Andreas

AIUI Eisenhower needed to read the riot act to Monty to get him to focus on the Scheldt, and even then it was done grudgingly.

I think Schörner decided to fight a bit longer, until the 11th, I think, before he donned his civvies and made of in a Fieseler Storch. Presumably to continue the fight for his beloved Adolf in the Alpenfestung. It was his luck that his own Standgerichte were no longer hanging anyone looking like a deserter when he decided to desert his troops.

I take it that is the same Graziani who had the nickname 'The Butcher' from his treatment of the Sanussi insurgents? Was his treatment of them really so horrible even by those day's standards? One day I'll be able to understand enough Italian read his 'Fronte del Sud'! Feldmarschall Busch comes to mind as an inept German commander. Rose from divisional commander rank in 1940 to AG command by 1944, allegedly mostly on the strength of his political views.

1944 </font>

It is not my stupid comment, but that of the official history - I suggest you take it up with the MGFA if you do think you have some insight to offer on where they went wrong in their analysis. It should be fairly clear to anyone who has ever stood next to a river that all you need to control it for traffic along its flow is to be on one side of it, with guns. As for problems with Germans, none, since I am one. 'Wiping the floor' is a pretty accurate account of what happened - in the same way as the Wehrmacht wiped the floor with the Red Army in summer 1941. It is an English colloquialism. Finally, even a 'what if' thread benefits from posters stating which year they are talking about. It should be clear that streetcar rides in the year of 1941 have little bearing on what 11. Armee did in 1942. So I am still unclear why you brought it up. My guess is that you simply did not know which year it happened, and are now not willing to admit your ignorance, instead resorting to insults. Oh well, do go on.

I thought Jason's problem was more with the connection to reality of the usual counterfactuals, and why nobody was interested in discussing the one situation that really could have changed things and that could quite realistically have happened. If you exclude the fielding of the Nazi multi-flailed laser octopusses with telepathy comms, that is. That would have really messed things up in the atlantic for the Allies.

Probably just too obvious, and it does not involve arrows on maps.

Now, if you want to discuss matters of history, it would help if you could get basic facts right. See below. Mine, and that of the official history of Germany in the war, Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg, Band. VI 'Der Globale Krieg'. Just in case mine is not good enough for you. Great, so now we see that this operational magick you previously advocated is not actually enough, and you need to take the city if you are serious about things? Previously, a magickally unharmed 6. Armee was doing great operational movements. Would those not have been impeded by those tanks rolling out of factories? 1941, and no unit came close. By 1942 total stalemate had ensued on the Arctic frontline, only to be broken when the Red Army wiped the floor with the Germans in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation in 1942. 1941 again, they captured a streetcar at the tram end station in Urizk (my grandfather was close by). The 11. Armee never attacked the city, in 1941 it was not even close, since it fought in the Nogai Steppe and on the Crimean approaches when Panzergruppe 4 was closing in on Leningrad. Get your facts straight, otherwise you are wasting everyone's time.

Happy to do that - no, it was not. Yes, and all you need to stop that are a few guns on the Volga, not the city of Stalingrad. Probably, but then you should not be going after the Caucasus at the same time. And Leningrad, and Sevastopol. Now we are descending into fairy land again. First, 6th Army was not intact - it was at the end of a very tenous supply line, and it had been fighting for months. Second, who should have broken the Murmanskbahn? They never attacked Leningrad, because in September 1942 a Soviet offensive hit them. 11. Armee under von Manstein, which had been shipped up to Leningrad following the success at Sevastopol, to repeat the performance, was used up trying to fend this off, and managed so, barely. The artillery ammunition for the siege artillery was used in the defense. The attack could never be carried out afterwards. Then the battles around Rzhev and in the south drained the forces away. They also did push aside only units that were ordered to retreat anyway. When that changed, the German advance stopped. If it had been Moscow, it would have stopped a lot earlier.

Bittrich got off to a bit of a ropy start though. "Soeben ist Kommandeur 9.SS-Panzerdivision mit Herzanfall zusammengeknallt." (XXXXVIII.Panzerkorps, Telephongespräche April 1944, 14.4., 06.55 Uhr) Turned out to be a mere shock. That was Balck's Meldung to 4. Panzerarmee when Bittrich collapsed on the phone after having the riot act read to him by Balck. Get yourself Fricke's 'Fester Platz Tarnopol', for a good (if depressing) read.

