Andreas

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Pascal DI FOLCO: Hmm, here is a Top 10 shortcut : Der Kessel Kudos guys, you really are the best, even if I was crushed when I fought To The Last Man ...well .. to the last man :eek: !<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Thanks - which side did you play? More importantly, why did you and your opponent not review it, eh?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Spook: One assertion within this thread is that many US FO's were typically "90-day wonders" who couldn't read a map to save their lives. I'm sure that extensive case-by-case studies would indeed reveal a few US FO's who were less than capable at effective artillery spotting or map-reading. But does that invalidate that many other US FO's could indeed do their job well, especially after some field experience?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Since it was I who said it - this refers to the practice that everyone (not just FOs) could call fire. I have no idea how well-trained FOs in the US system were, and this quib did not refer to them at all. It referred to an infantry platoon commander with a radio and a map and very little training in doing his proper job, let alone artillery procedures.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy: I originally said the western allies were fighting “predominantly the dregs of the German army”. Of course there was a small number of good divisions left. 1st SS was still of a high quality and 12 SS was motivated and fanatical, but compared to the total army strength in the west, they accounted for less than 10%. The majority of divisions in the west were of markedly poor quality.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Now, since we are getting real, can you tell me which German divisions were in the line opposite 43rd Wessex in the months 06/44-03/45? And an assessment of their quality? Because that is what we are talking about here - the experience of one officer which was just discarded by you as coming from someone with a personal bias who fought Volkssturm units. You still have not explained the 'anti-Nazi bias' and where that came from.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Scott B: To my knowledge this would have consisted of flash and sound ranging batteries and shell-crater analysis - not exactly counterbattery radar (which came into existance during the war), but still effective. In the German system, this would mean counterbattery would be fired by the unit tasked with counterbattery fires, while in the US and Commonwealth armies, it might also be engaged by others as well, if necessary.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The first part is defintely correct, the second most likely.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy: You should pick up a history book and also learn reading English, not just typing it. Try reading US and german sources besides your british tailored history books. You may then gain a better understanding of how poorly your beloved british army performed in WW2. What is wrong with a bias against Nazis BTW? Nothing if you want to play a UK fantasy game. Most normal people like historical accuracy and that requires one to be impartial and non-biased.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> You are equating Germans and Nazis here. Get your terminology right. Anyway, assuming that is just a stupid little oversight on your part, where does he say anything against Germans (or even Nazis for that matter)? Apart from that, you have no clue what I am reading, but obviously you have not read the original post closely because you immediately went into 'Must defend Ubergermany overdrive' - the guy quite clearly states who he was fighting and how. Last thing I checked, 1944 German paras were not considered 'dregs' by anyone's standard. Maybe you want to enlarge on your no doubt considered opinion that all German units in 1944 were 'dregs'? Where did it come from? Meyer's book on his time in 12th SS maybe? Come on, let's hear about your German sources for the stuff you go on about. Title, author and ISBN please. Particularly the one stating so unequivocally By June 1944 and onwards, the allies were predominantly fighting the dregs of the German army.'

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: Considering the crap THEY had to eat for breakfast, I would rate their skill much higher than the smelly old Germans.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> If you can stomach Sewer Trout and powdered egg for breakfast, you can take out a Kingtiger at 3,000 yards at the first shot. Hmmmm, M&V pie...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: The Canadian Army had a lot of Militia in it, too, and Militia formed the core of the overseas Army. Yet it is doubtful that many Militia troops received anything like useful training before 1939, and when you go from a 50,000 man Army (Militia included) to 500,000, your experienced troops have a little less impact.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Which is exactly the problems the Germans had in expanding their conscript army. Conscripting soldiers for two years (as they did) in large numbers (as they did) only makes sense if you have the guys to train them (which they did not - 100,000men was not enough). There were some problems with training early in the war. This became less of an issue once a core of NCOs with battle experience existed, who could train the new waves. As I understand it, the divisions raised pre-war were not up to a consistent standard in 1939 and 1940. Spook - 7th and 51st certainly improved after the Seine crossings. 50th for some reasons did not seem to have the same problems. I have seen the same reference to the 49th. Incidentally, they were the division with the 6th DWR incident, where the BN was disbanded. In general I think the overriding feature of the best Commonwealth divisions was a pretty steady performance. Michael, I was not aware that 59th was either good or bad, I thought they were disbanded because they had the highest number. Spook, one reason why the heavy losses did not harm battalions as much seems to have been the regimental system. E.g. 5th DCLI, which came off Hill 112 with less than 200 men was refreshed with a large draft from 4th DCLI (the training BN) which had just arrived. The Germans tried the same with their replacement systems, and reading German accounts it seems to have worked reasonably well. Divisions were often referred to by their territorial (landsmannschaftliche) affiliation, e.g. 6. Westfaelische' Panzerdivision, just like in the UK 43rd Wessex Infantry Division. But yes, your query is difficult, if not impossible to answer, and trying to grade performance is not exactly easy. Throw in changes over time (e.g. 90th US or 12th US AD were fairly abysmal at the outset but turned into good units later, AFAIK) and you end up with not being able to make solid pronouncements.

