ASL Veteran

Indeed, I am in complete agreement here. I too believe that maneuver gets into the enemy decision cycle. I believe that is how decisive battle is achieved. I would maintain that the goal of the attritionist is not to punch through, but rather to .... pound the enemy with artillery and attrit him (example only - I think consistant with Jason's view). Any attempt at punching through is maneuverist to me. ------------------ When we were in the Bocage country we were assaulted by them Tigers ... you know what I mean by assaulted huh? WELL I MEAN ASSAULTED!!!!

I would be curious to know what that definition would be? Might as well throw another log on the fire eh?

Ah, I see the good Captain has joined our thread again. Yes, the quest for decisive battle can be like grabbing at smoke. I only maintain that the commander will make an attempt to grab at that smoke through maneuver and shock (using Jason's definition for simplicity). Many commanders will fail and some will succeed. The quest for decisive battle is the quest for maneuver - that is where Jason and I disagree.

Yes, it is unclear who the 'you' in the Captains post is. Yes Jason, that post was the best description so far of what you mean by attrition and maneuver and I do not believe that we are too far apart on our definitions. I do indeed equate decisive action with shock and maneuver and you do not. From my point of view, it is more of a time factor since a strategy of maneuver will render a decision much more quickly that a strategy of attrition. There are a few fundamental differences in how we view things, but they are very small definitional differences that yield large interpretational differences. I believe that we are discussing this from opposit ends of the spectrum and I doubt we will ever actually agree - but at least I now understand

Manstein - yes, not Guderian. My mistake. I know full well how Falkenhayne intended to attrit the entire French army. I am sure that he thought it would be decisive too .. but only in the sense that Strategic bombing is decisive. In other words, Falkenhayne was going to bleed the French over a long period of time until the nation of France ran out of troops to throw into the cauldron. However, what I am referring to as decisive means that a result is achieved over a short period of time. Immediate. Decisive not in the sense that you are going to kill every Frenchman capable of carrying arms, but that a desired effect is achieved quickly. Decisive in the sense that Austerlitz was decisive. Note that I also said that decisive battle can be bloodless. I am not familiar with the example you gave from the Boer War, but if an enemy force is forced to retreat from a defensive position by the application of maneuver alone, then the desired result has been achieved. It still falls under the category of decisive battle - even though the 'battle' was technically just a maneuver. World War 1 was Total War, and the byproduct of Total War is the destruction of life and resources. Your first statement makes me again think that you are lumping the act of making war into the act of 'attrition'. You do not differentiate between the two and make War = Attrition. However, 'attrition' is just another means of waging war not the act of war itself. A statement that makes World War 1 in its entirety to be a war of attrition seems overly simple to me. By its very nature warfare itself is attrition, but that is not what I feel is the military definition of attritional warfare. Verdun seems to be a good spotlight on our differences. I feel Verdun was attritional because Falkenhayne had no intention of breaking the French line with decisive action which would then end the war (at least hope for the end). You seem to feel that Verdun was decisive battle and that it was attritional because Falkenhayne attacked the French with the intention of creating casualties. I don't feel that the act of casualty creation in and of itself is necessarily 'attritional'. Perhaps you could take your definition of attrition from your attrition post and apply your own definition to each of the same examples I gave and explain why you feel that they are what you feel they are. The why part is the most important because if the why consists only of destruction of the enemy, then virtually all battle is attritional. The why must consist of something other than - the enemy was there, therefore I hit him. Unless of course your definition of attrition is as simple as hitting the enemy where he is, and maneuver is hitting him where he isn't. Problem with that is that you now put Napoleon as an 'attritionist' because he sought battle. My definition leaves Napoleon as a 'maneuverist' because he sought decisive battle. The other problem is that the definition of 'maneuverist' as hitting the enemy where he isn't does not fit with the Marine Corps definition of 'maneuver warfare'. Perhaps another reading of the Marine Corp definition is in order?

Decisive battle can be achieved by the ‘defender’ if the resources are available. Comparing Verdun with Stalingrad might be revealing. Verdun was a battle of attrition no doubt, but what if the French didn’t want to play along with Falkenhayne’s plan? Although the situations are different geographically and technologically, perhaps the French, rather than allow themselves to get sucked into a battle of attrition at Verdun, could have allowed its easy capture and then if the Germans attempted to exploit that gain they could have pinched off the advancing forces. Falkenhayne’s plan of attack used too narrow of a frontage to allow for a clean break of the French line, so if a break were allowed to materialize the ‘exploiting’ force may have been cut off and destroyed. One would have to wonder what Falkenhayne’s reaction would have been if his armies made a breakthrough of the French line. Perhaps he would have been consumed with anger at the French reluctance to play along with his game. Problem is that the French were defending in a salient and the Germans would have to advance pretty far before such a plan could take effect. It could have been very Cannae like though. Maybe such mobile warfare was unthinkable to the French anyway. The Germans were the aggressors at Stalingrad, yet that is a case where the defender achieved decisive battle through maneuver by pinning the enemy in the city and enveloping his forces through maneuver. The Soviets could easily have chosen a pure attrition strategy by pouring troops into the city, but Zhukov opted for a more prudent maneuver strategy of double envelopment. The option and the resources were available. Guderian allowed the Soviet armored columns to advance in 1944 then cut them off and pursued a fairly brilliant strategy of maneuver in defense also. Who knows what may have been if Hitler had left him in command. The resources were just not there in sufficient quantity to make the campaigns in 1944 decisive for the Germans though.