There was no way the Germans could have taken Moscow in 1942. In any case, what would they have wanted there? They were even incapable of taking Leningrad, despite attempting to do so. All they got was Sevastopol. And so what if the Germans had taken Stalingrad? What would that have changed? Chuikov would not have written his memoirs, and what else?

That much is obvious. Mounted archers probably would not have managed to do it in two weeks though. Give some credit to Pliev. Turn to follow. Did you get my card? are you not scared yet?

Deep Operations were rather better thought through then Blitzkrieg campaigns.

Following my very crappy experience with PCs, I am contemplating buying a new iBook, most probably the 1Ghz 12" version. Question - can this be run in OS9.2.2 full version, i.e. not just Classic mode? Or in other words - can I play CMBB on it?

Consider that the German high command (Halder) considered the war lost when Fall Blau had failed in September 1942. The official German history suggests he got himself sacked on purpose when that had happened. The problem for the German war effort was that they did not have the oil to sustain it. Fall Blau was supposed to change that, but failed. I am not sure how much of an impact lend-lease had had by late summer 1942. Anything after that was cleaning up - long and messy cleaning up, but realistically there was no chance Germany could win the war after that date. There probably was not before then either, but that is a different story.

Unlucky. You can look at my photos, I will be IN London from the 3rd - 6th of June. Noba. </font>

Looks increasingly less likely for me, I am afraid.

Bagration was a large operation, but only covered 1/4 or so of the frontline. More importantly though, it was part of a concerted action that started in AG North sector in May (?), and then rippled south, with two tank armies being positioned in 1st Ukrainian Front sector against German AG North Ukraine for the L'vov-Sandomierz operation in July (1st and 3rd Guards), and one held behind 3rd Ukrainian Front Sector for the Iassy-Kishinev Operation in August (6th). Additionally, independent Mech and Tank Corps, and Tank Brigades and Regiments would be distributed along the frontline where these major operations were to take place. Finally, a lot of the available tanks were held in reserve, to make up losses and refill formations after their actions.

I'm sure there was a discussion on this forum about this guy a wee while back. As far as I remember he was greatly over-rated and had very little active role in the rescuing of Mussolini. He was more or less just along for the ride as a passenger but greatly exaggerated his own role. At least that's what I remember a few of the grogs saying </font>

Almost the whole of the June 1941 Soviet tank fleet will count as light tanks (BT, T26). The exceptions would be about 2,000 T34, KV1, and T28. The whole fleet was about 23,000, IIRC. Almost all of these were lost. Add to these significant numbers of the T60 and T70 tanks produced (and many of them lost) pre-Kursk, and you end up with a huge number of Soviet light tanks lost that skew the figures tremendously.

From this thread: Emphasis by me. Anything not in this report is probably legend.

I have also always been very sceptical about this. The story originates from the KTB of 6.PD though, as quoted in Jentz "Panzertruppen Vol.I". That is enough to make me believe it.

I am sorry comrade, but am I reading you right in saying that the superior fighting prowess bestowed by steeping in Soviet doctrine had nothing to do with stopping the Hamstergrenadiere? Time for a spot of re-edification, methinks? Just wait, I have a nice hammer here to keep you company down in the coal-mine for the next, uh, 25 years or thereabouts.

Thanks all for the feedback on this one. Always interesting to see how it played out - something as a designer I can never quite enjoy as much myself, obviously.

Von Mellenthin, commenting on the closeness to nature of the Russian peasant-soldier, observes that the tendency of the Soviets to use rabbit holes to undertunnel the German lines and sit out artillery bombardments, made dealing with them difficult later in the war. Their ability to thus easily capture rabbits made them into formidable enemies, both trained in rapid rabbit assault (RRA) and well-nourished. Two things are clear from this reference: a) Early in the war (when the Germans were winning), the Russian soldiers were taller, because they did not use the rabbit holes. German soldiers were always too tall to give chase in rabbit holes. c) Russia is full of rabbits. Hmmmmm, rabbit... If you get yourself a tape measure, and go out in the garden, you can measure the maximum height of the late-war Soviet soldier.