Tero - you do know that the UK had the Territorial Army, which was something like the National Guard then? So the trained manpower was much larger than the professional army. Many of the very well-performing units in 21st AG were old territorials. AFAIK the VG divisions were not old men and boys but the result of a call-up of previously exempt units, who had a very short training cycle? Both of which makes quite a few of your points incorrect.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sgt Steiner: Hi Jason et al Wandering a little off-topic but does anyone have any info on just which units used the Challenger ? I have a notion (no idea from where though) that they were used along with Cromwells in the Armoured Recon Regts. Interesting debate Cheers Gary<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Looks like the only unit that definitely had Challengers was 11th Armoured in its Recce Rgt 15/17th KRH (number maybe wrong). For the others, use has not been proven, AFAIK. Jason, you number crunching regarding Fireflies and troops is admirable, but you have not put into the equation the Squadron HQ with its three tanks. There would be no Firefly in it. So that reduces the number in the Armoured Brigades from 157 75mm to 130, and then you have a further reduction for three regimental and one Brigade HQ, and you maybe very close to the 108 you would need for a 1 in 4 ratio. You really have to look at squadron make-up. Just the total numbers will not give you the right answer. Churchills, as you said, were irrelevant in this discussion.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook: Actually, Andreas, it's interesting how you relate about the 43rd Division being one of the better UK outfits. Not to debate it, but I would've presumed, in earlier times, that more "veteranized" units like the 7th Armored, & 50th/51st Infantry Divisions would've been more consistent performers. It's a tricky thing to broach, but for those in the "know" regarding UK division histories of the NW Europe campaigns, which really seemed to be the "better" divisions on a regular basis? And which seemed to perform under expectations?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Michael, and RMC - it is a question of accepting variability. A statement like that by Mr. Runonsentence about the great Germans is equally ludicrous as one saying that by June 1944 there were only the dregs left. The reality (as always) is much more muddy. Some units were excellent, and on an ordinary day could outfight the best the Allies could throw at them. A lot of units were crap. Some units were indifferent, just your Ho-Hum lot of soldiers. Spook - actually, both the 7th and the 51st had very serious problems in Normandy. The usual explanation is that they were not used to this kind of fighting, and they were of the opinion that they had 'done their bit. Divisions like 11th Armoured and 43rd performed better because they had trained in England for two-three years, and had not seen what HE or an 88 penetration can do to the human body.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: Andreas, I think the Black Watch at Woensdrecht qualify for one of your awards - one rifle company was reduced from 90 men to 4, as the regiment had to attack over 1300 yards of open beet fields. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> That would be a repeat award to add to the earlier one for attack on Rocquancourt, where the 'dregs' of the German army annihilated the battalion.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy: By June 1944 and onwards, the allies were predominantly fighting the dregs of the German army. The personal accounts sound a lot like they were based on fighting volksturm units and dare I say it ‘biased’ on a hatred of the Nazis.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> You should pick up a history book and also learn reading English, not just typing it. What is wrong with a bias against Nazis BTW? 12th SS the 'dregs' of the German army? Panzerlehr? 1st SS LAH? Numerous Heer infantry divisions of earlier waves? The Fallschirmjaeger units? Yeah right. Get a book and start reading. For the record, 43rd Wessex, in which Jary must have been an officer, fought 12th SS at Maltot/Hill 112, achieved the Vernon Seine crossing, later fought at Arnhem and on the island against German paras, and fought beyond the Rhine. They did fight all sorts of German units.

Actually, bugger that. The Recce Rgt was not part of the Armoured Brigade, so the only mixed unit would have been 11th AD.

Jason, skimmed your post. When you say 'units' with a mix of Cromwells/Comets, what exactly do you mean? If you are talking Brigade, you are right. Below that, I don't think there was mixing. The only Comet equipped units in 21st AG were the three Regiments in the Armoured Brigade of 11th AD, AFAIK. Regarding the 95mm Churchills/Cromwells, you are spot on. These tanks were held on a strength of about two per squadron as infantry support. They were in Squadron HQ, AFAIK, and were present in Recce Rgts (Cromwell equipped, e.g. the SAR w/Shermans had none) and the tank regiments, because that is where you would expect to need them. They were not intended to be used to fight tanks.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Moon: LOL - if it's a bullet hole, the expression on this guys face gets a whole new meaning <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Zombie-Germans! Wenn Du in den Osten reist, vergiss die Kettensaege nicht!!!