I see that the old threads on Attrition vs Maneuver have sunk into the deeper recesses of this message board, so I am going to start a new thread on the controversy. I think we have a pretty decent working definition of warfare by ‘Maneuver’ so I would like to work on our definition of warfare by ‘Attrition’. I think that the first proposed definition of warfare by ‘Attrition’ fell a little short. ‘Attrition’ warfare is the destruction of the enemy army that much is true. However, I believe that this needs to be expanded a little bit. How about if we call ‘Attrition’ warfare as destruction of the enemy army without the use of decisive battle. This is simply battle through the use of brute force. Conversely, let’s call ‘Maneuver’ warfare as the destruction of the enemy army through the use of decisive battle. This decisive battle is achieved through speed and dislocation. Let’s also add a third category of warfare called … well lets just call it normal warfare. Warfare that is neither ‘Attrition’ nor ‘Maneuver’ but strives to be either one or the other. Let us also add another layer of warfare to our ‘warfare pie’ … let us call it Total War and Limited War. Think of it like whipped cream on top of mom’s apple pie . Better yet, think of Total War and Limited War as the context within which ‘Attrition’, ‘Maneuver’, and ‘Normal’ warfare reside. Okay, now that I’ve introduced a few new words to our discussion of ‘attrition’ and ‘maneuver’ let me try to explain my view on what these terms mean. By decisive battle, I mean a battle where a whole war can be won or lost based upon this one clash of arms. This clash of arms can be bloody or it can be bloodless – it is the end result of decisive battle that is important. This battle (or campaign in a more modern sense) ends the war that the nations are involved in. By Total War, I mean a war where each nation uses every resource at their disposal to destroy their antagonist and does so without regard to method employed. Total War = Total involvement. Limited War would then mean the opposite of Total War. War with some limiting factor – all the resources of each nation are not pledged toward mutual destruction. Let us now examine some examples in history to flesh out my theory. Verdun … ‘Attrition’ or ‘Maneuver’? Well let us apply our definitions. Falkenhayne’s plan was to attack the French army at Verdun. He chose Verdun because he knew that the French had a special reverence for that location that exceeded its strategic value and would fight to the last man protecting it. Falkenhayne’s battle plan was so constructed, however, that he could never actually take Verdun. Actually capturing Verdun was not Falkenhayne’s intention – destruction of the French army was. Well, as examined earlier, destruction of the French army is the objective and so far we can apply both ‘attrition’ and ‘maneuver’ to this battle. However, is Falkenhayne’s plan a plan for ‘decisive battle’? Absolutely not. There is absolutely no chance of the Germans capturing Verdun and ending World War 1 in decisive fashion. Verdun is an attempt to gain victory through battle that is not decisive. It is a simple numbers game – Falkenhayne thinks he can kill three times as many French soldiers as he loses German and that is the basis of his plan. Now let’s look at another battle from World War 1. The battle of the Somme. ‘Attrition’ or ‘Maneuver’? Easy enough some might think – the battle of the Somme was a battle of Attrition. Not so I say. Why you might ask? Well, I say the the Somme was not a battle of ‘Attrition’ because the intention was to break through the German lines and exploit that breakthrough with cavalry in an attempt to end the war. The intention was ‘decisive battle’. So was the Somme ‘maneuver’ warfare? No, because the Somme does not meet the criteria of ‘maneuver’ warfare either since the Germans were never behind in their decision cycle and their ability to resist was never weakened through speed and dislocation. Therefore, the Somme was ‘normal warfare’ that strived to become maneuver warfare. Okay, let’s now examine an example of ‘maneuver’ warfare. How about the Ludendorff offensives in 1918? The target of these offensives was the destruction of the allied armies in France. Specifically an attempt to force the British back onto their island. This would appear to be an ‘attritional’ objective. The difference, however, is that the Germans planned to achieve this destruction through the use of ‘decisive battle’. One season’s worth of campaigning and the war would be done. Things didn’t quite work out the way the Germans wanted to, but they did manage to achieve some measure of ‘maneuver’ warfare as the allies were temporarily suffering from the speed of the German advance. The advancing Germans would reach new allied defense lines in the early stages of preparation and overrun them before these defenses could be dug. Was World War 1 a war that was won by ‘attrition’ or ‘maneuver’? World War 1 was neither a war of ‘attrition’ nor a war of ‘maneuver’ – it was ‘Total War’ and attrition and maneuver were both used in its prosecution. An attempt to translate ‘attrition’ to ‘total’ can be argued, but by that translation all war is ‘attritional’ in nature because by its very definition ‘war’ involves the wasteful destruction of life and property. Therefore, I argue that the destruction of life and property is not ‘attrition’ warfare, but is simply a byproduct of warfare itself. Finally, I would like to address a few points brought up by various individuals in the original ‘Attrition’ vs ‘Maneuver’ threads. Vietnam – ‘attrition’ or ‘maneuver’? Vietnam was most definitely a Limited War that was prosecuted through a strategy of ‘attrition’. The reason we can define the whole Vietnam War as a war of ‘attrition’ is that neither side could ever bring about ‘decisive battle’ and since the scope of the war was limited we can label it easily enough. The Vietnamese could not achieve ‘decisive battle’ because they lacked the military strength to eject the forces of the United States. The US forces could not achieve ‘decisive battle’ because the enemy was ill defined and difficult to pin down – try as they might. The body count system is also a strong indication that the US forces had attrition as their goal. There was virtually no chance of ever achieving decisive battle for either side in Vietnam and that is why it lasted so long. Attrition almost in its purest form. Was the strategic bombing of Germany in World War 2 a campaign of ‘maneuver’ or a campaign of ‘attrition’? Although the proponents of Strategic Bombing felt that it would be decisive battle, it turned out to be anything but. That 1000 plane raid on Berlin was not going to end the war, nor was the next 1000 plane raid, or the next. Strategic Bombing is attritional warfare pure and simple because there is no chance of ‘decisive battle’. No single bombing raid was going to end World War 2 – not even hundreds if not thousands of raids were going to end World War 2. Strategic Bombing is destruction of the enemy without the use of ‘decisive battle’. Okay, how about D-Day? Was D-Day ‘attritional’ or ‘maneuverist’? Well, from the allied point of view, D-Day was normal battle that strived for maneuver. The landing was made in an attempt to force ‘decisive battle’ and end World War 2. The ‘maneuverist’ strives to break out of Normandy and end the war through ‘decisive battle’ but what would the ‘attritionist’ do? The ‘attritionist’ would not attempt to break out of Normandy, but would remain in the Normandy area and attrit the enemy. The ‘attritionist’ would land and sit thinking that they’ve got the enemy right where they want them. A closer look at Normandy actually reveals that it was the Germans who conducted a war of ‘attrition’ there. Why you might ask? Because the Germans were incapable of forcing ‘decisive battle’ and ‘attrition’ was the only means by which the Germans could fight the enemy. In the end then, ‘attrition warfare’ is what a commander relies upon when all his other options are gone, ‘maneuver warfare’ is what every commander strives to achieve, and ‘normal warfare’ is what most commanders end up doing.

