It does not get to illegally invade another nation and get away with it.  And if we tap out, we’ll what happens next is all on us.
Can they be beat?  They already have been.  Someone (other than Macgregor) paint me a scenario where Russian strategic aims are accomplished.  We can construct a new Iron Curtain if we have to, hell we split Germany in half and pulled its western side into NATO.  Europe is weaning off Russian energy, that is going to have effects that last a generation.  Russia has not regained operational offensive initiative, they are doing the same tactical pecking they have been doing for months.  And even if they did retake the initiative, how long can they hold onto it?

No, our main threat is western attention spans.  We are used to everything being fast, especially our “real” wars - the low level stuff we can always change the channel on.  So now that we are in a real test of resolve we either buckle down and finish this thing, or not.

New message from Mashovets. This time he paid attention to the Russian special forces on the territory of Ukraine, as well as the aviation group on the territory of Belarus.
🔺 The 2nd separate brigade of special forces - a separate consolidated tactical detachment is fixed, deployed in the area of the village of Valuyki, and its reconnaissance and sabotage groups (RSG) regularly roam along the border of Ukraine and the line of contact in the Kharkiv and Kupyansk directions.
🔺 3rd separate Special Forces Brigade - at least twice recorded southwest of Kremennaya, another RSG operated in the area of the village of Bogdanovskoye
🔺10th separate Special Forces Brigade - seen in the area of the village of Razdolnoye east of the city of Novaya Kakhovka (probably, in the area of village of Zeleny Pod, the base of the combined tactical detachment of the brigade is deployed)
🔺14th separate Special Forces Brigade - its units are deployed in Donetsk, at least everyone sees it there regularly, most likely they "work on short notice" to the west of the city, and their base is in the city itself
🔺16th separate Special Forces Brigade - probably its units use the area of the village of Troitskoye to base their forward base, it is quite possible that the main base is deployed in the city of Gorlovka.
🔺22nd separate Special Forces Brigade - based on Tokmak (forward group), but the main base, apparently, is located in Berdyansk.
🔺24th separate Special Forces Brigade - most likely aimed at Seversk - Liman, Kramatorsk, at least it was seen in the area of Lysichansk. It probably operates with at least one consolidated tactical detachment, precisely in this direction.
🔺45th separate Special Forces Brigade - its RSGs began to be regularly fixed in the direction of Orekhovo and to the east. Apparently, at least one combined detachment of the brigade was deployed in the Zaporozhye direction quite recently, now it is they who are very actively wandering around the "gray zone" in the Orekhovo region.
🔺 All 4 naval reconnaissance points of the naval forces of the Russian Federation are deployed in those directions where the main forces and means of the brigades of the marines (coastal defense) of the respective fleets operate (for example, the naval reconnaissance point of the Black Sea Fleet near the city of Volnovakha, pretends to be a "unit" 155 th arr MP of the same Black Sea Fleet).
A more interesting position of the forces and means of the special operations forces of the armed forces of the Russian Federation in particular:
🔺 part of the forces and means of the special operations forces (most likely a separate detachment / special training center "Senezh") and some command group of special operations forces deployed in the Belgorod-Valuyki area, not far from the subsection of the 2nd separate special forces brigade)
🔺special training center "Kubinka-2" and another forward group, starting from January 8, appeared in the Brest region (Belarus), while "studying the combat area".
It is quite likely that in the near future we should expect an intensification of reconnaissance and sabotage activities of the enemy in these directions.
To date, the activity of units and subunits of the Special Forces of the RF Armed Forces as part of an enemy force grouping is recorded only in certain directions and sectors, which is quite possibly due to several reasons:
 
🔺 losses
 
🔺the desire to hide the main areas of "interest" of the command of the Russian troops
🔺 the need to re-equip the relevant units and units of special forces, respectively, bringing their combat abilities to some more or less acceptable level.
Among the main tasks for which the Russian military command uses SPP units are the following:
🔺Guidance and adjustment of "high-precision" means of destruction of Russian troops, including UAVs, AOS. Yes, very often, the Russian command uses groups of "special forces" as banal spotters of artillery fire at the tactical level.
🔺Moreover, it is not uncommon for the Russian command to throw units of its "special forces" into assault attacks or "put them on the defensive for reinforcement." In fact, he uses his special forces as "elite" infantry.
🔺 Conducting search and reconnaissance operations in tactical and very rarely the nearest operational zones. This is recorded from time to time (Russian special forces have slipped into banal military intelligence, there have been cases when they purposefully "worked" on individual platoon strongholds, company strongholds), etc.
In fact, the current state of units and subunits of the Special Forces of the RF Armed Forces does not allow the Russian military command to use them for something more serious and "deep" than tactical (military) intelligence. And in some cases, it tritely uses its "special forces" as an elite assault infantry (for example, such cases were recorded in the 22nd and 24th special forces brigades).

This may be my mistake. I recall seeing that UAF had entered the edge of Kreminna early in January and from those positions to today they would have been pushed back between 5 to 8km. I'm looking around now and I cannot find evidence of this so I think this is my mistake and I apologize for not double checking.