Spook, it is actually le Plessis Grimoult on today's map. Well, for showing me up so badly, I now shan't send you my historical battle based on this action. So there. You are of course right regarding the validity of Jary's account, and it should also be remembered that 43rd Wessex was one of the best infantry divisions in the 2nd Army. The Germans seemed to regard it as such too, IIRC. Jary must also have been one lucky guy to make it as a platoon commander through the campaign. Any other platoon which may have lost its commanding officer a number of times would probably not have been capable of pulling this action off.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS: [ 10-16-2001: Message edited by: JonS because it drives The Anglophile wild, and he's posting to this thread so will probably see it, tee hee ] [ 10-16-2001: Message edited by: JonS ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The Anglophile just notes that you are incapable of getting it right the first time I have also seen references to FOOs like that one in a book called 'Tug of war - the Canadian battle that opened Antwerp' which I received yesterday, together with a copy of Stacey's 'History of the Canadian Army 1939-1945' signed by Stacey to Bob Moncel, OC 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade. No, I am not sad

Scott, excellent post by you. Really very helpful to someone with as little understanding of these matters as I do possess. I have inserted some comments below. They are mostly based on George Blackburn's 'The guns of war'. Blackburn was the longest-serving FOO in NWE in the Canadian Army. It is well worth reading. I have been looking for a book called 'Mike target', but it seems to be out of print (or I imagine it, not sure which is worse...) <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B: Clearly, the fact that the United States' and British Armies could exercise tactical level control over large amounts of artillery means that they were doing something more effectively than the Germans and Soviets were. In fact, one of the important things to remember about Western Allied artillery is that they were not opposed by an effective fire support system, and as such had somewhat exaagerated effectiveness, as the counterbattery and enemy air threats were low. Therefore, you're looking at excellent conditions for employment of very effective fire support systems.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Agreed - that certainly was a major point. Also the previous one about German/Red Army practice. The German system for CBF was well developed, but depended somewhat on static frontlines I believe. My grandfather did that job outside Leningrad. They even had observation balloons earlier in the war <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B: As for a comparison of US and British systems - I'd need to know more about the British. Here are my questions: 1. To what extent did the British employ aerial observers organic to their field artillery? (This is one often-mentioned area that granted impressive advantages in US target acquisition.)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The Commonwealth used aerial observers in Austers quite extensively, AFAIK. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B: 2. What level of training did an observer require? Did the British observer do the calculations for the firing battery, or did they have any sort of Fire Direction Center to "do all the math?"<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Okay, I have just checked with Blackburn. Seems to me there were three types of targets: 1. SOS - the guns would be aiming at this spot if they were not firing elsewhere. This would cover the most likely advance of the enemy. Response including flight time for one example in Normandy < 1min. Fire rate and time of shot predetermined 2. DF - defensive fire. Could only be ordered by a Brigadier (CRA) or up, for security reasons. Math would have been done beforehand, target was numbered. FDC in the gun position would just shout the number to the gun commander, fire starts at pre-determined intensity and time of shot. 3. Map reference targets (observed or unobserved 'firing from the map') - FOO calls target grid reference, number of rounds, and orders fire. FDC does the math. FOO calls adjustments as necessary. Time in one example for a troop shoot is under 'one minute or thereabouts'. Blackburns regiment 4th Field CRA had a training standard whereby the guns could move from travelling in convoy to putting a spotting round out in the time of 3-5 minutes, including laying the guns etc. 3 mins in normal terrain. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B: 3. What's the difference between "ordering" and "requesting" a fire mission? (And I mean, really, not just semantics.)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I don't know what the difference is (apart from semantics) since I don't know the US system. In the Commonwealth (shouldn't that be Dominion anyway?), an FOO requested a target and it got fired, unless someone higher up thought the guns might be more gainfully employed otherwise. I think it was a matter of institutional trust - if the FOO required something, the FDC would know that he needed it. If Joe Bloggs the 90-day wonder with the radio requests the same thing, there maybe some lingering doubts... Just guessing. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B: 1. Organic systems in the Division. A US Division had 48 howitzers, and a British Division had 72. More is better, although one for one I'd personally take the 105mm over the 25-pounder (shell weight is probably a more important concern than rate of fire - after the first salvo lands your target is going to be seeking cover with haste). Organic systems are important, because your guys are more used to working with them than those Corps arty types that showed up a week ago.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The AGRAs (Army Group Royal Artillery) with the medium and heavy/super-heavy regiments were pretty permanent attachments on Corps level and would have been known, although of course not as familiar. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B: 2. Fire Direction - the principle advantage of a Fire Direction Center system is that the tricky parts of fire calculations are done back in a tent someplace, and not up at the front where someone's shooting at you. By creating a simplified Call For Fire procedure, you can effectively teach anyone with a radio to call for fire. That kind of observation coverage is effectively absolute when radios become sufficiently widespread<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>. The most dangerous thing in the world is a Lieutenant with a map... You still need to be able to read your map correctly. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B: 3. Staffing - communications and survey are critically important for effective artillery support. I do know that one of the strengths of US artillery was that it was well staffed, as previously mentioned by Slapdragon.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I think there were more men in the RA (including LAA and AT Regiments) than there were in the infantry. Simon said the level was at 18% compared to 16%.