This is certainly my longest post ever … I tried to make it as brief as I could, and in doing so it was necessary to make a few generalizations – many of which are from memory. I also thought about breaking it into multiple posts for ease of reading, but what the heck, here it is all at once. While the notion of Napoleon, the genius of maneuver, being worn down and eventually defeated by Schwarzenburg and the overwhelming forces of attrition is a seductive conclusion to draw from the Napoleonic Wars, this conclusion is an overly simplistic one. The definition of ‘Attritionist’ put forth by Jason is this one, “Now, what is this attrition warfare? Attrition warfare is the phrase used by people who disagree with the doctrine, to slight those who believe the fundamental goal and essential process of warfare is destroying the enemy wherever he stands. Specifically, the doctrine is, that the enemy armed forces are the target. Not terrain. Not an "objective". Not a mission. Destroy the enemy, period. And try to lose less men doing it, but above all destroy the enemy.” I think this sums up Jason Cawley’s definition and this definition can be discovered in his first post on the subject. Let us also examine his ruminations upon Napoleon himself, “But two facts are overlooked in this first round of quest for manuever and genuis in warfare. The first is that Napoleon's method essentially were systematized, and made into a machine that in practice operated more smoothly than he ever did - the general staff system. And the second is that *he lost*. "Oh well, sure, he faced superior numbers, but his military art was superior in itself (an-sich, you see), and that is why it took superior numbers to..." Napoleon was a national sovereign, not a general. The entire strategy set, including decisions about war or peace, was under his command. Talleyrand said "you cannot make war on everyone". Napoleon did not believe in attrition (above the tactical level, where I contend by the way that he *did*), but in manuever. He fought everyone. He lost.” This quote can also be discovered in the first post of Jason’s thread on attrition. However, the whole premise of this quote is false and all the conclusions that follow from this premise are of course false also. The premise being that Napoleon was eventually overwhelmed by numbers because he felt that his genius could overcome his numerical deficit. As to Napoleon’s method of war, Jason goes on in an attempt to differentiate between maneuver and attrition by using some WW2 examples, “(Attrition) is actually not as common sense as it sounds, and it is not obvious that it is right. It is not a constructed straw man, nor does it set up the other side as a constructed straw man. There are many situatons in which, of course, any commander will focus on destroying the enemy e.g. that is in his way as he manuevers. And no one is disputing that all forms of warfare are attempting to defeat the enemy army overall. That is not the point.” I suppose that what Jason is explaining is that the overall defeat of the enemy is not the point, but that the method of defeating the enemy is. Jason would argue that the best method, the ‘attrition’ method, is the way wars are won and that the brilliant but doomed ‘maneuver’ method is the way wars are lost. “The question is - kill the German army in France inside the Falaise pocket, or race for the Rhine? Kill the Russian army inside the Kiev pocket, or race for Moscow? Grind forward through the mud of the Lorraine, or gamble on Operation Market-Garden?” Placing this question into the context of Napoleon Bonaparte, Jason would have us believe that Napoleon would choose the so called ‘maneuverist’ strategy of racing for Moscow as opposed to the ‘attritionist’ strategy of killing the Russian army inside the Kiev pocket since that, apparently, would be the obvious goal of the ultimate maneuverist, Napoleon Bonaparte. A greater misunderstanding of Napoleon Bonaparte could not be made and I think a review of history and Napoleon will quickly show this to be the case. Even the definition of Napoleon as a ‘maneuverist’ can be muddled by historical facts. To fully understand Napoleon, we must explore warfare before Napoleon. Although the first professional army is usually recognized as the Swedish army of Gustavus Adolfus, I am going to begin with the army of King Louis XIV. France was involved in numerous wars during the reign of King Louis – these wars generally stemmed from his belief that the natural border of France was the Rhine River. Of course, the Dutch weren’t big fans of this notion and consequently the French were involved in numerous wars with both the Dutch and the English (along with other nations at various times). The objectives of these wars is not the focus of my ramblings though, but the methods by which these wars were fought is. One clue as to what was felt to be important was the rise to prominance of General Vauban in the French army. Vauban was an engineer – something of a fortifications guru. Under Vauban’s direction, a chain of fortifications was built along the French frontier with the Dutch. The Dutch did the same. War consisted mainly of the reduction of these fortifications and strategy was based upon the control of these fortifications. The primary reason for this mode of thinking was that the army, the ‘King’s army’, was much too valuable to risk in field combat. This risk was great because there were no national reserves. Once the army was destroyed, the army was destroyed and an entirely new army would need to be raised in order to defend the frontiers. The raising of a new army would necessitate the training of all these new recruits etc, and could not be accomplished overnight. Battle was avoided if at all possible and a strategy that concentrated on occupying ‘space’ and lines of fortifications was the rule of the day. Whole years of campaigning went by where opposing armies did not meet in the field of battle, but simply maneuvered amongst the various towns and fortifications. The Duke of Marlborough was regarded as the ‘military genius’ of the time and his march from Holland to Austria (which ended in the battle of Blenheim …1704) was regarded as quite an accomplishment at the time. A march from Holland to Austria in the space of one month was considered spectacular due to the constraints present upon the armies at that time. An army was basically tied to a chain of depots where supplies were stored in the event of war. “The magazine and depot system of logistics with its many halts for resupply tended to limit a campaign of an entire year’s campaigning season to a distance of 300 miles” (Russell Weigley ‘The Age of Battles’) An army that strayed too far from its depots was asking for trouble since living off the land was not the normal thing to do. What made Marlborough’s march even more spectacular was that he didn’t have any depots on the route of the march. “His new plans were daring to a degree that was extraordinary in light of the logistical difficulties of the era” (Russell Weigley ‘The Age of Battles’) The only reason it could be accomplished at all was because various German allies and minor principalities supplied the Duke with provisions along the way. Naturally this was all planned out beforehand, but if the friendly principalities did not provide the needed supplies, the march would have been rendered impossible. At this point I would pose a question – is avoiding field combat and pursuing a strategy of fortress reduction an ‘attritionist’ strategy or a ‘maneuverist’ strategy? I would now like to fast forward, briefly, to Frederick the Great. I mention him because of the situation he was in. The Prussia of Frederick the Great was seen as a weak power trying for a land grab of Austrian territory and Russia, Austria, and France (at various times) all wanted to take the Prussians down. Prussia was fighting for its survival and was only saved by Russia making peace after tsarina Elizabeth passed away. The new King of Russia (Tsar Peter III) was an admirer of Frederick the Great and ended Russias involvement – thus ending the conflict. Although this was a form of Total War (because the destruction of Prussia as a sovereign nation was the objective) the old rules of warfare still applied. However, Frederick the Great sought out battles with his enemies since he always felt that if he let them build up strength unchecked it would be impossible to win. The odd part of this would be that the party who would seem to be conducting ‘maneuver’ warfare (Frederick the Great) was doing so because his intent was to engage the enemy in battle – despite the fact that his army was getting smaller and smaller with every engagement. He was attempting to use decisive concentration of force upon the various scattered allied armies that were descending upon his nation in an effort to defeat them in detail. The force with the superior numbers (Russia, Austria, and France) did not seek battle (actively avoiding it on occasion), and attempted to gain victory through the occupation of space (towns and fortifications). If Frederick the Great is considered a ‘maneuverist’ then this would be a victory for maneuver. If Frederick the Great is considered an ‘attritionist’ then this would be a case where the powers with the most toys did not win. Moving on to the French Revolution, we can still see the old way of thinking at the battle of Valmy. The battle of Valmy basically consisted of the opposing armies lined up ready for battle, but the Prussians decide to pound the French with a cannonade. Once the cannonade is finished, the Prussians decide to go home. Risking battle was too much for a Prussian commander who didn’t really have much enthusiasm for war with France anyway (Duke of Brunswick). The French army was different than past armies though. The French army was created from the Levee En Masse. A people’s army. Armies had been transformed from the army of the King to the army of the nation. This huge reservoir of manpower created a situation where battle did not need to be avoided and the preservation of your force no longer needed to be the essential factor in warfare. The situation was also one of self preservation for France. France was the victim here, not the aggressor. The monarchies of Europe were not going to allow the French Revolution to stand for fear that the same thing could happen to them. Into this maelstrom comes Napoleon. Napoleon felt that wars were won through the destruction of the enemy army, not the occupation of space. This was a fundamental break from the way wars were fought up to that point. There were a lot of logistical innovations introduced by the French during the Napoleonic Wars too, which allowed them to move with greater speed than armies in the past. This resulted in the combining of a General who had the destruction of the enemy army as his primary goal and an army that was much quicker than armies in the past. This combination allowed Napoleon to meet the Marine Corps criteria of maneuver warfare by giving Napoleon a much quicker decision cycle than his opponents. Napoleon’s objective was the destruction of the enemy army though. Napoleon never saw a battle he didn’t like and this is demonstrated again and again in his campaigns. Napoleon actively sought decisive battle with his opponents in an attempt to destroy their army and end the conflict. Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram, Borodino, Leipzig the list of battles goes on and on. The speed with which the French army moved assisted Napoleon in his efforts by allowing him to concentrate force with great rapidity. Is Napoleon an ‘Attritionist’ or a ‘Maneuverist’? According to Jason’s definition, Napoleon’s objective of destruction of the enemy army through battle would be attritionist doctrine. Napoleon, the greatest ‘attritionist’ of all time? His use of speed and maneuver to bring about decisive battle and defeat his enemy would appear to be ‘maneuverist’ according to the Marine Corp definition. Which is it? Moving on to Napoleon’s defeat, a close examination of the battles of 1813 (the campaign in central Germany culminating at the battle of Leipzig) finds the French actually begin the campaign with a healthy numerical advantage!! Russia and Prussia (and Austria who joined in later) had a big meeting when preparing for the campaigns of 1813. They decided at that time that they were to avoid pitched battle with Napoleon at all costs and to concentrate their efforts against Napoleon’s marshals. Napoleon, for his part, split his army into three parts … which played right into the hands of the coalition. The coalition forces then proceeded to catch each of the two columns under the independent command of Napoleon’s marshals and defeat them in battle. Napoleon tried to engage the coalition armies in battle, but they refused to cooperate and would quickly withdraw whenever Napoleon arrived on the scene. By the end of 1813, the coalition had achieved victory as Napoleon, abandoned by all his minor allies, was forced to retreat back to France. At that point the coalition nearly split apart because Austria didn’t see any need for an invasion into France, while Prussia wanted to go for it. A peace offer was made and rejected by Napoleon who was eventually crushed by weight of numbers in 1814 (when Napoleon was pretty much finished anyway). In light of the strategy of 1813 … was the ultimate ‘attritionist’ defeated by maneuver or was the ultimate ‘maneuverist’ defeated by attrition? ------------------ When we were in the Bocage country we were assaulted by them Tigers ... you know what I mean by assaulted huh? WELL I MEAN ASSAULTED!!!!