Excellent post Sgt. Steiner. Makes me want to buy the book, but unfortunately it seems to be no longer available. Bugger. Regarding the superiority of the Germans - well, whoever claims that should best crawl back under the stone he/it came from and continue it there. A couple of AARs from 43rd Wessex operations should lay that to rest: Steadyness under fire: the award goes to 5th DCLI on Hill 112 Highest damage for lowest casualties: the award goes to (again) 5th DCLI at Les Plessis Grimault (1 KIA for 2 German Coys and 2 Koenigstiger bagged) Most tragic performance: the award goes to 4th Dorset crossing with over 400 men to divert German attention from the rescue attempts of 1st Airborn at Driel. AFAIK they were all KIA or MIA/POW. Most heroic no hope last stand: 1st East Riding Yeo protecting the Dunkerque bridgehead. Late May 1940 at Cassel. Doggedness: the award goes to 2nd DCLI at Incontro Monastery, Italy, 1944. Any Canadian unit involved in the fights to clear the Schelde may ask for a recount. This is just based on my reading, by no means exhaustive and mostly off the top of my head. It makes no claim to fairness, and is arrived at the same way all other award lists are arrived at. Other people's list will be very different. So there. What's with all these Cornish guys featuring? Onen hag ol.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian: You realise that the abbreviation "AD" in British nomenclature denotes "Air-Defence", don't you?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> You realise that unlike someone who is clearly out to troll, I don't waste time writing this stuff out, don't you? Stop being a tosser, if you don't have anything to contribute, just bugger off (is that English-English enough for you to understand?).

Lorrin, hi. Firefly noticeability: the gun stood out. A lot. It had a muzzle brake and was longer. Also, once the Germans knew that the Firefly was there, they would look out for it and kill it first. So yes, I think that is realistic. Attempts to camo the gun were made, by painting the front half in some free-wheeling camo scheme. Later on, this was not kept up as much, judging from photographic evidence. At least one Regiment in 8th AB (I think) was the only unit to not do the 3:1 split. They went for a one Firefly troop per Squadron approach. Tactics. If German heavies were encountered, all tanks would retreat to cover. Then one 75mm tank (troop OC) would rev up, break cover at full speed, and dash like mad past the German tank. The German heavy would start to turn its turret to engage, but the traverse was slower than the speed of the Sherman. When the turret has traversed far enough, the Firefly would break cover and try to knock out the heavy. This is of course a high-risk lifestyle... I was told this by Paul Mace, Troop OC in the East Riding Yeo, 10/44-01/45. He would be in a 75mm Sherman, because he did not want to order one of his tanks to do the dash, and the Firefly was needed for see above. I commented that his crew must have been truly loving this self-less attitude of his. He just smiled. I normally don't play with tanks, so I can not really comment on what I do. Hope that helps.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS: But I think he might be close for the method the Germans used.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I think so too. My grandfather told me that for counterbattery they usually had one battery of 105 attached, and he seemed to mean the same one. It was all land-lines where he was, and a fairly static frontline though.

I still think that was in 7th AD after Villers-Bocage, and it is probably the only example in the campaign

Jon has it right. Trust me, err, him. The only time the control over the guns was taken away from the FOO was when the proverbial had really hit the fan, and there were too many conflicting demands on them. Blackburn mentions one instance when that occurred in Normandy IIRC, and the commander of his Field Regiment was 'firing the guns'. I think the big difference to the US was that not every hill-billy with a radio could call in the rounds, but that the FOOs were trained well, so they were expected to know when to call for a VICTOR target and when to use a troop. The FOOs were professionals at their job. Unlike the infamous example in Company Commander where the grunt requests 'big ones' or something, and gets 155mm much too close for comfort. Oops.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Leta: Oh, yes. It's right ... today. But we are talking about a game that recreate 1944-45 landscapes, 55 years ago. At this time, a multilane highway in Europe (specially in the CMBO theather) was very, very rare. A "highway" in this case is only a (little bit) wide paved road ...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> That's one point, the other is that because there is simply not enough space in Europe, even the Autobahn does not have more than 5m between the two lanes. Also, there were not a lot of paved roads around then.