I think I have finally been able to grasp what Jason is trying to say. It took me a long time because what he is saying is a gross simplification of events. To make sure I have it right I will pose a premise - call it the Jason premise. Napoleon, the brilliant operational 'maneuverist' was eventually defeated by the the practitioners of 'attrition' who eventually wore him down and defeated him in 1814. I will even consider the various different wars that occurred between 1805 and 1815 as one long and continuous war (false as it is). There is no need to include the campaign of 1815 since that was over in a few months anyway. Napoleon's real defeat occurred in 1814 (which came about from the campaigns of 1813). Okay Jason, please flesh out this premise for me (make any clarifications or corrections as needed) while I prepare a response. I will try to post this response later this evening. I choose Napoleon because ... well, I am well read in the Napoleonic Wars, and because the period from King Louis XIV to Napoleon are a critical time in military development and would serve well to show the blurred lines between attrition and maneuver.

Jason, Austria made peace with France after 1805 ... territory was ceded and terms were signed. Austria did not enter a war with France again until 1809 ... after which, Austria became an Ally of France in the War of 1812. To describe the hostilities of 1805 as just a campaign is not an accurate description of the events of that time - and may be placing a 'modern' interpretation on those events. The more I read (what I can make it through) of your lengthy posts, the more I come away with the impression that what you are attributing to "Attrition Warfare" can be better described as the concept of "Total War". You cannot separate the campaigns that make up a war from the war itself. There can be no war with no campaigns. There can be no war where all the campaigns that make up that conflict can be described as either 'attrition' or 'maneuver'. Both strategies are used depending upon circumstance and the commander in charge. Ultimately, I suppose that 'Total War' can be described as the ultimate form of 'Attrition' since no nation will surrender until they have fought to the last ounce of strength. This seems to be your point - that a war is ultimately decided by attrition. However, to describe 'Total War' as 'Attritional War' seems to be placing a 'strategy' or a 'tactic' upon the very way nations approach a war. Something like using a paint roller to create an oil painting. Your point of attrition warfare being the destruction of the enemy army also rings a bit hollow because the destruction of the enemy army can also be the goal of maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare and Attrition warfare can both have the same goal - destruction of the enemy army - they are just different means of achieving that same ends.

The war between France and Austria in 1805 is different than the war in 1940. In 1805 the war ended. The period between 1805 and 1815 (or even 1793 to 1815) was not a period of continuous warfare and can't really be compared to world war 2 where the hostilities never came to a conclusion until Germany's final defeat.

My post was directed at Jason, not you Captain. I agree with the majority of what you said.

"Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. We seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late-until eventually he is overcome by events." Using this as our guideline of what a maneuver strategy is, let's answer the challenge posed to us "To review, I am still waiting for a single example of a major war won by the successful application of a manuever strategy, as opposed to an attrition strategy, at any time since 1700, besides the 6-day war in 1967. No manueverist guru has come forward with a single example. A won war, not a campaign, battle, or firefight." Okay, how about Napoleon's victory over Austria in the war of 1805 or Napoleon's victory over Prussia in the war of 1806? Certainly Napoleon's victory at Ulm was a victory of maneuver as was his victory at Austerlitz. Napoleon's decision cycle was continuously ahead of that of his enemies and this resulted in victory. It is fairly obvious that Napoleon was dictating the action in 1806 as well since the Prussians were always two or three steps behind. Napoleon's army lived off the land and his enemies were tied to supply points and depots thus giving his armies much more speed than the armies of his enemies. I think it is extremely apparent that both the Austrians and the Prussians were continuously caught off balance in both of those wars.

I think this portion of the Marine definition of maneuver warfare is the most relevant: "Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. We seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late-until eventually he is overcome by events." Note that this definition does not require the maneuver force to avoid combat in order to achieve its goals. It simply means that the maneuver force is maintaining the initiative and keeping the opposing force off balance. This principle can be applied at CMs level - and I am sure that many CM players have felt helpless playing a tough opponent who always seems to have his stuff in the right place at the right time.

So you are sitting on your soapbox awaiting a response to your lengthy lecture on warfare eh? Okay, well your point seems to be that attrition warfare = killing enemy soldiers. I suppose that can be one definition of attrition in its most simple form, and if you are using that as a definition of attrition then obviously there is no such thing as maneuver warfare and the discussion ends. Of course, since your definitions of attrition and maneuver seem to be a bit of a moving target (a new form of maneuver warfare?) then it is difficult to debate the matter with you. It would seem that we have arrived at a bit of a consensus in the maneuver thread and I completely agree with the Marine Corp definition of maneuver warfare that was posted there. I think that if you take the time to read through that definition you will find that it is a simple matter to find instances of maneuver warfare throughout history. Perhaps it would be better to debate the definitions first rather than to assume that your definitions are the correct ones. Otherwise this leads to a situation where the various esteemed members of our community must attempt to prove to you that maneuver warfare exists, but only within the context of the definitions you have assigned. Once a definition has been settled upon, then perhaps examples of each type of combat can be found. How about if we start with a fairly straight forward example from this thread? One of the posters in this thread called the strategic bombing campaign against Germany in World War 2 maneuver warfare. After reading the Marine Corps definition of maneuver warfare - is that a valid example of maneuver warfare per that definition or is that attrition warfare?

Interesting comment. The threat of attrition existed prior to the batteries being located in a threatening position because the entire American army was camped outside of Boston and could have attacked, and attrited, the British force at any time. So the threat of attrition alone did not force the evacuation. A 'infamous' example of an attack by attrition would be when Burnsides took over command of the Union Army for his one brief campaign. I forget the name of the battle, but he just kept on sending his troops up this hill and got his army annihilated in an attempt to attrit his enemy. I believe Verdun is a classic case of attack by attrition too. Falkenhayne never intended to break through the French lines. His objective was to kill French troops. I guess it all depends on your definition of attrition. If attrition means both killing the enemy and the threat of killing the enemy, then a battle will always be a case of either attrition or the threat of attrition. Classes in tactics would be pretty simple then because it would consist of one sentence: "kill the enemy. Class dismissed". This seems to be a rather simplistic point of view to me. Perhaps attrition is killing the enemy, and maneuver is putting yourself in the most advantageous position to kill the enemy. Using that rationale, maneuver and attrition coexist as good chums on the battlefield. Neither being effective without the other.

I can't seem to get Steve's quote about convincing the enemy to leave an important location on his own to work on this post, but I wanted to dwell on that thought. I haven't followed the whole thread .. so I am only addressing that point. A good commander can convince the enemy to abandon a defensive position on his own ... and this can be done at CMs level Dr Brian. I actually do it all the time. A not so recent example of how to get a defender to decide to leave a location on his own would be when the Americans got the British out of Boston during the revolution. When Washington placed his batteries on the heights overlooking the bay, these cannons could threaten the British fleet with continuous bombardment (we lacked the powder, but the British didn't know that). The British (after storming Breed's Hill) elected to leave Boston all on their own because of the threat the American batteries posed to the British fleet. Boston did not need to be stormed by a frontal assault. The Americans forced the British out because the British situation became untenable due to the threat to their fleet. Now the British could have elected to stay in Boston, but a commander will normally attempt to preserve his force if staying in a location is clear to be a loser of a proposition (Adolf Hitler excepted of course). Is this maneuver warfare? I don't know. I am only commenting on the idea that direct use of force is not necessary to acheive a military goal. Simply occupying a threatening location can achieve the same thing. This principle can be applied at CMs level, just with individual clumps of trees or houses rather than whole cities or armies. Push one defending squad out of a certain house and the whole defense may be compromised. Conversely, the defender must identify key pieces of terrain when considering his defense. He must also be able to identify the importance that their loss has on their defenses and plan accordingly.

well there really is no such thing as gamey recon in ASL since nothing is hidden anyway. I would recommend that you just e-mail the designer and mention that an increased game length may be appropriate. 22 turns is probably too short for bocage fighting and perhaps a four to one conversion would be more appropriate than a two to one. So you may even double the time from 22 to maybe forty and try it again.

I haven't played that particular scenario and I don't have the original scenario card so I can't comment on the length. A 50% increase in length would probably help though. Airpower in ASL is handled ... similar to the way it is done in CM. Basically, you need to roll a number in order for the aircraft to show up, then a number of aircraft are randomly determined to arrive. Once the aircraft arrive, they are moved around on the map like any other unit only they basically have unlimited movement factors and you just strafe and bomb whatever you want to. If you roll a certain number you have a mistaken air attack and your opponent gets to choose one of your units and conduct an air attack on it.

Personally, I would like it if knocked out tanks were shown with their hatches open. Yes, it is just eye candy, but I think it would be neat. I would also like it if wrecks pushed off a bridge dramatically tumbled down to the ground / water below rather than teleporting. Does it serve a useful purpose? Sure - I would think it looked cool.

There is quite a bit of controversy in the 'converters' community as to the proper 'conversion' rate between ASL turns and CM turns. A straight conversion yields 2 CM turns for each ASL turn, while I have maintained that a 4 to 1 conversion is a little more optimal. Most of the other scenarios on the ASL2CM site use the two for one turns conversion rate so they are very short - too short to me anyway.

Okay, here is a cross section of Soviet guns as taken from “Russian Tanks and Armored Vehicles 1917 – 1945” by Wolfgang Fleischer. 152mm Tank Howitzer 1938/40 Barrel Length: L/24 Breech: Screw Ammunition: Separate, with cartridge case Weight & Velocity: AP 40kg @ 508 m/s; HE 51.07kg @ 432 m/s Targeting: targeting scope T-5 152mm M.38 and Panoramic scope PT-5 76mm 1940 and 1942 Tank Gun (F-34) Barrel Length: L/41.5 Breech: Semi-Automatic vertical wedge Ammunition: Cartridges Weight & Velocity: AP 6.3kg (BR-350 A) @ 662 m/s; HE 6.2kg (CF-350) 680 m/s Targeting: targeting scope TOD-7; Panoramic scope PT-7 76mm 1939 Tank Gun (L-11) Barrel Length: L/30.5 Breech: Semi-automatic vertical wedge Ammunition: Cartridges Weight & Velocity: AP 6.3kg @ 612 m/s; HE 6.21kg @ 610-635 m/s Targeting: targeting scope I O II-6; Panoramic scope F.-6 76mm 1938/39 Tank Gun (L-10) Barrel Length: L/30/5 Breech: Semi-automatic vertical wedge Ammunition: cartridges Weight & Velocity: AP 6.3kg @ 612 m/s; HE 6.2kg @ 555-635 m/s Targeting: no data 76mm 1927/32 Tank Gun (KT-28) Barrel Length: L/16.5 Breech: Screw with tension trigger and cartridge sealing Ammunition: Cartridges Weight & Velocity: AP 6.5kg @ 370 m/s; HE 6.2kg @ 381-387 m/s Targeting: targeting scope 1930; Panoramic scope 1932 45mm 1938 Tank Gun Barrel Length: L/46 Breech: Semi-automatic vertical wedge Ammunition: Cartridges Weight & Velocity: AP 1.43kg @ 760 m/s; HE 2.15kg @ 335 m/s Targeting: TOD 1932 or TOL tank aiming scope with stabilizer; PT-1 panoramic scope 122mm 1943 Tank Gun (D-25 T) Barrel Length: L/43 Breech: Semi-Automatic vertical wedge Ammunition: Separate, with cartridge case Weight & Velocity: AP 24.9kg @ 781 m/s; HE 24.9kg @ 800 m/s; HEAT 13.2kg @ 550 m/s Targeting: Tsch-17 tank telescope hinged targeting scope. 85mm 1944 Tank Gun (ZIS-S-53) Barrel Length: L/54.6 Breech: Semi-automatic vertical wedge Ammunition: Cartridges Weigth & Velocity: AP 9.02kg @ 792 m/s; HE 9.2kg @ 792 m/s Targeting: Tsch-16 tank targeting scope (16-degree field of vision, fourfold magnification)

Grenades are actually categorized into two types; Offensive grenades and Defensive grenades. Offensive grenades generally have little fragmentation effect and rely on the explosive power of the grenade to stun the enemy. Defensive grenades are what you would describe as 'Frags' because they rely on the fragmentation effect more than the explosive effect. The Germans, for example, had the stick grenade (Defensive) and the egg grenade (offensive). They also developed a rather interesting little stick grenade called the 'Nipolite' (sp?) grenade. This grenade was developed by creating this ... plastic type material from old powder the Germans had. It was found that this gunpowder/plastic stuff could be machined so the Germans just made the whole stick grenade out of the Nipolite stuff with no other material at all. Just a naked lump of explosives formed into a stick. Pretty ingenious I think. I am not in front of my sources right now so I can't give more detail than that.

I believe that the problem with the way Lewis is tackling this issue is that he is using 'area target' and 'point target' using a strict definition of each - which he sticks by to the point of ridiculousness. 'Point target' to Lewis is a bunker or a tank, 'Area target' is an infantry squad since it takes up a wide area if they are all dispersed at 5 meter intervals. Strictly adhering to these definitions, Rexford's description of a squad being fired upon as a 'point target' comes out as nonsense because a squad isn't a point target - it is an area target. Lewis can't (or is unwilling to) get past this point, so all the calculations that Rexford has made about trajectory and accuracy become nonsense since - according to Lewis - Rexford can't even define the target correctly. Of course, since Rexford's analysis deals with whether a target is a vertical target or a horizontal target and that the definition Lewis is using is irrelevant to Rexford's mathematics, they can't communicate effectively with each other. However, this is not the first 'issue' that Lewis got hung up on. There were other issues as well - equally ridiculous - and I am coming to the conclusion that Lewis is arguing for the sake of arguing and he probably enjoys all the attention that he is getting from someone who obviously has a great deal of knowledge on the subject. Lewis may feel that he is raising valid objections and important concerns about the data Rexford is presenting - unfortunately these objections and concerns come across as something other than important. I have some interesting (to me anyway) data about Soviet velocities and shell weights which I may share later on if it is of interest. The Germans seem (to me anyway) to have made a conscious decision to make HE shells lighter and slower than their AP cousins from the same gun, but the Soviets do not seem to have shared that design philosophy. Sometimes their HE is the same velocity but heavier, and sometimes even heavier and faster. In fact, their HE weights and velocities are all over the map (possibly in both weights and velocities and perhaps in where they land too).

I don't believe that dispersion is Rexford's theory - dispersion is something that is already established and recognized in various field manuals and range tests. Could your disagreement be in the way that Rexford is applying dispersion? If so, in what way is Rexford misapplying dispersion to his calculations?